Honble VERMA, J.–The prayer in the writ petition is to quash the impugned charge-sheet dated 8.12.1995 (Annexure-4) and to declare it illegal, invalid, ultravires and unconstitutional and any adverse action taken or contemplated to be taken on the basis of the impugned charge-sheet be also declared as illegal. (2). It is the submission of the petitioner that as a matter of fact the charge- sheet relating to the incident of 1982- 83 has been issued at the time when he was liable to be considered to be appointed in Indian Administrative Service when some vested interest had played the mischief against the petitioner in such a way as to get the charge-sheet issued to him at the nick of time when the petitioner was at the verge of promotion. Had the charge-sheet not been issued to him, he would have been promoted. His juniors have been appointed in IAS. It is stated that in January, 1995 selections were made for promotion to IAS. Recommendations made by the selection committee were considered and ultimately the petitioner was finally selected on having been so considered by the State Government of Rajasthan and Central Government and the Union Public Service Commission. It is the case of the petitioner that the final selection is made when the integrity certificate is put on the record. In March, 1995 the select list for IAS was prepared wherein the petitioner was included unconditionally at Sr. No. 5. The petitioner submits that on retirement of one Shri R.P Nag, the fifth vacancy had arisen in June, 1995 and his promotion to IAS had matured and in consequence and furtherance to the promo- tion of the petitioner to the cadre of IAS, the recommendations were made by the State Government on 3.8.1995 for making promotions from the select list in which select list the petitioner was figuring at the top at the relevant time. However, the petitioner was left out. His juniors were appointed and the petitioner was superseded for the reason that on 8.12.1995 the petitioner was issued a charge-sheet in respect of an incident pertaining to the year 1982-83. Promotions of the junior persons to IAS had been made on 13.12.1995 i.e. after about 5 days of the issuance of the charge-sheet. The petitioner is already taking up his supersession before the Central Administrative Tribunal where the case against his supersession in IAS cadre is pending. (3). Promotions of the junior persons to IAS had been made on 13.12.1995 i.e. after about 5 days of the issuance of the charge-sheet. The petitioner is already taking up his supersession before the Central Administrative Tribunal where the case against his supersession in IAS cadre is pending. (3). The petitioner submits that the charge-sheet not only illegal, but in the circumstances as narrated in the writ petition, written statement as well as in the rejoinder filed by the petitioner and the documents attached, there is no misconduct whatsoever made out. It is further submitted that this very matter for which the petitioner had been charge-sheeted was enquired into time and again and no- thing was found against the defaulting official. However, it is the case of the petitioner that he was not at all concerned with the allegations made in charge-sheet as during the relevant time he was no more the Secretary of the Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur, as he had been was transferred and had left the charge of his post in the month of June, 1984 as is clear from Annexure-4. (4). The charge relates to the decision taken for auction of the plot sit lated at Jodhpur for the construction of Cinema. This decision is said to have been taken by the Urban Improvement Trust in August, 1982. In pursuance of the said decision, it has been brought on record that the auction was held on 10.10.1982 by the UIT, but because of the reason that the bids were not found satisfactory, the auction was cancelled. The petitioner joined at Jodhpur on 18.12.1982 and remained there in the post of Secretary of the UIT till 29.6.1984. The plot was again auctioned on 21.11.1982 in pursuance of the decision of the UIT taken in August 1982 for auctioning the plot. Auction was complete and a lease-deed was executed by the then Chairman of the UIT in favour of the highest bidder on 1.7.1983. However, in the mean-time the Government had taken a policy decision to permit construction twin cinema and commercial complex as per Annexure 8 attached to the writ petition and circular in this regard was addressed to the various local authorities to the effect that it was permissible to construct twin cinemas as per Annexure-9. However, in the mean-time the Government had taken a policy decision to permit construction twin cinema and commercial complex as per Annexure 8 attached to the writ petition and circular in this regard was addressed to the various local authorities to the effect that it was permissible to construct twin cinemas as per Annexure-9. It was on 10.10.1983 that the Chief Town Planner vide Annexure-10 had written to the local authorities about the revised policy of the cinema industry and the allot- ment of land at fixed price. Because of the reason that the Government had taken a decision for granting permission for construction of twin cinema and commercial complex, the auction purchaser had sent a revised building plan for change of construction to twin cinema and commercial complex. Because of the reason that earlier when the auction was ordered, such policy had not been circulated and, therefore, in the lease-deed there was no mention about the twin cinema construction. The matter in regard to the sanction of the revised plan was ultimately put to the trust committee. The State Government vide Annexure-11 had decided to grant revised license to the auction purchaser for construction of the twin cinema at the site on 22.11.1983. Because of the reason that the State Government had granted the license as per revised plan, the Chief Town Planner, to whom the matter was sent by the UIT for opinion, had acted accordingly on sanction of license. It is stated that the petitioner had informed the Collector that had the site been auctioned with the revised conditions, the plot would have been auctioned at a higher rate. Matter in regard to the approval for sanction of the revised plan was still under