S. D. DAVE, J. ( 1 ) THIS motion of Contempt came to be moved originally by jayantilal Manilal Shah (Deceased) through his Heir and Legal Representative Smt. Madhuben Shah. The say of the petitioner in the motion of Contempt is rather lengthy. ( 2 ) H. R. P. Suit No. 4083 of 1974 came to be filed by the deceased Jayantilal shah against the present respondent for obtaining a decree of eviction qua the premises bearing No. 645/2 situated at Char Rasta, Nava Darwaja Road, Kalupur, ahmedabad. The Court of Small Causes at Ahmedabad was pleased to grant a decree of eviction in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant, who is the respondent before us, on 13/11/1978. This decree of eviction came to be confirmed by the Appellate Bench of Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad, in Appeal No. 13 of 1979 under judgment and orders dated 16/02/1982. This decree confirmed by the first Appellate Court came to be further confirmed by this Court under the orders dated 13/02/1995. This had so happened because the Civil Revision application No. 626 of 1982 filed by the defendant-tenant who is the respondent before us came to be dismissed. However, while dismissing the above said C. R. A. , this Court was pleased to grant the time up to 28/02/1998 to the respondent before us for the vacation of the premises, but subject to the condition that the respondent files before this Court an undertaking in usual terms within a period of six weeks. It appears that no undertaking as directed came to be filed by the respondent before us within the stipulated period. Any how. he moved M. C. A. No. 758 of 1995 asking for some time, "say about six weeks" for the filing of the undertaking. This Court had granted this time under the orders dated 10/07/1995 in M. C. A. 758 of 1995. It appears that, even during the extended period no undertaking came ,to be filed by the respondent. Instead of that M. C. A. No. 1266 of 1995 came to be moved by the respondent for extension of the time of two days to file the undertaking. This M. C. A. came to be allowed and ultimately on 7/09/1995, the respondent before us had filed the undertaking which came to be taken on record under the orders of this Court bearing even date. This M. C. A. came to be allowed and ultimately on 7/09/1995, the respondent before us had filed the undertaking which came to be taken on record under the orders of this Court bearing even date. The respondent before us was, therefore, required to hand over the actual physical vacant possession of the premises to the landlord during the stipulated time-frame, but instead of so doing, he had moved M. C. A. No. 291 of 1998 before this Court seeking a further extension for a period of one year, so as to enable him to vacate the premises and to make the alternative arrangement for his residence. These proceedings taken out by the respondent came to be dismissed. ( 3 ) THEREFORE, now the say of the petitioners before us is that, the respondent is guilty of disobeying and not fulfilling the undertaking which was given by him before this Court on 7/09/1995. We have pointed out that the motion was moved by one of the heirs and legal representatives of deceased Jayantilal Shah, namely, Smt. Madhuben Shah. Looking to the affidavit-in-reply, wherein a specific contention has been raised by the respondent saying that all the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased are not on record; an application came to be moved by the petitioner saying that all other heirs and legal representatives of the deceased be allowed to be brought on record. This application has been decided and the prayer has been granted. The net result, therefore, is that, now instead of Smt. Madhuben shah alone, all the heirs and legal representatives of deceased Jayantilal Manilal Shah are on record before us in these proceedings. ( 4 ) VERY many contentions were sought to be raised before us by the learned counsels representing the parties, any how ultimately the concentration has been only two of them. Firstly, we would like to have a fresh look at the undertaking given by the respondent who was the original defendant and therefore, the opponent in the Civil Revision Application. In this undertaking, it has been said that, he would hand over and shall give the possession of the premises on 28/02/1998, peacefully to the opponent No. 1. landlord. It should not be overlooked that the opponent No. 1 happened to be deceased Jayantilal Manilal Shah. In this undertaking, it has been said that, he would hand over and shall give the possession of the premises on 28/02/1998, peacefully to the opponent No. 1. landlord. It should not be overlooked that the opponent No. 1 happened to be deceased Jayantilal Manilal Shah. ( 5 ) VARIOUS contentions have been raised in the affidavit-in-reply which came to be filed by the defendant. At para 5 of the affidavit-in-reply, the respondent before us has said that, "he is ready and willing to hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the premises in question to a person in whose favour legal authentication by way of granting Succession Certificate and/or Letters of Administration as a legal and surviving heir of the deceased have been obtained from the Competent