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1998 DIGILAW 851 (GUJ)

VIVEKBHAI CHHOTUBHAI CONTRACTOR v. STATE

1998-12-24

D.C.SRIVASTAVA

body1998
D. C. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) IN this writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the prayer is to issue a writ of certiorari for quashing the detention order dated 31-7-1998 passed by the District Magistrate, Surat under Sec. 3 (2) of the prevention of Black-Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities act. 1980 and for a writ of habeas corpus for immediate release of the petitioner from illegal detention. ( 2 ) FROM the grounds of detention the following brief facts emerged for consideration. ( 3 ) VIVEK Gas Agency is a retail gas agency for distributing refill gas cylinders in Surat and licence was issued in the name of Chhotubhai Narsinhbhai Contractor who is father of the petitioner. Licence was renewed upto 31-12-1998. Inspection of the said gas agency was made by the Supply Department on 18-5-1998 and during the course of inspection large-scale irregularities were found in allocating new refill gas connections to the customers. The detention order dated 31-7-1998 was passed against the licence-holder Chhotubhai Narsinhbhai Contractor. He is absconding. He was declared as absconder by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Surat. The licence-holder submitted an application to the Chief Minister on 1-6-1998 that since last ten years he is not directly handling the business of gas agency. It seems that since he is Ex. MLA, therefore, he preferred to approach the Chief Minister. However, the irregularities were not liable to be ignored. Such irregularities continued for a period of ten years. Number of consumers were interrogated and it was found that several consumers confirmed that in the years 1995-96 large number of illegal gas connections were issued by the petitioner. Deputy Manager (Sales) Surat, Bharat petroleum Limited vide letter dated 18-5-1998 informed the Collector, Surat about these irregularities. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited terminated the gas agency vide letter dated 14-5-1998. When serious irregularities were detected licence-holder submitted written reply dated 11-11-1997 to Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited where he admitted the irregularities and requested for one chance and assured that no future irregularities will be committed. The agency of the licence-holder which was granted on 6-5-1983 was terminated on 14-5-1998. Still illegal connections were issued by the petitioner, hence the detention order was passed. This order of detention has been challenged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on several grounds. The agency of the licence-holder which was granted on 6-5-1983 was terminated on 14-5-1998. Still illegal connections were issued by the petitioner, hence the detention order was passed. This order of detention has been challenged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on several grounds. ( 4 ) THE first ground is that some of the documents supplied to the petitioner are illegible as a result of which the petitioners fundamental right of making effective representation under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India was taken away. The counter-affidavit of the Detaining Authority shows that legible copies of all the documents were supplied to the petitioner. I have examined the copies and found that the copies are legible. Xerox copies of the refill vouchers which were carbon copies could not be so legible as expected, but these documents cannot be said to be illegible. There is difference between faint document and illegible document. The faint document which can be read and understood cannot be said to be illegible document. It was vehemently argued that the letter of the Bharat Petroleum corporation whose copy was supplied to the petitioner was not legible. This is also incorrect. The lower portion of the document is faint. Original record was seen. In the original record Xerox copy the faint portion was over-written in hand but that does not amount any manipulation. Original letter must be with the owner and whatever is contained in this letter clearly shows that Bharat Petroleum Corporation highlighted the irregularities in the godown of the licence-holder, viz. , spurious cylinders were found kept in the godown. Thus. it cannot be said that fundamental right under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India was violated in any manner whatsoever. Moreover, this document was not relied upon by the Detaining Authority in the grounds of detention. The Detaining Authority considered the report of the sponsoring Authority and the Sponsoring Authority also did not rely upon this letter from Bharat Petroleum sent to the licence-holder. A document which is not relied upon by the Detaining Authority need not be supplied to the detenu. Simply because its Xerox copy was furnished to the detenu, it cannot be held that such document was relied upon by the Detaining Authority. Thus, this ground has no merit. A document which is not relied upon by the Detaining Authority need not be supplied to the detenu. Simply because its Xerox copy was furnished to the detenu, it cannot be held that such document was relied upon by the Detaining Authority. Thus, this ground has no merit. ( 5 ) THE next contention has been that the alternative efficacious remedy was not considered by the Detaining Authority. This is also incorrect. The alternative remedies were considered by the Detaining Authority which is clear from para 4. 