ORDER Tej Shankar, J. 1. This petition in revision has been moved by the petitioner against the order dated 4-9-1998 passed by Shri R. P. Sudele, Rent Controlling Authority, Gwalior. 2. It raises a short question. It appears that respondent No. 1 Anil Kumar Zutsi filed a petition for eviction of the petitioner and respondents 2 to 4 with the allegation that a part of the house No. 916 situate at Morar, Gwalior, was in the tenancy of the defendants i.e. the husband of defendant No. 1 and father of defendants 2 to 3. After his death, the defendants became the tenants. There was a mutual family partition, under which the portion with tenancy of defendants and the portion over it went to the original petitioner, i.e. respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 claimed that he was in service in Air Force and was posted at Pune. He was to retire in November 1997 and after his retirement, his family was to settle in the said house which is in the occupation of the defendants. He required the accommodation bona fide and as such, the petition was moved before the Rent Controlling Authority. 3. An application purporting to be under Section 23-J of Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 read with Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code was moved by respondents. It was alleged therein that under the provisions of Section 23 of the said Act, the R. C. A. had jurisdiction to pass an order, but eviction can be sought by the petitioner, if he was a retired Government servant on the date of the application. The petitioner's petition was not maintainable as the petitioner was not a retired Government servant on the date when the petition was moved. The RCA had, therefore, no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. This application was opposed. After considering the arguments submitted by the parties that the application was not maintainable and the authority had no jurisdiction, the R.C.A. rejected the application, hence this revision petition. 4. The solitary question involved in the petition is as to whether the petition was entertainable before the R.C.A. for eviction of the defendants i.e. the petitioner as well as the formal respondents 2 to 4. 4. The solitary question involved in the petition is as to whether the petition was entertainable before the R.C.A. for eviction of the defendants i.e. the petitioner as well as the formal respondents 2 to 4. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that as the petitioner-respondent No. 1 was not a retired Government servant on the date when the petition was moved, the R.C.A. had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition and was liable to be dismissed. If he will retire subsequently, it will not make the petition maintainable. On the other hand, the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 argued that the Court has to look into the subsequent events and as the petitioner-respondent No. 1 retired during the pendency of the petition, it cannot be argued that the petition is not maintainable. In support of his contention, he submitted several authorities, which will be considered hereinafter. 5. Before entering into the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it is important to mention the relevant provisions. Chapter III-A of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 makes a provision for eviction of tenant on ground of 'bona fide' requirement. Section 23-A provides for special provision for eviction of tenant on ground of bona fide requirement. This is a special provision and the eviction of the tenant can be sought on the ground of 'bona fide' requirement, if the case is covered within the provisions contained in this Chapter, which is a self-contained provision. Under this Chapter, there is the provision in Section 23-J which shows that a definition of 'landlord' for the purposes of Chapter III-A has been provided. It may be useful to mention here that the word 'landlord' has also been defined in the Act in Section 2(b), but the definition given under Section 23-J of the word 'Landlord' is for the purposes of Chapter III-A only. Under this section, the provision is: "For the purposes of this Chapter 'landlord' means a landlord who is - (i) a retired servant of any Government including a retired member of Defence Services; or (ii)............. (iii)............ (iv)............. (v).............. 6. In the present case, the petitioner i. e. respondent No. 1 came to Court on the ground that he was an employee in the Air Force and was to retire. (iii)............ (iv)............. (v).............. 6. In the present case, the petitioner i. e. respondent No. 1 came to Court on the ground that he was an employee in the Air Force and was to retire. The petition was moved before the Rent Controlling Authority on 17-1-1997, as is evident from the copy of the petition filed as Annexure P/l. A perusal of this petition itself shows that the petitioner alleged in para 4 that he was in Air Force services and posted at Pune and was to retire in November, 1997. It, therefore, clearly means that according to the averments made in the petition itself, the petitioner was in active service on the date when the petition was moved and he was to retire in November, 1997. In other words, on the date of moving of the petition, he was not a retired Government servant. Now, again if we refer to provision of Section 23-A, we find that a petition can be moved before the RCA on one or more of the grounds mentioned in the section for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the accommodation. The meaning of the word 'landlord' occurring in this section has to be taken as given in Section 23-J referred to above. In this way, as pointed out, the landlord means a retired servant of any Government including a retired member of Defence Services. Thus on the date of the application, the person under Section 23-A must be a 'landlord' within the meaning of 23-J i.e. he must be a retired Government servant. There is no dispute between the parties that on the date of filing of the petition, he was not the retired Government servant. The result is that on a plain reading of the provisions of Section 23-A and 23-J referred to above goes to show that the petition when it was moved was wholly incompetent inasmuch as the petitioner was not a landlord within the meaning of Section 23-J. 7. The contention of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 is that subsequent events have also to be seen and in this regard certain authorities have been referred. Reference has been made by the learned counsel for the respondent to AIR 1975 SC 1409 , P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders. The contention of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 is that subsequent events have also to be seen and in this regard certain authorities have been referred. Reference has been made by the learned counsel for the respondent to AIR 1975 SC 1409 , P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders. In this case, the Apex Court was considering the provisions of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960, Section 10(3)(iii) and observed that : "Where, during the pendency of a proceeding under Rent Control legislation by the landlord for permission to evict the tenants, a subsequent event in the facts of the case takes place which has a material bearing on the landlord's right to evict, the approach of the High Court in revision, in taking cognizance of the new development cannot be said to be wrong or illegal." If we scrutinise the authority carefully, we find in para 4 that : "......It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceedings. