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1998 DIGILAW 80 (PAT)

Kolsite Machine Fabric Limited v. State Of Bihar

1998-02-03

S.K.CHATTOPADHYAYA

body1998
Judgment S.K.Chattopadhyaya, J. 1. Since common facts and questions of law are involved in these two revision applications, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. Whereas in Cr. Revision No. 160/97R Satya Narayan Gopilal Kabra, the Managing Director of M/s. Kolsite Machine Fabrik Ltd. Bombay is the petitioner; in Cr. Rev. No. 166/97R the Company itself is the petitioner being represented by its office superintendent. 3. The order dated 21.8.97 passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Seraikella in C/1 case No. 56/94 has been impugned in both the cases by reason of which the prayer for discharge of the petitioners has been refused. 4. Before adverting to the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties brief facts of the case are necessary to be stated : The opposite party No. 2, Rajendra Kumar Agrawalla, the proprietor of Sri Shyam Industries, filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, that one Om Prakash Agrawalla of Bistupur supplied brochures and the complainant came across of the advertisement which were issued by the petitioner-Company for sale of machines for making polythene bags. The petitioner-Company was approached through a letter requesting it to supply a Kolsite Bag Maker Model KMF - 172500 having bottom seal as advertised by the Company. A sum of Rs. 50,000.00 by way of bank draft was sent by the complainant in favour of the company by way of advance payment for supplying the same. Terms and conditions for supply of the said machine including the approximate cost was conveyed to the complainant by letter dated 15.1.92. Accordingly, the company despatched the machine to be delivered to the complainant but the machine was ultimately delivered to him on 23.4.92 after payment of its price, freight charges and other expenses. The complainant alleged that right from the time of installation of the machine by the Engineers of the Company it was not functioning properly as per the assurances given to him by the said Company. Instead of producing the finished products it was subsequently found that the machine was producing waste materials due to manufacturing defects. It was further alleged that though in the perform invoice the machine had been described as 18 inches Bottom Seal Bag Maker, but the machine which was supplied to him was of different design. Instead of producing the finished products it was subsequently found that the machine was producing waste materials due to manufacturing defects. It was further alleged that though in the perform invoice the machine had been described as 18 inches Bottom Seal Bag Maker, but the machine which was supplied to him was of different design. The machine gets heated and the sealer does not function as a result, the opening also gets sealed. The complainant has come to learn that the machine is a mere scrap skeleton. The complainant has further alleged that another fault has been perpetrated by the accused as would be evident from the pamphlet as two meters have been shown but the machine supplied to the complainant is different one with three meters. The price of Bag Maker Machine in the proforma invoice was quoted at Rs. 2,40,500.00 as because the machine was with two side sealing. The Company deputed its service engineers but they also could not rectify the defect and the machine is lying idle without giving any desired result and no sign improvement. The complainant ultimately moved the Consumer Forum under the Consumer Protection Act claiming damages/compensation which has been registered as case No. 7/93 and is still pending. It is said ihat as because the complainant was perusing his remedy elsewhere he could not file this case earlier but realising that the accused could not mend their ways, the complaint has been filed before the Magistrate. It is also alleged that the complainant has come to know that the accused has deceived many others at Calcutta and other places in the manner the complainant has been cheated. 5. On receipt of such complaint, the learned Magistrate examined the complainant and his witnesses on solem affirmation and by order dated 2.12.94 cognizance was taken under Secs. 420, 406, 409 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code. It appears that the petitioners moved this Court against the order taking cognizance in Cr. Misc. No. 827/95R but without any success as by order dated 19.3.96 the said application was dismissed. Thereafter, as stated above, the petitioners filed a petition for discharge which has been rejected by the impugned order. 6. Mr. P.S. Dayal, learned Sr. It appears that the petitioners moved this Court against the order taking cognizance in Cr. Misc. No. 827/95R but without any success as by order dated 19.3.96 the said application was dismissed. Thereafter, as stated above, the petitioners filed a petition for discharge which has been rejected by the impugned order. 6. Mr. P.S. Dayal, learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submits that the learned Court below has erred in law in passing the impugned order inasmuch as he has not considered the materials on record. His second contention is that the Magistrate should have given a detailed reasons for not accepting the prayer of discharge made by the petitioners. Elaborating his argument, learned Counsel submits that when the witnesses were examined by the complainant and documents were exhibited before the Court, it was incumbent upon the Magistrate to come to a positive conclusion as to whether those materials were sufficient for framing charge against the petitioners. That having not been done, he asserts, the impugned order must be set aside. In this connection it has also been submitted that there is no finding as to what section of the IPC would apply to the individual petitioners inasmuch as there