26 page 8 of the English translation of the grounds of detention. Thus, this ground has no substance. ( 6 ) ANOTHER contention has been that the representation dated 5-8-1998 sent by the brother of the detenu was given to the Detaining Authority on 10-8-1998 which was rejected on 14-8-1998 and this has violated fundamental right of the petitioner under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. This is factually incorrect that the representation dated 5-8-1998 was given by the brother of the detenu to the detaining Authority on 10-8-1998. From the record, the learned Assistant Government pleader pointed out that the representation was received by the District Magistrate on 11-8-1998. It may be mentioned that the State Government had already approved the detention order dated 31-7-1998 on 11-8-1998. Thus, if the representation was received by the Detaining Authority on or after confirmation of detention order by the State Government, the Detaining Authority became functus officio and he could not have taken any decision to revoke the detention order. The record shows that this is also factually incorrect that the Detaining Authority rejected the representation on 14-5-1998. On the other hand. feeling that the Detaining Authority became functus officio this representation was forwarded by him to the State government. Of course it was forwarded to the State Government but this cannot be said to have violated fundamental right of the petitioner under Art. 22 (5) of the constitution of India. It is also factually incorrect that the representation dated 5-8-1998 was ordered to be filed by the Detaining Authority. The counter-affidavit of Shri P. R. Shukla, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Gujarat mentions in para 5 that representation dated 5-8-1998 addressed to the Detaining Authority was forwarded through letter dated 14-8-1998 by the District Magistrate which was received in Special Branch on 14-8-1998. 15th and 16/08/1998 were holidays. The counter-affidavit of Shri P. R. Shukla, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Gujarat mentions in para 5 that representation dated 5-8-1998 addressed to the Detaining Authority was forwarded through letter dated 14-8-1998 by the District Magistrate which was received in Special Branch on 14-8-1998. 15th and 16/08/1998 were holidays. The file was put up on 17-8-1998 which was cleared on 19-8-1998 and placed before the Under Secretary on the same date. It was then submitted to Addl. Chief Secretary who cleared the same on the same date and then the representation was sent to the concerned Minister who cleared the file on 20-8-1998. It was received back by the special Branch on 20-8-1998 at 6-20 p. m. , and decision was taken. The representation was rejected. The detenu was informed of rejection through letter dated 21-8-1998. Thus, the representation dated 5-8-1998 sent by the brother of the detenu to the detaining Authority was not only forwarded by the Detaining Authority to the State government but it was expeditiously disposed of by the State Government and rejected. Consequently, no violation of Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India can be complained of. ( 7 ) ANOTHER contention has been that the representation dated 11-8-1998 to the central Government has not been decided so far. The counter -affidavit of Jatinderbir singh, Director in the Department of Consumer Affairs, shows that representation dated 11-8-1998 made by the brother of the detenu addressed to the concerned minister was not received in the concerned section. In the additional counter- affidavit also, filed by Shri A. L. Makhijani. Under Secretary, the same stand has been taken. It was further argued on the strength of rejoinder affidavit and certificate from post office that this representation was sent by speed post addressed to Shri barnala. Minister of Civil Supplies, New Delhi on 11-8-1998 which was delivered on 12-8-1998. On the basis of the certificate it was urged that the representation was received by the concerned Minister and it should have been dealt with. Certain academic points were raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner. The first contention was that under Sec. 3 (8) of the General Clauses Act. 1897 the Central government, after the commencement of Constitution of India means. President and shall include other functionaries mentioned therein. The learned Counsel, therefore, contended that if the President is the Central Government within the meaning of sec. The first contention was that under Sec. 3 (8) of the General Clauses Act. 1897 the Central government, after the commencement of Constitution of India means. President and shall include other