JUDGMENT 1. - The instant writ petition has been filed for quashing the impugned order dated 24-4-91, contained in Annexure-2 to the writ petition, by which the petitioner has been discharged from service. 2. Petitioner, being a Scheduled Caste candidate, was appointed as Police Constable against reserved category quota on 22-5-1990, on probation of two years. His services were terminated on administrative ground vide impugned order dated 24-4-1991 (Annexure-2). Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, petitioner has preferred the instant writ petition contending that he had been discharged on the ground of misconduct, therefore, his termination, without holding enquiry or complying with the principles of natural justice, was bad in law and the impugned order is liable to be quashed.Respondents have filed reply stating that the petitioner was appointed on probation of two years and after assessing his conduct, he was discharged. Respondents did not find him suitable on the happening of a particular event, i.e., petitioner had absconded from the Police Training School, Jodhpur, on 11-4-1991 without any information to the concerned authorities and as per the standing order of the Director General of Police, Rajasthan, No. 4/1985, his services were terminated. According to the respondents, no enquiry was required as it was a case of discharge simplicitor without causing any stigma and, thus, the impugned order did not suffer from any vice. 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 4. The services of the petitioner were governed by the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989. Rule 39 of the said Rules reads as under:- "Confirmation, Extension of Probation and Discharge. - A member of the service who successfully completes his probation period and passes the Departmental Examination prescribed by the Director General of Police, shall be eligible for confirmation at the end of the probation period, provided the appointing authority is satisfied that his integrity is unquestionable and that he is otherwise fit for confirmation." The said rule further provides for extension of probation period maximum for a period of one year where a candidate has not given a satisfactory account during the probation period. In case of a candidate belonging to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, such an extension can be given for a period of three years. 5. Mr. In case of a candidate belonging to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, such an extension can be given for a period of three years. 5. Mr. Parihar has submitted that when the order of discharge is based on a particular incident and not on an over-all assignment (assessment ?) of performance of the petitioner, it cannot be said to be a discharge simplicitor as the mind of the competent authority has actuated by a particular incident and, thus, the order is penal in nature and it required the enquiry before passing of such an order. Mr. Parihar has further urged that in no case the petitioner could have been discharged prior to the completion of two years probation period. His conduct could have been observed/watched for two years and even if the competent authority was not satisfied with his performance, the statutory Rules provided for further extension of probation period, maximum for three years, in case of petitioner being a Scheduled Caste. In support of his contention, Mr. Parihar has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Ram Kumar Bairwa v. R.S.R.T.C., 1989(1) RLW 675, wherein after placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd., Madurai v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai, 1964(8) FLR 289, it has been held that the services of the probationer cannot be terminated before expiry of the initial probation period. Terminating the services of the petitioner before completion of two years of probation period itself makes it evident that he has been discharged/terminated on the ground of misconduct. In Syed Azam Hussaini v. Andhra Bank Ltd., AIR 1995 SC 1352 : 1995(2) SCT 347 (SC), the Apex Court has held that the services of the probationer should not be terminated during the period of probation or extended period of probation without showing sufficient cause. 6. Mr. In Syed Azam Hussaini v. Andhra Bank Ltd., AIR 1995 SC 1352 : 1995(2) SCT 347 (SC), the Apex Court has held that the services of the probationer should not be terminated during the period of probation or extended period of probation without showing sufficient cause. 6. Mr. R.P. Vyas, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kanwar Arun Kumar v. U.P. Hills Electronics Corporation Ltd., 1997(2) SCC 191 , wherein it has been held that termination of the services of the probationer for unsatisfactory performance, after recording a finding that he was "regularly absent on one ground or the other" is not bad in law, for the reason that recording of such reason was the motive and not the foundation as a ground for termination and hence such termination cannot be held, as based on misconduct and in such circumstances, inquiry was not warranted. 7. However, the ratio of the aforesaid case is not applicable in the instant case as the factual matrix of both the cases is entirely different. In the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed to the effect that the petitioner therein was "regularly absent on one ground or the other". Therefore, in the said case, as it was an over-all assessment of the competent authority of the performance of the duties of the employee, the order was discharge simplicitor and could not be penal in nature and thus, the facts and circumstances of that case did not require any enquiry. The instant is a case where the services of the petitioner had been terminated on an eventuality of one particular incident. Therefore, it cannot be said to be the overall assessment of the petitioner's performance during the probation period. 8. This issue has been considered by the Apex Court from time and again and it has consistently been held that the probationer can be terminated from service for "failure to satisfactorily completing the period of probation." The termination of services on the ground of unsatisfactory work cannot be termed as penal and does not require any enquiry. (vide State of Punjab v. Baldeo Singh Khosla, 1996(9) SCC 190 ). 9. (vide State of Punjab v. Baldeo Singh Khosla, 1996(9) SCC 190 ). 9. In K.V. Krishnamani v. Lalit Kala Academy, AIR 1996 SC 2444 , the Supreme Court observed as under:- "The very object of the probation is to test the suitability and if the appointing authority finds that the candidate is not suitable, it certainly has the power to terminate the services of the employee. Under these circumstances it cannot but be held that the reasons mentioned constitute the motive and not foundation for termination of services." (Emphasis added). 10. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, 1991(1) SCC 691 : 1991(1) SCT 760 (SC), the Apex Court has held that termination of services of temporary Government servant, in terms of contract of service, by passing an order of termination simplicitor on assessment of suitability after considering his work and services record, must be held as valid and not punitive. Similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in Ram Chandra Tripathi v. U.P. Public Service Tribunal, 1994(5) SCC 180 : 1994(2) SCT 567 (SC). 11. In Governing Council of Kidwai Memorial Institution on Oncology v. Dr. Pandurang Godwalkar, 1993(1) SCT 267 (SC) : AIR 1993 SC 392 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- "But whenever the service of an employee is terminated during the period of probation or while his appointment is on temporary basis, by an order of termination simplicitor after some preliminary enquiry, it cannot be held that as some enquiry had been made against him before issuance of order of termination, it really amounts to his removal from service on a charge, as such penal in nature......The principle of tearing of the veil for finding out the real nature of order shall be applicable only in the case where the Court is satisfied that there is a direct nexus between the charges so levelled and the action taken. If the decision is taken to terminate the services of an employee during the period of probation after taking into consideration the overall performance and some action or inaction on the part of such an employee, then it cannot be said that it amounted to his removal from service as a punishment. If the decision is taken to terminate the services of an employee during the period of probation after taking into consideration the overall performance and some action or inaction on the part of such an employee, then it cannot be said that it amounted to his removal from service as a punishment. It need not be said that the appointing authority, at the stage of confirmation or while examining the question as to whether the services of such employee be terminated during continuation of the period of probation, is entitled to look into any complaint made in respect of such employee while discharging his duties for purpose of making assessment of the performance of such employee." (Emphasis added). 12. While deciding the aforesaid case the Apex Court had placed reliance on its earlier judgment in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Dr. M.S. I. Ali, AIR 1980 SC 1242, wherein it was held that if a person is appointed on probation for a particular period only in order to test whether his conduct is good and satisfactory so that he may be retained even if misconduct, negligence or inefficiency may be the motive, or the influencing factor which induced the employer to terminate the services of the employee, which such employer admittedly held under the terms of appointment, such termination cannot be held to be punitive. But such misconduct etc. should be considered while making the overall assessment of his performance. 13. The issue was also considered in Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India, AIR 1984 SC 636 and the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that as the discharge was based on a particular incident which reflected on inefficiency of probationer, the termination could not have been made without holding proper enquiry and the Court held that if the probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct or inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper enquiry and without giving him a reasonable opportunity to show cause against his discharge, it may be violative of the mandate of law and in such a case it is open to the court to examine whether the order, which apparently looks innocuous, has been passed for some other reason. 14. 14. Similarly in the case of Jurnail Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1986 SC 1626 , the Supreme Court held that the mere form of order is not sufficient to hold that the order of termination was innocuous. When an allegation is made by the employee assailing the order of termination as one based on misconduct, though goes in innocuous terms, it is incumbent on the Court to lift the veil and to see the real circumstances as well as the basis and foundation of the order complained of. In such a case the Court may lift the veil and see whether the order was made on the ground of misconduct/inefficiency or not; but for that an allegation of serious magnitude must be alleged by the discharged employee and he must adduce sufficient evidence is support of it. 15. In the instant case, as the respondents themselves have admitted that the services of the petitioner were terminated on the basis of sole incident that he had absconded from the Police Training Centre, Jodhpur, without intimation to the concerned authority, the impugned order, though innocuous in appearance, was penal in nature. Respondents terminated the services of the petitioner during period of probation and not after its completion. This fact alone fortifies the petitioner's case that his services had been terminated on misconduct and without having overall assessment of his performance and, thus, penal in nature. Moreover, the impugned order itself provided that petitioner was discharged on administrative ground. 16. In view of the above, the impugned order dated 24.4.1991 (Annexure-4) is held to be penal in nature and as no enquiry had been held against the petitioner before terminating his services and the order has been passed without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, the impugned order is vitiated and, thus, liable to be quashed. 17. In view of the above, the writ petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed. Impugned order dated 24-4-1991 (Annexure-2) is hereby quashed. Petitioner be reinstated as probationer and the respondents are at liberty either to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him on the ground of misconduct, i.e., absconding from Police Training Centre, or assess his suitability after completing the initial or extended period of probation, as the case my be. Petitioner shall, also, be entitled for other consequential benefits, but shall get only fifty per cent of the back wages. Petitioner shall, also, be entitled for other consequential benefits, but shall get only fifty per cent of the back wages. Respondents are directed to pay the arrears of wages etc. in six months from today. No order as to costs.Petition allowed. *******