JUDGMENT : R.L. Khurana, J. : - The abovementioned two civil revisions, which have arisen out of the same order dated 12.6.1998, of the learned District Judge, Solan, are being disposed of by this single judgment. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case leading to the present petitions are these. The petitioners before this court are the defendants while the respondent Smt. Madhuri Saini is the plaintiff in Civil Suit No. 104/1 of 1998 on the files of learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Nalagarh. The parties are being referred to accordingly hereinafter. 3. The plaintiff has been granted lease by the State Government in respect of the land measuring 1468 bighas 5 biswas in village Mandhyarpur, Dadi, Nahar Singh and Kheri of Tehsil Nalagarh (hereinafter referred to as the land in dispute), for the purpose of extraction of minor minerals, vide lease deed dated 28.2.1996 for a period of five years. Since after such grant of lease, the plaintiff is carrying on mining operations in the land in dispute. Mining lease in respect of adjoining 1600 bighas of land falling within the revenue estate of village Nanowal, Nihala Khera, Brahman Beli and Kunda was granted by the State Government in favour of one Mohan Lai Mussafir. However, subsequently such lease was transferred in favour of the defendants. One of the terms contained in the lease deeds in favour of the parties, namely, clause No. 9 of the Part III, provides that the lessee shall allow existing and future licensees or lease holders, constructors of any land which is comprising in or adjoins or is reached through such lands leased by the lessee, reasonable facilities for access thereto. 4. According to the plaintiff, she has provided access to the defendants through the land in dispute to enable them the access to their land and that such path provided by her links the land of the defendants with Nalagarh-Baddi Road. In addition to the path provided by her, the defendants have another independent path which links their leased land with the above said road. The defendants in order to have another passage through the land in dispute, approached the District Mining Officer, Solan, for issuance of directions to the plaintiff to provide a passage through the land in dispute linking their leased land with Nalagarh-Ropar Road near Sarsa Bridge. The defendants in order to have another passage through the land in dispute, approached the District Mining Officer, Solan, for issuance of directions to the plaintiff to provide a passage through the land in dispute linking their leased land with Nalagarh-Ropar Road near Sarsa Bridge. On the representation of the defendants, the District Mining officer vide letter dated 20.2.1998 directed the plaintiff to provide reasonable access to the defendants through the land in dispute as required under the terms of the lease deed. On the basis of the reply submittedly the plaintiff, the District Mining Officer on 24.2.1998, directed the defendants to use the passage already provided to them by the plaintiff. The defendants were also asked not to pass through any other part of the land in dispute except through the passage provided by the plaintiff. Since the defendants continued to threaten the plaintiff and persisted with their right to pass through the other portion of the land in dispute, a suit for permanent injunction came to be filed by the plaintiff. 5. In such suit, an application under Order 39, rule 1 & 2, Code of Civil Procedure, was made by the plaintiff seeking temporary injunction for restraining the defendant from using any other part of the land in dispute as a passage except the passage provided to them. The learned Sub Judge, while directing issuance of the notice to the defendants, granted an adinterim injunction in favour of the plaintiff, as prayed for by her. 6. The defendants, in addition to the reply to the application made by the plaintiff, also filed an application under Order 39 rules 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure, seeking temporary injunction for restraining the plaintiff not to cause obstruction in the passage of the defendants through the land in dispute. 7. Be it stated that the passage through the land in dispute, as claimed by the defendants in their application is different from the one provided to them by the plaintiff. 8. The case set up by the defendants that under the terms of the lease deed, the plaintiff is bound to provide a passage to them through the land in dispute. The passage provided by the plaintiff to them is not suitable inasmuch as the defendants through such passage has to cover a distance of 20 Km. whereas such distance is only 7 Km. The passage provided by the plaintiff to them is not suitable inasmuch as the defendants through such passage has to cover a distance of 20 Km. whereas such distance is only 7 Km. through the passage being claimed by them. Existence of another independent passage was denied. 9. The learned Sub Judge vide a common order dated 2.6.1998 allowed the application of the plaintiff. The ad-interim order dated 31.3.1998 was made absolute pending suit. The application made by the defendants was dismissed. 