Judgment :- A.R. Lakshmanan, J. The unsuccessful petitioners in O.P. No. 23179 of 1997 are the appellants in this Writ Appeal. This appeal is directed against the judgment of C.S. Rajan J. dated 15th January, 1998 dismissing the petition on the following grounds: "The petitioners were appointed under R.9(a)(i) of K.S.and S.S.R. for 180 days or till regular appointment through Kerala Public Service Commission or otherwise is made whichever is earlier. The petitioners are now challenging the termination of their service. I do not find any justification to accept the above challenge because the petitioner is bound by the conditions mentioned in Ext. P-1. Having accepted the appointment order along with the conditions, the petitioner cannot now turn round and contend that their services are not liable to be terminated on the expiry of 180 days. Therefore, the Original Petition is dismissed as devoid of any merit." The said judgment of the learned single judge is challenged in this appeal on the following grounds. (a) Candidates like the appellants can continue in service till the date of joining duty of Public Service Commission recruits and, as such, the action of the respondents in terminating their services cannot be justified. (b) Although there is a condition that the tenure of appointment of the appellants was for 180 days or till the Public Service Commission recruits joins duty, there is no jurisdiction to accommodate other provisional hands. (c) As the termination of service of the appellants is not to accommodate Public Service Commission recruits, the same is against the condition imposed in the order of appointment of the appellants and cannot be justified and is against the principles of natural justice. 2. In support of their contentions, the appellants have cited a recent judgment by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Om Prakash J. (as he then was)and Koshy J. in Writ Appeal No. 2201 of 1997 dated 5th December, 1997 wherein the Bench held that in cases like the instant, the better course would have been to permit the appellants to continue until regularly selected candidates become available from Public Service Commission. The judgment reads thus : "Appellants are challenging the impugned judgment dated November 10,1997 passed by the learned single judge. 2. The appellants were appointed by order dated 10.4.1995, Ext. The judgment reads thus : "Appellants are challenging the impugned judgment dated November 10,1997 passed by the learned single judge. 2. The appellants were appointed by order dated 10.4.1995, Ext. P1, as Ophthalmic Assistants in the Health Service Department on a temporary basis under R.9(a)(i) of the KSSR,1958 for a period of one year or till regular hands appointed through PSC join duty, whichever is earlier. Upon expiry of the term of one year, their appointments were terminated. 3. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents it is averred that appointments of the appellants were rightly terminated upon the expiry of the period of one year for which the appointments were restricted because that contingency happened earlier than the other, namely the availability of the regularly selected candidate from PSC. No doubt, the termination orders are consistent to the terms of the appointment orders. 3 A. It is however further stated in para 8 of the counter affidavit that the appellants are not entitled to continue in service beyond one year, as so many qualified unemployed hands who got registered their names in employment exchanges are waiting for an appointment atleast for admited period. From this plea of the respondents, it is clear that they want to continue different sets of candidates on adhoc basis, which cannot be countenanced. The respondents should not encourage adhocism. Better course would have been to permit the appellants to continue until regularly selected candidates become available from PSC. 4. Our attention has been drawn to another judgment dated 21.11.1997, passed by a Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No. 2094 of 1997 arising from O.P. 19150 of 1997. In similar circumstances the Division Bench observed as under: "We would further direct the first respondent to allow the appellant to continue in service, if there is no candidate advised by the Public Service Commission available for filling up of the post in which the appellant is at present working". On the basis of the said judgment, learned counsel for the appellants made efforts to persuade us to give the same direction in the instant appeal as well. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants stated at the bar that an examination to fill up such vacancies has already been conducted by the Public Service Commission and the result of the examinations is in the pipeline. This is not controverted by the Government Pleader. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants stated at the bar that an examination to fill up such vacancies has already been conducted by the Public Service Commission and the result of the examinations is in the pipeline. This is not controverted by the Government Pleader. On these facts, the appeal is disposed of finally with the observations that if the posts occupied by the appellants are decided to be filled up by the respondents, then they will be filled up either by appointing the appellants or by the regularly selected candidates, made available by the PSC. It is made clear that such posts will not be filled up by the respondents by another set of candidates of adhoc appointments. In support of the contentions of the appellants, learned counsel for the appellants also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of Haryana v. Piara Singh ((1992) 4 SCC 118) = AIR 1992 SC 2130). Paragraph 46 of the above judgment was heavily relied on by the counsel for the appellant. The said paragraph runs thus: "Secondly, an adhoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another ad hoc or temporary employee; he must be replaced only by a regularly selected employee. This is necessary to avoid arbitrary action on the part of the appointing authority". 3. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that persons like the appellants who were appointed under R.9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules can continue only upto 180 days and that they have no right to continue in service till replaced by Public Service Commission recruited hands. Learned Government Pleader further submitted that provisional appointments of the appellants being thus regulated by the statutory provisions, they cannot claim any right higher than the one which the statute has prescribed, nor can they claim any right inconsistent with the statutory provisions. When appointments are made under a statutory provision for a definite statutory period, it is not possible to spell out any right to the effect that contrary to the said statute the appointees are entitled to continue in service. When appointments are made under a statutory provision for a definite statutory period, it is not possible to spell out any right to the effect that contrary to the said statute the appointees are entitled to continue in service. In support of her contentions the learned Government Pleader relied on the following decisions: (1) Narayani v. State of Kerala (1984 KLT 17 (SQ), (2) S. Parimalom v. State of Kerala (1985 KLT 624), (3) Rajan v. v. Kerala State Electricity Board (1992 (1) KLT 566), (4) Reji Joseph v. Kerala