ORDER S.C. Pandey, J. 1. In this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner had challenged the vires of Clause 11 (a) and (b) of M. P. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1963 (henceforth 'the Rules of 1963') framed under M.P. Industrial (Standing Orders) Act, 1961 ('the Act of 1961' for short). However, the learned counsel for the petitioner did not question the vires of aforesaid clauses before me presumably because a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bharat Heavy Electricals Labour Union v. Bharat Electricals Limited, Bhopal, reported in 1989 MPLJ 183 , upheld the validity of similar clause. No opinion is, therefore, expressed upon the validity of aforesaid clauses. The petitioner has also challenged order dated 19-5-1989 (Annexure-A), passed by Labour Court, Bhopal and order dated 4-3-1992, (Annexure-B), passed by Industrial Court, Indore refusing to reinstate him with back wages. 2. The undisputed facts of this case are that the petitioner was appointed as a conductor with M. P. State Road Transport Corporation, at Jagdalpur Depot, on 29-6-1985. His services were dispensed with by order dated 15-2-1988. No domestic enquiry was held. No retrenchment compensation was given to him. The petitioner, therefore, claimed that he be reinstated with back wages, by filing an application under Section 31(3) of M P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 ('the Act' for short). 3. The respondents, inter alia claimed that the work of the petitioner was not satisfactory. The respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, in their return, do not dispute that the order dated 15-2-1988 was passed without holding an enquiry under clause 12 of the Rules of 1963. 4. The Labour Court, as well as the Industrial Court, by orders dated 19-5-1989 (Annexure-A) and 4-3-1992 (Annexure-B), respectively have upheld the termination of services of the petitioner and have both dismissed the application of the petitioner under Section 31(3) of the Act. In coming to the aforesaid conclusion, both the tribunals have upheld claim of M.P. State Road Transport Corporation (M.P.S.R.T.C, for short) that the termination of the services of the petitioner was justifiable because he had committed a misconduct for which he was liable to be dismissed under clause 12 of the Rules of 1963. In coming to the aforesaid conclusion, both the tribunals have upheld claim of M.P. State Road Transport Corporation (M.P.S.R.T.C, for short) that the termination of the services of the petitioner was justifiable because he had committed a misconduct for which he was liable to be dismissed under clause 12 of the Rules of 1963. He was found to have carried 18 passengers without tickets in a bus of M.P.S.R.T.C, plying between Malkhagiri to Jagdalpur on 13-2-1985, out of 92 passengers and had taken fare from them. On being checked by the flying squad, the petitioner did not co-operate and refused to sign the Panchnama. In view of this matter, the Labour Court as well as the Industrial Court dismissed the application of the petitioner under Section 31(3) of the Act. 5. It is not disputed in the return that the petitioner was appointed as a conductor on 29-6-1985. It is not specifically denied and there is also nothing on record to suggest that the petitioner was not confirmed in his post. Therefore, this Court holds that the facts that the petitioner was appointed on 29-6-1985 and was holding the post of permanent conductor, were not in dispute before the Labour Court as well as the Industrial Court. 6. Before embarking upon the discussion of this case it is made clear that this petition being decided under Article 227 of the Constitution. 7. It may be necessary to examine 'the Act of 1961' in short, in order to understand 'the Rules of 1963' or 'standing orders'. The Rules framed under Section 21 of the Act of 1961 provide for rules defining the conditions of employment of undertakings in Madhya Pradesh. They are framed by virtue of Section 3(b) of the Act of 1961 in respect of the matters set out in the schedule. It may be noted that the schedule mentions that rules can be framed relating to 'termination of employment otherwise than by way of punishment, and notice thereof to be given to employers and employees'. Section 6 of the Act of 1961 empowers by notification of the Rules of 1963 or Standard Standing Orders to apply to the undertakings mentioned in it from the date specified therein. Sections 7 and 8 of that Act permit modification upon agreement between the employers and the employees in respect of Standard Standing Orders. Section 6 of the Act of 1961 empowers by notification of the Rules of 1963 or Standard Standing Orders to apply to the undertakings mentioned in it from the date specified therein. Sections 7 and 8 of that Act permit modification upon agreement between the employers and the employees in respect of Standard Standing Orders. There is a provision for referring the matter to Labour Court in case of doubt or dispute as to the implication of any clause of the Standing Orders. Section 17 of the Act of 1961 provides for punishment of an employer who modifies the Standing Order without following the procedure under the Act. Section 19 of the Act of 1961 bars oral evidence for contradicting or varying the terms of the Standing Order. The Standing Orders are statutorily imposed conditions of service but it is held by Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Krishna Kant etc., AIR 1995 SC 1715 , that they cannot be elevated to the pedestal of statutory provisions themselves within the meaning of the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Sukhdev Singh and Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuwanshi and Anr., AIR 1975 SC 1331 . However, there is no option to the parties to contract out of terms of Standing Orders after certification, if the amendments are not made in Standing Orders in accordance with Sections 7 and 8 of the Act of 1961. Otherwise, the entire object and purpose of the Act of 1961 would stand defeated. 