ORDER R.S. Garg, J. 1. By this petition under Section 115 Code of Code of Civil Procedure the applicants/ Defendants seek to challenge the correctness and validity of the order dated 17-11-95 passed in Civil Suit No. 6-A/90 by the learned Civil Judge, Class I, Mungeli, granting Plaintiff's application filed under Order 40, Rule 1 Code of Code of Civil Procedure appointing a receiver, confirmed by the 4th Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, link Court at Mungeli, in Misc. Appeal No. 11/95, by order dated 12-12-95. 2. Brief facts necessary for the disposal of the revision petition are that one Nanku was owner of the property. The said Nanku had two sons Umedi and Asharam. Under the partition between Umedi and Asharam, certain lands came in possession of Umedi. According to the Plaintiff, on the death of Umedi, his widow Erawati (since deceased after the institution of the suit) and daughters Dularin and Kewri succeeded to the property. The Plaintiff filed the suit in the year 1990, inter alia, pleading that violating her possession in the property, her mother Erawati and sister Kewribai have surreptitiously sold the property under a sham and bogus sale deed in favour of Defendants Nos. 3 to 5. It would be necessary to note that on a application filed by the non-applicant before the S.D.M. under Section 145 Cr. P.C. the property was attached and receivers were appointed. On objection by applicants Nos. 1 and 2 the said receivers were removed and the S.D.M. directed that another receiver be appointed. Probably that order was not executed and another receiver could not be appointed. Ultimately, the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. culminated in favour of the present applicants and possession was delivered to them. The order was challenged by the present Plaintiff but she was unsuccessful. Possession of the property was delivered to the present applicants some where in the year 1994. The Plaintiff/non-applicant filed the application for appointement of receiver on 10-11-95. The application was replied by the present applicants and they contended that they were in possession of the property, they have cultivated the land and have sown paddy crop. It is also necessary to note that during the pendency of the criminal proceedings before the S.D.M., in the present suit, on 25-8-92 the present applicants had filed their written statement. The application was replied by the present applicants and they contended that they were in possession of the property, they have cultivated the land and have sown paddy crop. It is also necessary to note that during the pendency of the criminal proceedings before the S.D.M., in the present suit, on 25-8-92 the present applicants had filed their written statement. In para 14 of the written statement, they have stated that because receiver has been appointed on the application of the Plaintiff, the property was not properly maintained. 3. The learned trial Court after hearing the parties granted the Plaintiffs application by its order dated 17-11-95, holding that the sale deed was sham and bogus and as the Plaintiff has 1/3rd right in the property and as the Defendants have admitted in para 14 of the written statement that the property was not being properly maintained, a receiver was required to be appointed. By order dated 17-11-95 though recorded in the proceedings, the court below after granting the application for appointment of receiver, asked for a name of the person to be appointed as receiver. At about 1 noon, the parties gave an agreed name of Shri Ramchandra Vanshi who was appointed as receiver. 4. Being aggrieved by the order dated 17-11-95, the Defendants preferred Misc. Appeal before the District Judge who was pleased to dismiss the same. Being aggrieved by the said order, the Defendants/applicants have filed this revision petition. 5. At the commencement of the arguments, Shri Trivedi learned Counsel for the non-applicant raised a preliminary objection that the appeal filed before the first appellate Court was not maintainable because the appeal was not filed against the appointment of named receiver but was filed against the order directing appointment of receiver. Placing strong reliance on the judgment of this Court reported in A.I.R. 1938 Nag. 540, later on followed in the judgments reported in 1980 (1) MPWN, 33 and and Note No. 237, it was contended that as the appeal was not maintainable, the present revision which arises out of the appellate order is also not maintainable. 6. In the opinion of this Court, this objection is misconceived. On 17-11-95, not only the court passed order directing appointment of a receiver but also appointed a person with his name. 6. In the opinion of this Court, this objection is misconceived. On 17-11-95, not only the court passed order directing appointment of a receiver but also appointed a person with his name. Whether the particular person was appointed under the main order or was appointed under the proceedings written separately would not make much of difference because appointment of the receiver by name was consequence of the first order directing appointment of receiver. I could understand a case where on subsequent date the receiver by name was appointed. In such a case, the ratio of the judgment in A.I.R. 1938 Nag. 540 can certainly assist the Plaintiff in the objection. In case where the court directs appointment of a receiver and on the same date directs appointment of a receiver by name, then such objection would not be available. Probably considering this aspect of the matter, no objection was raised before the first appellate court. The objection to the maintainability of the revision petition or misc. appeal is rejected. 