Director of Public Instructions of W. B. v. Ashish Pal
1998-02-23
Ronojit Kumar Mitra, Satyabrata Sinha
body1998
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Satyabrata Sinha. J: This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 21st March, 1997 passed by a learned single Judge of this court in C.O. No. 526(W)/96. 2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. 3. The writ-petitioner-first respondent was appointed as a part-time lecturer in the subject of plant protection in Netaji Mahavidyalaya, Hooghly. He was allegedly working since 1987 at a monthly remuneration of Rs. 1,000/-. Intially, University Grants Commission used to sanction his pay but after four years the University Grants Commission did not continue to undertake the financial liability as per their norms. The writ petitioner filed a writ application before this Court being C.O. No. 13196(W) of 1995 claiming that a post should be sanctioned as work load justified the same. He also prayed for his absorption in the said institution. By a judgment dated 11.8.95 a learned single Judge of this court directed the Director of Public Instructions, Government of West Bengal and the Secretary to the Department of Higher Education, Government of West Bengal to consider the question of according sanction for second post and to send the proposal to the Finance Department and thereafter to consider the question of absorption of the petitioner. 4. A second post had been created by the Government by an order dated 29.11.95. However, as the name of the petitioner had not been recommended by the College Service Commission, the petitioner's case for absorption could not be considered. The Commission allegedly despite requests did not also sent recommendation. In that situation, the petitioner filed another writ application which was marked as C.O. 526(W)/96, inter alia, praying for his absorption in the plant protection department with retrospective effect. By reason of the impugned judgment the learned trial, Judge allowed the writ application. 5. Mr. Maitra, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, inter alia, submitted that the learned trial Judge committed an illegality in giving the impugned direction as the writ petitioner was not selected as a part-time lecturer by any valid selection committee in terms of the extant rules. It was further submitted that the petitioner was not validly appointed and. in any event, as regard the• inaction on the part of the College Service Commission is concerned, another writ application being C.O. No 1221(W)/95 is pending.
It was further submitted that the petitioner was not validly appointed and. in any event, as regard the• inaction on the part of the College Service Commission is concerned, another writ application being C.O. No 1221(W)/95 is pending. It is submitted that recommendation of the College Service Commission is sine qua non for appointment and in that view of the matter relaxation of the recruitment rule could not have been directed. Reliance in this connection placed on Dr. Arundhati Ajit Pargaonkar vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in AIR 1995 SC 962 , E. Ramakrishnan & Ors. vs. State of Kerala & Ors. reported in 1996(10) SCC 565 and Smt. Debi Rani Bhattacharyya vs. District Inspector of Schools (S.E) Burdwan & Ors. reported in 1996 (II) CHN 415 . 6. Mr. Mondal, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the College Service Commission, inter alia, submitted that the plant protection is the subject appertaining to Botany but the petitioner is a candidate of Zoology and as such his case cannot be considered. It is further submitted that a panel has been made for Zoology, wherein the petitioner's position was at S1. No. 17A but the life of the said panel has expired. 7. Mr. Pratap Kumar Roy, the learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner-respondent, on the other hand, submitted that as the appellant did not file any affidavit-in-opposition, this appeal is not maintainable. It has further been submitted that keeping in view the direction made by a learned single Judge of this Court in C.O. No. 13196(W)/95 that the case of the petitioner should have been considered on its own merits, the respondents were bound to do so. It has been submitted that plant protection is a new subject which was introduced by the University Grants Commission, for which two posts had been created, one of which was to be filled up from Botany and another from Zoology. Mr. Roy would contend that as the petitioner was an organiser staff, he should have been absorbed keeping in view the fact that UGC had taken up the financial liability for a period of five years. It has further been submitted that the petitioner having taken up full load work he ought to have been absorbed. Reliance in this connection has been placed on Jaipal and Ors.