8. Thus, the terms and conditions of services of the petitioner were regulated by the Standard Standing Orders or the Rules. It is nobody's case that these Standing Orders were modified at any time. The Standard Standing Orders or the Rules are, therefore, liable to be interpreted as such. We are here concerned with clauses 11 and 12 of the Standing Orders. They are being reproduced here as such :- "11. Termination of employment and the notice thereof to be given by employer and employee.- (a) When the employment of a permanent employee is to be terminated, he shall be given one month's notice or shall be paid wages for one month in lieu of notice. They are being reproduced here as such :- "11. Termination of employment and the notice thereof to be given by employer and employee.- (a) When the employment of a permanent employee is to be terminated, he shall be given one month's notice or shall be paid wages for one month in lieu of notice. No employee other than a permanent employee shall be entitled to any such notice or wages in lieu thereof for termination of his service, (b) The reason for the termination of service shall be recorded in writing and shall be communicated to the employee unless such communication may in the opinion of the manager directly or indirectly lay the company or the manager or the person signing the communication open to civil or criminal proceedings at the instance of the employee." "12. Disciplinary action for misconduct.- (1) The following acts or omissions on the part of an employee shall amount to a major misconduct: (a) conviction by a Court of law for an offence involving moral turpitude; (b) theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the business or property of the undertaking; (c) taking or giving bribe or any illegal gratification; (d) wilful disobedience of any lawful or reasonable order of a superior involving safety of any person or property or other matter having an adverse effect upon the work or wages of other employees; (e) gambling within the premises of the undertaking; (f) . drunkenness, riotous or disorderly behaviour, during working hours at the undertaking or conduct endangering the life or safety of any person, intimidation, physical duress or any act subversive of discipline; (g) collections of any moneys within the premises of the undertaking for purpose and by persons not authorised by law or if no such authority is required by law without the sanction of the manager; (h) engaging in trade, or business within the premises of the undertaking including collection of pay-tickets given to the employees or the sale or canvassing of tickets, coupons or other tokens of any commodity or article without the previous sanction of the manager; (i) canvassing for trade union membership and collection of union's dues within the premises except as permissible under law; (j) holding meetings inside the premises of the undertaking without the previous permission of the manager or except as permitted by law; (k) commencing, going or joining the strike in contravention of the provisions of any law for the time being in force; (1) inciting, instigating others to take part or otherwise acting in furtherance of a strike in contravention of the provisions of any law for the time being in force; (m) wilful slowing down in performance of work, or abetment or instigation thereof; (n) wilful damage to work in process or to any other property of the undertaking; (o) disclosing to any unauthorised person any information in regard to the processes of the undertaking which may come into his possession in the course of his work; (p) unauthorised absence from duty for more than ten consecutive days; (p-1) Obtaining financial assistance from the Employees State Insurance Corporation on the basis of tax on forged documents, (q) a minor misconduct of which a workman is found habitually guilty, i.e. for not less than three occasions within a space of one year or less. (2) Any of the following acts or omissions shall amount to a minor misconduct: (a) late attendance; (b) absence from duty without leave or without sufficient cause, which is not major misconduct; (c) refusal to work on a job of a similar nature without giving adequate reasons for the same; (d) sleeping during working hour; (e) failure to observe safety instructions or unauthorised removal in reference to machinery, guard, fencing or other safety device installed in the premises of the establishment; (f) any act or omission for which deductions from the wages of an employed person are authorised by or under the Payment of Wages Act; (g) entering or leaving the premises of the undertaking except by the gate or gates appointed for the purpose; (h) committing a nuisance in the premises of the undertaking, indiscipline, breach of any standing order or instructions for the maintenance or running of any department and maintaining its cleanliness; (3) (a) The punishment for a minor misconduct may be : (i) censure; or (ii) fine. (b) The punishment for a major misconduct may be : (i) censure, or (ii) fine, or (iii) suspension for a period not exceeding four days on any one occasion, or (iv) withholding of increment for a period of one year, or (v) demotion, or (vi) dismissal. (c) In awarding the punishment the manager shall take into account the gravity of the misconduct, the previous record of the employee, if any, and other extenuating or aggravating circumstances. (4) No punishment shall be imposed on an employee unless proved guilty of misconduct in an enquiry conducted in the following manner : (a) The manager or other officer authorised by him in this behalf shall give to the employee a charge sheet clearly setting forth the misconduct charged and the circumstances appearing against him and requiring his explanation. (b) The employee shall be given for submitting his explanation a period of at least 24 hours if he is charged with a minor misconduct and at least 72 hours if he is charged with major misconduct. (b) The employee shall be given for submitting his explanation a period of at least 24 hours if he is charged with a minor misconduct and at least 72 hours if he is charged with major misconduct. (c) An employee shall be allowed to defend by himself or the representative of employees, if he so desires; (d) Except in cases where he admits the charge levelled against him the employee shall be permitted to produce witness in his defence and cross-examine any witness on whose evidence the charge rests; (e) The substance of the evidence shall be recorded and read over; (f) An order of punishment shall be in writing and shall be issued over the signature of the manager or other officer authorised under standing order (1)(a). A copy of the order passed awarding the punishment shall be given to the employee; (g) In case of an employee other than the one belonging to the clerical, technical or supervisory staff the manager can suspend him pending enquiry into an alleged major misconduct for a period not exceeding four days. (h) The manager may suspend a clerical, technical or supervisory employee for a period of three months pending enquiry into major misconduct alleged against him and shall pay suspension allowance to such employee at the rate of half of the average wage; (i) The order of suspension shall be in writing and may take effect immediately on communication thereof to the employee. If no action is taken within a period of six months then the amount of wages for the period of suspension shall be payable in full. (5) If on enquiry, the order is confirmed or the period of suspension reduced the employee shall be deemed to be absent from duty for the period of suspension and shall not be entitled to any wage for such period. If, however, the order is rescinded the employee shall be deemed to be on duty during the full period of suspension and shall be entitled to the same wages as he would have received if he had not been suspended." 9. It may be readily seen that clause 12 of the Standard Standing Orders deals with disciplinary action for misconduct. Therefore, it would be reasonable to hold that clause 11 of the Standing Orders would not cover the same field. It may be readily seen that clause 12 of the Standard Standing Orders deals with disciplinary action for misconduct. Therefore, it would be reasonable to hold that clause 11 of the Standing Orders would not cover the same field. The termination of the services of an employee under clause 11 could not be for proved misconduct. All that would be necessary in case of a permanent employee to issue notice of one month or pay the salary of one month in lieu thereof and terminate his services on the basis of an order giving reasons. These reasons must be communicated to the employee but the manager of the company has an option not to communicate the reasons if he thinks that the communication thereof may render the person passing the order or the company liable for civil proceedings or criminal actions. No such notice is necessary in case of a temporary employee. It is obvious that power conferred by clause 11 is extraordinary power of the employer. This could not be exercised validly when the employer sought to terminate the services of a permanent employee by way of disciplinary action. The power under clause 11 could be employed on a ground apart from misconduct of a permanent employee for which the disciplinary action could be taken pursuant to clause 12 only. No element of punishment should be involved when an order is passed under clause 11 of the Standard Standing Orders. It would be for reasons given in writing to the employee or in the alternative not communicated to him for the reason mentioned under clause 11 in the interest of the employer and his business on a ground which cannot be a matter of enquiry as a misconduct. For example, an employee may not commit any misconduct within the meaning of clause 12, but may conduct his affairs in such a manner that business of the employer is affected or his image is tarnished. The infirmity in the employee must be such which cannot be a subject-matter of enquiry. Otherwise, it would not be ever necessary to hold a domestic enquiry because clause 11 shall give power to the employer to dispose with the services of a person at his sweet-will driving the employee to labour Court for redressing the wrong committed by the employer. Otherwise, it would not be ever necessary to hold a domestic enquiry because clause 11 shall give power to the employer to dispose with the services of a person at his sweet-will driving the employee to labour Court for redressing the wrong committed by the employer. The domestic enquiry may appear to be a thin safeguard in practice to cynically inclined people but safeguard it is, because it is legal duty of a fair employer not to punish an employee when the result of domestic enquiry is in his favour. Even otherwise, if we give wider interpretation to clause 11, it is likely to be exercised vagariously giving the employer powers to act arbitrarily and, thereby, violating Article 14 of the Constitution. It is well established that such construction should be avoided even if these Standard Standing Orders are the statutorily imposed conditions of service upon the employer as well as employee. The interpretation of clause 11 making it to be a Henry VIII Clause so familiar to administrative lawyers must be avoided. 