State Electricity Board (1993 (1) KLT 393) (5) Sadanandan V. Circle Inspector (ILR 1994 (1) Ker. 701), (6) Sini P. Kuriakose v. State of Kerala (1987 (2) KLT 425), (7) Dr. Santhosh Babu v. State of Kerala (1990 (1) KLT SN P. 68), (8) A. Lakshmikutty v. State of Kerala (1991 (1) KLJ 698) and (9) C. Latha v. State (1993 (2) KLJ 496). An unreported decision of Sreedharan, J. (as he then was) and Koshy, J. in Writ Appeal No. 80 of 1989 dated 6th February 1996 was also relied on by the learned Government Pleader, wherein the Division Bench had considered the legal position under R.9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules and held that a temporary employee under R.9(a)(i) of the general rules has no right to the post and he cannot claim regularisation in service. That legal position has been consistently taken by this Court as can be seen from the decisions reported in Dr. Santhosh Baby v. State of Kerala (ILR 1990 (2) Ker. 484), Raj an v. Kerala State Electricity Board (1992 (1) KLT 98), Reji Joseph v. Kerala State Electricity Board (1993 (1) KLT 393), C. Latha v. State (1993 (2) KLJ 497) and an unreported decision in Writ Appeal Nos. 1056/92 and 55/95 as well as the numerous decisions cited by the learned Government Pleader. Counsel who appeared on either side before the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 2201 of 1997 have, unfortunately, not cited any of the above decisions or brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Judges the consistent legal position taken by this Court in interpreting the very same rule. 4. Before considering the rival contentions and rulings cited, a short statement of facts is necessary in order to appreciate the contentions of the appellants and the respondents. 4. Before considering the rival contentions and rulings cited, a short statement of facts is necessary in order to appreciate the contentions of the appellants and the respondents. The appellants were appointed as Junior Auditors of Co-operative Societies in the Department of Co-operation and posted in various Co-operative Banks under the supervision of the respondents in Kasargod District purely on a provisional basis under R.9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules for a period of 180 days from the date of their joining duty or till the Public Service Commission recruited persons joining duty, whichever is earlier. Ext. P1 is the order. The tenure of appointments completed on 31-12-1997 and 2-1-1998 with reference to the respective dates on which they joined duty. The Original Petition was filed on 29.12,1997 seeking a writ of prohibition restraining the respondents from terminating the service of the petitioners to accommodate provisional hands other than Public Service Commission recruits; and a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to permit the petitioners to continue in service till regularly appointed Public Service Commission recruits join duty. The appellants were discharging their duties even after the expiry of the period fixed in Ext. P1 in view of the interim order passed in CM P41414 of 1997 in the Original Petition. It is stated that the Public Service Commission has conducted a written test for the post of junior Auditors and that the results of the examination is awaited and no select list has yet been finalised. In the meanwhile, the appellants were to be replaced by another set of provisional hands. The appellants submit that the audit work can be discharged easily by experienced hands like the appellants which is admitted by the Department and hence they have issued direction to the appointing authorities to select experienced persons while making next selection. It is also submitted that the appellants have appeared for the written test conducted by the Public Service Commission and are likely to be selected by the Public Service Commission after the interview which is to be conducted soon. It is also submitted that the appellants have appeared for the written test conducted by the Public Service Commission and are likely to be selected by the Public Service Commission after the interview which is to be conducted soon. It is therefore submitted that candidates like that of the appellants are entitled to continue in service till the date of joining duty of Public Service Commission recruits if there are vacancies, which is the position emerging from the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Sasankan v. State of Kerala (1987 (2) KLT 347) and Sasidharan v. Kerala State Electricity Board (1991 (1) KLT 566) of this Court and also the judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 2979 of 1992 reported in State of Haryana v. Piara Singh (1992) 4 SCC 118). As already stated, a very recent decision of Division Bench of this Court was also relied on by the Counsel for the appellants in support of their contentions wherein the Bench had occasion to consider identical cases and was pleased to hold that if the posts occupied by the appellants therein are decided to be filled up by the respondents, then they will be filled up either by appointing the appellants therein or by the regularly selected candidates made available by the Public Service Commission. The said judgment of the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 2201 of 1997 is produced as Annexure A. The Bench also gave a direction that such posts will not be filled up by another set of candidates of ad hoc appointees. Since the proposed termination is not to accommodate Public Service Commission recruits, counsel for the appellants contended that the same is not in accordance with the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court and the Supreme Court, and therefore, .the judgment of the learned single judge cannot be sustained. 5. The Writ Appeal was resisted by the respondents by filing a counter affidavit through the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies (Audit), Kanhangad. It is contended that since the appointment of the appellants itself is on a provisional basis and that too for a specific period stipulated in Ext. P1, they are not entitled to continue in service beyond that period. The Writ Appeal was resisted by the respondents by filing a counter affidavit through the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies (Audit), Kanhangad. It is contended that since the appointment of the appellants itself is on a provisional basis and that too for a specific period stipulated in Ext. P1, they are not entitled to continue in service beyond that period. It is also stated that the message regarding the dismissal of the Original Petition received in the office of the first respondent on 21-1-1998, and accordingly, orders have been issued on the same day terminating the service of the appellants and directing to hand over the files and records of the unit to the office Auditor, but the appellants have never turned up for duty thereafter. It is submitted that the appellants have no right to continue alter 180 days of service and hence their services have been legally terminated after the dismissal of the Original Petition. 