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to Court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief, or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice - subject of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice ...." Thus, it has been specifically laid down that the basic rule is that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceedings. Thus to my mind, in view of this proposition, it has to be seen as to whether the petitioner had a right to the relief on the date when the petition was moved. Thus to my mind, in view of this proposition, it has to be seen as to whether the petitioner had a right to the relief on the date when the petition was moved. In the present case, the petitioner-respondent No. 1 had no right to move the RCA because he was not covered within the definition of the 'landlord' as shown above. Thus, even if subsequently by subsequent event i.e. by his retirement, he requires that right cannot bring the application back to the date of the application. Thus, on the facts of the present case in spite of the fact that there is a subsequent event that the petitioner retired subsequently, he cannot get relief on that account because he was not entitled to the relief on the date the petition was moved. Here, the petition itself was incompetent and no right could be conferred upon the petitioner-respondent No. 1 on the date of the petition by such subsequent events. Of course it can be said that the petitioner can get a right to move the Court after his retirement but in that regard to my mind, the petitioner-respondent will have to file a separate petition. He cannot get any relief on the basis of the present petition, which itself was incompetent. Thus this authority to my mind cannot help the learned counsel for respondent No. 1. 8. Certain other authorities have also been cited by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 with respect to subsequent events but I need not mention those authorities in view of what has been stated above. 9. I may mention here another authority of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1976 SC 49 , Rameshwar v. Jot Ram, where the Apex Court reiterated the same principle. Here again the Hon'ble Judges observed : "It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceedings. This is an emphatic statement that the right of a party is determined by the facts as they exist on the date the action is instituted...... Later developments cannot defeat his right .. Again it was laid down that "Courts can, however, take note of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly, but this can be done only in exceptional circumstances. Later developments cannot defeat his right .. Again it was laid down that "Courts can, however, take note of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly, but this can be done only in exceptional circumstances. Rights vested by statute cannot be divested by this equitable doctrine." In this view also, the petitioner had no right on the date when the petition was presented and there existed a right in the respondents inasmuch as they could not be evicted on the motion of the petitioner because he was not the landlord within the meaning of Section 23-J. Even if by subsequent events, the petitioner became the landlord, it will not confer any right on the petitioner to evict the respondents-tenants on the basis of the petition moved by the petitioner on the date when he was not the landlord within the meaning of word 'landlord' given in the Act. 10. The authority reported in AIR 1979 MP 157 , Bhanu Prakash v. Munna Lal has no application because in that case, the question was entirely different. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance upon AIR 1991 MP 132 , Baijnath Prasad Sain v. Daya Shankar Sain, 1994 MPACJ 13,Janendra Kumar Jain v. Roshan Lal and 1993 (1) MPWN Note 95, Director, ESI Services v. Smt. Kamla Devi. All these authorities are on different points. In the case of Baijnath Prasad Sain (supra) the question related to the eviction with respect to an accommodation acquired subsequent to retirement. It was covered under Section 23-J. Similar was the position in the case of J. K. Jain (supra), and the case of Director, ESI Services (supra). There also the facts were different. In that case, the question was as to whether the applicant was governed by Section 23-J of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. This is not the case here. The last authority submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents is 1983 MPWN Note 265, Jitendra Devi v. Kanhaiya Lal. It was a case under Section 12(l)(e) of the Accommodation Control Act and not under the provisions of Chapter III-A which defines the 'Landlord'. As stated above, all these authorities have no bearing upon the facts of the present case as they were entirely on different points. 12. It was a case under Section 12(l)(e) of the Accommodation Control Act and not under the provisions of Chapter III-A which defines the 'Landlord'. As stated above, all these authorities have no bearing upon the facts of the present case as they were entirely on different points. 12. In view of what has been stated above, as the respondent No. 1-petitioner was not covered within the meaning of the word 'landlord' as given under Section 23-J, the petition was incompetent on the date when it was moved. The subsequent event bringing him within the meaning of landlord cannot enable him to get a relief on the basis of a petition moved when he was not the landlord i.e. the date of petition. It is one of those cases in which subsequent events will not have any effect as the relief has to be granted on the basis of entitlement of the petitioner to bring the petition as stated in the petition. I am, therefore, of the view that the order of the learned R.C.A. is wholly illegal. The revision petition must, therefore, succeed. It is accordingly allowed and it is held that the petition filed by the petitioner-respondent No. 1 for eviction of the present petitioner and other respondents was incompetent as on the date when it was presented, the R.C.A. had no jurisdiction to entertain it. Consequently, the revision petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The petition of the petitioner-respondent No. 1 for eviction is dismissed with costs. Respondent No. 1 may, however, move afresh in accordance with law, if he is so advised.