10. From the aforesaid discussions, it would be clear that this Court is of the view that scope of clause 11 is different than clause 12. The first refers to the realm of general good administration of the establishment of the employer and is operative when the employee has to suffer termination in the larger interest of the establishment, factory or the company that he is serving. It is directed towards an infirmity of the employee which cannot legitimately be the subject-matter of an enquiry. The clause 12, on the other hand, is specifically meant for disciplinary action in a case of misconduct. It is the duty of the Court to see that clause 11 could not be used as a camouflage for an action under clause 12. Otherwise, in practice the use of clause 12 by the employer shall fall into oblivion or misuse leaving the employee to approach the labour Court every now and time. 11. It is the duty of the Court to see that clause 11 could not be used as a camouflage for an action under clause 12. Otherwise, in practice the use of clause 12 by the employer shall fall into oblivion or misuse leaving the employee to approach the labour Court every now and time. 11. The aforesaid conclusion can be justified by examining Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which reads as under : "(oo) "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include- (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health; It defines "retrenchment" to mean- (i) Termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever; (ii) otherwise than as a punishment by way of disciplinary action. Now, No. (i) has a very wide implication. The termination of the services for any reason whatsoever are very wide. No. (ii) is an exception. Therefore, exception shall determine the limit and the width of No. (i). We must, therefore, determine the scope as a punishment by way of disciplinary action. In order to claim exception it has to be shown that the action taken against the employee was by way of disciplinary action and it resulted in punishment. Now, what is "disciplinary action"? It is obviously, a proceeding taken for the purpose of punishing the breach of the discipline, when there be a breach of discipline and a penalty or punishment is awarded in certain cases. All the breaches of discipline do not result in punishment. Therefore, the exception refers to those actions taken by employer which result in punishment. It is obviously, a proceeding taken for the purpose of punishing the breach of the discipline, when there be a breach of discipline and a penalty or punishment is awarded in certain cases. All the breaches of discipline do not result in punishment. Therefore, the exception refers to those actions taken by employer which result in punishment. If we associate the language of Clause 12 with No. (ii) above, it would be obvious, that disciplinary action referred to in the exception to the definition of "retrenchment" is nothing but misconduct as defined by clause 12. Therefore, an action taken under clause 12 would not come within the meaning of retrenchment as its exception. Otherwise, No. (i) is so wide and would include termination from service for any reason whatsoever. It is obvious that termination of the service of a workman in exercise of powers conferred by clause 11 would amount to retrenchment. The workman would be entitled to retrenchment compensation. The employer cannot get away without paying the retrenchment compensation merely because clause 11 gives him almost absolute powers in practice to dispense with the services of a workman. The following decisions support the view of this Court: (1) The State Bank of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money, AIR 1976 SC 1111 ; (2) L. Robert D'Souza v. The Executive Engineer Southern Railway and Anr., AIR 1982 SC 853 ; (3) Mohanlal v. The Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd., AIR 1981 SC 1253 ; (4) H. D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India and Ors., AIR 1986 SC 132 ; (5) Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh v. Presiding Officer, Chandigarh and Ors., (1990) 3 SCC 682 ; (6) Union of India etc. etc. v. K. V. Jankiraman etc. etc., AIR 1991 SC 2010 ; (7) Rolston John v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court and Ors., AIR 1994 SC 131 ; and (8) Management of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore v. M. Boraiah and Anr., AIR 1983 SC 1320 . These cases are of Supreme Court. A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Factory Manager, Central India Machinery Mfg. Co. Ltd., Gwalior and Anr. v. Naresh Chandra Saxena and Ors., reported in 1984 MPLJ 402 . These cases are of Supreme Court. A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Factory Manager, Central India Machinery Mfg. Co. Ltd., Gwalior and Anr. v. Naresh Chandra Saxena and Ors., reported in 1984 MPLJ 402 . This Court, therefore, reiterates that an ex parte decision taken by the employer under clause 11 for reasons to be recorded in writing showing the infirmity of the employee would be retrenchment within the meaning of clause (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the employee would be entitled to retrenchment compensation. The giving of one month's notice to a permanent employee is no safe-guard against a possible arbitrary action. The power can be used as Henry VIII Clause - a naked power to hire and fire. It appears to this Court the exception indicated in No. (ii) has to be construed literally because the width of language of No. (i) indicates the intention of the Legislature. The policy of the Legislature is to give protection to the workmen by giving them retrenchment compensation, if they are not being dismissed for proved misconduct. 