Judgment :- 1. The respondent filed the suit in O.S.No.322 of 1972 on the file of the learned District Munsif, Uttamapalayam against the petitioners seeking a decree for a sum of Rs. 18,912 being the principal and interest due on a promissory note dated 3.6.1969 executed by the defendants/petitioners in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. The said suit was decreed by the court below on 2.5.1973. To execute the said decree, the respondent filed E.P.No. 412 of 1989 on 13.9.1989. The petitioners filed E.A.No. 399 of 1991 to terminate the Execution Petition No. 412 of 1989 on the ground that it was barred by limitation. According to them, the decree in O.S.No.322 of 1972 could have been executed on or before 2.5.1985. The respondent/decree-holder filed a counter stating that at the instance of the petitioners, in I.A.No. 1675 of 1979 the decree was amended on 18.10.1979 giving effect to the benefits under Act 8 of 1973 and so the date for the purpose of limitation has to be construed only from 18.10.1979 and not from 2.5.1973. The respondent has also mentioned in the counter that he filed E.P.Nos. 62 of 1980, 12 of 1981, 251 of 1982 and 681 of 1984 to execute the abovesaid decree, which were disposed of on one reason or the other. The court below accepting the case of the respondent and following the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Fatimunnisa Begum v. Mohd. Zainulabuddin Saheb, A.I.R. 1986 A.P. 355 has held that the execution petition filed by the respondent is well within time and consequently rejected the application filed by the petitioners. Aggrieved against the same the petitioners have filed the above revision. 2. The only question that has to be decided in this case is whether the period of limitation starts from the date of the original decree or from the date of the amendment, for the purpose of calculating the period of 12 years under Article 136 of the Limitation Act. 3. 2. The only question that has to be decided in this case is whether the period of limitation starts from the date of the original decree or from the date of the amendment, for the purpose of calculating the period of 12 years under Article 136 of the Limitation Act. 3. In the decision reported in Fatimunnisa Begum v. Mohd.Zainulabuddin Saheb, A.I.R. 1986 A.P. 355, the learned Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court relying on the expression in Article 136 of the Limitation Act “when the decree becomes enforceable" which is not in Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, came to the conclusion that the decree which was subjected to an amendment can be enforced only as amended and so the period of limitation starts only from the date of the amendment of the decree. The learned Judge has held as follows:- “The next decision on which reliance was placed was Ouseph v. Lona, AIR1979 Ker. 14. This decision undoubtedly supports the case of the respondents. But I am unable to agree with the principle enunciated in this decision. No doubt, the principle of S.48 is now embodied in Art. 136 which provided for 12 years period of limitation for the execution of a decree, but the starting point must be determined with reference to the express language of Art. 136 which says 'when the decree becomes enforceable'. The se words were not there in S.48. In my opinion the proper interpretation would be, to reckon the period from the date of the decree that is sought to be enforced i.e., if there is an appeal, it is the Appellate Decree and if there is an amendment, it is from the date of the amended decree. As I said earlier, even in a case of affirmance, if time begins to run from the date of the appellate decree and not the original decree, much more so in the case of a decree which is amended as the original decree no longer retains its form. The amendment gives a fresh starting point of limitation. Even though Art. 136 does not contain the words 'in case of an appeal', the courts have construed that it is the appellate decree that is relevant as ultimately it is that decree which becomes capable of execution. The amendment gives a fresh starting point of limitation. Even though Art. 136 does not contain the words 'in case of an appeal', the courts have construed that it is the appellate decree that is relevant as ultimately it is that decree which becomes capable of execution. In the case of an amendment, the original decree no longer retains its form and what is sought to be executed is the amended decree. Therefore, the words 'enforceable' must be construed with reference to the decree that is sought to be enforced. Reckoned from the date of the amendment, the execution petition filed is within time" 4. The abovesaid decision has been relied on by the court below to reject the application filed by the petitioners. But In the decision of the Division Bench in Ramachandrudu v. Gulabchand, A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 709, the Division Bench of the Andra Pradesh High Court has taken a different view, following the decision of this court in Venkatasubhayya v. Venkanna 1952 (II) M.L.J. 498 , wherein the learned Judges have accepted the Principles laid down by this Court in the said decision in Venkatasubhayya v. Venkanna 1952 (II)M.L.J. 498. 