6. R.9(a)(i) of the Kerala State & Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 reads as follows: "9. Temporary appointments - (a) (i) Where it is necessary in the public interest, owing to an emergency which has arisen to fill immediately a vacancy in a post borne on the cadre of a service, class or category and there would be undue delay in making such appointment in accordance with these rules and the Special Rules, the appointing authority may appoint a person, otherwise than in accordance with the said rules, temporarily: provided further that a person appointed under this clause by direct recruitment to a post other than teaching post and a post covered by the proviso to clause (iii) of R.10(b) shall not be allowed to continue in such post for a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days. Provided also that a person appointed under this clause by direct recruitment to a post and discharged from service after the admissible period, shall not be re-appointed to the same post by the same appointing authority, except when fresh candidates are not available for appointment through Employment Exchange, and such re-appointment shall be made only with the prior concurrence of the Commission." As per the second proviso to R.9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1956, a person appointed temporarily by direct recruitment to a post other than teaching post and a post covered by the proviso to clause (iii) of R.10(b) shall not be allowed to continue in such post for a period exceeding 180 days. Originally the period was limited to three months. As it was felt that this system has various difficulties, it has been decided by the Government to enhance the time limit to 180 days and to amend the rules accordingly. The term "three months" was substituted by "one hundred and eighty days" by Government Order, G.O.(P) No. 26/82/GAD. dated 27-1-1982, published as SRO. No. 678/82 in Kerala Gazette No. 22 dated 1-6-1982. The last proviso to R.9(a)(i) clearly provided that persons appointed under this clause by direct recruitment to a post and discharged from service after the admissible period, shall not be re-appointed to the same post by the same appointing authority, except when fresh candidates are not available for appointment through Employment Exchange, and that such re-appointment shall be made only with the prior concurrence of the Public Service Commission. This proviso was inserted by G.O. (P) 137/84/GAD. dated 5-5-1984 published as S.R.O. No. 527/84 in Kerala Gazette No. 22 dated 29-5-1984. 7. The prayer in the Original Petition is to issue a writ of prohibition restraining the respondents from terminating the service of the appellants to accommodate provisional hands other than Public Service Commission recruits. So, the question involved is whether the service of the appellants can be terminated on the expiry of the term of their appointment for accommodating another set of provisional hands. This question has already been considered by this Court in the number of decisions. So, the question involved is whether the service of the appellants can be terminated on the expiry of the term of their appointment for accommodating another set of provisional hands. This question has already been considered by this Court in the number of decisions. In Remlath v. State of Kerala (1984 KLT 312) which is a case of termination of service after 180 days in the absence of persons advised by the Public Service Commission reporting duty, the Bench has observed as follows : "It is true that a person appointed under Cl. (i) of R.9(a)(i) shall be replaced as soon as possible by a member of the service or an approved candidate qualified to hold the post; that does not, however, mean that unless such candidate reports for duty, the service of the temporary hand employed to meet the emergency and as a stop-gap arrangement, could not be terminated even after the lapse of the period for which he or she was appointed in terms of the appointment order issued under R.9(a)(i) of the Rules". In S. Parimalom v. State of Kerala (1985 KLT 624) the Division Bench consisting of Bhaskaran CJ. and Bhaskaran Nambiar, J., while considering the impact of Government circular dated 3.5.1984 and also the question whether an employee if can continue in service beyond the period for which the appointment was made, observed as follows: "It would be totally untrue to the spirit of the directions contained in the judgment if we are to construe that the Supreme Court permitted a perpetual violation of R.9(a)(i), with particular reference to the second proviso thereto, which prohibited the continuation of the persons so appointed in service for a period exceeding 180 days. In our view, the circular dated 3.5.1984 issued by the Government reflects correctly the opinion of the Supreme Court in the decision in 1984 KLT 17. Therefore, the petitioner has no legal right to continue in service beyond the period for which appointment was made in Ext. P1 either in terms of R.9(a)(i)of the rules or by virtue of the observations or directions contained in the decision of the Supreme Court in Narayani's case(1984 KLT 17)". In Sini P. Kuriakose v. State of Kerala (1987 (2) KLT 425), Malimath, CJand Bhaskaran Nambiar; J. considered the question whether provisional employees appointed for 179 days are entitled to continue in the post till regular hands come. In Sini P. Kuriakose v. State of Kerala (1987 (2) KLT 425), Malimath, CJand Bhaskaran Nambiar; J. considered the question whether provisional employees appointed for 179 days are entitled to continue in the post till regular hands come. The validity of the circular dated 3rd May 1984 and the rights of provisional hands appointed subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court to continue in service notwithstanding the provisions contained in R.9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules came up for consideration in a batch of Writ Petitions before this Court and this Court has since then consistently held that the provisional employees have no statutory right to continue in service and they cannot be allowed to remain in service against the provisions of the statutory rules. In the above decision, the Bench, while considering identical question, has extracted the observations of a Bench of this Court in O.P. No. 4508/85 (1985 KLT 624) while construing the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1984 KLT 17 in Narayani v. State of Kerala and the circular issued by the State of Kerala dated 3rd May, 1984. The Bench expressed its doubt as to whether these decisions had been placed before the Supreme Court when the Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 410, 1574 and 1790 of 1986 and 874 of 1987 were disposed of by the Supreme Court by the decision reported in Sasankan v. State of Kerala (1987 (2) KLT 347). In the said decision also the Supreme Court has stated that the appropriate order to be passed in that case should be in the same terms as in P. K. Narayani v. State of Kerala & Ors. (AIR 1984 SC 534 =1984 KLT 17). The Division Bench, in its concluding remarks passed the following order: "6. It is not possible to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that any principle has been laid down by the Supreme Court contrary to the decisions of this Court reported in 1984 KLT 312 and 1985 KLT 624. When appointments are made under statutory provisions for a definite period, it is not possible to spell out any law to the effect that contrary to the said statute the appointee is entitled to continue in service beyond the period for which he was appointed in accordance with the statute. When appointments are made under statutory provisions for a definite period, it is not possible to spell out any law to the effect that contrary to the said statute the appointee is entitled to