JUDGMENT R.L. KHURANA, J.—This order shall dispose of the above noted Original Miscellaneous petition preferred by the defendants/applicants under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the setting aside of the ex parte decree dated 21.5.1990 passed in Civil Suit No. 68 of 1988. 2. The Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation, Shimla, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, filed a suit, being Civil Suit No. 68 of 1988 for the recovery of Rs. 23,73,683.53 paise against the two applicants and two other defendants, namely, S/Shri Amarjit Singh and Gurjit Inder Singh. 3. Applicant No. 1 Messrs. Shivalik Forgings (P) Limited, is a private limited company duly incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. Applicant No. 2 Jaswant Singh and defendants 3 and 4 abovenamed, are the Directors thereof. They obtained a loan of Rs. 14,90,000/- from the plaintiff for the purchase of land, plant and machinery and for the construction of the factory building for setting up of an industrial unit for the manufacture of Open Ended Jaw Spanners (hand-tools). Having availed the loan, the defendants failed to repay the same in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Accordingly the suit was filed by the plaintiff for recovery of the loan amount alongwith interest thereon at the rate of 13-1/2 per cent per annum with half yearly rests. 4. Defendant No. 4 Gurjit Inder Singh was served by way of affixation. He did not appear inspite of service. He was as such ordered to be proceeded against ex-parte on 21.12.1988. 5. Defendants No. 1 to 3, that is, Messrs. Shivalik Forgings Private Limited, Shri Jaswant Singh and Shri Amarjit Singh, who could not be served by the ordinary process, were ordered to be served by way of proclamation in the Dainik Tribune, Chandigarh. Such proclamation came to be published in the said daily news paper in its issue dated 9.1.1989 whereby these defendants were called upon to put in appearance either in person or through Counsel or a recognised agent on 21.3.1989. Since these defendants failed to put in appearance in Court on the date fixed inspite of proclamation, they were also ordered to be proceeded against ex-parte. 6. The plaintiff thereafter led ex-parte evidence and on 21.5.1990 an ex-parte decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. Since these defendants failed to put in appearance in Court on the date fixed inspite of proclamation, they were also ordered to be proceeded against ex-parte. 6. The plaintiff thereafter led ex-parte evidence and on 21.5.1990 an ex-parte decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 23,73,683.53 paise with costs and future interest at the rate of 13-1/2 per cent per annum with quarterly rests from the date of suit till realisation of the decretal amount. 7. The applicants/defendants have now approached this Court for the setting aside of the ex-parte decree dated 21.5.1990. It has been averred that after the unit was taken over by the plaintiff and sold in public auction, the defendants/applicants had no office and were not transacting any business. Applicant/defendant No. 2 Jaswant Singh had started living at Agra. He was got involved in a Criminal Case at the instance of the plaintiff and that the ex-parte decree has been obtained by suppressing facts and by trying to serve the defendants/applicants at wrong address. They were never served in the suit in accordance with law. It was further pleaded that the applicant /defendant No. 2 came to know about the ex-parte decree only on 15.7.1995 at Chandigarh from a relative who had happened to read the proclamation in a daily newspaper regarding the pending execution proceedings against him. 8. On having come to know about the ex-parte decree, the defendant/applicant No. 2 came to Shimla and the present petition came to be filed on 17.7.1995. On the above facts, the defendants/applicants have also prayed for the condonation of the delay in making the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree. 9. The application is being resisted and contested by the plaintiff. While admitting that the ex-parte decree was passed on 21.5.1990, the plaintiff denied the other averments made by the defendants/ applicants. It was pleaded that the application for setting aside of the ex-parte decree was hopelessly barred by time and no sufficient cause has been shown for the condonation of such delay. 10. On the pleadings of the parties, following issue were framed on 10.7.1996 :— 1. Whether the ex-parte decree is liable to be set aside? OPA 2. Whether the application is within time? OPA 3. Relief. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case. 10. On the pleadings of the parties, following issue were framed on 10.7.1996 :— 1. Whether the ex-parte decree is liable to be set aside? OPA 2. Whether the application is within time? OPA 3. Relief. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case. My findings on the above issues are as under. ISSUES No. 1 and 2. 11. Both these issues are being taken up together as they are co-related and inter-connected. Admittedly, the defendants/applicants were not personally served in the suit. They were served under Order 5, Rule 20, Code of Civil Procedure, by way of proclamation. The ex-parte decree was passed on 21.5.1990 while the application under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, for setting aside the ex-parte decree was made on 17.7.1995, that is, after the expiry of about five years, one month and twenty-six days. 12. Article 123, Limitation Act, 1963, provides for a period of limitation of thirty days for an application for setting aside the ex-parte decree. Such period of thirty days is to be reckoned from the date of the decree, and in case where the summons or notice was not "duly served" on the defendant, from the date of knowledge of the ex-parte decree. 