12. Hitherto we have considered the text of the main part of the definition of "retrenchment" but this interpretation should consider if there be anything repugnant in the subject or context. This Court does not find anything of that sort. Nor can this Court ignore what is excluded by express words in clause (a) i.e. voluntary retirement, on superannuation as mentioned in clause (b); termination of employment on non-renewal as mentioned in clause (bb); and termination of service on the ground of ill-health. If narrow definition of "retrenchment" was indicated, there was no occasion to expressly exclude anything from the definition of "retrenchment" under Section 2(oo). In no case the four contingencies would arise if "retrenchment" merely meant removal of surplus staff. It is trite law that Courts cannot ignore the express words in a clause sought to be interpreted. The Legislature is not supposed to use its words in vain. Thus considered as a whole after considering the textual and contextual construction of Section 2(oo), there is no escape from the conclusion that the words "any reason for whatsoever" should be given widest signification. 13. The Legislature is not supposed to use its words in vain. Thus considered as a whole after considering the textual and contextual construction of Section 2(oo), there is no escape from the conclusion that the words "any reason for whatsoever" should be given widest signification. 13. After holding that an action taken under clause 11 of the Standard Standing Orders or rules, amounts to retrenchment it is necessary to consider the effect of retrenchment on the employee and the employer as per Sections 25A, 25J of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Sections 25A, 25J fall within Chapter V-A of this Act. It would now necessary to rivet our attention to Section 25J (Chapter V-A) of this Act. It provides that the provisions of Chapter V-A shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other law including standing orders made under Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Section 25J(2) provides that provisions of Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, shall not affect any other provision of the law but the rights and liabilities of a workman so far as lay off and retrenchment shall be determined by the provisions of Chapter V-A. This Section 25J (2) clarifies the position that even in case of the State law, the provisions of Chapter V-A shall have primacy so far lay off and retrenchment is concerned. A Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Bhanwarlal and Ors. v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr., reported in 1984 Lab IC 1794, at page 1851 held that the Standing Orders of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation could not permit retrenchment without complying with Chapter V-A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Clause 13(1) of Standing Orders of aforesaid Corporation provided termination of employment of permanent employees by giving notices as per clause (a) and clause (b) thereof. They are almost similar in nature to clause 11 of the Standard Standing Orders which are involved in this case. The learned Judges of Rajasthan High Court, constituting the Full Bench wrote separate opinions and differed with each other on other points, but so far as interpretation of Section 25J aforesaid was concerned, they recorded their unanimous opinion as follows at page 1851 :- "Q. 1. The learned Judges of Rajasthan High Court, constituting the Full Bench wrote separate opinions and differed with each other on other points, but so far as interpretation of Section 25J aforesaid was concerned, they recorded their unanimous opinion as follows at page 1851 :- "Q. 1. Section 25J of the Industrial Disputes Act does not permit application of clause 13 of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Workers and Workshop Employees Standing Orders, 1965 without complying with provisions of Sections 25F, 25FF and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act." This Court too records its respectful concurrence with the above conclusion as no exception can be taken to aforesaid view; and holds that Section 25J of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 does not permit application of clause 11(a) of Standard Standing Orders without complying with the provisions of Sections 25F, 25FF and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act for reasons already recorded. 