continue in service beyond the period for which he was appointed in accordance with the statute. The power of this Court is to keep within bounds of law and not to issue directions contrary to law. We are not inclined to take the view that Supreme Court has taken any decision contrary to what we have said in the aforesaid decisions. The decision of the learned single judge not to interfere is, in our view, right". In Dr. Santhosh Balm v. State of Kerala (1990 (1) KLT SN. P. 68) which was a case regarding admission to M.D. Course in Medical Colleges, the prospectus expressly stipulated that it was only the tutors in regular service who were eligible for selection in the 30% of seats reserved for tutors. Admittedly the petitioners were not tutors in regular service as their appointments were only provisional in character and, therefore, the petitioners were ineligible for being considered for admission to the seats reserved for tutors in regular service. The State of Kerala took the stand that those seats were added to the general merit seals and that candidates on the basis of general merit have been accorded admission to those seats. The Bench consisting of Malimath, C. J. and Viswanatha Iyer, J. held that the action taken by the respondents in filling up' the remaining seats reserved as tutors' quota on the basis of general merit is consistent with the law laid down by this Court in 1986 KLJ 637. The Bench held thus "Provisional appointments of the petitioners being thus regulated by the statutory provisions, they cannot claim any rights higher than one which the statute has prescribed nor can they claim any rights inconsistent with the statutory provisions. When appointments are made under this statutory provision for a definite statutory period, it is not possible to spell out -any right to the effect that contrary to the said statute the appointee is entitled to continue in service beyond the period for which he was appointed in accordance with the statute. Provisional employees have no right to continue in service beyond the statutory period and they cannot be allowed to remain in service against the statutory rules. Provisional employees have no right to continue in service beyond the statutory period and they cannot be allowed to remain in service against the statutory rules. There is no statutory provision on the basis of which a person appointed under R.9 can claim regularisation of services, the stipulation contained in that rule clearly mandates that no such regularisation is legally permissible as there is a positive bar against any claim for future appointment to such service being recognised on the strength of his prior appointment as a provisional appointee. It therefore. follows that there is in effect express bar against regularisation in service of those appointed under R.9. A person appointed under R.9 cannot therefore seek a work in the nature of mandamus directing the authorities to regularise his services on the ground that he has rendered service for several years as a provisional appointee under R.9. Granting of such a relief would be clearly in violation of the statutory prohibition contained in R.9." In A Lakshmikutty v. State of Kerala (1991 (1) KLJ 698) K. Sreedharan, J. (as he then was) had occasion to consider whether the period of 180 days prescribed as the term of appointment of a temporary hand is arbitrary and violative of Art.14 of the Constitution of India. The learned judge held as follows : "Only when a regular appointment in conformity with the General Rules and Special Rules is found to be time consuming can that temporary appointment be resorted to. At the earliest opportunity that vacancy should be filled up in strict compliance with the provisions of the General Rules and the Special Rules. So, as a stop gap arrangement that temporary appointments are effected. If the temporary appointments are to be of indefinite duration, it will go to defeat the provisions of the General Rules and the Special Rules governing regular appointment. Therefore, it is highly necessary to fix a term of appointment under R.9(a)(i) of the General Rules. Government thought it fit to fix the tennat 180 days. The wisdom in fixing that period is not open to judicial review because the Government is bound to fix a term for the temporary appointment. It is not for the court to substitute that period with another on the ground that it will be more appropriate. Government thought it fit to fix the tennat 180 days. The wisdom in fixing that period is not open to judicial review because the Government is bound to fix a term for the temporary appointment. It is not for the court to substitute that period with another on the ground that it will be more appropriate. The fixation of this term of 180 days can by no stretch of imagination be considered as arbitrary because it applies to all temporary appointments under R.9(a)(i) of the General Rules. All temporary appointments are being treated equally, in the sense that the appointees have to vacate the post on the expiry of the period of 180 days. So, it is not violative of Art.14 of the Constitution". The learned judge also held that the third proviso to the said Rule giving privilege to members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes by allowing them to continue beyond 180 days can never be termed as arbitrary or illegal and that the State Government, while framing the rules, incorporated the third proviso giving protection to them by allowing them to continue in service even beyond the period of 180 days, but by this continuance in service they are not acquiring any right to the post either. The learned judge also held that this provision being in consonance with the Art.335 of the Constitution of India, cannot be taken as sufficient ground to challenge R.9(a)(i) as violative of the equality provision contained in the Constitution. In Rajan v. State of Kerala (1992 (1) KLT 98), the Bench consisting of Jagannadha Rao, C.J. and John Mathew, J. held thus: "No mandamus can be issued for continuance of employees temporarily appointed under R.9(a)(i) of the K.S.& S.S.R. after the expiry of the term of their appointment. This is so, notwithstanding the observations and directions issued by the Supreme Court in Narayani's v case, 1984 KLT 17, as also the observations of the Supreme Court in Sasankan's case, 1987 (2) KLT 347. The petitioners have no right to continue in service and no mandamus can be issued under Art.226 of the Constitution of India for their continuance." The Division Bench also observed that under S.25H of the Industrial Disputes Act workmen who have been retrenched, can be re-employed, if certain conditions are satisfied. Basically therefore, they must be retrenched workmen. The petitioners have no right to continue in service and no mandamus can be issued under Art.226 of the Constitution of India for their continuance." The Division Bench also observed that under S.25H of the Industrial Disputes Act workmen who have been retrenched, can be re-employed, if certain conditions are satisfied. Basically therefore, they must be retrenched workmen. While construing the definition of retrenchment in S.2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Bench observed that retrenchment does not include termination of service of the workmen as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein. Admittedly, orders of appointment of the petitioners in that case contained a condition that the employee will be