13. The Explanation to Article 123, Limitation Act, 1963, provides that for the purpose of the article, substituted service under Rule 20 of Order 5, Code of Civil Procedure, shall not be deemed to be due service. 14. As stated above, the defendants/applicants were served through substituted service within the meaning of Order 5, Rule 20, Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, in terms of Explanation to Article 123, Limitation Act, 1963, they would not be deemed to have been "duly served" and, as such, the period of limitation of thirty days will have to be reckoned from the date of knowledge of the ex-parte decree. 15. The purpose of service of notice is that the opposite party should know the case he has to meet and contest. If a person knows about the pending case and still ignores the said litigation, it would be wholly unfair for that person to urge that he had not been formally served. [See: Ajita Sharma v. Rakesh Kumar Sharma, 1998 (2) PLR 170]. 16. If a person knows about the pending case and still ignores the said litigation, it would be wholly unfair for that person to urge that he had not been formally served. [See: Ajita Sharma v. Rakesh Kumar Sharma, 1998 (2) PLR 170]. 16. As per the case put up by the defendant/applicant No. 2 Jaswant Singh, he was residing at Chandigarh, at the address given in the plaint, till 1985. Thereafter, he had shifted to Agra alongwith his family and residing at Agra till date. He was informed about the ex-parte decree on 15.7.1995 by a relation, that is, a cousin brother, Surjit Singh of Jullandhar. 17. The suit, in which the ex-parte decree was passed, was instituted on 12.7.1988. Defendant/applicant No. 2 while appearing as AW-1 has categorically admitted that no intimation was given by him to the plaintiff regarding the change in his address. On the failure of the defendant /applicant to inform the plaintiff about the change in address, it cannot be said that the plaintiff is guilty of suppression of facts and that it had intentionally given wrong address in the plaint. 18. There is no denying that defendant/applicant No. 2 had given the address as mentioned in the plaint to the plaintiff in the loan documents executed by him. 19. A perusal of the record shows that summons in the suit sent for the service of this defendant/applicant for 22.9.1988 at Chandigarh address, was received back unserved. There is an endorsement dated 30.8.1988 on the back of the summons in the hand of Shri Rajinder Singh Bhullar, Advocate, in the following terms:— “Mr. Jaswant Singh Bhullar is not residing at House No. 200/ Sector 19-A but his address is H.No. 2096, Phase VII, Mohali. He has left this house in the year 1979." The summons was also sent to the said defendant /applicant on Chandigarh address under registered A.D. cover. A perusal of such registered cover, which was received back unserved, shows that it was redirected for being delivered at House No. 20-B, Phase I, Mohali. However, no such person is reported to be found at that address and consequently the registered cover was returned to this Court as unserved on 3.9.1988. 20. The above two referred to reports demonstrate that the defendant/applicant has come up with a false plea of his having shifted to Agra in the year 1985. However, no such person is reported to be found at that address and consequently the registered cover was returned to this Court as unserved on 3.9.1988. 20. The above two referred to reports demonstrate that the defendant/applicant has come up with a false plea of his having shifted to Agra in the year 1985. Had he actually shifted to Agra the report on the summons would have been to that effect. It appears that the defendant /applicant was very much residing at Chandigarh and he has been in the know of the suit pending against him and has been avoiding the service of summons. 21. The record of the case further shows that during the proceedings for enforcement/execution of the ex-parte decree, notice of the proceedings was sent to defendant /applicant No. 2 on the available Chandigarh address for his appearance on 27.6.1994. Such notice was received back with the report of the process server that the mother of the defendant/applicant who was available on the given address had informed that the defendant/ applicant was not residing at the said address and that his whereabouts were not known to her. 22. It is not the case of the defendant/applicant that he has no dealings with his mother or that she never informed him about the notice(s) received in the case. This also goes to show that the defendant/applicant was all the time in the know of the proceedings against him. 23. There is yet another significant aspect of the case. In the application made under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, for the setting aside the ex-parte decree, the defendant/applicant Jaswant Singh has given the same address of Chandigarh as was mentioned in the plaint and in various summons/notice sent to him. Therefore, as per his own showing, he is residing on the given address at Chandigarh. 