It has further been submitted that the petitioner having taken up full load work he ought to have been absorbed. Reliance in this connection has been placed on Jaipal and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors., reported in AIR 1988 SC 1504 and Bhagwan Dass vs. State of Harayana reported in AIR 1987 SC 2049 . The learned Counsel submitted that the appointment of the petitioner was not a back-door one. It was further submitted that the appellant has relied on the decision of division bench of the Supreme Court comprising of 2 Judges whereas these decisions relied upon by him have been rendered by division benches comprising of 3 Judges which are binding on this court. It had further been submitted that the Judgment of learned single Judge of this Court in earlier writ application would attract the principles of constructive res judicata and/or estoppel. 8. The principal question which arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the petitioner’s service can be regularised. 9. It had not been denied or disputed that the case of the petitioner has not been recommended by the College Service Commission. The State of West Bengal enacted West Bengal College Service Commission Act, 1971. The said Act was enacted to provide for the constitution of a College Service Commission in West Bengal and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 7 of the said Act begins with non-obstinate clause and reads thus:- "Functions of the Commission. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract, custom or usage to the contrary, it shall be the duty of the Commission to select persons for appointment to the posts of Teachers of a College: Provided that -- (i) for selection of persons for appointment to the posts of Teachers other than Principal, the Commission shall be aided by two persons having special knowledge on the subject for which such selection is to be made, of whom one shall be a nominee of the University to which such college is affiliated and the other shall be a nominee of the Chancellor of such University.
(ii) for selection of person for appointment to the post of Principal, the Commission shall be aided by the Vice-Chancellor of the University to which such college is affiliated or his nominee and a nominee of the Chancellor of such University. (2) It shall also be the duty of the Commission to advise the Chancellor or the State Government on such matter as may be referred to it by either of them.” 10. The said provision, therefore, is of wide amplitude. 11. Section 8 provides for the manner of selection. Section 9 provides for the effect of recommendation of the Commission. It clearly states that recommendation of the Commission would not be necessary if the appointment was on a part-time basis. 12. The State of West Bengal also enacted the West Bengal College Teachers (Security of Service) Act, 1975. Section 3 of the said Act reads as follows:-- “Appointment to the post of a teacher shall be made by the Governing Body on the recommendation of the University and College Service Commission to be constituted by the State Government in the manner prescribed: Provided that pending formation of such Commission such appointment shall be made on the recommendation or' a Selection Committee to be constituted for the purpose in the manner prescribed: Provided further that no recommendation of the University and College Service Commission or the Selection Committee will be necessary with respect to filling up for a period not exceeding six months of any permanent or temporary vacancy in the post of a teacher : Provided also that in cases of permanent vacancies or temporary vacancies for a period exceeding six months, if no recommendation of the University and College Service Commission or Selection Committee, as the case may be is forthcoming, it shall be lawful for the Governing Body of the College to extend, with the prior approval of the University to which such college is affiliated, the period of a teacher from time to time, so, however, that the, total period of such temporary appointment shall not exceed two years.” 13. Section 4 of the said Act provides that every teacher of a College on his appointment be 'provided with a letter of appointment containing such terms and conditions of appointment as may be prescribed. 14.
Section 4 of the said Act provides that every teacher of a College on his appointment be 'provided with a letter of appointment containing such terms and conditions of appointment as may be prescribed. 14. Section 5 provides for a period of probation to be undergone by such teacher and only on satisfactory completion of period of probation the Governing Body may confirm such teacher. 15. The Calcutta University First Statutes, 1979 also provides for appointment of teachers of Colleges. Clause 101A of the said Ordinance reads thus:- “Appointment of teachers, whole-time or part-time, including Principals, of affiliated colleges other than Government Colleges shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the West Bengal College Service Commission Act, 1978 (West Bengal LXII of 1978) and the rules made thereunder.” 16. As noticed hereinbefore, the petitioner was appointed only as a part-time lecturer. It may be true that he was appointed on the basis of a scheme framed by University Grants Commission but the fact that he had not been appointed in terms of the aforementioned Acts has not been and cannot be disputed. 17. It is now well settled by reason of various decisions of the Supreme Court of India as also of this Court that regularisation cannot be a mode of recruitment. Reference in this connection may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in B.N. Nagrajan and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka reported in 1979(3) SCR 937 and R.N. Nanjudappa vs. T. Thimmiah reported in 1972(2) SCR 799 . The aforementioned decisions have been referred to with an approval of the Apex Court in V. Srinivas Reddy vs. Govt. of A.P & Ors. reported in J.T. 1994(6) SC 476. The aforementioned decisions have been followed by this Court in various judgments. Reference in this connection may be made to Krishna Chandra Singha vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in 1996 Lab IC 28 and Sk Jamaluddin vs. State of West Bengal reported in 1995 Lab IC 1853. This aspect of the matter has also been considered in Sanjoy Chakraborty vs. Union of India reported in 1996 Lab IC 1326. wherein it has, inter alia, been held that regularisation does not mean permanence. It has also been held that appointment by way of regularisation would be violative of Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 18.