terminated and will not confer any right for regularisation and, therefore, the Bench held that the petitioners cannot, as of right, claim any benefit of S.25H of the Industrial Disputes Act. In Reji Joseph v. K.S.E.B (1993 (1) KLT 393) the Bench consisting of Paripoornan, J. (as His Lordship then was) and Usha, J. held that the appointees under R.9(a) (i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules have no legal right to insist that they can be substituted only by candidates selected through the Public Service Commission for regular appointment and that they have no right to claim regularisation in the post to which they were appointed on provisional basis. The above view was expressed by this Court after an elaborate consideration of the statutory provisions contained in R.9 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. The challenge in the above case was against the termination of the service of the petitioner as Pharmacist under the respondents. He was appointed on a provisional basis under R.9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. Petitioner's case was that his service could not be terminated except for appointing a candidate regularly recruited through the Public Service Commission. The challenge in the above case was against the termination of the service of the petitioner as Pharmacist under the respondents. He was appointed on a provisional basis under R.9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. Petitioner's case was that his service could not be terminated except for appointing a candidate regularly recruited through the Public Service Commission. It was also argued that the view taken in the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in W.A. 358 of 1990 against similar claims put forward by employees appointed provisionally under R.9(a)(i) of the K.S. and S.S.R. was liable to be considered in the light of a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 2979 of 1992((1992)4 SCC 118 = AIR 1992 SC 2130). Before the Division Bench of this Court in the above case it was not in dispute that the petitioner accepted the conditions mentioned in the appointment order and joined the service as Pharmacist and on the expiry of 50 days, his service was terminated. It was alleged in the Original Petition that in his place another candidate recruited through the Employment Exchange was being appointed. The main thrust of the argument of the petitioner was that the petitioner's service could not be terminated in order to accommodate another temporary candidate and that he can be replaced only by regularly appointed candidate selected through the Public Service Commission. As the above question was the subject matter of consideration in a number of decisions of this Court, the Division Bench referred to all the earlier decisions and rejected the contentions of the petitioner. Considering all the earlier rulings of this Court, the Bench has observed that the appointees under R.9(a)(i) have no legal right to continue in service beyond the period of their appointment or to insist that they can be substituted only by candidates selected through the Public Service Commission for regular appointment and that they have no right to claim regularisation in the post in which they were appointed on a temporary basis. As noticed earlier, before the Division Bench of this Court, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 2979 of 1992 reported in State of Haryana v. Piara Singh ((1992) 4 SCC 119) was heavily relied on. Paragraph 23 of the said judgment was relied on by the petitioners before the Division Bench. As noticed earlier, before the Division Bench of this Court, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 2979 of 1992 reported in State of Haryana v. Piara Singh ((1992) 4 SCC 119) was heavily relied on. Paragraph 23 of the said judgment was relied on by the petitioners before the Division Bench. The Bench has distinguished the judgment of the Supreme Court in paragraphs 18,19 and 20 of its judgment, which reads as follows: "18. The above observations of the Supreme Court has to be understood in the light of the facts of the case considered in the civil appeals and the detailed statutory provisions made under R.9 of the K.S.& SSR governing the appointment of temporary employees. As mentioned earlier, the appointments which were subject matter of the appeal were made not under any statutory rule or regulation. They were appointed on an ad hoc basis on the whims and fancies of the appointing authorities. Such method of ad hoc appointments would certainly lead to arbitrary action. But, when the provisions of R.9 are examined, it can be seen that there will be no scope for any arbitrary action. The condition that the provisional appointment shall be for a period not exceeding 180 days is applicable to all provisional employees except categories specifically exempted under the rule. Provisional appointment can be made only through employment exchange. Sufficient provisions are made in the general rules to avoid arbitrariness in the matter of appointment of provisional employees. 19. So long as the provisions contained in the general rules are not found lacking in necessary safeguards suggested by the Supreme Court, the general observations contained in Paragraph 25 of the civil appeal by itself would not give support to the contention of the petitioner that he is entitled to continue in service beyond the period of his appointment and till regular candidates through P.S.C. join duty. On an anxious consideration of the latest decision of the Supreme Court, we are not persuaded to hold that the earlier decisions of this Court holding that a provisional appointee under R.9(a)(i) of the K.S. and S.S.R. is not entitled to continue in service beyond the period of his appointment and till candidate through PSC joins duty, is liable to be reconsidered. 20. 20. It is true that while disposing of some of the Special Leave Petitions or Civil Appeals, the Supreme Court has directed the appointing authorities to allow provisional employees to continue in service till regular appointments are made. But as mentioned earlier, in none of these cases the Supreme Court has considered the provisions contained in R.9 of Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules which is a complete code in itself and held that inspite of the provisions contained therein a provisional appointee under R.9(a)(i) can continue in service till regular appointment is made. Under these circumstances, it is not open to this Court exercising jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution to grant the prayer made by the petitioner herein to allow him to continue in service till candidates selected through the P.S.C. join duty. In State of Punjab v.Surinder Kumar (ABR 1992 SC 1593), the limitation of jurisdiction of the High Courts under Art.226 of the Constitution to pass such orders has been made clear. In the above case, judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana directing the State Government to allow the petitioners who were appointed on part-time basis to continue until regular appointments were made on the recommendation of the PSC was under challenge before the Supreme Court. In order to sustain the impugned direction, reliance was placed before the Supreme Court on the directions issued by the apex court in several cases for absorption of temporary or ad hoc Government servants on permanent basis, the Supreme Court held