24. It is the admitted case of the defendant/applicant that he has been facing criminal prosecution at Nalagarh in District Solan on the basis of the complaint of the plaintiff during the period 1985 to 1988 and he has been attending the Court at Nalagarh on each and every date of hearing. Nothing has been brought on the record to show as to what address was given by him to the Court in these proceedings. 25. Nothing has been brought on the record to show as to what address was given by him to the Court in these proceedings. 25. Much reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the defendant/applicant on the evidence of AW-2 Jodhbir Singh. This witness has deposed that the defendant/applicant is working for him at his service station at Agra since 1985. 26. No reliance can be placed on the evidence of AW-2. This witness has admitted that the business of service station is being looked after by his father. He could not state as to what salary is being paid to the defendant/applicant or whether the presence of defendant/applicant is being marked as an employee of the service station. The relevant record of the service station has not been produced to show that the defendant/applicant is in fact working at Agra since 1985. 27. According to the defendant/applicant, he came to know about the execution proceedings and the ex-parte decree on 15.7.1995 when he was told about the same by one of his relation at Chandigarh. Though in the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree, the defendant/applicant has not given the name of his relation who informed him about the ex-parte decree or the pending execution proceedings, while appearing as AW-1 he has stated that he was informed by his cousin brother Surjit Singh of Jullandhar. This Surjit Singh has not been examined by the defendant/applicant. On his failure to do so, an adverse inference has to be drawn against him. Therefore, even if it be assumed that the defendant/applicant was not aware of the civil suit against him, he has failed to prove the date on which he derived knowledge of the decree and, as such, the application made for the setting aside of the decree dated 21.5.1990 cannot be said to be within time. Apart from pleading that they were not duly served, the defendants/ applicants have neither pleaded nor proved sufficient grounds either for the condonation of delay in making the application or for the setting aside of the ex-parte decree. Neither the delay can be condoned nor the ex-parte decree can be set aside merely on the ground that there was no "due service" within the meaning of Article 123, Limitation Act, 11963. 28. Neither the delay can be condoned nor the ex-parte decree can be set aside merely on the ground that there was no "due service" within the meaning of Article 123, Limitation Act, 11963. 28. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Kanshi Ram Mohan Lal v. Smt Bhagwan Kaur (AIR 1970 P&H 300) had the occasion to deal with the scope of the provisions contained in "Explanation" to Article 123, Limitation Act, 1963, and that contained in sub-rule (2) of Rule 20, Order 5, Code of Civil Procedure. It was held:— “......The two provisions have to be so read as to avoid any conflict, and it is immediately apparent that the Explanation to Article 123, on its very words, has to be confined to that Article alone and for the purpose of limitation an ex-parte decree can be set aside within thirty days from its date, but, where there has been no due service, within thirty days from the knowledge of the decree. In the case of substituted service under Rule 20 of Order 5 it would not ordinarily be open to the party served under that rule to say that there was no due service, because sub-rule (2) of Rule 20 of Order 5 says specifically that such substituted service shall be as effectual as personal service. It is the rigour of this sub-rule which the Explanation to Article 123 is meant to meet, but only for the purpose of enabling the person against whom an ex-parte decree has been passed to make an application to have the decree set aside. Once he is permitted to make an application for setting aside a decree in spite of service under Rule 20 of Order 5, the merit of the matter still remains for him to meet, that is to say it still remains for him to prove that he was not duly served. If he fails in that, then while his application shall have been made within time but he would fail on the merit of his application. So the Explanation to Article 123 does not either abrogate in any way sub-rule (2) of Rule 20 of Order 5 or operate as a limitation of any kind of that sub-rule....." 29. If he fails in that, then while his application shall have been made within time but he would fail on the merit of his application. So the Explanation to Article 123 does not either abrogate in any way sub-rule (2) of Rule 20 of Order 5 or operate as a limitation of any kind of that sub-rule....." 29. The defendants/applicants in the present case have failed to prove that they were not duly served within the ambit of sub-rule (2) of Rule 20, Order 5, Code of Civil Procedure. 30. A contention was raised on behalf of the defendants/applicants that the delay may be condoned and ex-parte decree may be set aside on equitable grounds. 31. I do not find force in the contention of the learned Counsel. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and another (1998 (1) Shim. L.J. 626) has held :— "Law of limitation may harshly effect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.” For the foregoings, both the issues are decided against the defendants/ applicants. RELIEF. As a result of my findings on issues No. 1 and 2 above, the present application is dismissed. No orders as to costs. Application dismissed.