considera- tion when the petitioner was transferred on 29.6.1984. Revised plans were sanctioned on 13.9.1984 i.e. after about three months of the transfer of the petitioner. (5). It was a matter of concern with the authorities as to why the approval or revised sanction of approval of maps for twin cinema was granted and, therefore, it was thought to inquire into the matter. The matter was even also referred to Loka- yukta in respect of complaints received regarding various decisions of the UIT including the matter of approval of the revised building plans. (6). The matter was even also referred to Loka- yukta in respect of complaints received regarding various decisions of the UIT including the matter of approval of the revised building plans. (6). It was decided by the department who issued charge- sheet to Shri D.L. Bhakar erstwhile Executive Engineer, UIT, Jodhpur on whose recommendation the revised building plans were approved by the Building Plan Committee as per Anne- xure-23 attached with the rejoinder. A complaint was also made to the Director, Prevention of Corruption Department on 2.5.1990 against Shri D.L. Bhakar. It is stated that the petitioner had not been named any where, rather as per Annexure-17 the petitioner was sited as witness. The petitioner was being involved for criminal action as well along with Shri D.L. Bhakar aforesaid and the Government had vide its Annexure-18 taken up the plea that at the time of sanctioning of the revised plan, the petitioner had been transferred in the month of June, 1984 and, therefore, the petitioner was not involved or responsible for sanction of the plan. This was so decided by the Government on 1. 11. 1 994. However, despite the above stand being taken by the government the petitioner was charge-sheeted vide the impugned charge-sheet Annexure-4 dated 8.12.1995, with the charges that the building plans were approved by the UIT on 22.11.1983 without realising any extra amount from the auction purchaser and the petitioner had failed to high light this aspect at the time of sanction. (7). It is the case of the petitioner that as a matter of fact the approval of the sanction was not granted on 22.11.1983 as alleged in the charge-sheet but on 13.9.1984 and similar charge- sheet was issued to Dr. D.L. Bhakar in November, 1987, but he was exonerated. Reference is being invited to the charge-sheet issued to Dr. Bhakar which is attached as Annexure 24. It is the case of the petitioner that in the similar circumstances not only in Jodhpur but at so many other places the approval of the revised plan had been allowed but it is the petitioner who has been choosen for the said action mainly for the reason that he was to be promoted immediately and the Inquiry Officer had been appointed against the petitioner vide Annexure-26 vide letter dated 29.6.1996. (8). (8). The petitioner prays that the charge-sheet being belated with inordinate delay, is arbitrary and likely to be quashed. It is further submitted that the charge-sheet is manifestly unjust and is based on erroneous assumption that the revised plan was approved on 22.11.1983 when it is very clear that the revised plan was approved on 13.9.1984 when the petitioner had already transferred from Jodhpur. (9). It is the case of the petitioner that the approval to the revised plan could have been cancelled by his successor if at all under law it was permissible to do so and not the petitioner who was no more holding the said post on the relevant time and date. It is further submitted that similar charges were also levelled against Dr. D.L. Bhakar who has been exonerated. It is further submitted that even though the Govt. had allowed the construction of the twin cinema, the lease-deed could not have been cancelled because of the reason that the lease was given in the open auction and the money had been deposited by the auction purchaser which was duly approved by the Chairman of the UIT. In nutshell the petitioner submits that during the period when he stayed at Jodhpur as Secretary of the UIT, he had no part to play and thus he had been wrongly and erroneously issued the charge- sheet of alleged misconduct when actually there is no misconduct at all made out. (10). Reply has been filed on behalf of the respondent. It is denied that there was any extraneous consideration and motive while issuing the charge-sheet. It is stated that the relevant facts had come to light in the year 1990 and the matter was under investigation by the Rajasthan State Bureau of Investigation for five years when the matter was being proceeded for giving sanction for prosecution but instead of granting sanction of prosecution, the Government had decided to initiate the departmental proceedings. The allegations of malafide were denied. It is stated that the petitioner was Chief Executive of the UIT Jodhpur and, therefore, respon- sible for irregularities. It is stated that he had acted contrary to the advise of the Chairman of the UIT deliberately to benefit the private party. The allegations of malafide were denied. It is stated that the petitioner was Chief Executive of the UIT Jodhpur and, therefore, respon- sible for irregularities. It is stated that he had acted contrary to the advise of the Chairman of the UIT deliberately to benefit the private party. It is stated that the site was auctioned for construction of one cinema building and grant of permission for building to twin cinema building and 72 shops was highly irregular. It is stated that had the auction been re-held the property would have fetch much higher price however, it is averred that granting of no objection certificate by the licensing authority is totally irrelevant for the purpose of approval of building plan. It is stated even though the petitioner was earlier as well issued charge-sheet on 3.9.1986, but it related to some other matter and so was the case in regard to the proceedings before the Lokayukt. It is stated that the prosecution of Mr. Devra on the same gro- und and as narrated has no relevancy whatsoever. It is reiterated in the written statement that sanctioning of building plan for construction of twin cinema and commercial complex was approved on 15.7.1983 and 22.11.1983 when the petitioner was working as Secretary to the UIT, Jodhpur even though it is not