ORDER 1. In this writ petition the petitioner has assailed the validity of the order dated 10.2.1997 contained in Annexure-1 whereby and whereunder punishment of discharge from the service under the provisions of Item iii (v) of Rule 13 (3) of the Army Rules, 1954 has been affirmed by the appellate authority. Bare perusal of the impugned order would show that the petitioner has confessed that his name was Mahesh Tiwary and that he had enrolled himself as Suresh Pandey with the help of the education certificate and sponsoring form meant for Sri Suresh Pandey. 2. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent-authority were not legally justified in taking recourse to a summary procedure prescribed under Rule 13 of the Army Rules, 1954 for the discharge from his service. According to him, for such act the petitioner can be tried and convicted by court martial under section 43 of the Army Act, 1950 subject to the limitation prescribed under sub-section (4) of Section 122 of the Act which also expired and as such he could not have been legally proceeded under Rule 13. Thus, according to him, the impugned order of discharge from the service on the above mentioned ground is wholly without jurisdiction and bad in law. 3. I am unable to accept the said submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. It may be true that under Section 43 of the Act the petitioner could be proceeded and, convicted by court martial for such fraudulent act. But, in my opinion, that does not exclude the power of the competent authority to act in terms of the Rule 13 of the Army Rules specially where the petitioner confessed his guilt of getting fraudulent appointment in Army service. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of the apex Court in the case of Radha Kishan vs. Union of India and ors. reported in AIR 1996 SC 3091 , on support of his contention that since no trial by court martial was permissible in the facts and circumstances of the case the authority could not have adopted summary procedure against the petitioner for his discharge from the service in terms of Rule 13 of the Rules. 5. I am unable to appreciate as to how the said decision of the Apex Court is of help to the petitioner. 5. I am unable to appreciate as to how the said decision of the Apex Court is of help to the petitioner. In the said decision Court has considered the scope of sub-section (2) of section 122 vis-a-vis Section 43 of the Army Act. Sub-Section (2) of Section 122 of the Army Act provides that the provision of sub-section (1) shall not apply to a trial for an offence of desertion or fraudulent enrolment or for any of the offences mentioned in Section 37 of the Act. In sub-section (4) it is clearly mentioned that no trial for an offence of desertion other than desertion on active service or of fraudulent enrolment shall be commenced if the person in question, not being an officer, has subsequently to the commission of he offence, served continuously in an exemplary manner for not less than three years with any portion of the regular Army. Thus, the limitation clause is to apply to the case other than desertion on active service or of fraudulent enrolment. In the present case the charge against the petitioner is relating to fraudulent enrolment which• he himself confessed. As such, in my opinion, it is not a case covered by the limitation prescribed under sub-section (4) and thus, there is no illegality in the impugned order. 6. In view of the matter this Court does not feel inclined to exercise the discretionery jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the facts and circumstances of the present case where the petitioner himself confessed that he got himself appointed fraudulently with the help of education certificate and sponsoring form meant for Sri Suresh Pandey. The writ petition is, thus, summarily dismissed. Petition Dismissed.