Court. " therefore, it appears that even before us at an earlier occasion the stand of the respondent was to the effect that he is ready and willing to hand over the actual vacant possession of the premises in question to a person or persons who can be said to be legally authorised to have the possession of the premises. ( 6 ) IN our opinion, the above said say coming from the respondent before us appears to be wholly a misconceived one. It should not be overlooked that the suit came to be filed by Jayantilal Manilal Shah. Later on, after his demise the heirs and legal representatives who have been left behind by him would be entitled to the fruit of the decree of eviction which could have been obtained by the deceased during his life-time. It should also not be overlooked that the dispute being raised by the respondent before us. of course technical in nature, does not survive, and recedes in the background looking to the fact that now all the heirs and legal representatives of deceased are before us in the contempt proceedings. ( 7 ) LEARNED Counsel Mr. Kiran Pandit who appears on behalf of respondent before us has urged with great vehemence as the first contention that, present proceedings are not maintainable before us in our contempt jurisdiction because the execution proceedings which were taken out by the deceased during his life-time are still pending before the executing Court and that, the above said aspect has been deliberately suppressed by the petitioners before us while making of the motion in our Contempt Jurisdiction. In other words, the contention coming from learned counsel Mr. Pandit is that the petitioners are guilty of the suppression of material and vital facts and therefore, on that count alone these proceedings are required to be dismissed. Learned Counsel Mr. Pandit has drawn our attention to an application which has been registered as Exh. 18 in the execution proceedings, which have been registered as Execution Application No. 117 of 1995. By this application deceased jayantilal Manilal Shah had moved the Court for adjourning the execution proceedings sine die on a ground that. now at a belated stage the undertaking had been given by the defendant-tenant in pursuance of the orders of the High Court, and therefore. till other and further orders by the High Court, the execution proceedings should be adjourned sine die. It is not in dispute that these proceedings are still subsisting on the file of the Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad. It also cannot be disputed that the matter has been adjourned to 22/12/1998. Learned Counsel Ms. Kusum Shah who appears on behalf of the petitioners wanted to urge that, this has been done at the behest of the respondent who would have moved Small Causes court for the fixation of a date. In our opinion, it is not necessary for us to enter into this controversy. We shall have to notice the fact that the execution proceedings taken out by deceased Jayantilal Manilal Shah are still subsisting on the file of Small causes Court at Ahmedabad. ( 8 ) LEARNED Counsel Mr. Kiran Pandit has placed reliance upon the pronouncement of this Court in Vijay J. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat and Ors. . 1988 (2) [xxix (2)] glr 902. It was a case of a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Learned single Judge has expressed the opinion that there should not be the suppression of material facts and if an interim order is obtained by suppressing the material facts, the petitioner would be liable even to be punished for the Contempt of the Court. Learned single Judge was pleased to say further that, at any rate, such a petition was liable to be rejected when there is no remorse. Turning to the facts, it would appear that the petitioner had obtained the interim orders from this Court and at the hands of the very same. Learned single Judge was pleased to say further that, at any rate, such a petition was liable to be rejected when there is no remorse. Turning to the facts, it would appear that the petitioner had obtained the interim orders from this Court and at the hands of the very same. learned single Judge by suppressing material facts that he was appointed purely on ad hoc and temporary basis and that too, also on a temporary post. The fact situation is entirely different before us. Despite this the principle laid down by the learned single Judge remains that if the petitioner is found to be guilty of suppression of material facts, the petition would be liable to be rejected. ( 9 ) BUT here, in our opinion, the suppression of the facts cannot be said to be of a material fact because though the execution proceedings were instituted by the deceased, in all his sincerity, and with honesty he had gone before the very same court by himself and has urged the Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad by saying that. now in view of the orders of the High Court and the undertaking filed by the defendant-tenant who is respondent before us; (which was not being filed) the proceedings should be adjourned sine die. It would have been absolutely better if these facts were to find their place in the proceedings before us. But merely because the same has not been done, we are not of the opinion