functionaries mentioned therein. The learned Counsel, therefore, contended that if the President is the Central Government within the meaning of sec. 3 (8) of the General Clauses Act, the petitioner could have sent the representation to the President. This contention is presumptive, because no representation was addressed and sent to the President of India. This definition in Sec. 3 (8) of the general Clauses Act. of Central Government does not provide that a Minister is also the Central Government within the meaning of this section. Consequently, this argument has no substance. ( 8 ) IN this connection, a point for consideration arises whether detenu has right to send representation to the Central Government addressed to any Minister, Prime minister or President of India, especially when in the grounds of detention it was clarified that if the representation is to be made to the Central Government it should be addressed to the Secretary, Ministry of Civil Supplies and Public Distribution, shastri Bhavan, New Delhi. This disclosure is made in the grounds of detention to enable the detenu to make representation to the concerned authority of the Central government dealing with such representation so that it may be expeditiously disposed of and it may not have to travel from one table to another table. There was no reason either for the petitioner or his brother to violate this information given in the grounds of detention. It was not open either for the detenu or for the members of his family to send the representation to the President, to the Prime minister or to the Minister concerned of their choice and if they adopts such course of action, then it cannot be said that if the representation was so addressed it must be disposed of expeditiously. Even in the grounds of detention it was disclosed that the representation to the Central Government is to be addressed to the; Secretary and not the Secretary. Ministry of Civil Supplies and Public Distribution by name. Even in the grounds of detention it was disclosed that the representation to the Central Government is to be addressed to the; Secretary and not the Secretary. Ministry of Civil Supplies and Public Distribution by name. ( 9 ) THUS, even if the brother of the detenu decided to send the representation to the Minister concerned vide Annexure "c" page 23 of the compilation he chose it to address the representation to Shri Barnala, Minister of Civil Supplies, Consumer affairs and Public Distribution Ministry, Krishi Bhavan, New Delhi. He should not have sent the representation to Shri Barnala by name. Moreover, full name of Shri barnala is not mentioned either in the representation or in the certificate obtained from the post office. If such representation was addressed to the Minister by name it must have been placed either before the Minister or his family members. It seems to have given impression that it was a letter addressed personally to the Minister and such personal letters were not to be handled by the Minister himself nor he was obliged to forward it to the concerned department. The delegation of power is made with a view to relieve the burden of work. Of course, if there would have been allegation in the representation that the Secretary of the Department was prejudiced against the petitioner or his brother or was biased there could have been justification for addressing the representation to the Minister but that too not by name but by office so that office might have forwarded to the concerned department. Possibility that the letter might have been kept at the residence of Shri Bamala cannot be ruled out. Shri Barnala could not be compelled to file counter-affidavit in this proceeding. If the representation was lying with the Minister the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Central Government that the representation was not received in the concerned section cannot be termed as false counter- affidavit. If the petitioner failed to establish that the representation dated 11-8-1998 reached the concerned section of the Central Government it cannot be held that the Central Government was guilty of not deciding this representation. If the brother of the petitioner had chosen the risk of addressing such representation by name to the Minister, he must face the consequences. Thus, on this ground the impugned order cannot be quashed. If the brother of the petitioner had chosen the risk of addressing such representation by name to the Minister, he must face the consequences. Thus, on this ground the impugned order cannot be quashed. ( 10 ) THE Centra] Government has considered the representation dated 5-8-1998 expeditiously which is borne out from the affidavit of Jatinderbir Singh. There was no delay in disposal of representation aforesaid by the Central Government. ( 11 ) THE contention that the detention order and papers concerning the detention order of the father of the petitioner should have been supplied to the petitioner has no merit because separate detention order was passed against the father of the petitioner and that order was not considered for passing the detention order against the petitioner. ( 12 ) HOWEVER, there are two