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1998 DIGILAW 803 (KAR)

LEBIUS MATTHEWS v. CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF BANGALORE

1998-12-14

A.J.SADASHIVA

body1998
A. J. SADASHIVA, J. ( 1 ) WHETHER the reference made by the Commissioner to the Corporation against the decision of the Standing Committee, reversing or substantially modifying any action taken or proposed to be taken by the Commissioner or any order passed by him, becomes inoperative if the reference is not delivered to the Council of the Corporation along with the records within 60 days from the date of decision of the Standing Committee? is the question that falls for consideration in this petition. ( 2 ) ). The petitioner is the owner of the premises bearing Nos. 58 to 61, Lavelle Road, Bangalore. He entered into a development agreement with East-Coast Rocklines, Builders and Developers. He submitted an application with a plan for obtaining licence from the Corporation and for sanction of the plan. The original plan submitted by the petitioner was for 1. 25 F. A. R. as the property is facing 5th Cross, Lavelle Road, Bangalore, whose width is alleged to be more than 9 meters. The plan submitted was not approved. A portion of the third floor plan was dissolved and erased allowing a F. A. R. of 1. 02. The petitioner filed an Appeal before the Standing Committee under S. 444 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (for short "the Act" ). The Standing Committee by its resolution dated 5-8-1998 allowed the Appeal and ordered to sanction the plan with 1. 25 F. A. R. as per Annexure-E. The second respondent-Commissioner appeared to have not agreed with the resolution in view of certain mis-statements as to the width of the road. He, therefore, referred the matter to the Corporation for its decision by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 444 of the Act. ( 3 ) THE petitioner having not been served with any endorsement pursuant to the resolution of the Standing Committee filed this petition for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to sanction the plan as originally submitted by him allowing 1. 25 F. A. R. , without modifying the same in respect of the property, inter alia, contending that since the Commissioner did not refer the matter to the Corporation under sub-section (2) of Section 444 of the Act against the decision of the Standing Committee, the order of the decision of the Standing Committee has become final and shall be implemented. ( 4 ) SRI Ashok Harnahalli, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted that, the petition has become infructuous in view of the reference having been made by the second respondent to the Corporation against the decision of the Standing Committee. ( 5 ) ON the request of Sri G. S. Visweswara, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, the records from the second respondent was called for and perused. It was also inspected by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. On inspection it was contended that the actual order of reference was made on 16th October 1998 beyond 60 days from the date of decision of the Standing Committee and, therefore, there was no reference in the eye of law and the decision of the Standing Committee shall be implemented. It was further contended that, the note, in the records, by the Commissioner to refer is not a reference under the Act, unless it is followed by an order and submission of the same to the Corporation; If no action was taken in furtherance of the decision to refer, it is no reference until it is submitted to the Corporation for appropriate action; As the reference was made on 16th October 1998 beyond the prescribed period of 60 days from the date of decision of the Standing Committee, the reference is illegal and void and should be ignored. Sri G. S. Visweswara, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, in support of his contention, has referred to various dictionaries explaining the meaning of the word "refer" and contended that unless the records are submitted to the Corporation for consideration, the reference is not completed and the alleged reference in this case is illegal and void. Sri G. S. Visweswara, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, in support of his contention, has referred to various dictionaries explaining the meaning of the word "refer" and contended that unless the records are submitted to the Corporation for consideration, the reference is not completed and the alleged reference in this case is illegal and void. ( 6 ) SRI Ashok Harnahalli, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents has contended that, sub-section (2) of S. 444 of the Act envisages that, if on any appeal the Standing Committee reverses or substantially modifies any action or proposed to be taken by the Commissioner or any order passed by him, he may within 60 days from the date of such decision refer the matter to the Corporation for its decision and when once he orders to refer the matter, the reference is completed as it complies with sub-section (2) of section 444 of the Act, even though records are not submitted to the Corporation which is only a ministerial act to be performed by the ministerial staff. He has further contended that, when once the Commissioner substantially complies with S. 444 (2) of the Act by ordering reference the subsequent ministerial act even though performed after the period prescribed would not erase the effect of the order. Sri Ashok Harnahalli draws support for his contention from the decision of the Supreme Court in Burn Standard Company Limited v. M/s. Mcdermott International Inc and another, AIR 1991 SC 1191 . Sri Ashok Harnahalli has further