denied that the formal approval was accorded much lateron. (11). Rejoinder has been filed by the petitioner. It is reiterated that on 26.11.1987 a charge-sheet was issued to Shri D.L. Bhakar on the charge of granting approval of twin cinema in the plot in question as per Annexure-23. It is averred that all facts and matter relating to such facts were very much in the knowledge of the concerned authorities from the very beginning. It is denied that the petitioner had ever acted contrary to the views expressed by the Chairman rather it is submitted that the Chairman had made an noting on 30.7.1983 to seek the opinion of the Chief Town Planner as per Schedule A attached to the rejoinder. (12). From the above narration of pleadings, the charge-sheet, statement of allegations and facts as revealed are as under : DETAILS OF CHARGE-SHEET: (i) The petitioner was working as Secretary, UIT, Jodhpur from 18.10.1982 to 29.6.1984. (ii) On 21.11.1982 a plot was leased on rent by way of auction for an amount of Rs.44 lacs. (12). From the above narration of pleadings, the charge-sheet, statement of allegations and facts as revealed are as under : DETAILS OF CHARGE-SHEET: (i) The petitioner was working as Secretary, UIT, Jodhpur from 18.10.1982 to 29.6.1984. (ii) On 21.11.1982 a plot was leased on rent by way of auction for an amount of Rs.44 lacs. (iii) According to the conditions of the auction the plot was meant for one cinema hall. (iv) The auction purchaser had applied for revised sanction for con- struction of twin cinema hall and a commercial complex. (v) Vide notification dated 26.3.1983 the State Government had allowed the construction of twin cinema by amending the regulations and similarly the Government had taken a decision to allow the commercial complex as well. (vi) On 22.11.1983 license was granted to the auction purchaser by the Licensing Authority, a separate entity to construct the twin cinema hall. (vii) The petitioner has been charged that as a Secretary he should have been made careful and should not have ignore the fact that lease was for single cinema. (viii) As per charge sheet it is alleged that sanction was granted by the petitioner on 22.11.1983. Further allegation was levelled that the petitioner had not tried to recover the amount for the sanction of twin cinema. (ix) It was alleged that the petitioner had not considered the financial aspect of the matter thus, a loss has been caused to the government. (13). Lease-deed has been produced on record as Annexure-7 which is signed by Man Singh Devra, the then Chairman of the UIT and the auction purchaser. A letter dated 27.8.1982 has been annexed with the writ petition wherein it is stated that under the Rajasthan Cinema Control Act, 1982 approval had been granted to add the commercial complex with the cinema. Annexure 11 dated 22.11.1983 has been attached by which the licensing authority has given the permission and no objection certificate for construction of permanent cinema to the auction purchaser to construct the twin cinema. The licensing authority has modified the ear- lier permission to that of the twin construction permission. Para 3 of the Annexure 11 shall be relevant for the purpose which is reproduced as under : ``3. The licensing authority has modified the ear- lier permission to that of the twin construction permission. Para 3 of the Annexure 11 shall be relevant for the purpose which is reproduced as under : ``3. In pursuance of the above decision the `No Objection Certificate already granted to Shri Mukan Chand Bhansali s/o Shri Ghewar Chand Bhansali, Promotor, Arihant Theaters Pvt. Ltd. Lakhara Bazar, Jodh- pur for construction of a permanent cinema in the land belonging to the applicant at Jodhpur, vide this Department order of even number dated 4.5.83 (copy enclosed for reference), is hereby modified to a Twin Cinema on the same terms and conditions prescribed in the No Objection Certificate issued vide order dated 4.5.83. Annexure- 12 is the approval granted by the building committee on 13.9.1984 which reads as under: `Sub-Proposed Twin Cinemas with Commercial Complex at Manji-Ka-Hatha, Jodhpur. The Building Committee, Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur held its meeting today, the 13th September, 1984. The revised plans as per the observations of the Committees meeting held on 11 th September 1984, plans were examined by the committee. The committee hereby approves the building plans. Sd/- Senior Town Planner & Chairman, Building Committee, UIT, Jodhpur. Sd/- S.E., R.W.D., Member Building Committee, UIT, Jodhpur. Sd/- S.E., RSEB Member, Building Committee, UIT, Jodhpur. (14). There is a letter Annexure-13 placed on record which has not been denied wherein the petitioner himself has pointed out that the site in question was auctioned for one cinema but now the permission for twin cinema has been applied for. It is stated in the letter written by the petitioner that the permission for twin cinema has been applied for. It is stated in the letter written by the petitioner that the permission for twin cinema could have brought more money to the UIT, meaning thereby, that the petitioner had informed the authorities of this fact that there was a possibility that the auction could have brought more amount but still the competent authority did neither took action for cancellation of the auction but approved the revised maps after the transfer of the petitioner from Jodhpur. (15). The petitioner has also placed on record a copy of the FIR (Annexure-16) against the then Man Singh Devra, Chairman of the UIT. Amongst other allegations against the then Chairman, one of the allegation was levelled in regard to this very cinema hall etc. (15). The petitioner has also placed on record a copy of the FIR (Annexure-16) against the then Man Singh Devra, Chairman of the UIT. Amongst other allegations against the then Chairman, one of the allegation was levelled in regard to this very cinema hall etc. to the effect that the Chairman had allowed the twin cinema and commercial complex on the site in question by according his approval. (16). It is on record that yet on 1.11.1994 the Government vide its letter aforesaid had written to the police department wherein it was pointed out by the Govt. to the police itself that the petitioner had