important points on which the detention order cannot be sustained. The first point is that it is well settled law that the preventive detention differs from punitive detention. It is also settled that the purpose of preventive detention is to detain a person from committing and continuing illegal as well as anti-social activities. Whereas the purpose of punitive detention is to keep a person under detention for committing certain offences tor which he was tried and was found guilty. The preventive detention on the other hand is not equivalent to punitive detention and there cannot be any preventive detention in the nature of punitive detention to punish a person for certain offences committed by him for which he was not tried and convicted by any Court of law. In the instant case, it appears that the purpose for detention order is purely punitive and not preventive. It cannot be said to be preventive. If in spite of previous conduct of the petitioner there was possibility of his indulging in similar illegal and black-marketing activities, viz. , supplying gas cylinders, regulators and fake connections and charging more money from consumers it could be done only when the Agency of the licence-holder was in existence. Of course, the Detaining Authority while considering the alternative efficacious remedy applied its mind to the consideration regarding cancellation of licence. To my mind. cancellation of licence is a mere formality on the facts and circumstances of the case. Agreement to grant agency came into existence between bharat Petroleum Corporation and the licence-holder Chhotubhai Narsinhbhai on 6-5-1983. Of course, the Detaining Authority while considering the alternative efficacious remedy applied its mind to the consideration regarding cancellation of licence. To my mind. cancellation of licence is a mere formality on the facts and circumstances of the case. Agreement to grant agency came into existence between bharat Petroleum Corporation and the licence-holder Chhotubhai Narsinhbhai on 6-5-1983. From the grounds of detention it appears that on 14-5-1998 Bharat petroleum Corporation took a decision to terminate the agreement of agency executed on 6-5-1983. The learned Assistant Government Pleader admitted that the agency was actually terminated on 14-5-1998. On further question she admitted that after termination of agency premises was taken over by Bharat Petroleum Corporation and the gas cylinders whether full or empty and regulators etc. . were taken away by Bharat Petroleum Corporation. It was also admitted that, thereafter, no fresh supply of refill cylinders was made either to the petitioner or to the licence-holder after 14-5-1998. The raid and inspection was conducted on 18-5-1998. In these circumstances, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Assistant government Pleader that even after 18-5-1998 the petitioner issued illegal gas connections. If the gas cylinders and regulators were already taken over immediately after 14-5-1998 the petitioner could not have repeated his activities thereafter, and in any case after 18-5-1998. Instances and statements of various consumers given in the grounds of detention show that the petitioner issued fake illegal connections charging higher price from the consumers between 1995 to 1996. No incident of such illegal supply after 14-5-1998 or 18-5-1998 was disclosed in the grounds of detention. It was thus almost impossible for the petitioner to indulge in similar black- marketing activities after 14-5-1998. If this was so. then the petitioner should have been prosecuted for committing offences under the Essential Commodities Act and not that he should have been preventively detained. ( 13 ) THE second point is that in view of the aforesaid observations, it seems that the consideration of alternative efficacious remedy by the Detaining Authority in the grounds of detention appears to be mechanical. The Detaining Authority did not consider how after termination of agency the petitioner could have been able to carry on his illegal activities either after 14-5-1998 or after 18-5-1998. On this point, mind of the Detaining Authority was not at all drawn. The Detaining Authority did not consider how after termination of agency the petitioner could have been able to carry on his illegal activities either after 14-5-1998 or after 18-5-1998. On this point, mind of the Detaining Authority was not at all drawn. As such consideration of alternative efficacious remedy suffers from vice of non-application of mind. ( 14 ) ON these two grounds the impugned order of detention cannot be sustained. Firstly, because it is punitive in nature and secondly because alternative efficacious remedy was there to prosecute the petitioner under Sec. 7 of the Essential commodities Act. There was no possibility for the petitioner to indulge in repeated and similar illegal activities. In view of these two grounds (he detention order is to be quashed. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order of detention dated 31-7-1998 is hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be released forthwith from custody if not wanted in any other case. Petition allowed. .