that the High Court has no jurisdiction to pass such orders unlike the Supreme Court which is empowered under Art.142 of the Constitution to make such orders as may be necessary "fordoing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it". In the decision reported in C. Latha v. State (1993 (2) KLJ 497) also R.9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules came up for consideration and the Bench consisting of Jagannadha Rao, Q. and K. Sreedharan, J. (as they then were) held thus: "It will be noticed from the provision in the K.S. and S.S.R. that temporary appointment is made where an emergency has arisen when regular hands are not available, where it would take considerable time to make regular appointment through the Public Service Commission or other procedures prescribed for regular appointment. In such cases, temporary appointments could be resorted to. In such cases, temporary appointments could be resorted to. Then, such appointments will be for a period not exceeding 180 days. As to what should happen after the termination of such appointment before 180 days, the proviso last extracted above clearly mentions that a person appointed under this clause by direct recruitment to a post and discharged from service after the admissible period shall not be reappointed to the same post by the same appointing authority except when fresh candidates are not available for appointment through Employment Exchange and such reappointment shall be made only with the prior concurrence of the Commission. In other words, there is a prohibition in the proviso last extracted stating that a person who has been appointed for a period less than 180 days by direct recruitment to a post and discharged from service after the admissible period shall not be reappointed to the same post, except when fresh candidates are not available for appointment through Employment Exchange. The proviso to R.9 appears to be based upon a policy which is peculiar to the State of Kerala. Here, number of jobs are limited, and the persons available are in thousands. The policy of the Government appears to be to have the post filled up by rotation from among the candidates registered in the Employment Exchange, and this is to go on till regular appointments are made through Public Service Commission or other competent authority. There is always a heavy backlog of candidates registered in the Employment Exchange. They are given temporary posting for less man 180 days by rotation. Such a policy has been adopted in the peculiar conditions prevailing in the State where jobs in private employment are few, and there is a clamour for Government employment, In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the policy behind the proviso in R.9 last extracted above is unreasonable." The same Bench in Sadanandan v. Circle Inspector (ILR 1994 (1) Kerala 701) has observed that the service of a provisional appointee under R.9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules who continued beyond the period specified in the appointment order is liable to be terminated even before any Public Service Commission recruited candidate is appointed. In that view of the matter, the Court held that the refusal to permit the petitioner to rejoin duty even before the Public Service Commission recruit joined duty could not be said to be invalid. The unreported decision by a Division Bench comprising of Sreedharan, J. (as he then was) and Koshy, J. in W.A. No. 80 of 1989 and connected cases can also be usefully looked into in the present context. In that case, the State Government appointed the petitioners in the Original Petitions as Assistant Engineers in the Public Works Department under R.9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. While they were holding the post on temporary basis, they were selected by the Public Service Commission for filling up the post of Assistant Engineers in the same Department. On the basis of the ranks obtained by them, they were advised and appointed as Assistant Engineers. They wanted regularisation in service and fixation of rank with effect from the date of their entry in service under R.9(a)(i). In other words they wanted seniority and regularisation on the basis of the date of the order of their first appointment to the service under R.9(a)(i) of the General Rules. Since the Government did not concede to this request, they filed the Original Petitions. The Division Bench, in paragraph 6 and 12 of the judgment, opined as follows: "6. An appointee under R.9(a)(i) of the General Rules has no claim for any right for continuance in service. He has no right to the post except for the salary for the work he has done. He has no right to claim regularisation in service in view of the specific provision contained in clause (iv) of R.9(a) of the General Rules. R.9(e) of the General Rules inter alia provide that a temporary appointee who has put in two years of continuous service on 22-12-73 in one category of post in the same department may be regularised in service by an order passed by the Government in that regard. As per this provision, a provisional employee who has put in provisional employment of two years as on 22-12-73 can get regularisation in the service with effect from the date of order of regularisation. Invoking this provision, 23 persons mentioned in G.O. Ms. No. 86/81 PW & E were regularised in service with effect from the date of the order namely, 11-4-81. Invoking this provision, 23 persons mentioned in G.O. Ms. No. 86/81 PW & E were regularised in service with effect from the date of the order namely, 11-4-81. Similarly 4 others, who satisfied R.9(e) of the General Rules, were given regularisation with effect from 12.5.81, the date on which G.O. Ms. 91/81 PW & E was issued. It is worth while to note that the Engineers who were regularised as per the orders dated 11-5-81 and 12-5-81 were not given regularisation with effect from the date of their entry in service. They were given regularisation in service only with effect from the date on which their services were regularised. Government considered the case of Sri. K.K. Narayanan as a special one and by invoking the provisions contained in R.39 of the General Rules, regularised his services with effect from the date of his entry in service. The benefit that is so extended to Narayanan by invoking the powers under R.39 of the General Rules cannot be, as a matter of right, claimed by other provisional employees. No one has got a right to compel the Government to exercise the power under R.39 of the General Rules and to confer them the benefit of retrospective regularisation in service. 