This aspect of the matter has also been considered in Sanjoy Chakraborty vs. Union of India reported in 1996 Lab IC 1326. wherein it has, inter alia, been held that regularisation does not mean permanence. It has also been held that appointment by way of regularisation would be violative of Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 18. In Lalan Kumar Singh vs. The State of' Bihar & Ors. reported in 1995(2) PLJR 309 , a division bench of Patna High Court (of which I was a member) upon taking into consideration a large number of decisions, held that regularisation can be done by virtue of or under the provision of legislative Act or a policy decision adopted by the State in exercise of its executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. In several decisions which had been noticed in that judgment, it has been held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to issue an order directing regularisation of the services of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the colleges of the Universities contrary to the mandatory provisions contained in the Bihar State Universities Act. The said view has been upheld by the Apex Court in Ashwini Kumar Sinha vs. State of Bihar reported in JT 1995(8) SC 563. I have also considered this aspect of the matter in Birbhum Zilla Parishad vs. Nitya Hari Chatterjee reported in 100 CWN 748. 19. This aspect of the matter has again been considered in West Bengal Board of Primary Education vs. State of West Bengal reported in 1997(1) CLJ 165 by a division bench of this court holding :– “The second principal question framed by the learned trial Judge must also be answered in negative in view of the fact that the teachers when so appointed having not been appointed under any provision of law or upon following any rule conforming to the provision of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and their services being not protected under any statute, question of their regularisation does not arise. This bench in several cases including in Registrar of North Bengal University vs. Biplab Roy & Ors. in FMA No. 159/93 disposed of on 24.1.96, inter alia, observed :– The Supreme Court of India in a number of decisions categorically held that regularisation cannot be a mode of apointment.
This bench in several cases including in Registrar of North Bengal University vs. Biplab Roy & Ors. in FMA No. 159/93 disposed of on 24.1.96, inter alia, observed :– The Supreme Court of India in a number of decisions categorically held that regularisation cannot be a mode of apointment. Reference in this connection may be made to B.N. Nagrajam vs. State of Karnataka reported in 1979(3) SCR page 937 and R.N. Nenjundeppa vs. J. Thimmaiah reported in 1972(2) SCR page 749: 1972 Lab IC 618, which have recently been followed by the Supreme Court in V. Shrinibas Reddy vs. Govt. of A.P & Ors. reported in AIR 1995 SC 586 ; Sk. Jamaluddin vs. State of West Bengal reported in 1995 Lab IC 1853. Similar view has been taken in Asoke Kumar Pal vs. State of West Bengal C.O No. 4244(W) of 1995 disposed of on 25.4.1995 and reported in 1995 Lab IC (NOC) 319; Narendra Nath Palui vs. State of West Bengal reported in 99 CWN 440, 1995(2) SLR 670. 1995 Lab IC 37 (Ker); 70 FLR 294(AII) and 1994(2) SCC 630 ; 1993(2) SCC 213 , AIR 1995 SC 962 , 1995(2) CLJ 255; Bishnudeo Chowdhury vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 1995(1) PLJR 123 (Pat)(F.B). This aspect of the matter has also been considered by various Division Benches of the Patna High Court on amongst others 1994(1) PLJR 68 , 1995(2) PLJR 309 and 1995(2) PLJR 573 . 20. Reference in this connection may be made to Birbhum Zilla Parished vs. Nitya Hari Chatterjee reported in 100 CWN 748. 21. It is not necessary to multiply decisions on this point. 22. In State of Orissa vs. Dr. Piari Mohan Misra reported in AIR 1995 SC 974 , the Apex Court held :– “Mere prolonged or continuous service does not ripen into a regular service to claim permanent or substantive status.” 23. The same view has been taken recently by Gowhati High Court in Miss Juliate Zimik and Ors. vs. The State of Manipur and Ors. reported in 1997 Lab IC 2384 and Kerala High Court in N. Sreedharan and Ors. vs. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. reported in 1997 Lab IC 2557. 24. The Apex Court has also considered in J&K Public Service Commission & Ors. vs. Dr. Narinder Mohan & Ors.