14. It is clear from paragraph 2 of the order dated 4-3-1992, Annexure- B, that the petitioner's services were terminated by applying clause 11 (a) of the Standard Standing Orders as per order dated 15-2-1988. This fact was not disputed by the respondents in paragraph 2 of their return. However, when the petitioner filed an application before the Labour Court for getting that order declared void, the respondents made a somersault and tried to justify the termination on the ground that in fact, the termination was for misconduct. The Labour Court permitted the respondents to take this defence and decided the case, as if termination was for a 'misconduct' which could be justified before it by leading evidence. The moot question is whether such a volte face on the part of the respondents could be permitted so as to say, by way of 'second wind'. In the opinion of this Court, if this course is permitted, it would be mockery of justice. After taking a definite stand, the respondents cannot be permitted to swerve from its course for defeating the claim of the petitioner. It would breed dishonestly at its cynical best. Apart from the aforesaid consideration there is technical reason for adopting such a course. It cannot be disputed that respondents were required to pass an order in writing under the Standing Orders. What would be the evidence of that document? The order itself. It would breed dishonestly at its cynical best. Apart from the aforesaid consideration there is technical reason for adopting such a course. It cannot be disputed that respondents were required to pass an order in writing under the Standing Orders. What would be the evidence of that document? The order itself. Section 91 of the Evidence Act provides inter alia, that in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced in a form of document, then no evidence shall be given in proof terms of such document except the document itself. Section 92 of the Evidence Act prohibits contradicting or varying the terms of such document between the parties subject to certain exceptions which are not obviously applicable. The respondent No. 1 admit that the order was passed under clause 1 l(a) that is to say, not by way of disciplinary action. They were trying to contradict the terms of the order, by showing that it was passed by way of punishment for a misconduct. In the opinion of this Court no amount of oral evidence could prove that the order was passed by way of punishment without holding a domestic enquiry. If it was so, then it was fraud committed by the respondent and it cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own fraud. There is yet another reason for holding that such justification should not be permitted because it shall permit arbitrary powers in the disciplinary authority giving it option not to hold a domestic enquiry for a misconduct. Fourthly, it would be discriminatory, giving the employer a power to pick and choose. The rule of law shall be turned into an unruly horse. In this connection it would not be out of place to recall the words of Vivian Bose, J. in the case of Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gurdhandas Bhanji, reported in AIR 1952 SC 16 , at page 19, paragraph 10 as follows : "(10)......................Public authorities cannot play fast and loose with the powers vested in them, and persons to whose detriment orders are made are entitled to know with exactness and precision what they are expected to do or forbear from doing and exactly what authority is making the order.............." This case has been followed by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Ors., reported in AIR 1978 SC 851 , at page 858, paragraph 8, as follows :- "8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji ( AIR 1952 SC 16 ) (at p. 18) :" "Public orders publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself." For all these reasons this Court comes to the conclusion that the Labour Court as well as the Industrial Court misdirected themselves in considering the justification of the respondent to the effect that the petitioner's services were terminated for misconduct. This appears to be an afterthought. No evidence could be led for proving misconduct of the petitioner. 15. On behalf of the respondents reliance was placed on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Employers in relation to M/s Anand Cinema, Jabalpur v. Mohan Tiwari and Anr., reported in 1992 MPLJ 334 . In that case Section 58 of Shops and Establishment Act as it stood prior to its amendment on 1-5-1982 authorised the employer to terminate the services of his employee after serving him a notice of 30 days, in writing under Section 58(1) of that Act. It dispensed with the holding of an enquiry for "misconduct" as defined by the rules made by the Government under the aforesaid Act. It dispensed with the holding of an enquiry for "misconduct" as defined by the rules made by the Government under the aforesaid Act. Therefore, the employer was legally authorised to dispense with a domestic enquiry and after serving a notice of 30 days or paying wages for that period, in lieu thereof, terminate the service of the employee. Section 58(1) was obviously, an ultra vires, because it permitted as a matter of law of termination for a misconduct without any opportunity to the employee. But, it appears this section was amended at the time the case was heard and, therefore, no occasion arose for declaring it ultra vires. Under such circumstances and under the peculiar facts of the case termination of the employee was held to be for "misconduct" because Section 58(1) of M. P. Shops and Establishment Act permitted such a method for termination even for a misconduct. If the Statute permitted termination for misconduct issuing a notice in writing of 30 days to the employee or giving him wages for that period in lieu thereof in disciplinary matters, the Division Bench rightly concluded that it would not amount to retrenchment. This case is not applicable because the Standing Orders did not and could not permit termination of service for