been transfered from Jodhpur on 29.6.1984 i.e. three months before the approval of the revised plan was given. It was further pointed out by the Government that if at all any charge is made out that allegation should have been levelled against the successor Secretary who has holding the post on 13.9.1984 rather the Government had defended the petitioner by saying that the petitioner had pointed out this fact to the Government that such sanction of the revised plan would also be obstacle to the traffic but the Collector had not given any attention to the objections being raised by the petitioner for the construction of the twin cinema and the commercial complex. Para 2 and 8 of the letter No. A. Sha(3) 43/90/3625 dated 15.6.1994 which is reproduced hereunder which according to the petitioner esttops the Govt. Para 2 and 8 of the letter No. A. Sha(3) 43/90/3625 dated 15.6.1994 which is reproduced hereunder which according to the petitioner esttops the Govt. from levelling any charge: bl izdj.k esa ftl flusek Hkw[k.M ds lEcU/k esa vkjksi yxk;k x;k gS fd ,d flusek gkWy fuekZ.k ds lanHkZ dks ysdj Hkw[k.M dh uhykeh gqbZ vkSj mlds ctk; 2 flusek gkWy fuekZ.k o 130 O;kolkf;d nqdkusa cukus dh Lohd`fr nsus ijUrq ml vuqikr esa Hkw[k.M dh dher dh vkuqikfrd o`f) ds fy;s iz;kl ugha fd;k x;k vkSj eSllZ vfjgar fFk;sVj izkbosV fy- dks vuqfpr :i ls vkfFkZd ykHk igqWapk;k x;k rks bl vkjksi ds lEcU/k esa fLFkfr ;g gS fd flusek fuekZ.k dh Lohd`fr 13-9-89 dks fcfYMax desVh }kjk nh xbZ tcfd mudk rcknyk yxHkx rhu ekg igys vFkkZr~ 29-6-84 dks uxj fodkl U;kl] tks/kiqj ls vU;= gks x;k FkkA bl izdkj vuqfpr Lohd`fr iznku dj ,oa U;kl dks vkfFkZd gkfu igqWapkus dk tks vkjksi gS og rF;kRed :i ls Hkh lgh ugha gSA cfYd ;g vkjksi ml vf/kdkjh ds fo:) yxk;k tkuk pkfg;s tks 13-9-84 dks tks/kiqj uxj fodkl U;kl esa lfpo ds in ij FkkA fooknxzLr Hkw[k.M dk ,d ls vf/kd flusek O;kolkf;d nqdkusa cukus ds fo"k; esa muds }kjk ftyk dysDVj] tks/kiqj dks Li"V fuosnu fd;k x;k Fkk fd ;fn ,d ls vf/kd flusek cuk;k tkrk gS rks tgkWa VªsfQd ds n`f"Vdks.k ls vuqfpr ^^ifjfLFkfr mRiUu gksxh vkSj lkFk gh U;kl dks Hkh vkfFkZd gkfu gksxhA ijUrq dysDVj] tks/kiqj us muds lq>koksa ij n;ku ugha fn;kA bl lEcU/k esa 3-12-83 dks dysDVj] tks/kiqj dks i= fy[kk ;g i= ,usDpj 22 i=koyh ds i`"B 135@lh ij voyksdukFkZ miyC/k gSA fookfnr Hkw[k.M esa fuek.kZ ds vykok tks O;kolkf;d nqdkuksa dk fuekZ.k djus dh btktr fnukad 13-9-84 dks nh xbZ gS og btktr U;kl dh fuekZ.k lfefr }kjk nh xbZ gS vkSj bl dk;Zokgh esa mudk dksbZ lg;ksx@ijkekZ@jk; ugha yh xbZ D;ksafd rcknyk gh twu] 1984 esa gks pqdk FkkA uxj fodkl U;kl ls lEcfU/kr ,DV o :Yl dh fdlh Hkh Lrj ij dksbZ mYya?ku ugha fd;k x;k gS vkSj Hkz"Vkpkj fujks/kd foHkkx us dkYifud :i ls ;g ekeyk rS;kj fd;k gSA vr% jkT; ljdkj ,sls dkYifud izdj.kksa esa vfHk;kstu dh Lohd`fr iznku djrh gS rks vuko;d :i ls tgkWa ekufld mRihM+u o vkfFkZd gkfu gksxh rks mlds lkFk lkFk lekt esa lsok ifjfLFkfr ij Hkh foijhr izHkko iM+sxkA /kkjk 16 ds vUrxZr tks iwoZ esa dk;Zokgh dh xbZ Fkh og dk;Zokgh Hkh dbZ o"kksZa rd pyh vkSj inksUufr ls oafpr jguk iM+kA bl izdj.k dks mPpre vf/kdkjh ftyk dysDVj] ekuuh; yksdk;qDr ,oa jkT; ljdkj ds lfpo Lrj rd ijh{k.k fd;k x;k gS vkSj mUgksausa Hkh mUgsa nks"kh ugha ik;k gSA** (17). The Government had ultimately concluded by holding that the petitioner was not at all responsible for any approval of the revised plan. The conclusion of the Government as per Annexure-8 is reproduced as under: tgkWa rd Hkw[k.M tks ewy :i ls ,d flusek gkWy fuekZ.k ds fy;s izkjEHk esa uhyke fd;k x;k vkSj ckn esa muesa ls nks flusek gkWy ,oa 130 O;kolkf;d nqdkusa cukusa dh Lohd`fr Hkh tkjh gqbZ] rks ;g Lohd`fr fnukad 13-9-84 dks tkjh gqbZ gS] tcfd Jh kekZ dk rcknyk twu 1984 esa uxj fodkl U;kl] tks/kiqj ls vU;= dgha gks x;k FkkA vr% izFke n`"V;k ;g Li"V gS fd fuekZ.k dh Lohd`fr Jh kekZ ds vfrfjDr vU; fdlh vf/kdkjh us nh gSA (18). The Government had taken a categorical plea that no case is made out against the petitioner for according any sanction as he was not at all responsible for the approval which was accorded after the transfer of the petitioner. (19). From the above narration of the above facts and also the documents annexed with the writ petition, it is clear that when the approval of the revised plan was accorded by the Trust in the month of September 1984, the petitioner had since been transferred. During the tenure of the petitioner the matter was still being dealt with and as regard viability of granting the approval and in the changed circumstances, the Government had taken a decision to accord sanction for the construction of twin cinema with the commercial complex. (20). It is apparent from the order Annexure 18 wherein the Government had taken a categorical stand that the petitioner was not at all liable or responsible for sanctioning any revised plan. (21). It is also on record that the plot was leased out to the auction purchaser wherein it was provided that the site is for construction of a cinema hall. So far the auction itself is concerned, no finger is being pointed out to any employee to the effect that there was any irregularity in the auction. Legality of the auction is not disputed. What is being disputed is this that the auction purchaser initially had submitted the plan for a single cinema hall, lateron had filed a revised plan for construction of twin cinema hall with commercial complex. The matter was to be decided by the trust. The trust approved the revised plan in September, 1984. Legality of the auction is not disputed. What is being disputed is this that the auction purchaser initially had submitted the plan for a single cinema hall, lateron had filed a revised plan for construction of twin cinema hall with commercial complex. The matter was to be decided by the trust. The trust approved the revised plan in September, 1984. At the time when the petitioner was transferred in June, 1984, the matter was still under consideration of the authorities and no final decision had been taken about the sanction of the revised plan. In such circumstances, can it be said that the petitioner could at all be charge-sheeted for imaginative act/or omission which decision had not been culminated into a final decision when the petitioner had already left on transfer. (22). The petitioner submits that because of the above circumstances, he had been