10. Feeling aggrieved, the defendants filed two separate appeals, being CM. Appeal No. 8-S/14 and 9-S/14 of 1998, before the learned District Judge, respectively, against the dismissal of their application and allowance of the application of the plaintiff by the learned Sub Judge. Both these appeals were dismissed by the learned District Judge on 12.6.1998 by a single judgment. Resultantly, the defendants are before this court by way of the present two revision petitions, under section 115, Code of Civil Procedure. The learned counsel for the plaintiff, at very outset, contended that this court would not be justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of the two courts below while granting the temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff. 11. The scope of interference by the High Court under section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, came up for consideration before the Honble apex court in The Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Suresh Chandra Jaipuria and another (AIR 1976 SC2621). In the said case the trial court as well as the first appellate court had refused to grant interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff therein. In revision, the High Court of Delhi interfered with the concurrent findings of the two courts below and granted the interim injunction. On appeal being carried before the apex court, it was held that the interference by the High Court with the concurrent findings was (sic) justified as the court had overlooked the principles governing interference under section 115, Code of Civil Procedure. While so holding, the apex court drew attention of all the learned Judges to its earlier decisions in Baldevdas Shivlal and another v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd. and others. (AIR 1970 SC 406) and in D.L.F. Housing & Construction Co. While so holding, the apex court drew attention of all the learned Judges to its earlier decisions in Baldevdas Shivlal and another v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd. and others. (AIR 1970 SC 406) and in D.L.F. Housing & Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi v. Sarup Singh (AIR 1971 SC 2324), as also in The Managing Director (MG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Balanagar, Hyderabad and another v. Ajit Prasad Tarway (AIR 1973 SC76). 12. In the case of Hindustan Aeronautics v. Ajit Prasad (supra), the Honble apex Court after discussing the scope of powers of the High Court under section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, has observed :- "In our opinion the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate Court. It is not the conclusion of the High Court that the first appellate Court had no jurisdiction to make the order that it made. The order of the first appellate Court may be right or wrong; may be in accordance with law but one thing is clear that it had jurisdiction to make that order. It is not the case that the first appellate court exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularly. That being so, the High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction under S. 115 of the Civil P.C." 13. Following the above ratio, a learned single Judge of this Court in Devi Saran and another v. Shri Ram Chand and others (AIR 1982 HP 124) had declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of the two courts below refusing to grant the temporary injunction under Order 39 rules 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure. 14. In the present case, as well, the two courts below had the jurisdiction to make the orders that it made. Such orders may be right or wrong; may not be in accordance with law. It is not the case that the two courts below exercised the jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. That being so, this court cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of the two courts below by invoking the jurisdiction under section 115, Code of Civil Procedure. 15. Even otherwise, on merits also, no interference by this court is called for. Admittedly, a passage through the land in dispute has been provided by the plaintiff to the defendants and they are presently using the same. 15. Even otherwise, on merits also, no interference by this court is called for. Admittedly, a passage through the land in dispute has been provided by the plaintiff to the defendants and they are presently using the same. The question as to reasonableness of such passage cannot be gone into at this stage, since for determination of the same parties would have to be afforded the opportunity to lead evidence. Therefore, in view of the existence of a passage to the defendants through the land in dispute, neither the balance of convenience is in their favour nor they are likely to suffer irreparable loss and injury in the event of refusal of temporary injunction as prayed for by them. 16. The two courts below have rightly held that there is a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff and that the balance of convenience is also in her favour and that she would suffer irreparable loss and injury in case the temporary injunction is not granted in her favour. Consequently, both the petitions are dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. 17. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the learned trial court on 28.12.1998. The records be returned forthwith so as to reach well before the date fixed. -