that the proceedings require to be jettisoned on the ground that, there has been the suppression of the material fact. This is especially so because the grievance made by the petitioners before us is not regarding the non- performance of the obligation arising against the respondent-tenant by virtue of a decree of eviction, but the grievance precisely is of non-fulfilling of the obligations arising from the undertaking which has been filed by the respondent before this Court. We. therefore, are not in a position to agree with learned Counsel Mr. Kiran Pandit, who urges that the petition requires to be dismissed on the sole ground of suppression of material facts. We. therefore, are not in a position to agree with learned Counsel Mr. Kiran Pandit, who urges that the petition requires to be dismissed on the sole ground of suppression of material facts. We cannot remain unimpressed by the fact the execution proceedings were there even at the time of the hearing of the Civil Revision Application filed by the respondent before us, and the said application came to be presented in a fond hope that the undertaking filed by the tenant shall be honoured, and execution of the decree shall not have to be resorted to. ( 10 ) IT is not in dispute that the undertaking in question has been filed and has not been honoured, and that an excuse has been taken out in the affidavit-in-reply by saying that the defendant-tenant, namely, the respondent before us. is ready and willing to hand over the actual and physical possession of the premises peacefully to a person who could be said to be legally authorised or "legally Authenticated" ( 11 ) THE next question would be as to whether what we sitting in Contempt jurisdiction should do. The answer is provided by the Supreme Court pronouncement in Smr. Ram Pyari and Ors. v. Jagdish Lal, JT 1991 (4) SC 515. It was also a case of eviction under the relevant Rent Law. The Supreme Court had issued the necessary directions for staying the execution of eviction decree, subject to the respondent filing an undertaking before the Supreme Court within three weeks, saying that. the respondent shall hand over the possession within a period of three weeks. As has been noticed by the Supreme Court, neither the undertaking was filed nor the possession of the premises came to be delivered. In this fact situation though the respondent was found not to be guilty of violating any undertaking as there was none, the Supreme Court had directed for the delivery of possession of the premises on/or before a particular date. It has also been said that, if that does not happen, learned Addl. Munsiff concerned should cause the delivery of vacant possession of the premises in question, namely, the shop situated at Shahjahanpur, if required with the help of the police. ( 12 ) A reference, with great advantage, could also be made to the Supreme Court pronouncement in Noorali Babul Thanewala v. K. M. M. Shetty and Ors. Munsiff concerned should cause the delivery of vacant possession of the premises in question, namely, the shop situated at Shahjahanpur, if required with the help of the police. ( 12 ) A reference, with great advantage, could also be made to the Supreme Court pronouncement in Noorali Babul Thanewala v. K. M. M. Shetty and Ors. , AIR 1990 sc 464 , which deals with and rules in respect of the undertaking given by the tenant to the Supreme Court regarding the delivery of vacant possession of the premises in dispute and the breach thereof. The say of the Supreme Court appears to be a two-fold one. Firstly, it is made clear that the breach of an undertaking given to the Court is regarded as a tantamount to a breach of injunction, and that it is settled law that breach of an injunction or an undertaking given to the Court by a person in a civil proceeding on the faith of which the Court sanctions a particular course of action is misconduct amounting to the Contempt. Going to the question of remedy, the Supreme Court rules that the same in such circumstances may be in form of direction to purge the contempt, or a sentence of imprisonment or fine or all of them. ( 13 ) IN our opinion, therefore, when we hold that the usual undertaking given before this Court at a belated stage on the basis of which the respondent before us was permitted to continue in the premises for some time. and when in the affidavit-in-reply the respondent-tenant has inter alia said that he is ready and willing to hand over the possession of the premises in question to a person who is authorised under the law to have the possession thereof, in our opinion, we should give the respondent before us a reasonable time to vacate the premises and on his failure to do so, we should direct the Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad, to see that, actual physical possession of the premises is handed over to the petitioners or to any one of them duly authorised by others or to a duly constituted Power-of- attorney of all the petitioners. ( 14 ) LOOKING to the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the respondent before us to hand over the actual physical vacant possession of the premises in question as aforesaid, either to all the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased who are before us on the record, or in their absence to a person nominated and authorised by them. or to a person who happens to be a duly constituted Power- of-Attorney within a period of eight weeks hereof. If the same is not done, it shall be open for the petitioners or the authenticated petitioner or constituted attorney of the petitioners to approach the Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad with copy of these orders, making a request to the Court that, necessary steps be taken by the court to see that the actual physical possession of the premises in question is handed over to the above said person or the persons as the case may be, without any delay whatsoever. ( 15 ) WHILE reaching the above said conclusion, we have examined the question as to whether when the execution proceedings are pending, contempt proceedings could be initiated or not. as the second contention raised by learned Counsel Mr. Pandit, rather feebly. ( 16 ) A decree of eviction given by a competent civil Court and the motion for civil Contempt moved under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. shall have to stand on entirely different pedestals. A decree of eviction given by a Rent Court to a landlord against a tenant under the relevant Rent Legislation is a formal expression of an adjudication, which conclusively determines the rights of the parties regarding the matter in controversy, and endorses the right of a landlord to obtain the possession of the premises from the tenant. But the obtaining of a decree is not all. The decree in many matters and especially the same obtained from a Rent Court. often requires to be executed. Execution of such a decree has to be as per Law. Forget not the limitation and follow the procedure. Done this. the landlord may acquire the possession of the premises, because a decree lying in a drawer unexecuted, though precious, is not meaningful. Therefore, the concept of execution and the prescription of a recognised mode for it. Execution of such a decree has to be as per Law. Forget not the limitation and follow the procedure. Done this. the landlord may acquire the possession of the premises, because a decree lying in a drawer unexecuted, though precious, is not meaningful. Therefore, the concept of execution and the prescription of a recognised mode for it. ( 17 ) ON the other hand Contempt proceedings initiated by a motion made in that respect, are meant for voicing grievance regarding the deliberate and wilful disobedience of the orders of the Court etc. , and would take under the sweep the breach of the undertaking. The intent primarily is never to obtain the execution or the compliance of the orders of the Court based upon the undertaking or after the recognition of the fact that there exists an undertaking. It is being made known to the Court by a motion that, there has been a wilful disobedience of the orders of the Court. Once this is done then it becomes more or less a matter between the court and the alleged contemner. In a case of proven contempt the Court may direct or order the purge of the contempt or impose fine or sentence the contemner or can order all. ( 18 ) WHEN the contempt is already purged by the contemner, the decree of eviction may not be required to be executed if during the purging exercise the actual possession of the premises passes on unto the hands of the decree holder. But the decree holder, when the Court in the contempt proceedings does not order the purge of the contempt or when the exercise of purging does not wholly satisfy the decree in question may have to pursue the execution proceedings. On the other hand, the execution of a decree itself does not in all cases rule out the right or a possibility of moving a motion of contempt. In such a case. the approach of the Court could be different "leaning towards leniency" depending upon the facts of each case and the manner and method of the contempt, alleged and proved. In such a case. the approach of the Court could be different "leaning towards leniency" depending upon the facts of each case and the manner and method of the contempt, alleged and proved. ( 19 ) THUS, it appears to us that the execution of a decree of eviction against a tenant and contempt proceedings for the breach of the undertaking stand on a different footing and many cases could go on simultaneously though the ultimate execution of a decree can be set up as a ground for the dropping of the contempt proceedings, or for taking a liberal view. or could be pleaded as mitigating circumstances. In our considered opinion, therefore, the pendency of the execution proceedings generally and on the facts and in the circumstances of the case of course should not stand in the way of the petitioners while they invoke our Contempt Jurisdiction. ( 20 ) LEARNED Counsel Mr. Kiran Pandit at this juncture urges that, we should stay the operation of these orders of ours for a period of eight weeks. We do not see any justification for acceding to the request coming from learned Counsel for the simple reason that, in our orders we have given the above said time to the respondent before us tor the vacation of the premises in question. Proceedings stand disposed of. Notice shall stand discharged. No costs. .