is no specific averment against the Director, Mr. Kabra as to how he is responsible for day-to-day business of the Company. Referring to various documents which are exhibited before the Court, learned Counsel has tried to impress upon the Court that under the terms of contract it was the condition that the complainant was required to maintain a certain degree of electrical energy for functioning of the machine and that having not been done, the machine could not give its desired result. Secondly, the complainant did not use P.P. plastic and, as such, there does not exist any reason to complain in respect of the machine supplied and its works. According to him, in the notice it is specifically mentioned that poly propylene (P.P.) is not recommended but as per the evidence of C. W. 1 the P.P. Plastic was not successful and for that the complainant had purchased the machine of Mode 1-KMF-172500-. 7. Mr. Bajaj appearing on behalf of the complainant-opposite party No. 2, on the other hand, has submitted that the petitioners themselves having admitted that correspondence was made to the Managing Director by letter as contained in Ext. 7. Mr. Bajaj appearing on behalf of the complainant-opposite party No. 2, on the other hand, has submitted that the petitioners themselves having admitted that correspondence was made to the Managing Director by letter as contained in Ext. 4, it would be futile for the petitioners to suggest that being Director he was not responsible for day-to-day affairs of the Company. He submits that in the complaint petition the name of two accused persons have been given; one is the Company and the other its Managing Director. The complaint petition discloses that it was on the assurance of the accused meaning thereby, both the accused, that the petitioners installed the said machine on payment of such lumpsum amount. According to him, the learned Magistrate has rightly observed that detailed discussion of evidences on record was not required to be made at this stage. According to him, the power conferred upon the Magistrate to discharge an accused is to be exercised by giving reasons to the effect that no case is made out against the accused. 8. Law in this regard is well settled. In the case of State of Maharastra V/s. Somenath Thappa reported in AIR -- , their lordships have, inter alia, observed that if the Courts were to think that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. 9. In the instant case there are two versions; one given by the complainant and his witnesses and the documents sought to be relied upon on behalf of the petitioners. In my view, the law does not permit the High Court to find out at this stage as to which of the two verious given by the parties it correct. I have already indicated above that their lordships have categorically observed that at the stage of framing of charge probative value of the statements cannot be gone into which would come to be decided at the close of. the trial. 10. Similarly; in the case of R.S. Naya/c V/s. A.R. Antulay and Anr. I have already indicated above that their lordships have categorically observed that at the stage of framing of charge probative value of the statements cannot be gone into which would come to be decided at the close of. the trial. 10. Similarly; in the case of R.S. Naya/c V/s. A.R. Antulay and Anr. reported in , the law regarding discharge of accused has been dealt with by their lordships by observing as follows: The Code contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of Sessions under Sec. 227 in case friable by it; cases instituted upon a police report are covered by Sec. 239 and cases instituted otherwise than on police report are dealt with in Sec. 245. The three Sections contain somewhat different provisions in regard to discharge of the accused. Under Sec. 227, the trial Judge is required to discharge the accused if he considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Obligation to discharge the accused under Sec. 239 arises when "the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless." The power to discharge is exercisable under Sec. 245(1) when "the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no ease against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction...." It is a fact that Secs. 227 and 239 provide for discharge being ordered before the recording of evidence and the consideration as to whether charge has to be framed or not is required to be made on the basis of the record of the case including documents and oral hearing of the accused and the prosecution or the police report, the documents sent along with it and examination of the accused and after affording an opportunity to the two parties to be heard. The stage for discharge under Sec. 245, or the other hand, is reached after the evidence referred to in Sec. 244 has been taken. The stage for discharge under Sec. 245, or the other hand, is reached after the evidence referred to in Sec. 244 has been taken. Notwithstanding this difference in the position there is no scope for doubt that the stage at which the Magistrate is required to consider the question of framing of charge under Sec. 245(1) is a preliminary one and the test of prima facie case has to be applied in spite of the difference in the language of the three Sections, the legal position is that if the trial Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed. 11. Having noticed the aforesaid pronouncement of their Lordships I am of the view that in the instant case the learned Magistrate having perused the allegations made in the complaint and the deposition of the witnesses has coma to a conclusion that a prima facie case has been made out for framing of charge an at this stage the High Court will not interfere with the said order. 12. On careful consideration of the facts and circumstances, I find that no ground has been made out for interference with the impugned order. Both the Cr. revision applications are, accordingly, dismissed.