Devinder Gupta ( 1 ) THE petitioners challenged the constitutional validity ofthe Delhi Municipal Corporation (Determination of Ratable Value) Bye-laws, 1994and the Delhi Municipal Corporation (Property Tax Return) Bye-laws, 1994 notifiedthrough notification dated 24. 10. 1994 in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of theconstitution of India. The writ petition was disposed of on 18. 9. 1995 upholding thevalidity of the bye-laws except to the extent as mentioned in the judgment. Alongwith the said writ petition another Writ Petition No. 555/95 was also disposed of bythe same judgment. ( 2 ) FEELING aggrieved, the petitioner on 16. 10. 1995 filed an application seekingreview of the decision of a number of grounds and also sought stay of the operationof the judgment. ( 3 ) NOTICE in the review application was served to the opposite party andarguments were also heard. Before the review petition could be disposed of, it cameto our notice that the decision of this Court dated 18. 9. 1995 was challenged byrespondent-M. C. D. in two Special Leave Petitions No. 8799 and 8798 of 1996. Leavewas granted. On 3. 10. 1997 the Supreme Court disposed of the said two appeals. Thedecision is now reported as Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Delhi Urban Houseowners Welfare Association, AIR 1998 S. C. 36=69 (1997) DLT 391 (SC ). Thedeclaration on the invalidity of Explanation to Bye Law 3 (l) (a) of the Ratable Valuebye-Laws and Bye-Law 8 of the Property Tax Return Bye Laws as repugnant tosection 131 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation of Act, was set aside and the samewere declared to be a valid pieces of legislation. In view of the conclusions, theappeals were allowed in part. Thus in nutshell the judgment of this Court wasinterfered with. ( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner urged that review sought by the petitioner is on grounds other than the one which were not the grounds which wereconsidered by the Supreme Court in the appeals preferred by the respondent-M. C. D. In the appeals M. C. D. challenged the decision of this Court on groundsdifferent than the one on which the petitioner sought the review of the judgment. Hissubmission has been that there could be no bar in the maintainability of the reviewpetition when the grounds of review are different than those on which the appealswere preferred against the same decision irrespective of the fact that the Supremecourt has now in the appeals preferred by the respondent, interfered with thejudgment of this Court, Review will still be competent and maintainable. ( 5 ) HAVING considered the submissions made by learned Counsel for thepetitioner, we are of the view that in view of the well settled limitations for exerciseof the power of review, which also find mention in express provisions contained inorder 47 Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code and the observations made by the Supreme Court in itsjudgment M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh,represented by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Anantapur, AIR1964 S. C. 1372, this Court will now have no jurisdiction to decide the reviewapplication after the Supreme Court has disposed of the appeals. ( 6 ) RIGHT of review does not exist unless conferred by law expressly or bynecessary implication. Rule 1 of Order 47 deals with the limits within which a reviewis permitted by the Code of Civil Procedure. Order 47 Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code is not directlyapplicable to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India because ofthe explanation to Section 141 of the Code. However, the said explanation does notaffect High Courts inherent power of review of its own orders passed under Article226 of the Constitution, which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction toprevent miscarriage of justice or to correct gross and pulpable error committed byit. However, the said explanation does notaffect High Courts inherent power of review of its own orders passed under Article226 of the Constitution, which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction toprevent miscarriage of justice or to correct gross and pulpable error committed byit. There are definitive limits recognised to the exercise of such power of review,which are to be found in Rule I, Order 47 of the Code, which reads as under : " (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved - (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but fromwhich no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (e) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, andwho, from discovery of new and important matter or evidencewhich, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within hisknowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistakeor error apparent on the face of the record, or for any othersufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passedor order made against him, may apply for a review of judgmentto the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for areview of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal bysome other party except where the ground of such appeal is commonto the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he canpresent to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for thereview. "explanation-The fact that the decision on a question of law on which thejudgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground forthe review of such judgment. The aforementioned provision enumerates the grounds on which the power ofreview may be exercised.- ( 7 ) IN the instant case, the point for consideration is of the maintainability of thepending application of review after the superior Court has exercised its power ofappeal by making modification in the order of the Court. ( 8 ) IT cannot be disputed that the petitioner was within its right in having soughtreview since it felt aggrieved against the decision of this Court. ( 8 ) IT cannot be disputed that the petitioner was within its right in having soughtreview since it felt aggrieved against the decision of this Court. The petitioner had not preferred any appeal and no appeal had been preferred by the opposite party onthe day when review application was instituted. Thus on the day when the reviewapplication was filed, the same was competent and maintainable. Only after theinstitution of the review application, the respondent-M. C. D. challenged the decisionof this Court by preferring two Special Leave Petitions. Leave was granted andfinally the two appeals of the respondent against the judgment of this Court wereheard and disposed of on merits after affording due hearing to the petitioner, whowas duly served and was duly heard. In view of these circumstances it was open forthe petitioner to have urged and agitated all such grounds on which the petitionersought review of the decision of this Court in the appeals preferred by therespondent-M-C. D. , after leave was granted to the respondent-M. C. D. Had those pointsbeen urged and agitated, there is no manner of doubt that the same would have beenduly considered and decided on merits while disposing of the appeals of therespondent by the Supreme Court. ( 9 ) CLAUSE (2) of Rule I of Order 47, Civil Procedure Code stipulates that a party who is notappealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party. But this is subject to twoexceptions, namely, where the ground of such appeal is common to the party seekingreview and the appellant, or, when the party seeking review, being respondent, canpresent to the Appellate Court the case on which. he applies for the review. Thisexception is in the following words: "when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case onwhich he applies for the review. " ( 10 ) THE aforementioned restriction would equally apply to the Court beforewhich an application for review is pending adjudication in exercise of its inherentjurisdiction. Such a restriction has the effect of rendering the review applicationpreferred by the petitioner incompetent and not maintainable after the decision ofthe appeals by the Supreme Court. " ( 10 ) THE aforementioned restriction would equally apply to the Court beforewhich an application for review is pending adjudication in exercise of its inherentjurisdiction. Such a restriction has the effect of rendering the review applicationpreferred by the petitioner incompetent and not maintainable after the decision ofthe appeals by the Supreme Court. ( 11 ) IN Thungabhadra Industries s case (supra) the Supreme Court held: "order XLVII, Rule 1 (1) of the Civil Procedure Code permits an application forreview being filed "from a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed butfrom which no appeal has been preferred. " In the present case, it would be seen,on the date when the application for review was filed the appellant had notfiled an appeal to this Court and therefore, the terms of Order XLVII, Rule (1)did not stand in the way of the petition for review being entertained. Learnedcounsel for the respondent did not contest this petition. Nor could we read thejudgment of the High Court as rejecting the petition for review on that ground. The crucial date for determination whether or not the terms of Order XLVII,rule 1 (1) are satisfied is the date when the application for review was filed. Ifon the date no appeal has been filed it is competent for the Court hearing thepetition for review to dispose of the application on the merits notwithstandingthe pendency of the appeal, subject only to this, that if before the applicationfor review is finally decided the appeal itself has been disposed of, thejurisdiction of the Court hearing the review petition would come to an end. "[emphasis supplied] ( 12 ) THE reason that why the jurisdiction of the Court hearing the review petitionwould come to an end on decision of the appeal is obvious, namely, the applicabilityof the doctrine of merger. On final decision of appeal, particularly when the appellateorder modifies or-reverses the order of inferior or original Court, as a general rule theappellate judgment stands in place of the original judgment for all intents andpurposes. It will not be permissible thereafter for the inferior or orignal Court toeither modify, alter or reverse the original order, which would stand merged in the appellate order.