Honble CHAUHAN, J.–The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 27.5.98 issued by the Commanding Officer of the 8th Mech. Inf., by which the petitioner has been informed that he will be tried by Summary Court Martial (hereinafter called ``S.C.M.) in the said Unit on various charges which had been explained in the charge-sheet served upon the petitioner alongwith the said order. (2). The petitioner is a Male-Nurse in the Military Hospital and posted in the Military Hospital, Jodhpur. The respondents have alleged that while petitioner was on duty of Medical Papers in respect of new candidates for recruitment, in the month of February, 1997 he had improperly obtained for himself some amount from respondent No.4 - a prospective candidate, for enrollment in Army as a consideration for disclosing the result of his medical examination and while performing the duties, on 21.2.98, petitioner improperly demanded a sum of money from the respondent No.4- a prospective candidate, for his enrollment for procuring the clearance in Medical Examination of his enrollment. The grievance of the petitioner is that under the law, the Commanding Officer of the petitioner had been the Incharge of the Medical Hospital, Jodhpur and he cannot be tried by S.C.M. by attaching him to any other Unit and, thus, direction is sought to the respondents not to attach the petitioner to 8th Mech.Inf. for trial by some other officer. (3). Mr. K.K. Shah, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that under Section 116 of the Army Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred as ``the Act), a S.C.M. may be held by the Commanding Officer of any Unit and he shall alone constitute the Court. The Commanding Officer has been defined in Section 3 (v) of the Act as the Officer, who under the Regulation of the Regular Army, has to discharge the functions of a Commanding Officer in regard to the matters of description referred to in the provisions. Sub-section (3) of Section 120 of the Act reads as under:- ``A Summary Court Martial may try any person subject to this Act and under the Command of the Officer holding the Court, except an Officer, Junior Commissioned Officer or Warrant Officer. (4). Thus, it is clear that only sepoys and non-commissioned Officers can be tried by the S.C.M. and that is to be conducted by the Commanding Officer. (4). Thus, it is clear that only sepoys and non-commissioned Officers can be tried by the S.C.M. and that is to be conducted by the Commanding Officer. Regulation 381 of the Army Regulations, 1962 provides that S.C.M. can be conducted only by the Commanding Officer of the Unit, except in the case of desertors. On the basis of the aforesaid provisions, it has been submitted by Mr. Shah that in the instant case, as the petitioner was serving in the Military Hospital, Jodhpur and his Commanding Officer is the Colonel Incharge of the Hospital, he can be tried by S.C.M. only by the Commanding Officer of the Hospital and the impugned order, contained in Annexure 2 to the petition which has been issued by the Commanding Officer of 8th Mech.Inf., is without jurisdiction and the petitioner cannot be attached to another Unit for being tried by S.C.M. (5). On the contrary, Mr. Vineet Mathur, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, has submitted that under the Act there is no bar to attach a person even for purpose of conducting S.C.M., to any other Unit and once he is attached to the other Unit, the Commanding Officer of the said Unit would be competent to try him by S.C.M. He referred to and relied upon a Circular dated 22.5.85, contained in Annexure R.3, which has explained the provisions of Section 120(3) of the Act. The necessity to issue that Circular was felt to explain as the averment had been raised time and again that a N.C.O. or O.R. cannot be attached to another Unit after commission of an offence for his control by S.C.M. The said Circular reads as under:- ``The law on the subject has to be determined with reference to Army Act Sections 116, 3 (v) and 120. Army Act 116 (1) provides that a SCM will be held by the CO of any Corps, department or detachment of the regular Army. By virtue of the wide definition of the term ``Commanding Officer given in Section 3(v), a CO exercises command over all persons including the one properly attached to his unit. Army Act 120(3) lays down that a person to be tried by a SCM should be under the command of the officer holding the Court, i.e. the CO of the Unit, to which he is posted or attached. Army Act 120(3) lays down that a person to be tried by a SCM should be under the command of the officer holding the Court, i.e. the CO of the Unit, to which he is posted or attached. Thus, neither Army Act 116 nor Army Act 120 puts any bar to holding of a SCM by the CO of the unit, to which the person is attached, before or after the commission of the offence. In view of the legal position explained above, it is not correct to interpret or hold that a person attached after the commission of an offence cannot be tried by the CO of the unit to which he is attached. Further, Regulations for the Army, 1962, Para 381 (second sub para) provides that in no circumstances will a man be tried by SCM held by a CO other than the CO of the unit to which the man properly belongs. A person, who is attached to a unit under orders of a competent authority will be taken as belonging to that unit. In such cases the Commanding Officer of the Unit to which a person is attached would be legally empowered to proceed against him under the Army Act, punish him summarily, try him by SCM, have him tried by a GCM, SGCM or DCM, as the case may be, and even dismiss a charge against him, if the merits of the case so warrant. Notwithstanding the above, it will be ensured that an accused should not be attached to another unit for having him tried by a SCM merely with a view to have an enhanced punishment awarded to him in terms of Army Act 120(5). Such a course would be a misuse of the law to the prejudice of the accused and will be prohibited through suitable instructions to lower formation headquarters. As the above stated position regarding jurisdiction of a Commanding Officer to hold trial by a SCM in respect of NCOS and OR posted