vs. The State of Manipur and Ors. reported in 1997 Lab IC 2384 and Kerala High Court in N. Sreedharan and Ors. vs. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. reported in 1997 Lab IC 2557. 24. The Apex Court has also considered in J&K Public Service Commission & Ors. vs. Dr. Narinder Mohan & Ors. reported in (1994) 2 SCC 630 that when the appointment is illegal, the question of regularising the appointee in service docs not arise. 25. The Apex Court has also considered the same view in Dr. Arundhati Ajit Pargaonkar vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in AIR 1995 SC 962 and E. Ramakrishnan & Ors. vs. State of Kerala and Ors. reported in 1996(10) SCC 565 . Yet recently in State of U.P & Ors. vs. Ajay Kumar reported in (997)4 SCC 88, it has been held: “The admitted position is that the respondent came to be appointed on daily-wage basis on 14.2.1985 as Class IV employee, Nursing Orderly, in the Medical College by the Medical Superintendent. When the respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court for his regularisation, the learned Single Judge pointed out that the respondent has not brought to the notice of the Court, any statutory rule under which the respondent could be regularised, on the basis of the service rendered by him as a daily-wage earner. Even the method of recruitment adopted by the Superintendent was not proper inasmuch as he did not call for applications. The Division Bench reversed the decision of the learned Single Judge and had given directions. It is now settled legal position that there should exist a post and either administrative instructions or statutory rules must be in operation to appoint a person to the post. Daily-wage appointment will obviously be in relation to contingent establishment in which there cannot exist any post and it continues so long as the work exists. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench was clearly in error in directing the appellant to regularise the service of the respondent to the post as and when the vacancy arises and to continue him until then. The direction in the backdrop of the above facts is, obviously illegal.” 26. This aspect of the matter has also been considered by a division bench of this court in Sri Pintu Acharyya vs. State of West Bengal reported in 1997(2) CLJ 428. 27.
The direction in the backdrop of the above facts is, obviously illegal.” 26. This aspect of the matter has also been considered by a division bench of this court in Sri Pintu Acharyya vs. State of West Bengal reported in 1997(2) CLJ 428. 27. It is also well-settled that an appointment made in violation of the recruitment rules would be illegal. Reference in this connection may be made in (995)1 SCC 138, State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Suresh Kumar Verma reported in JT (1996)2 SC 455 and State of West Bengal vs. Nani Gopal Jana reported in 1998 (I) CHN 5 . 28. There cannot be any doubt or dispute that the petitioner was appointed without going through the processes as required under the Calcutta University First Statute, 1979, the West Bengal College Teachers (Security of Service) Act, 1975, as also the West Bengal College Service Commission Act, 1978. 29. The petitioner, therefore, could not have been regularised in his services nor any such direction could be given. In our opinion, the learned trial Judge committed an error in not considering this aspect of the matte. 30. It may be true that the initial appointment of the petitioner was not a backdoor one but it must be borne in mind that such an appointment cannot be said to be dehors the statute as for the purpose of a temporary employee, the College Service Commission was not required to be considered. The University Grants Commission merely made a scheme. If the said scheme had not been continued the question of the continuation of the petitioner in service does not arise. Whenever a permanent post has to be filled up, the provisions of the aforementioned statute must be followed in the matter of recruitment. A direction for regularisation if made by this court, the same shall be violative of statutory provisions as also Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 31. The contention of Mr. Roy to the effect that the judgment of a learned single Judge of this court in the earlier writ application constitutes a res judicata is also not correct. A pure question of law of jurisdiction never operates as res judicata. 32. For the same reasons, the question of invoking the doctrine of estoppel also docs not arise in this case. 33. In Mohd. Nazimuddin & Anr.
