ORDER This L.P.A. is directed against the order dated 26.3.1998 passed in FA No. 369 of 1995 whereby the learned appellate courts affirmed the decree passed by the trial court in favour of the landlord Sita Ram Prasad and his wife Indu Devi for evicting the appellant Subodh Kumar @ Subodh Kumar Gupta from the suit premises under the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act'). Bonafide need as pleaded by the landlord is found proved and as such a decree against the tenant appellant is passed and the same is affirmed, as stated aforesaid, against which this L.P.A. is filed. 2. On 15.9.98 at the stage of admission, counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent landlord, Shri S.K. Mazumdar, raised a preliminary objection that in view of the provision of sub-section (8) of section 14 of the Act, the appeal is not maintainable. However, this Court proceeded further and passed the following order. For the brevity sake, it is necessary to produce the entire order in extenso:- "This L.P.A. is directed against an order dated 26.3.98 passed in FA. No. 639 of 1995 Today it is listed for admission. Yet learned counsel appearing for the appellant has not opened his lips to advance argument but a preliminary objection is raised on behalf of the Respondents that the appellant has no locus standi to maintain this appeal referring the provisions of section 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the' Act'). For the brevity sake, it is necessary to produce the provisions of section 14(8) of the Act. “14. Special Procedure for disposal of cases for eviction on ground of bona fide requirement.-(1) Every suit by landlord for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (c) or (e) of sub-section (1) of section 11 shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this section. “14. Special Procedure for disposal of cases for eviction on ground of bona fide requirement.-(1) Every suit by landlord for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (c) or (e) of sub-section (1) of section 11 shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this section. Xx xx xx (8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made in accordance with the procedure specified in this section: Provided that on an application being made within sixty days of the date of the order of eviction, the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order under the section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order ir respect thereto as it thinks fit." No doubt, the statutory liberty has not been granted to the tenant against whom an eviction decree is passed. However, utmost he can assail that decree in revision. The facts as appearing on record ex facie demonstrate that decree in part for eviction is passed in favour of the landlord against which the landlord filed F.A. No. 639 of 1995 and the tenant has also filed Civil Revision No. 447 of 1993. By the impugned order both, revision and appeal have been disposed of by a common judgment dated 26th of March, 1998. As the appeal is barred by sub-clause (8) of Section 14 of the Act, therefore, the tenant preferred S.L.P. against the impugned order before the apex Court and when it was brought to the notice of the Court that L.P.A. against the order passed in First Appeal has been filed, the apex Court directed that only after the decision of the L.P.A., the appellant may seek appropriate remedy. In First appeal the desired reliefs have been granted in favour of the landlord against which this Letters Patent Appeal under clause 10 of the Patna High Court Rules has been filed wherein this objection was raised that this L.P.A. is not maintainable. The submission made by the respondents by raising objection has no force in terms of sub-clause (8) of section 14 of the Act. The submission made by the respondents by raising objection has no force in terms of sub-clause (8) of section 14 of the Act. Indeed, the tenant has not been vested with substantive powers to challenge the order of eviction passed against him in appeal or first appeal and it is not that against the original decree or order of eviction, he is preferring any appeal or first appeal or even L.P.A. but it was the landlord, who preferred First Appeal in whose favour the eviction decree has been passed in part and only against that, this L.P.A. has been filed. Thus in our view, the statutory bar created under sub-clause (8) of section 14 of the Act has no application to the facts of the instant case and thus this appeal is maintainable. List this matter for admission after Puja holidays." 3. However, after signing the order this Court realised that in view of the provision of sub-section (8) of section 14 of the Act, the appeal as made and filed is not tenable and the interpretation given by this Court to the provision of sub-section (8) of section 14 of the Act is not only contrary to the provision of the Act and the aim and object and total scheme of the Act but also against a Full Bench decision of this Court rendered in Md. Jainul Ansari & ors. VS. Md. Khalil: 1990(2) PLJR 378. Therefore, immediately on 18.9.98 we passed orders for relisting this appeal on 22.9.98. This order is also reproduced hereinbelow : "At our instance this appeal is listed under the heading 'for orders' today. After dictating the order on 15.9.98 in the open Court and signing the same we realised that the order dated 15.9.1998 requires reconsideration on the interpretation of sub-clause (8) of section 14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982. Thus, let notices be issued to the appellant and the respondents both to address on the issue as to whether the appeal is maintainable by the tenant in view of the provision of sub-clause (8) of section 14 of the Act aforesaid. Learned counsel Mr. Pramod Kumar Singh appearing for the appellant is present. Mr. Vishwanath Choudhary appearing for the respondents is also present. Due to paucity of time, this matter could not be taken up today. Learned counsel Mr. Pramod Kumar Singh appearing for the appellant is present. Mr. Vishwanath Choudhary appearing for the respondents is also present. Due to paucity of time, this matter could not be taken up today. Put up on 22nd September, 1998 within top five cases under the heading 'for admission'. .. And after hearing learned counsel for the parties on the date of hearing the order was reserved. 4. The scheme of the Act if taken into consideration, particularly the relevant provision, what we feel is that the legislature while enacting this Act had in their mind that the proceeding under the Act be expeditiously disposed of and for that purpose sub-section (8) of section 14 of the Act has been enacted so that in a summary hearing the 'suit proceedings may be concluded just like the hearing in Small Causes Court Act. The practice and procedure for Small Causes Court is thus made applicable in hearing of the eviction suit under the Act. This procedure has been adopted to give speedy relief to needy landlord so that the proceedings may not unnecessarily be prolonged. We may say so that it is not that this provision only finds place in this Act alone, but also a similar provision finds place in Delhi Rent Control Act, vide section 25(b) of the Act. 5. Thus, considering the aim and object of the scheme of the Act what we realise that the true intent of the provision of sub-section (8) of section 14 of the Act has not been considered by us while passing order on 15.9.98, in as much as right of appeal is a statutory right and if the statute has taken away this right and instead revision etc. is provided, indeed, as of right the litigant cannot invoke the right of appeal by filing an appeal. This proposition has no two opinion-Once a decree in a suit for eviction is passed against a tenant, the provisions of section 96 or 100 or other ancillary provision provided under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is not available as the right of appeal is taken away by virtue of sub-section (8) of section 14 of the Act. This had completely escaped our attention on 15.9.98. 6. This had completely escaped our attention on 15.9.98. 6. However, ul1der the Proviso to sub-section (8) of section 14 within the statutory period of limitation stipulated therein, if an appropriate application is made by the tenant against whom decree of eviction is passed the impugned order may be revised by the revisional court. This being the law, we are revising our earlier order dated 15.9.98 referred to above which is also supported by Full Bench decision of this Court in Md. Jainul Ansari's case (supra) and the Full Bench decision of this Court is binding on us. 7. Thus, the appeal as framed and filed is not tenable. Accordingly, it is dismissed.