7. Learned Counsel for the Appellants submits that the trial Court so also the appellate Court were absolutely unjustified in making a reference to the statement made in para 14 of the written statement for appointing receiver. According to him, the written statement was filed on 25-8-92 and at that time, it was necessary for the Defendants to submit before the court that the property was not properly managed as it was under attachment. He further submits that the Courts below have not appreciated that right from 1989 till date, barring the period of attachment, the present applicants remained in possession of the property and by appointing receiver they could not be dispossessed. His further submission is that in the application filed by the non-applicant, nothing special has been pleaded relating to appointment of receiver. He submits that the orders passed by the two courts deserve to be vacated. Shri Trivedi learned Counsel for the non-applicant submits that the facts of the case would clearly show that property belongs jointly to the successors of Umedi and the Plaintiff/ non-applicant has 1/3rd share in the property. According to him, to protect the property and share of the Defendant and to avoid mismanagement and to earn profits from the property, appointment of receiver was a must. His further submission is that the Courts below were justified in appointing receiver. According to him, to protect the property and share of the Defendant and to avoid mismanagement and to earn profits from the property, appointment of receiver was a must. His further submission is that the Courts below were justified in appointing receiver. I have heard the parties at length. 8. So far as the statements made in para 14 of the written statement are concerned, they have not been taken in proper perspective by the two courts. The written statement was filed on 25-8-92. At that point of time, the order of attachment issued by the S.D.M. was in force, obviously at that point of time, the applicants could not enter upon the property, manage it or cultivate it. The order was finally set aside in the year 1994 and possession was restored to the present applicants. Reliance of the two cours below on the pleadings mentioned in para 14 was wrognly placed. 9. Order 40, Rule 1 Code of Code of Civil Procedure provides that where it appears to the court to be just and convenient, the Court may by order appoint a receiver of any property before or after the decree. The court may remove any person from possession and custody of the property; commit the same to the possession, custody or management of the receiver and confer upon the receiver all such powers as to bringing and defending suits and for the realisation, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property, etc. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of Order 40 Code of Code of Civil Procedure provides that nothing in the said rule shall authorise the court to remove from the possession or custody of property any person against whom any party to the suit has not a present right so to remove. Sub-rule (2) only means that if a person is in possession of the property under some assumed legal right, then he cannot be removed from possession under the garb of appointment of receiver. In the present case, the non-applicant/ Plaintiff, either on the date of the suit or on the date of the application or on the date of the order had no right of possession to the said property. She would acquire right of possession only when it is held that she is owner of the property and the sale deed executed by her mother in favour of Defendants Nos. She would acquire right of possession only when it is held that she is owner of the property and the sale deed executed by her mother in favour of Defendants Nos. 3 to 5 sham and bogus and would not adversely affect the rights of the Plaintiff. It is trite law that a receiver can be appointed only when it is found to be just and convenient and not otherwise. In the present case, the Court below has mainly relied upon the pleadings as recorded in para 14 of the written statement without appreciating that the scenario had changed after 1992. 10. The submission of the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff/non-applicant that the property is being mismanaged and is not earning anything cannot be accepted at this stage because the property was not under the management of the applicants almost for four years and after the property came to their possession, by way of reply, the defendans have clearly stated that they had sown paddy crops. That statement made by the Defendants has not been taken into consideration at all. If the property is being managed properly, if possession was restored to them and they are cultivating the lands and are earing profits from the land, then it cannot be held that the property is in danger of being wasted or alienated. If the Plaintiff feels that the Defendants are required to be restrained from alienating the property or her interest in the property deserves to be protected then she is free to move an application for grant of such injunction restraining the Defendants from doing so, but in any case the present in not a fit case where a receiver was required to be appointed. The Courts below were unnecessarily influenced by the pleadings as contained in para 14 of the written statement and have not taken into consideration the legal position in its true perspective. 11. The orders passed by the Courts below deserve to and are accordingly set aside. The revision is allowed. There shall be no orders as to costs. The records of the Courts below be remitted back immediately. The trial Court is directed to dacide the suit as expeditiously as possible.