A pure question of law of jurisdiction never operates as res judicata. 32. For the same reasons, the question of invoking the doctrine of estoppel also docs not arise in this case. 33. In Mohd. Nazimuddin & Anr. vs. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in (1990)2 BLJR 843, a full bench of Patna High Court (of which I was a member) held :– “It is now well known that a decision on a pure question of law touching the jurisdiction of the court docs not operate as res judicata. Reference in this connection may be made to Chittoori Subhanna vs. Kudappa and Ors., reported in AIR 1965 SC 1325 and in Mathura Prasad vs. Dossibai Subbanna, reported in AIR 1971 SC 2355 ." 34. Spencer-Bower and Turner in 'The Doctrine of Res judicata', stated the law in Article 114 thereof thus: "A Tribunal may exceed its jurisdiction either by embarking upon an enquiry outside its province, or, while confining its inquiry within the proper limits, by making an order in excess of its powers. In either case the result will be to nullify the decision as a res judicata in the former case, by the effect of the events, we have mentioned upon the declaratory part of the decision, and, in the second, by their effect upon its jussive or prohibitory provisions." 35. Refusal to exercise jurisdiction on an erroneous view of the law is also a question of law touching the jurisdiction of the Court. 36. Further, if the order passed was a nullity being wholly without jurisdiction, the same will also not operate as res judicata. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Chief justice, Andhra Pradesh vs. L.V. S. Dikshitu, reported in AIR 1979 SC 193 , wherein the law was laid down in the following terms :– “If the argument holds good, it will make the decision of the Tribunal as having been given by an authority suffering from inherent lack of jurisdiction. such a decision cannot be sustained merely by the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel, as urged in this case.” 37. In Smt. Isabella Johnson vs. M.A. Susai reported in AIR 1990 SC 993, it has been held:- “A Court which has no jurisdiction in law cannot be conferred with the jurisdiction by applying principles of res judicata.
such a decision cannot be sustained merely by the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel, as urged in this case.” 37. In Smt. Isabella Johnson vs. M.A. Susai reported in AIR 1990 SC 993, it has been held:- “A Court which has no jurisdiction in law cannot be conferred with the jurisdiction by applying principles of res judicata. Further, it is well settled that there can be no estoppel on a pure question of law and the question of jurisdiction is a pure question of law.” 38. So far as the submission of Mr. Roy to the effect that the judgments referred to were rendered by division benches consisting of 3 Judges of the Supreme Court whereas the decisions cited by Mr. Maitra are judgements rendered by 2 Judges is wholly misplaced. The judgments of the Apex Court relied on by Mr. Roy were rendered in different fact situation. The Apex Court in the said decisions did not consider the judgments of 3 Judges in B. N. Nagrajan (supra) and other decisions which judgements were binding upon the later Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decision relied upon by Mr. Roy apart from having different fact situation are not binding on this court keeping in view the earlier Supreme Court decisions as also later ones. 39. In Bhagwan Dass & Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors. reported in AIR 1987 SC 2049 , the Apex Court was concerned with the doctrine ‘equal pay for equal work’. It was held that the petitioners who were appointed each time for six months after giving a break or two, their prayer for absorption could not be granted. The said decision, therefore, runs counter to the contention of Mr. Roy. 40. In Jaipal and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors., reported in AIR 1988 SC 1504 , the Apex Court was again concerned with the doctrine ‘equal pay for equal work’. Both the aforementioned decisions were relied upon by Mr. Roy had been rendered by a two Judges' Bench. 41. This aspect of the matter has been considered by various decisions of this court as also by the Patna High Court in M. B. Gupta vs. Instrumentation Ltd. reported in 1992 (1) PLJR 137 wherein the decisions in Bhagwati Prasad vs. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation reported in (1990)1 SCC 361 , Dharwad Dist. P.W.D. Literate Daily Wage Employees Association and Ors.