contended that, even otherwise, that without conceding, if 16th October, 1988 is taken as the date of reference, even then the reference was within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision of the Standing Committee to the Commissioner as the cause of action to make a reference accrues only from the date of communication of such decision. ( 7 ) REFUTING the contention of Sri Ashok Harnahalli, Sri G. S. Visweswara has contended that, time beings to run from the date on which the Standing Committee made the decision whether or not it was communicated to the Commissioner; An act which is required to be done in accordance with the procedure prescribed, if not done in accordance with such procedure it will not save the consequences of non-performance; He, therefore, vehemently contended that, irrespective of the date of communication of the decision of the Standing Committee to the Commissioner, the time begins to run from the date on which the Standing Committee had made the decision and the reference having been made on 16th October, 1998, it is illegal and void. The decision of the Standing Committee shall be implemented. ( 8 ) SUB-SECTIONS (2) and (3) of Section 444 of the Act reads as follows :-"444. Appeal from Commissioner to standing committee :-1 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2) If, on any such appeal, the standing committee reverses or substantially modifies any action taken or proposed to be taken by the Commissioner or any order passed by him, he may, within sixty days of the date of such decision, refer the matter to the corporation, and pending the decision of the corporation on such reference, the Commissioner shall not be bound to give effect to the decision of the standing Committee. 3) The decision of the standing committee or where the matter has been referred to the corporation as aforesaid, the decision of the corporation shall be final. " ( 9 ) FROM the aforesaid provision it is clear that the decision of the Standing Committee shall be final if there is no reference by the Commissioner to the Corporation against the decision of the Standing Committee, and, in case the Commissioner refers the matter (the decision of the standing committee) to the Corporation, the decision of the Corporation shall be final. The question of referring the matter to the Corporation would arise only if the Commissioner had not agreed with the decision of the Standing Committee. The question of referring the matter to the Corporation would arise only if the Commissioner had not agreed with the decision of the Standing Committee. It is, therefore, necessary that the Commissioner should be communicated of the decision to enable him to take a decision to refer or not, the matter to the decision of the Corporation within 60 days. ( 10 ) ACCORDING to the various dictionaries, the meaning of the word "refer" in the context of sub-section (2) of section 444 of the Act suggest "submitting for information or decision. "chambers Dictionary explains the word 'refer' as follows :-"refer - to reproduce, represent : to assign : to impute : to attribute : to bring into relation : to deliver : commit, or submit : to hand over for consideration : to direct for information, confirmation, testimonials, or whatever is required : to direct the attention of : to postpone, etc. ,"the New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language explain the word "refer" as follows :- "refer - pres. part. ref. fer. ring past and past part. re. ferred v. i. to speak or write of something in the course of dealing with some other or larger topic to relate, this statement refers to remarks by his opponent to turn for information etc. , to refer to the dictionary v. t. to transfer (something) for the attention or action of someone else to direct (someone) to a source of information etc. to assign to a specific place, period etc. , historians refer the fall of Rome to 410 A. D. to regard as caused by, he referred his depressions to his childhood illness ref. er. eel. n. a person to whom something in dispute is referred for his opinion or decision, etc. ,"stroud's Judicial Dictionary explain the word "refer" as follows :-"refer - "referring the action to a master" (the old R. S. C. , Ord. 14, R. 7, See now Ord. 14, R. 6 (2) : see Fraser v. Fraser, 49 S. J. 203, cited OFFICER. See also EXPRESSLY REFER. "the New Oxford Illustrated Dictionary explains the word "refer" as :-"refer - Trace or ascribe to person or thing as cause or source; assign to certain date, place, or class. 2. Commit, hand over, to person etc. 14, R. 6 (2) : see Fraser v. Fraser, 49 S. J. 203, cited OFFICER. See also EXPRESSLY REFER. "the New Oxford Illustrated Dictionary explains the word "refer" as :-"refer - Trace or ascribe to person or thing as cause or source; assign to certain date, place, or class. 2. Commit, hand over, to person etc. , send on or direct (person), make appeal or have recourse, to some authority or source of information; cite authority or passage; back, postpone consideration of (proposal etc.) by reference to specified authority. 3. (of statement etc.) Have relation, be directed, (of hearer) interpret as directed, to; make allusion, direct attention, to. 4. referred pain, pain felt at a point in a sensory system remote from the part actually affected. "the Legal Glossary published by the Kannada Department, State of Karnataka, Bangalore, explain the word "refer" as :-"refer - (vernacular matter is omitted - Ed.)The Random House Dictionary of the English Language explain the word "refer" as :-"refer- 1. to direct for information or anything required. He referred me to books on astrology. 2. to direct the attention or thoughts of : The asterisk refers the reader to a footnote. 