or attached to him unit, (even if attached after the commission of the offence) is a sharp departure from the existing practice on the subject, it is requested that the correct legal position, may be disseminated to lower formations and units under your command for their guidance. (6). In view of the above, Mr. (6). In view of the above, Mr. Mathur has submitted that the statute does not bar for attaching a person to another unit even after commission of an offence for the purpose of trying him by the SCM and there is no prejudice caused to the person to be tried and this is the practice which has been consistently followed and understood by the Authorities concerned since 1985, and, therefore, the impugned order, contained in Annexure 2, cannot be said to be suffering from any illegality whatsoever. (7). On the basis of the above, one may submit that this case warrants the application of the said principle of ``contemporanea expositio as the respondents Authorities have understood the provisions of Statute in a manner explained in the said Circular. (8). In K.P. Varghese vs. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam (1), the Honble Supreme Court applied the rule of contemporanea expositio as the Apex Court found it a well established rule of interpretation of a statute by reference to the exposition it has received from contemplary authority. However, the Apex Court added the words of caution that such a rule must give way where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. Similarly, in Collector of Central Excise, Bombay and another vs. M/s. Parley Export (P) Ltd. (2), the Honble Supreme Court observed that the words used in the provision should be understood in the same way in which they have been understood in ordinary parlance in the area in which the law is in force or by the people who ordinarily deal with them. In Indian Metals and Ferry Alloy Ltd., Kuttack vs. Collector of Central Excise (3), the Honble Supreme Court has applied the same rule of interpretation by holding that ``contemporanea expositio by the administrative authority is a very useful and relevant guide to the interpretation of the expression used in a statutory instrument. The same view has been taken by the Honble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. G.S. Daal and Flour Mills (4), and Y.R. Chawla and others vs. M.P. Tiwari and another (5). (9). In J.K. Cotton, Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors. The same view has been taken by the Honble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. G.S. Daal and Flour Mills (4), and Y.R. Chawla and others vs. M.P. Tiwari and another (5). (9). In J.K. Cotton, Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors. (6), it has been held that the maxim is applicable in construing ancient statute but not to interpret Acts which are comparatively modern and an interpretation should be given to the words used in context of the new facts and situation, if the words are capable of comprehending them. Similar view had been taken by the Apex Court in Senior Electric Inspector vs. Laxmi Narain Chopra (7). (10). However, as the said Circular remained in operation for last thirteen years and Mr. Vineet Mathur has submitted that it has been consistently followed and understood that it does not bar the attachment of an employee to another Unit even after commission of the Offence, for the purpose of being tried by S.C.M., and Mr. Shah is not in a position to controvert it by adducing some material, it is to be interpreted that attachment of an employee to another Unit, for the purpose of holding S.C.M., is permissible. (11). There is another aspect of the matter. The impugned order can also be examined by application of doctrine of prejudice. The envail of the argument of Mr. Shah may be tested on the touch-stone of reasonableness and the ``doctrine of pre- judice. In Major S.S. Sodhi vs. Union of India (8), the Honble Apex Court has held that the procedural defect, if any, in holding the Court Martial would not vitiate the trial unless they are very vital and substantial and unless there is a flagrant violation of any procedure, causing serious prejudice to the accused, as the deliberate lapses and intentional omission on the part of the Army Authorities cannot be presumed. The Apex Court held that the matter should be examined by the Court objectively bearing in mind the general principle whether departure from the law has caused any prejudice to the delinquent officer. Unless it is held, that provision itself is mandatory in nature. Similar view has been taken by the Honble Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECII Ltd. vs. B. Karunakar, (9), State Bank of Patiala vs. S.K. Sharma (10), and S.K. Singh vs. Central Bank of India (11). Unless it is held, that provision itself is mandatory in nature. Similar view has been taken by the Honble Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECII Ltd. vs. B. Karunakar, (9), State Bank of Patiala vs. S.K. Sharma (10), and S.K. Singh vs. Central Bank of India (11). (12). The Circular referred to above provided for sufficient safe-guard to protect the offence of the accused-employee as it clearly mandates that an employee cannot be attached to another Unit only in view to have enhanced punishment awarded to the prejudice of accused-employee as in the given case the puni- shment may vary with the rank of the Commanding Officer. (13). Mr. Shah has submitted that as the petitioner is working in the Military Hospital, Jodhpur, the Commanding Officer may be knowing the nature and conduct of the petitioner and, therefore, it is desirable that he should be tried by S.C.M. by the Commanding Officer of the Military Hospital, Jodhpur. I fail to understand how it will prejudice the case if the petitioner is tried before the Commanding Officer of 8th Mech.Inf. for the reason that the Commanding Officer of the Military Hospital, Jodhpur, knowing the petitioner well, may prejudice his decision, also. In the instant case there are no allegations of malafide against the Commanding Officer of 8th Mech.Inf. where the petitioner is likely to be tried by SCM. (14). Thus, in view of the above, I find no force in the petition and it is accordingly dismissed.