roped-in in the year 1995 and just less than a couple of days before, he could have been promoted to the post of IAS. In any case from the record it is apparent that the matter was in the knowledge of the Government as far back in the year 1986 and 1987 when Mr. D.L. Bhakar was charge-sheeted and asked to explain on this very ground. No action was taken right upto 1990 and to say on behalf of the Government that it was for the first time when the Govt. had come to know about the sanction of the revised plan of the auction purchaser in the year 1990 is without any basis. Even otherwise, there is no explanation on behalf of the Government as to why right from 1984 to 1990 and then from 1990 to 1995 till the chargesheet was issued, why the proceedings were not started against the petitioner. Even otherwise, there is no explanation on behalf of the Government as to why right from 1984 to 1990 and then from 1990 to 1995 till the chargesheet was issued, why the proceedings were not started against the petitioner. Admittedly, this is a case of in-excusable delay and lapse on the part of the Government to issue the charge-sheet for the imaginative misconduct which otherwise is not borne out from the record and even as per the submission of the State itself when the petitioner was defended by the State itself by writing to the police that the petitioner was not at all responsible for sanction of the revised plan, rather the State had been taking stand that the petitioner himself was taking up the plea then the matter was being dealt with in the trust to the effect that any such sanction would hamper the traffic, coupled with objection that had the auction been done for twin cinema, there would have been likelihood of fetching more amount. In such circumstances, the counsel for the petitioner submits that the charge-sheet is a delayed charge-sheet and that too, on the alleged misconduct which can not be termed misconduct at all as the petitioner was not at all responsible for any such approval as has been admitted by the State itself. The issuance of the charge-sheet, thus points out to some ulterior malice by some person who was interested in getting the petitioner superseded for promotion of the IAS when the petitioner was going to be promoted within a week of the issuance of the charge-sheet and the appointment to the post of IAS, which should have been offered to the petitioner had been offered to his next junior because of present charge-sheet. The petitioner was bye passed. Though there are no direct malafides alleged against any person but the action of issuing the charge-sheet of the incident of 1982-83 in the year 1995 do point out to the fact that either there was something wrong when the matter was dealt with by the State or there were some hidden hands working against the petitioner for giving such a blow as to deprive him from promotion to the post of IAS. (23). (23). Counsel for the petitioner relies on a judgment reported in State of And- hra Pradesh vs. N. Radhakishan (1) wherein while dealing with the facts of issuing the charge-sheet just before the meeting of the DPC, it was observed as under by the Supreme Court: ``Tribunal was concerned with the question if promotion of the respondent could be denied to him after his name had been included in the panel prepared by the DPC on the ground that the disciplinary, inquiry initiated against him had not yet been terminated. The respondent had submitted before the Tribunal that the charge memo dated July 31, 1995 was served upon him just before the meeting of the DPC only to deprive him his claim of promotion. ``The Tribunal did not go into the culpability of the respondent with respect to the charges as contained in memo dated July 31, 1995 and did not record any finding of guilt or otherwise on those charges. The Tribunal, however, said that the memo dated July 31, 1995 related to the incidents that happened ten years or more prior to the date of the memo and that there was absolutely no explanation, by the government for this inordinate delay in framing the charges and conducting the inquiry against the respondent. The explanation given by the State that for some reason or the other the Inquiry Officer was being changed from time to time and on that account inquiry could not be conducted, did not find favour by the Tribunal. It said that there was no justification on the part of the State now conducting the inquiry against the respondent in respect of the incidents at this late stage. ``By letter dated August 3, 1995 respondent informed the disciplinary authority, who issued the Articles of charges, that he worked as Assistant City Planner in the Corporation from December 6, 1977 to February 16, 1979 in different circles and that from that it could be seen that only charge No. 1 related to his period when he was working as Assistant City Planner in that circle. ``In his written statement dated September 25, 1995 the respondent explained as to how charges 2, 3 and 4 could not relate to him and subsequently also in his letter to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Andhra Pradesh he said that charges 2 and 4 related to the period when he was working in Andhra Pradesh State Scheduled Caste and Tribes Co-operative Housing Society Federation from February 9, 1979 to September 30, 1981. During the period charge No. 3 related to, the respondent said that he was on deputation at Oxford Polytechnic in United Kingdom from October 11, 1984 to September 1985 for his post- graduation course. (24). It was held by the Honble Supreme Court as under: ``It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has taken into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnor- mal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In conside- ring whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. ``Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations. ``It is nobodys case that respondent at any stage tried to obstruct or delay the inquiry proceedings. The Tribunal rightly did not accept the explanations of the State as to why delay occurred. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations. ``It is nobodys case that respondent at any stage tried to obstruct or delay the inquiry proceedings. The Tribunal rightly did not accept the explanations of the State as to why delay occurred. In fact there was hardly any explanation worth consideration. In the circumstances the Tribunal was justified in quashing the charge memo dated July 31, 1995. (25). Yet in another case, the Chief Secretary to Govt. of Andhra Pradesh vs. R. Veerabhadram (2), the Supreme Court observed as under- ``So far as the second point is concerned, the Tribunal has, on the material before it, persuaded itself to the view that it would be unreasonable to permit the continuation of the enquiry after the lapse of a decade after the alleged misconduct. The Tribunal noticed that while the charge against the respondent that while functioning as a statutory authority to deal with the cases under the land ceiling law had accepted a birth certificate in order to come to the conclusion that the person referred to therein had attained the age of majority and entitled to the benefit of an additional ceiling area and that the respondent had, instead of rejecting the claim, deliberately, overlooked the tell- tale interpolations in the documents that, respondent, even while the appeal against his determination was pending before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, had himself proposed to corr- ect the order on the ground that he had since come to suspect that the declarant had practised fraud on him and that the mistake should not be left uncorrected. The Tribunal also noticed the inaction on the part of the disciplinary authority in pursuing the enquiry with reasonable diligence. ``The question is whether this view of the Tribunal should be interfered with under Article 136. On a consideration of the matter, we are of the view that it is not an appropriate case where we should interfere with the view taken by the Tribunal. (26). In State of M.P Vs. Bani Singh and Another (3) the Supreme Court obser- ved as under: ``The appeal against the order dated 16.12.1987 has been filed on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and latches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. Bani Singh and Another (3) the Supreme Court obser- ved as under: ``The appeal against the order dated 16.12.1987 has been filed on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and latches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. The irregularities which were the subject matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-77. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case, there are not grounds to interfere with the Tribunals orders and accordingly we dismiss the appeal. (27). The petitioner also relies on a Single Bench decision of this court in J.D. Jain vs. State of Raj. & Ors. (4) wherein the alleged irregularity was committed in the year 1980-81 and was charge sheeted in May 1995 after a lapse of 15 years and this court had held as under- ``In my opinion it is a fit case where the Annex. 2, the charge sheet, dated 8.5.1995 is to be quashed for the reasons that no explanation whatsoever is forthcoming from the respondents as to why the charge sheet could not be issued for 15 years. It is also admitted fact, as revealed from the bare reading of the charge sheet when no overt act of say misconduct has been levelled against the petitioner and the only allegation mentioned in the charge sheet is that the petitioner had got an order passed on the file from the Executive Engineer in regard to some average charge per hour and for the purpose of running of heavy machine or its repairs. It has not been shown as to how the petitioner who was working as a Technical Assistant to the Superintending Engineer could influence the Executive Engineer to pass any such order. Assuming it be so, that some order has been pa- ssed by the Executive Engineer on some file, which file must have been submitted to the Superintending Engineer through the petitioner, it cannot be said that the petitioner had committed any irregularity or misconduct. It is clear that the Government had woken up all of a sudden and started departmental proceedings against the petitio- ner for alleged loss of petty amount of Rs. 187.92 paise on some supposed repairs, on some machine or calculating the average running rental income of some heavy machine but has also shown utter negligence on its part as well to have waken up after 15 years. ``Apart from the above fact initiation of the proceedings against the petitioner deserves to be quashed on the ground of abnormal delay of 15 years. It is clear from the charge-sheet itself that the so called imaginative misconduct of the year 1980-81 has been now initiated in the year 1995 without giving any explanation whatsoever for such a delay. Reliance is placed on Beni Singh Vs. State, reported in AIR 1990 SC page 1308 and S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1662/87 K.M. Bani Vs. State of Raj. to support the contention that the delayed charge sheet causing prejudice deserves to be quashed." (28). The petitioner has also relied a Single Bench decision of this court in Yog Raj vs. State of Raj. & Ors. (5) wherein this court had held that the malice in law means malice which is presumed in law to exist in the mind of the authority. There need not be any factual malicious conduct present and alleged in the officer. The allegations of malafides are of two kind; one allegation of malice in law and another, allegation of malice in facts. Malice in law is an inference of existence of malice arising out of attending circumstances and not out of the person against whom the malice is alleged. In the case being dealt with by the Honble Judge, the malice had arisen by mere dealing with the proceedings by Mr. N.S. Bhandari who was related to one of the delinquent officer which fact was undisputed, itself was sufficient to prove malice in law. In the case being dealt with by the Honble Judge, the malice had arisen by mere dealing with the proceedings by Mr. N.S. Bhandari who was related to one of the delinquent officer which fact was undisputed, itself was sufficient to prove malice in law. On the question of delay the court had quashed the proceedings of punishment on the ground that admittedly, the incident had ta- ken place in the year 1982 when an inquiry was commenced in the year 1995 and it was observed that to take 13 years time to decide