3. to hand over or submit for information, consideration, decision, etc,. to refer the argument to arbitration, etc. ," ( 11 ) SRI G. S. Visweswara, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, in view of the aforesaid meaning, has contended that the Commissioner should have actually submitted the reference to the Corporation for its decision, within 60 days from the date of decision of the Standing Committee and the reference having been submitted after the expiry of 60 days is illegal and void. On perusal of the records it is seen that, the Standing Committee passed the resolution modifying the order of the Commissioner on 5th August, 1998. The said order was received by the office of the Commissioner on 19th August 1998 and it was brought to the notice of the Commissioner for appropriate action on 21st August 1998. The note dated 1st September, 1998 put up by the Joint Director of Town Planning, Corporation of City of Bangalore, recommending the matter to be referred to the Corporation for its decision was accepted by the Commissioner and ordered to refer to 1st September 1998. The note dated 1st September, 1998 put up by the Joint Director of Town Planning, Corporation of City of Bangalore, recommending the matter to be referred to the Corporation for its decision was accepted by the Commissioner and ordered to refer to 1st September 1998. Before the order of reference was sent to the Corporation along with the records the Commissioner received a letter from the Chairman of the Standing Committee for Town Planning and Improvement, Corporation of City of Bangalore, requesting the joint inspection of the property in question on 19th September 1998 by the Commissioner and the Joint Director as he had learnt that the matter was being referred to the Corporation for its decision. Even though the second respondent had already made an order to refer the matter to the decision of the Corporation, it appears the property was again inspected and having found the inconsistency as to the width of the road between the note by the Department of Town Planning, Corporation of City of Bangalore and the observation made in the order of the Standing Committee he affirmed the order made on an earlier occasion and directed to refer the matter to the Corporation. ( 12 ) IT is true that the meaning of the word "refer" in the context of referring any dispute to the decision of a superior authority is to handover or submit for information or consideration and in this case sending the matter or submitting the matter to the jurisdiction of the Corporation Council. There is no dispute as to the meaning of the word "refer" as contended by Sri G. S. Visweswara, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. But then, the question that arise for consideration is, what is the effect of the order made by the Commissioner. The meaning of the word is "refer" or "place before the Council". When there is an order to place the matter before the Council for consideration, is it necessary that order should be placed before the Corporation within the period prescribed along with the records; Does it become inoperative after the prescribed period; or Does it continue to be operative even after the expiry of prescribed period since it is only a ministerial act to be performed by the ministerial staff? ( 13 ) IT is settled principle of law that, in an institution like the Corporation of City of Bangalore, where an order was made by the Commissioner to refer the matter to the Corporation, it is the duty of the ministerial staff to implement it by submitting the order of reference to the Corporation along with the records. If the ministerial act is not done within the period prescribed it would not erase the effect of order of reference. In my considered view, the non-performance of their functions by ministerial staff would not erase the effect of the order made by the Commissioner to refer the matter to the Corporation. ( 14 ) IN "burn Standard Company Limited" the Supreme Court while considering the contention that the agreement itself is void ab-initio for want of an application in the prescribed form which was imperative in respect of the question, whether the arbitration clause contained in Article XII of the Technical Collaboration Agreement entered into at Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on September 25, 1984 between the appellant-Burn Standard Company Limited, a Government of India Undertaking, and the respondent, Mc Dermott International Inc. , a foreign company, is rendered void by virtue of the agreement itself being ab initio void for want of general or special permission of Reserve Bank of India (RBI) under Section 28 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA)? has held as follows :-"13. But counsel for the appellant stressed that the facts placed on record clearly reveal that no application for permission under S. 28 (1) was made in the prescribed FNC5 as contemplated by paragraph 25 A. 2 of the manual. It is indeed true that the record does not disclose making of an application in the said prescribed form by either party to the agreement. Counsel, therefore, submitted that once it is found that no application for permission was ever made in the prescribed form, the provisions of sub-secs. (2) and (3) of S. 47 of FERA cannot save the agreement declared void by the statute itself. He further submitted that the case was governed by paragraph 25 A. 2 and not by 24a. Counsel, therefore, submitted that once it is found that no application for permission was ever made in the prescribed form, the provisions of sub-secs. (2) and (3) of S. 47 of FERA cannot save the agreement declared void by the statute itself. He further