JUDGMENT This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dt. 5.2.94 in Civil Suit No. 20-A/92 by Additional District Judge, Manendragarh, District Sarguja, whereby the plaintiff/appellant's suit for declaration that he is in service of respondent No. 1 from 1.11.83 and is entitled to full pay and other facilities in that capacity, has been dismissed. The allegations of the plaintiff were that the defendant/respondent No.1 is a registered Company having its head office of Chirmiri Zone at Malviya Nagar. The defendant/respondents No.2 & 3 are his officers. It has also been alleged that the plaintiff/appellant had applied in the year 1983 for being appointed as labourer and he was after the formalities of interview duly selected and his name appeared in the list of successful candidates. The list was published on 22.10.1983 however, the plaintiff/appellant was not given employment despite his efforts and oral and written requests made by him. Therefore, he has filed the present suit. The defendant/respondents resisted the suit and filed their written statement. They denied that any assurance was given to the plaintiff/appellant. It was also alleged that as the plaintiff/appellant was not found medically fit, therefore he was not appointed. It has also been alleged that the suit was barred by limitation. The learned lower Court inter alia found that the suit was barred by time. In this appeal it has only been urged that the suit is within limitation and is not barred by time. It is urged by the learned counsel for plaintiff/appellant that Article 58 of the Limitation Act would apply and the suit should have been brought within 3 years from the accrual of the cause of action. It has been urged that, since the plaintiff/appellant was continuously making correspondence and it was only in the year 1989, that he was intimated in writing that he could not be appointed. The limitation would, therefore, be computed from 5.11.89 and the suit is, therefore, within the period of limitation. The learned counsel for respondent/defendant has urged that the refusal of appointment was much earlier. It was also intimated to the plaintiff/appel1ant in the year 1984. Therefore, the cause of action cannot be said to have accrued in the month of November 1989 and the said letter sent to the appellant by the defendant/respondents was only in confirmation of the decision taken and intimated much earlier. It was also intimated to the plaintiff/appel1ant in the year 1984. Therefore, the cause of action cannot be said to have accrued in the month of November 1989 and the said letter sent to the appellant by the defendant/respondents was only in confirmation of the decision taken and intimated much earlier. Therefore, the .said letter cannot give rise to cause of action. It is clear from the averments in the plaint itself, in para 17 that the cause of action is said to have accrued on 1.11.83. If that be so, the period of limitation would expire after a period of 3 years from the said" date i.e. from 1.11.83. Therefore, the suit having been filed on 6.4.92 is clearly much beyond the period of limitation, and is therefore, barred by limitation. It may also be noticed in this connection, that in para 11 of the plaint, it has been alleged by the plaintiff/appellant himself that he had sent a letter to the Prime Minister complaining of the action of the respondents in not giving him ~m appointment letter, on which the office of the Prime Minister had sent a letter dated 16.4.84 to the Coal Department. Obviously, the plaintiff/appellant was in the know of refusal of the respondents to appoint him from before 1984. In the circumstances cause of action cannot be said to have accrued from the date of letter dt. 5.11.89, written by the respondents. It may also be noticed in this context that there was no statutory liability on the part of the respondents, to send a letter dt. 5.11.89. The suit was obviously barred by time, as has been rightly held by the trial Court. There is no reason for interference in the said finding, which deserves to ::'e confirmed. Accordingly, the suit was rightly dismissed. Thus, I find no substance in this appeal, which is dismissed. Parties shall however bear their own costs.