the matter whether the imposition of minor penalty should be undertaken or not is in-excusable in law. Similarly, in another Single Bench decision of this Court in S.C. Sharma Vs. State & Anr. (6) it was observed as under: ``No particulars have been given in the reply regarding the delay which occurred at all levels between the dates of receipt of the report of the preliminary enquiry in the year 1985 and the service of charge sheet dated 6.12.1994 which was served on the petitioner on 5.1.1995. In the reply it has not been disputed that the UDC concerned was found guilty of having suppressed the facts and has been punished for the same. It is also not understandable when the proceedings were contemplated against the petitioner for imposition of major penalty under rule 16 of the CCA Rules how he was promoted to the post of S.E. and in the revised DPC he was given the year 1990-91. It appears that the Government did not think it proper to take any action against the petitioner for all this time but when he became due for promotion to the post of Additional Chief Engineer some one thought it necessary to get the enquiry conducted against the petitioner so that his case for promotion could be delayed and then the Govern- ment came in action and served the charge sheet which had been prepared before the promotion of the petitioner was made by the revised DPC. Not only this is a case of inordinate and unexplained delay but the action of the Government in taking up this matter at this stage also shows that the action is not bonafide. (29). Similarly in other Single Bench decisions of this Court reported in Ram Gopal Kumawat vs. United Comm. Bank & Anr. (7), Dr. Not only this is a case of inordinate and unexplained delay but the action of the Government in taking up this matter at this stage also shows that the action is not bonafide. (29). Similarly in other Single Bench decisions of this Court reported in Ram Gopal Kumawat vs. United Comm. Bank & Anr. (7), Dr. B.K. Choudhary vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (8), S.K. Pareek vs. Jaipur Nagaur Anchalik Gramin Bank & Anr. (9) and Jagjit Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (10) in which case a charge-sheet was served on 31.12.1986 in respect of an incident of the year 1976-77 and it was held by this court that where the charge sheet was issued almost after 9/10 years of the incident, the delay in charge-sheet is not explained and for the reason the inquiry proceedings had not concluded, the writ petition was allowed and the disciplinary proceedings were quashed. Similar is the effect of the judgment in C.L. Rassawat vs. State of Rajasthan (11). (30). Counsel for the petitioner also relies on the latest judgment of the Supreme Court in R.C. Sood vs. High Court of Judicature at Rajasthan & Ors. (12) wherein the Full Court of the Rajasthan High Court had decided to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against Shri Sood who was a member of R.H.J.S. on a complaint which complaint had already been looked into by the Honble Chief Jus- tice of Rajasthan and it was not thought proper to start the disciplinary proceedings but lateron the Full Court by revoking the earlier order of the Fact Finding Committee consisting of three Judges of the High Court and after going into the circumstances of the case the Honble Supreme Court observed as under : ``We have, therefore, carefully seen the report of the Committee and the complaints against the petitioner in order to satisfy ourselves whether there was any cogent material which warranted initiation of disciplinary proceedings. We do not find, after such examination, that any material existed which could justify the initiation of the impugned action. The allegations against the petitioner were generally vague or were such which stood explained from the record itself or were such which did not show that the petitioner had committed any irregularity, leave alone illegality. For example one of the main allegations against the petitioner was of his having committed irregularity in obtaining loan for constructing a house. The allegations against the petitioner were generally vague or were such which stood explained from the record itself or were such which did not show that the petitioner had committed any irregularity, leave alone illegality. For example one of the main allegations against the petitioner was of his having committed irregularity in obtaining loan for constructing a house. Apart from the fact that this loan was sanctioned by the then Chief Justice, the petitioner has with the assistance of the loan constructed the house and is living there and the loan amount already stands returned. In such circumstances for the Committee to come to a conclusion that the disciplinary proceedings should be initiated was clearly unwarranted. Suddenly, we find on the High Court record Justice Kokjes letter dated 27th October, 1994 forwarding to the then Chief Justice the old complaint of Vijay Singh. The Chief Justice makes an endorsement on this letter on the same date-thereby showing the sense of urgency. First office note is written only on 9th November, 1994, after issuance of notice by this Court in the writ petition filed by the petitioner. The fact that it is only on 30th November, 1994, after the decision of this Court on 22nd November, 1994, that the Full Court fixed up the matter lends credence to the petitioners submission that the dates which appear on record may not be real. This is more so when we find that none of the documents in the form of complaints allegedly received by the Judges bear any endorsement as to the date of receipt of the same. To crown it all the second round started on a complaint of Vijay Singh stated to have been received by Justice Kokje on or before 27th October, 1994. This complaint had been circulated in September, 1993 amongst all the then Judges of the High Court and in respect of which order was passed by the then Chief Justice and the matter was closed on 31st January, 1994. Respondents counsel could give no explanation as to how Justice Kokje got this complaint against the petitioner some time before 27th October, 1994 when he was trans- ferred to the Rajasthan High Court only on 28th April, 1994. At that time the petitioner had ceased to be the