12. R.18 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules specifically states that a person who has been appointed temporarily under R.9(a)(i) of the General Rules to any post will not be a probationer on account of the said temporary appointment. R.9(a)(i) also states that the appointment under that Rule is only to tide over the undue delay that may be caused in making regular appointment in accordance with the Rules. Since he is not a regular appointee and he is not on probation, his service which can count for seniority shall commence only from the date of regular appointment. R.27 of the General Rues states that seniority of a person in service, class or category shall be determined by the order of first appointment to such service, class or category. That provision has got an explanation which states that appointment made mention of in R.27 shall not include appointment under R.9 or appointment by promotion under R.31 of the General Rules. Therefore, on the basis of the temporary. provisional appointment obtained by the petitioners, they cannot claim regularisation in the service. That provision has got an explanation which states that appointment made mention of in R.27 shall not include appointment under R.9 or appointment by promotion under R.31 of the General Rules. Therefore, on the basis of the temporary. provisional appointment obtained by the petitioners, they cannot claim regularisation in the service. Nor can they claim seniority in the service depending on the date of entry in service on provisional basis." A Division Bench of the Madras High Court comprising of A.R. Lakshmanan & P. Thangavelu, JJ. in Writ Appeal No. 512 of 1997 and other connected batch of appeals and Writ Petitions, while considering the case of temporary appointment, held by judgment dated 14-10-19971hattheemployeehavenorighttoclaimregularisationsince the appointment is seasonal in character and the appointment order specifically stated that they will he ousted from service at any time due to non availability of work, for want of vacancy on account of completion of work and due to non-availability of budgetary sanction for the continuance of such seasonal employees. The Bench has opined that the workmen did not acquire any vested right to be regularised since the appointment was a seasonal one to produce paddy for the Civil Supplies Corporation during 'Sambha' season and "Kuruvai" season of 1997. At the time of appointment the employees were informed that the appointment is seasonal in character and purely temporary one for a short period and they are liable to be ousted from service at any time without prior notice or assigning any reason. 8. This Bench is of the view that as the appointment is purely on ad hoc basis and is contractual, the appointment comes to an end as soon as the work is over and the person holding such post can have no legal rights to continue in the post. Temporary employees have no right to ask for continuance in the post till the employees are regularly appointed by the Public Service Commission, or for regularisation, as the seasonal employees are not recruited in the manner contemplated in the rules. The conditions precedent for regularisation is that the appointment should be on regular basis after selection according to rules. To our mind, it is clear that where the appointment is contractual, by efflux of time the appointment comes to an end the appointees would have no right to continue in the post. 9. The conditions precedent for regularisation is that the appointment should be on regular basis after selection according to rules. To our mind, it is clear that where the appointment is contractual, by efflux of time the appointment comes to an end the appointees would have no right to continue in the post. 9. The Supreme Court in the decision reported in Union of India v. Mot Hal (1996 (7) SCC 481) held thus: "11. This it is apparent that a daily-wage or casual worker against a particular post when acquires a temporary status having worked against the said post for specified number of days does not acquire a right to be regularised against the said post. He can be considered for regularisation in accordance with the rules and therefore, so far as the post of mate under Railways is concerned, the same has to be filled up by promotion from the post of gang man and key man in Class IV subject to employees passing the trade test." In the decision in Ram Sakhi Devi v. State of U.P. (1997) 4 SCC 379) which is also a case of an ad hoc appointment and the appointee continued in service on the basis of interim stay. The Supreme Court held that such continuation did not entitle him for regularisation. It was held as follows: 7. In fact, the regularisation order passed by the District Inspector of Schools also says that it was subject to the result in the writ petition. The appeal being the continuation of the writ petition, the question arises whether the respondent is entitled to claim the benefit of S.33-B(1)(a)(i) of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission Act, 1982. We have seen that his services came to be terminated on 30.5.1988 and the Amendment Act has no application. Hence, the Division Bench was not right in giving direction that his regularisation will be subject to the further orders since the regularisation order itself means that it was subject to the result of the writ petition". A single judge of the Madras High Court (A.R. Lakshmanan, J.) in the decision reported in C.R. Mugundan & Ors. v. Director General (Member secretary), Indian Council of Medical Research, New Delhi & Ors. (1996 (1) LLJ 849) held thus: "The employees were engaged on contract basis on various dates from May 31,1991 to June 15,1992. A single judge of the Madras High Court (A.R. Lakshmanan, J.) in the decision reported in C.R. Mugundan & Ors. v. Director General (Member secretary), Indian Council of Medical Research, New Delhi & Ors. (1996 (1) LLJ 849) held thus: "The employees were engaged on contract basis on various dates from May 31,1991 to June 15,1992. The order of appointment clearly states that the petitioners are engaged only for a specific period. The said contract was renewed at the end of the earlier contract period only if there was any necessity for renewing the same. The contract between employees and Indian Council of Medical Research is only a private contract of employment and the same stipulates various terms and conditions. The order of appointment clearly shows that the posts are temporary. The appointment was made under the scheme and the employees will not have any benefit like contributory provident fund, general provident fund, medical benefits, bonus, leave travel concession, etc. The staff employed in the Research scheme are not employees of Central Jalma Institute for Leprosy which is a field unit of Indian Council of Medical Research." In the decision in Director, Institute of Management Development v. Pushpa Srivastava (AIR 1992 SC 2070) the Supreme Court held that there is no ground for claiming that the appointee is entitled to regularisation in service, where the appointment is purely on ad hoc basis and is contractual and by efflux of time the appointment comes to an end and the person holding such post can have no right to continue in the post, even if the person is continued from time to time on'ad hoc' basis for more than a year. 10. As already noticed, learned counsel for the appellant placed strong reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 46 of its judgment in State of Haryana v. Piara Singh ((1992) 4 SCC 118). The above case, in our opinion, is distinguishable on facts. In fact in paragraph 53 the Supreme Court itself has observed that each Government or authority has to devise its own criteria or principles for regularisation having regard to all the relevant circumstances, but while doing so, it should bear in mind the observations made therein. It is useful to reproduce paragraph 53 in the present context. "53. In fact in paragraph 53 the Supreme Court itself has observed that each Government or authority has to devise its own criteria or principles for regularisation having regard to all the relevant circumstances, but while doing so, it should bear in mind the observations made therein. It is useful to reproduce paragraph 53 in the present context. "53. These