submitted that the case was governed by paragraph 25 A. 2 and not by 24a. 11 and hence making of an application in the prescribed FNC5 form was imperative and failure to do so raised a clear inference that the RBI had not granted permission under S. 28 (1) since it had never been approached for such permission. He emphasised that the prescribed form for SIA 'approval' under paragraph 24a. 11 is not the same as FNC5 and hence the administrative direction in the said paragraph that "it will not be necessary for the foreign collaborators to seek Reserve Bank permission under this section separately' cannot override the statutory requirement of S. 28 (1 ). The statutory duty cast on the RBI by S. 28 (1) cannot be abdicated by the R. B. I. by the deeming clause contained in paragraph 24a. 11 (i) extracted earlier. To buttress the submission counsel invited our attention to two cases, viz. , (i) M/s. Dhanrajmal Gobindram v. M/s. Shamji Kalidas and Co. (1961) 3 SCR 1020 : ( AIR 1961 SC 1285 ) and (ii) LIC of India v. Escorts Ltd. (1986) 1 SCC 264 : ( AIR 1986 SC 1370 ) : (1986 Tax LR 1826) wherein this Court held that paragraph 24a. 1 was merely an explanatory statement of guideline for the benefit of the authorised dealers and was neither a statutory direction nor a mandatory instruction. On the other hand counsel for the respondent argued that the RBI's action in regard to grant of permission under S. 28 (1) being essentially administrative. See Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, 1990 (3) SCC 223 : ( AIR 1990 SC 1277 ), it is enough to show that the R. B. I. had granted the permission no matter whether it had followed the procedure of paragraph 24a. 11 (i) or 25a. 2 of the manual. We think there is considerable force in his contention for the simple reason that we are concerned with the factum of permission and not the procedure followed by the R. B. I. for granting the same. 11 (i) or 25a. 2 of the manual. We think there is considerable force in his contention for the simple reason that we are concerned with the factum of permission and not the procedure followed by the R. B. I. for granting the same. The prescription of the form is merely to aid the R. B. I. to process the application for permission. Emphasis must be laid on substance and not on mere form. If there has been substantial compliance, as in this case, the mere lapse on the part of the R. B. I. in failing to communicate its decision should make no difference. Paragraph 25a. 2 is not in derogation of paragraph 24a. 11 (i) nor does it dilute the requirement of S. 28 (1 ). In any case the facts of the present case clearly reveal that the RBI had applied its mind to the question of grant of permission and had only thereafter permitted remittance of the first instalment of the fees payable to the foreign collaborator. Merely because application for such permission was not made in FNC5 form cannot cloud the fact that the decision to grant the permission was actually taken but the ministerial function of communicating the same remained to be done by oversight. This lapse cannot erase the decision already taken. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the R. B. I. had granted the permission contemplated by S. 28 (1) and hence the agreement cannot be voided by virtue of S. 28 (2) of FERA. It is not the case of RBI that it at any time had second thoughts about its action. It never contemplated withdrawal of the permission at any point of time thereafter. Once the decision to grant the permission is taken, whether through the course charted by paragraph 24a. 11 (i) or 25a. 2, that decision stands unless rescinded and the authorities are bound to act in aid thereof. " ( 15 ) IN view of my observation that the word substantially complies with sub-section (2) of section 444 of the Act and the failure to submit the said order with records to the Cooperation, within the prescribed period by the ministerial staff would not obliterate the effect of the order, And in view of the order dated 1st September, 1998 made by the Commissioner to the subsequent order is of little consequence. ( 16 ) EVEN otherwise as contended by Sri Ashok Harnahalli, the Commissioner referred the matter to the Corporation within 60 days from the date of communication of the order of the Standing Committee as the said order was communicated to him on 19th August 1998 and the order dated 1st September 1998 was submitted to the Corporation on 16th October 1998. Sri G. S. Visweswara, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that, this period of 60 days should be calculated from the date of decision of the Standing Committee as it is not possible to understand the provision in any other manner in the absence of any explanation regarding the communication of the order of the Standing Committee to the Commissioner. He placed emphasis on the words "the date of such decision" and contended that the decision of the Standing Committee is the starting point. I am not able to persuade myself to agree with the contention of Sri G. S. Visweswara as the said expressions will have to be read with the period prescribed in order to determine the date of accrual of cause of action. Unless the order is communicated, the question of taking a decision to refer or not to refer would not arise. In order to refer the Commissioner should apply his mind and it is not possible in the absence of the order. The date of communication of the order is, therefore, the starting point for the Commissioner to refer the matter to the Corporation. ( 17 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, this petition fails and accordingly rejected. ( 18 ) IN the circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs. --- *** --- .