Judgment : M. KARPAGAVINAYAGAM, J. ( 1 ) - Mr. Shanmugasundaram the petitioner herein was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 304-A and 279 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo the rigorous imprisonment for one year and one month respectively by the learned trial Judge. In the appeal, the sentence for the offence under Section 279 I. P. C was set aside and the file ://d :prograrn Filescrirnesdatabaseaaaacmo 1998-4 (440 of 1995 ). htrn 8/10/2006 sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year under Section 304-A I. P. C. was modified into a fine of Rs. 5000/-, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. ( 2 ) THIS revision is against the findings given by both the Courts below. ( 3 ) THE Case of the prosecution is this: On 2-2-1994, at about 8. 30 A. M. , the victim Gandhiammal, aged about 15 years, was standing at the left side of the mud road waiting for the bus. At that time, the petitioner being the driver on Annai Sathya Transport Corporation drove the bus bearing Registration No. T. N. 29, No. 0458 at a great speed and hit against the victim and the bus remover the body of the victim and caused her death on the spot. ( 4 ) P. WS. 1 to 3 are eye-witnesses. Exs. P. 1 to P. 7 were marked. On behalf of the accused. D. W. 1 was examined through whom Ex D. W. 1 was marked. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel Mr. K. V. Sridharan appearing for the petitioner would contend that the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 3 does not appear to he reliable and that the cogent evidence given by D. W. 1 who was the passenger of the bus was not taken into account in the proper perspective while both the Courts below convicted the petitioner for the offences referred to above. ( 6 ) I have heard the learned Government Advocate who resisted the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner and contended that the judgments given by both the Courts below are correct and unassailable. ( 7 ) I have heard and carefully gone through the depositions of witnesses and the judgments of both the Courts below. ( 6 ) I have heard the learned Government Advocate who resisted the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner and contended that the judgments given by both the Courts below are correct and unassailable. ( 7 ) I have heard and carefully gone through the depositions of witnesses and the judgments of both the Courts below. ( 8 ) AS correctly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner the evidence of P. W. 1 cannot be accepted inasmuch as he admitted in the cross-examination that he came to the road side, only after the accident. However, it must be noticed that the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 who were standing on the road, would specifically state that the victim girl aged about 15 years was standing at the left side of the road that too, in the mud portion and at that time, the bus came at a great speed even without blowing the horn hit against the victim and sped away from the scene even without stopping the bus. Besides this evidence, if we look at the sketch, it is quite clear that at the right side there is a long space available through which the petitioner could have driven the bus and avoided the accident. As correctly observed by the learned Sessions Judge on the strength of the decision reported in 1986 L. W. (Cri) 58 (S. N.)1, the very fact that the driver instead of driving the vehicle on the tarred portion of the road has negligently driven the vehicle and dashed against the victim girl who was standing at the mud road keeping to her left side would clearly show that the driver has driven the vehicle with rashness and caused the accident. As a matter of fact the sketch shows both the place of impact as well as the place where the body was thrown, is in the mud portion. The tar portion contains 22 feet space. It is the case of the defence that in the opposite side, a lorry was coming and to avoid collision with the lorry driver swerved the bus to the left side and in the mean time, the victim darted across the road and met with an accident. Of course, it is true that this version has been spoken to by D. W. 1 who is one of the passengers of the bus. Of course, it is true that this version has been spoken to by D. W. 1 who is one of the passengers of the bus. But both the Courts below have given elaborate reasoning to conclude that the evidence of D. W. 1 is not acceptable. Therefore, when the factual findings are given by both the Courts below with reference to the guilt of the accused. I do not propose to interfere with the verdict of the Courts below in the absence of any infirmity in the said decision. However, Mr. K. V. Sridharan, learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out the decision reported in Veerasamy v. State, in which it is held that in the absence of the Doctors evidence relating to the details of the injuries found in the post-mortem, the Courts cannot act upon only on the post mortem Certificate and come to the conclusion that the deceased died due to the accident. As correctly pointed out in the said decision the prosecution must prove that the death was a direct result of the rash and negligent act of the accused. It is also true that in the said decision it was held that the post mortem Certificate is not the substantive piece of evidence and therefore, it cannot be a conclusive evidence to hold that the death was the direct result of the rash and negligence act of the accused. ( 9 ) HOWEVER, in the case on hand, though the Doctor, P. W. 4 who issued the postmortem Certificate. Ex. p. 4, has not given out the details of the injuries as contained in the postmortem Certificate would categorically state that the deceased died due to the injuries and the consequent shock and haemorrhage. Moreover, in the cross examination, it has been elicited by the defence counsel that the doctor found injuries with tyre marks on the body of the deceased. The said part of evidence is as follows: (Sic Matter in other language) ( 10 ) THEREFORE, the decision cited by the learned counsel would not be of any use in this case. At the end, it is submitted that on the strength of the judgment reported in Dudh Nath v. State of Uttarpradesh, merely because the judgments are concurrent judgments, it cannot be said that it cannot be interfered with. At the end, it is submitted that on the strength of the judgment reported in Dudh Nath v. State of Uttarpradesh, merely because the judgments are concurrent judgments, it cannot be said that it cannot be interfered with. There is no doubt in this proposition; but the thing is only when this Court comes to the conclusion that the finding given by both the Courts below are perverse, certainly this Court has got powers to interfere. But, unfortunately. I am not able to identify any such perversity in the finding given by both the Courts below. ( 11 ) LASTLY, the learned counsel for the petitioner requested for releasing the petitioner under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, which in my view, cannot be proper because it is a case where the petitioner did not even care to stop the bus after hitting the victim girl to attend on her, either to take to hospital or to give some helping hand. Therefore, in view of the above conduct. I do not find any reason to show sympathy to the petitioner, so as to invoke the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act. ( 12 ) IN the result, the criminal revision petition is dismissed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed. Revision dismissed.