are but a few observations which we thought it necessary to make impelled by the facts of this case and the spate of litigation by such employees. They are not exhaustive nor can they be understood as immutable. Each Government or authority has to devise its own criteria or principles for regularisation having regard to all the relevant circumstances, but while doing so, it should bear in mind the observations made herein." The Supreme Court had also no occasion to consider the validity of R.9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules or any other identical rule. The case before the Supreme Court was also a case of regularisation of ad hoc/temporary employees, members of work-charged establishments, daily wagers, casual labour and those engaged temporarily in temporary schemes. The services of a number of persons could not be regularised for the reason that they did not satisfy one or the other of the conditions prescribed in the orders. They were, however, allowed to continue in service. It was this category of employees who approached the Punjab & Haryana High Court praying for the issue of a writ or direction for regularisation of their services. The High Court, while allowing the batch of writ petitions, issued certain directions as found in paragraph 16 of the Supreme Court's judgment. The States of Punjab & Haryana questioned the validity and correctness of the said directions in the appeals filed by them before the Supreme Court. It was submitted on behalf of the employees that the directions were given with a view to curb atbitrariness of the authorities and with a view to give a satisfactory solution to a human problem created by the policies of the Governments themselves. On the other hand, counsel for the State questioned the veracity of the order of the High Court and submitted that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in virtually amending the Government orders on the subject of regularisation. On the other hand, counsel for the State questioned the veracity of the order of the High Court and submitted that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in virtually amending the Government orders on the subject of regularisation. The Supreme Court, after pointing out the several problems that may arise if such directions given by courts become the norms, has however, proceeded to examine whether the High Court was right in holding that the several conditions prescribed in the orders issued by the two Governments from time to time were bad. In conclusion, the Supreme Court, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case on hand and before parting with the case, gave certain directions to the concerned Governments for regularisation of ad hoc and temporary employees in Government service. One such direction is found in paragraph 46 of the order. The Supreme Court also made it clear that those directions should not, however, apply to the statutory/ public Corporations functioning with in the States of Punjab and Haryana as are under the control of the Government of India, and that the Corporations may evolve a policy for regularisation, if they had not already evolved one, and make their existing policy consistent with the judgment of the Supreme Court to avoid litigation. As already noticed, in paragraph 5 3 of the judgment the Supreme Court itself has observed that the observations made by it in the judgment are not exhaustive nor can they be understood as immutable and that those were a few observations which the Court thought necessary to make, impelled by the facts of that case and the spate of the litigation by such employees. The Supreme Court gave opportunity to each Government/Authority to devise its own criteria or principles for regularisation having regard to all the relevant circumstances. 11. As already seen, the last proviso to R.9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules provides that a person appointed under this Clause by direct recruitment to a post and discharged from service after the admissible period, shall not here-appointed to the same post by the same appointing authority, except when fresh candidates are not available for appointment through Employment Exchange, and such re-appointment shall be made only with the prior concurrence of the Commission. This proviso was inserted by G.O.(P) No. 137/84/GAD. This proviso was inserted by G.O.(P) No. 137/84/GAD. Dated 5-5-1984 published as S.R.O. No. 527/84 in Kerala Gazette No. 22 dated 29.5.19 84. Pursuant to the directions of the Supreme Court in Narayani v. State of Kerala (1984 KLT 17), the Government of Kerala issued a circular dated 3rd May, 1984 stating therein in paragraph 2 as follows: "It has come to the notice of Government that the benefit of continuing in service beyond 180 day s is allowed not only to provisional employees who have been in continuous employment on the date of the judgment of the Supreme Court, viz. 24-11-1983, but also to those appointed through Employment Exchange after 24-11-83 as well. This is not the intention of the Government in issuing circulars dated 5-12-1983 and 9-1-1984. The benefit of continuance beyond 180 days till regular hands advised by the Kerala Public Service Commission join duty is allowed only to those temporary (provisional) employees who have been in continuous employment on 24-11-1983, the date of Supreme Court judgment. The temporary (provisional) appointments made after 24-11-1983 will be governed by the provisions contained in R.9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958." The validity of the above circular and the right of provisional hands appointed subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court to continue in service notwithstanding the provisions contained in R.9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules came up for consideration in a batch of Writ Petitions before this Court and this Court has since then consistently held that the provisional employees have no statutory right to continue in service and that they cannot be allowed to continue in service against the provisions of the statutory rules. We are also included to take the same view which has been consistently taken by many eminent judges of this Court that the provisional employees have no statutory right to continue in service and they cannot be allowed to continue in service against the provisions of the statutory rules. 12. In this case, the appellants/ petitioners have not canvassed the validity of the rules and it could never have been the intention of the Supreme Court, in effect, to nullify the second proviso to the said rule which prohibited continuation of persons appointed under that clause in the post for a period exceeding 180 days. The Writ Petition and the consequent appeal are misconceived. The Writ Petition and the consequent appeal are misconceived. The appellants have no legal right to continue in service beyond the period for which the appointment was made in terms of R.9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules or by virtue of the observations of the Supreme Court contained in the decision in State of Haryana v. Piara Singh (1992) 4 SCC 118. The result, therefore, is the Writ Appeal is dismissed. The appellants shall be entitled to their salary and other emoluments, if any due, for the period they actually worked, which shall be paid as expeditiously as possible. There will be no order as to costs. C.M.P. No. 335 of 1998 also stands dismissed.