5. In the decision in Venkata Subbaya v. Venkanna, 1952 (II) M.L.J. 498 , The Chief Justice, as he then was, while speaking to the Division Bench of this Court, has held as follows:- “The fallacy in this argument is to treat the scaled down decree as a fresh decree and to assume that the decree-holder gets a fresh starting point from the date of the order scaling down the decree. Not only is there no authority in support of the appellant's contention but there is authority for the position that a scaled down decree is not a fresh decree and even after scaling down, what can be executed is only the original decree though the amount for which execution can be levied might be less than the amount of the original decree. This argument therefore must fail" 6. Even the Full Bench of this Court reported in AIR 1940 Mad 127 construing the scope of Section 48 of the Code and Article 182 of the Limitation Act, has held as follows:- “The corresponding Article in the present Limitation Act is Art. 182. This argument therefore must fail" 6. Even the Full Bench of this Court reported in AIR 1940 Mad 127 construing the scope of Section 48 of the Code and Article 182 of the Limitation Act, has held as follows:- “The corresponding Article in the present Limitation Act is Art. 182. Now, turning to Cl.(4) of that Article we find that the period of limitation where a decree has been amended is three years from the date of the amendment, but the Article is expressly limited to applications for execution not provided for by Art. 183 or by S.48, Civil P.C. Art. 183 refers to applications to enforce judgments of High Courts and it has no bearing here. In as much as Art. 182 clearly leaves the provisions of S.48 untouc hed there can be no execution of a decree governed by S.48 when 12 years have passed from the date of the decree, amendment or no amendment. It is true that there is no period of limitation for an amendment of a decree to correct an accidental slip or omission under S. 152 of the Code. But because the Code gives the Court power to correct slips or omission at any time it does not mean that the law of limitation is affected. A correction made in a time-barred decree leaves the decree still time-barred" 7. Even the learned Judge of the Kerala High Court in the decision in Ouseph v. Lona, A.I.R. 1979 Ker. 14, while construing the similar issue has held that the period begin to run from the date on which the decree became enforceable, i.e., from the date of the original decree, and, although the decree underwent a change with its amendment, until the date of amendment, the decree in its original form is enforceable from the date when it was passed. After construing the scope of Section 48 of the Code which was repealed by Section 28 of the present Act, the learned Judge of the Kerala High Court has held as follows:- “Sec.49 of the Civil P.C. was found to be no longer necessary when Art. 182 of the repealed Act was replaced by Art. 136 of the present Act. That is why S.48 of the Civil P.C. was repealed by S.28 of the present Act. That is why S.48 of the Civil P.C. was repealed by S.28 of the present Act. The principle of S.48 C.P.C. is now embodied in Art. 136 of the present Act which provides for a 12 year period of limitation for the execution of a decree. The period begins to run from the date on which the decree became enforceable and that in the present case was the date of the decree itself. Although the decree underwent a change with its amendment on 24.7.1962, until the date of the amendment, the decree in its original form was enforceable as from the date on which it was passed, that is, 28.6.1961. It was that date which is crucial for computing the period of limitation as provided under Art. 136" 8. In view of the abovesaid decided cases, the respondent cannot take advantage of the amendment pursuant to the order in I.A.No. 1675 of 1979. It cannot be denied that the decree had become enforceable even on 2.5.1973 itself and so the period of limitation would start from that date. Hence the court below is not correct in rejecting the application filed by the petitioners. Therefore the order of the court below passed in E.A.No.399 of 1991 in O.S.No.322 of 1972 is set aside. Consequently E.A.No. 399 of 1991 is ordered, and the proceedings in E.P.No.412 of 1989 are terminated as they are time-barred. This Revision is allowed accordingly. No costs.