Registrar of the High Court with effect from 1st February, 1994. Respondents counsel could give no explanation as to how Justice Kokje got this complaint against the petitioner some time before 27th October, 1994 when he was trans- ferred to the Rajasthan High Court only on 28th April, 1994. At that time the petitioner had ceased to be the Registrar of the High Court with effect from 1st February, 1994. It is obvious that a copy of this complaint was handed over to Justice Kokje by some one who was interested in harming the petitioner and thereupon the second round of action against the petitioner commenced with Justice Kokje being made one of the members of the Three Judges Committee. (31). While reaching the conclusion in the facts of that case, the Honble Supreme Court further observed as under: ``It is evident that there was a deliberate design to bring to a prema- ture end the judicial career of the petitioner, whose name, at that time, was being actively considered for elevation as High Court Judge. This is apparent from the fact that in the resolutions dated 30th November, 1994 and 5th January, 1995 it was resolved by the Full Court that the President of India and the Chief Justice of India should be informed about the holding of the departmental enquiry against the petitioner. Acting on the basis of the Committees biased report the Full Court, we are said to note, continued in similar vein and proceeded to nail the petitioner by taking a decision which lacked objectivity. Apparently stung by the judgment dated 22nd November, 1994 of this Court it retaliated by launching a fresh set of charges against the petitioner clearly with a view to ruin his judicial career. We have no doubt that the action taken by the court was not bonafide and amounts to victimisation. This is certainly not expected from a judicial forum, least of all the High Court, which is expected to disch- arge its administrative duties as fairly and objectively as it is required to discharge its judicial functions. ``We have no doubt that all these complaints were procured solely with a view to show that apart from the original complaint of Vijay Singh there were other complaints against the petitioner which rep- resented new material justifying a fresh enquiry. ``We have no doubt that all these complaints were procured solely with a view to show that apart from the original complaint of Vijay Singh there were other complaints against the petitioner which rep- resented new material justifying a fresh enquiry. These complaints, some of them being made by discredited persons containing vague and general allegations could not, in our view, be regarded as fresh material which required disciplinary proceedings being initiated. The said complaints did not merit any serious considerations and refere- nce to them by the High Court was uncalled for. (32). Ultimately the Honble Supreme Court after going through various materials brought into the notice to their Lordships quashed the entire disciplinary proceedings initiated by the High Court against R.C. Sood together with the Full Court resolution dated 30.11.1994, 5.1.1995 and 6.1.1995. (33). In view of the facts as discussed above, it is established on record that the so called irregularity as alleged against the petitioner was an incident of the year 1982-83, approval of the revised plans had been accorded by the trust when the petitioner had already been transferred from Jodhpur and there was no occasion for the petitioner to be party to the final decision for according sanction of the revised plans for construction of a twin cinema hall. The Government itself had granted license for construction of a twin cinema. While granting the licence the Licensing Authority had specifically noticed this fact and after noticing this fact the license was granted. Even the Government was of the opinion that the petitioner is not at fault and nor he was involved as is clear from letter of the Government Annexure-18. For 13 years, the matter had not been taken by the Government nor any proceedings started against the petitioner and it was only 3 or 4 days before the petitioner was to be considered for promotion to the post of IAS, that the charge-sheet dated 8.12.1995 (Annexure-4) had been issued and, therefore, the legal malice in the case cannot be ruled out specially when on this very matter another officer had been blamed for according the revised sanctioned plan in the year 1986 itself. Meaning thereby that the respondent Government was well aware of the fact in the year 1986 that the revised plan had been sanctioned for construction of twin cinema hall at the site instead of single cinema and, therefore, the con- tention of the respondents that they had come to know of this irregularity, has no basis and the charge- sheet is definitely issued with in-excusable delay for which there is hardly and explanation. From the facts as narrated above, even to mention in the charge-sheet, that the revised plan had been sanctioned in the year 1983 has no basis as it is admitted fact that the revised plan was sanctioned after three mon- ths of the transfer of the petitioner in Sept., 1984 and thus, the very basis of the charge-sheet is non-existent. (34). Apart from above, the authorities below have not taken any notice of the petitioners note/letter to the effect that when he was holding the post he had objec- ted that the granting of license for construction of twin cinema would be traffic haz- ardous and in any case had the matter been dealt with properly, it could have brought more auction money and now to charge the petitioner on the ground as mentioned in the charge-sheet is totally devoid of any record before the authorities. (35). Seeking support of the judgment in R.C. Soods case (supra) and after going into the various records, I find that there was no basis for the respondents to have issued any charge-sheet at all and thus the charge-sheet Annexure-4 is quashed and also all the disciplinary proceedings including the appointment of inquiry officer is quashed and consequentially, if the petitioner has been deprived of any benefit because of the pendency of the charge-sheet, the petitioner shall be entitled to all those consequential benefits. (36). The writ petition is allowed with a cost of Rs. 5,000/-.