P.W.D. Literate Daily Wage Employees Association and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. reported in (1990)2 SCC 396 and Jacob M. Puthuparmbil and Ors. vs. Kerala Water Authority & Ors. reported in (1991)1 SCC 28 were distinguished. It was noticed : “Unfortunately, however in none of the aforementioned cases, the Supreme Court considered its earlier binding precedents on the question of manner of regularisation, that its, State of Mysore vs. S.V. Naraynappa, (1967)1 SCR 128 and R.N. Nanjudappa vs. T. Thimmiah reported in (1972)2 SCR. 799 . The aforementioned judgments of the Supreme Court was followed by a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in B.N. Nagrajan and others vs. State of Kamataha, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1676 .” 42. The Patna High Court, thereafter, referred extensively from R.N. Nanjudappa vs. T. Thimmiah (1972)2 SCR 799 and B.N. Nagrajan and others vs. State of Karnataka ( AIR 1979 SC 1676 ). It was held:- “In none of the cases referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the aforementioned authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court which have defined the term 'regular' and 'regularisation' were taken into consideration. The decisions of the Supreme Court referred to on behalf of the petitioner, therefore, will have to be considered from that angle.” 43. The Patna High Court, this Court and the Supreme Court in various decisions have also taken into consideration the fact that if appointment is made by a back-door or where the initial appointment is made contrary to the provision of law, the same would be violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of' India. 44. The aforementioned view finds support from later decisions. 45. In P. Ravindran and Ors. vs. Union Territory of Pondicherry & Ors. reported in (1997)1 SCC 350 , the Apex Court relied upon Dr. Narinder Mohan (supra) and held:- “Shri K.M.K. Nair, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the petitioners are postgraduates, M. Phil and Ph. D., and they are highly qualified and have acquired experience from 1987 as lecturers. When they were appointed number of vacancies were available. Since they have been working since 1987, they require to be regularised by suitable directions. We find no force in the contention. The petitioners also have that right. At one time, they staked their claims but were not selected.
When they were appointed number of vacancies were available. Since they have been working since 1987, they require to be regularised by suitable directions. We find no force in the contention. The petitioners also have that right. At one time, they staked their claims but were not selected. Therefore, the process of recruitment through the Commission, as envisaged under the Constitution, cannot be by passed by issuing direction for regularisation of the services of the ad hoc persons who had come to the service through back-door entry. This Court in a catena of decisions has deprecated this practice of regularisation except in extraordinary cases by directing the Government to frame a scheme and regularise Classes III and IV services in accordance with the scheme. Even in subsequent decision, that leverage is not being insisted upon. This Court in J & K Public Commission vs. Dr. Narinder Mohan had held that the Court cannot adopt hybrid process of direction to regularise the services by passing the process of selection envisaged under the Constitution. This Court has deprecated the Government for exercising the power under Article 320 of the Constitution taking out the posts from the purview of the Commission and to regularise services dehors the Commission. Under those circumstances, we arc of the view that the Tribunal has rightly rejected the claim to grant the relief sought for.” 46. As in our view the petitioner is not entitled to regularisation as the same would attract the wrath of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, the question of upholding the judgment on the ground of estoppel, res judicata or the judicial finality as has been submitted by Mr. Roy does not arise. It may be true that in some cases regularisation had been directed by the Supreme Court has under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, which power this Court does not have. 47. For the reasons aforementioned the impugned judgment cannot be upheld which is accordingly set aside. Accordingly the appeal is allowed but there will be no order as to costs. 48. Ronojit Kumar Mitra, J. I agree. Appeal allowed.