misconduct without an enquiry as already indicated earlier. On the other hand, the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Factory Manager Central India Machinery Mfg. Co. Ltd., Gwalior (supra) which was distinguished by the Division Bench in Employers in relation to Anand Cinema, Jabalpur (supra), appears to be the law applicable to facts of this case. The Division Bench in that case laid down that termination of service as per clause 11(a) would amount to retrenchment and employee was entitled to retrenchment compensation without which the termination would be void. The view of Division Bench in the case of Factory Manager, Central India Machinery Mfg. Ltd., (supra) that the decision of Division Bench in the case of Sunil Kumar Azmi and Ors. The view of Division Bench in the case of Factory Manager, Central India Machinery Mfg. Ltd., (supra) that the decision of Division Bench in the case of Sunil Kumar Azmi and Ors. v. M. P. Road Transport Corporation and Ors., 1980 MPLJ 471, was no longer good law, appears to be correct as the Supreme Court had given wider meaning to word "retrenchment" than the meaning as understood by ordinary acceptation, in : Management of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (supra); Gammon India Ltd. v. Niranjan Das, AIR 1984 SC 500 ; Mohanlal's case, AIR 1981 SC 1253 (supra); L. Robert D'Souza's case (supra); Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. (supra); and Rolston John's case (supra). It may be pointed out that view taken by the Court for restricting the meaning of retrenchment to discharge of surplus staff with the aid of Section 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is no longer available because of the wider connotation given to the words 'any reason whatsoever'. It may be noted that Section 25G aforesaid deals with only one kind of retrenchment, that is to say, when the employer applies the axe to surplus staff. Section 25G says that in those circumstances the principle of Mast come first go' shall apply. In the opinion of this Court even loss of confidence in the employee would be retrenchment and the employer may 'retrench' him within the meaning of Section 2(oo) but he is bound to comply with the provisions of Chapter -VA and cannot justify the termination of employee on the ground of any misconduct. The right of the employer is subject to right of employee to claim compensation for sudden loss of job merely because the employer thinks that he had no confidence in him. The employee may not be retained, but subject to payment of retrenchment compensation. It is difficult to accept the position that the employer should be absolved from his duty of holding an enquiry on the specious and possibly dishonest plea that the domestic enquiry is likely cause stigma upon the employee. Such an object on the part of the employer would be better implemented by payment of 'retrenchment compensation'. No stigma shall be caused to the workman. Such an object on the part of the employer would be better implemented by payment of 'retrenchment compensation'. No stigma shall be caused to the workman. It is difficult to accept the plea that the employer can save his skin by employing dubious means like passing an order under clause 11 of the Standing Orders. It would be better to say more honestly that the employee had committed a 'misconduct' but it is not possible to hold an enquiry and justification for termination on misconduct shall be given by leading evidence in the Court of law. The employee then shall know what he is required to meet. He shall not grope in dark and accordingly file his case before the appropriate forum. It is firm opinion of this Court that the avowed intention of the law makers is not to play dice with the persons who are bound by the law. The consequences of law should be clear and there should be as little room for the game of hide and seek as possible. The Court should not come to aid of the persons who make the confusion worse confounded. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh case (supra) has already reconciled the apparent conflict between Hari Prasad Shivshankar Shukla and Anr. v. A. D. Divelkar and Ors., AIR 1957 SC 121 and Anakapalli Co-operative Agricultural and Industrial Society Ltd. v. Workmen and Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1489 ; and authoritatively laid down that the wider meaning should be ascribed to words for the "any reason whatsoever" in the definition clause. 16. The upshot of the above discussion is that this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution succeeds and is allowed. The Order impugned dated 19-5-1989 (Annexure-A), passed by Labour Court, Bhopal and the order dated 4-3-1992, (Annexure-B), passed by Industrial Court, Indore are hereby set aside. It is held that the termination of services of the petitioner by order dated 15-2-1988 is void ab initio as the petitioner, being a permanent employee could not be removed from the service without payment of retrenchment compensation. The petitioner is reinstated in service as a result of this order. However, looking to time that has elapsed, the matter is remitted to Labour Court for determining the back wages under the facts and circumstances of the case. The petitioner is reinstated in service as a result of this order. However, looking to time that has elapsed, the matter is remitted to Labour Court for determining the back wages under the facts and circumstances of the case. The Labour Court, Bhopal, shall determine if the petitioner is entitled to any amount by way of back wages as per principles of Industrial Jurisprudence.