JUDGMENT 1. - The instant writ petition has been filed challenging the impugned order dated 9.11.97, contained in Annexure. 5 to this writ petition, by which the claim of the petitioner for service on compassionate employment has been rejected only on the ground that the case of the petitioner's father does not fall within the ambit of the Rajasthan Compassionate Appointment of Dependants of Deceased Government Servants Rules, 1996 (hereinafter referred as "the Rules of 1996"). 2. Petitioner's father was in Government Service as Class IV employee and his whereabouts are not know since 1977. As he was not traceable and under the law, a lost person whose whereabouts are not known for seven years, can be presumed to be dead. Petitioner's father was missing since 1977, seven years were completed in 1984. However, the petitioner has filed an application for the first time in 1996 when he was 26 years of age as the petitioner claims to have born in 1970 and at the time of disappearance of his father, he was seven years of age. 3. Mr. S.G. Ojha, learned counsel for the respondents, stated that such a presumption is not recognised under the provisions of the compassionate employment under the 1996 Rules, for the reason that it provides for immediate relief to the grieved family. If the case of presumed death is taken-up, the grieved family will have to wait for a minimum period of seven years and after the lapse of the said period, grieved party cannot say that it has lost its bread-earner which is to be redeemed forthwith. 4. There seems to be some substance in the averment made by Mr. Ojha. The issue of compassionate employment had been considered by the Apex Court from time to time. In Sushma Gosain v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 1976 , the Apex Court had observed that the purpose of giving employment on compassionate ground is to mitigate the hardship of the family due to the death of the bread-earner. It is provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. If it is not given immediately, the very purpose for which the employment is provided for, would stand frustrated. 5. It is provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. If it is not given immediately, the very purpose for which the employment is provided for, would stand frustrated. 5. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana and others, 1994(4) SCC 138 , the Apex Court observed as under: "As a rule, appointments in public services should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications and merit. No other mode of appointment is permissible. Neither the Government nor the public authorities are at liberty to follow any other procedure or relax the qualification laid down by the rules for the post. However, to this general rule which is to be followed strictly in every case, there are some exceptions carved out in the interest of justice and to meet certain contingencies. One such exception is in favour of the dependants of an employee dying in harness and leaving his family in penury and without any means of livelihood. In such cases, out of pure humanitarian consideration, taking into consideration the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be able to make both the ends meet, a provision is made in the rules to provide gainful employment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for such employment. The whole object of granting compassionate employment is thus to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give a member of such family a post much less a post for post held by the deceased. What is further, mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle his family to such source of livelihood." It further observed as under- "For these very reasons, the compassionate employment cannot be granted after a lapse of reasonable period which must be specified In the rules. The consideration for such employment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. The object being to enable the family to get over the financial crisis which it faces at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner, the compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered whatever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over." 6. The object being to enable the family to get over the financial crisis which it faces at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner, the compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered whatever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over." 6. The issue was further considered by the Supreme Court in Jagdish Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1996(1) SCC 301 , wherein it was observed as under- "The very object of appointment of a dependent of the deceased employees who die in harness is to relieve unexpected immediate hardship and distress caused to the family by sudden demise of the earning member of the family. Since the death occurred way back in 1971, in which year the appellant was four years old, it cannot be said that he is entitled to be appointed after he attained majority long thereafter. In other words, if that contention is accepted, it amounts to another mode of recruitment of the dependent of a deceased Government servant which cannot be encouraged, de hors the recruitment rules." 7. After considering all these judgments, the Supreme Court again in Haryana State Electricity Board v. Naresh Tanwar. and another, 1996(2) JT 542 , has held that under the Dying in Harness Rules, the dependent of the deceased cannot claim the employment as a vested right and such employment cannot be given after expiry of the long period, i.e., after the lapse of a reasonable period. 8. A Division Bench of this Court has, also, considered this aspect of the case in Narendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan and others, 1998(3) WLC (Raj.) 22 , wherein after considering a large number of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court came to the conclusion that employment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right for the reason that employment on compassionate ground is not a vested right and such an employment can, also, be refused in case the financial condition of the family is satisfactory. 9. 9. In Haryana State Electricity Board and another v. Hakim Singh, 1997(8) JT 332 , the Hon'ble Apex Court placed reliance upon the judgments referred to above and observed that "the object of providing for compassionate employment is only to relieve the family from financial hardship, therefore, an emelorating relief should not be taken as opening an alternative mode of recruitment to public employment." The same view has been reiterated in Jagdish Prasad v. State of Bihar (supra), State of Bihar v. Samsuz Zoha, AIR 1996 SC 1961 , Hmachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation v. Dinesh Kumar, 1996(4) SCC 560 , and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. A. Radhika Thirumalai, 1996(6) SCC 394 . It has categorically beep held that compassionate employment cannot be claimed as a matter of course not being a vested right. 10. The impugned order does not suffer from any illegality for the reason that in a given case if a person deems to have died after a period of seven years from the date his whereabouts are not known, and he had reached the age of superannuation, by that time his dependants would certainly be not entitled for drawing any benefit under the Rules. Neither the petitioner nor the respondents have though it proper to mention as what was the age of the father of the petitioner at the time of his disappearance, nor the date on which he had joined the service, that is difficult to hold whether petitioner's father was alive in 1984, i.e., on the date the presumption can be drawn. A party is supposed to plead and prove the averments made by it by adducing cogent and sufficient evidence, which the petitioner, in the instant case, has failed to do. (Vide Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1988 SC 2181 . Thus, in such a case, it is difficult to hold that the petitioner may be entitled for consideration for grant of any benefit under the Rules. The Court must interpret the provision of a Statute bearing in mind that an enactment must achieve the object, for which it has been enacted and it should not defeat the purpose of such a beneficiary legislation. 11. In Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. The Court must interpret the provision of a Statute bearing in mind that an enactment must achieve the object, for which it has been enacted and it should not defeat the purpose of such a beneficiary legislation. 11. In Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, 1989 (3) SCC 709 , the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court observed as under- "The Courts strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a Statute to futility. The provision of a Statute must be so construed as to make it effective and operative, on the principle' ut res magis valeat quam pereat'. It is, no doubt, true that if a statute is absolutely vague and its language wholly intractable and absolutely meaningless, the Statute could be declared void for vagueness. This is not in judicial review by testing the law for arbitrariness or unreasonableness under Article 14, but what a court of construction, dealing with the language of a Statute, does in order to ascertain from, and accord to, the Statute the meaning and purpose which the legislature intended for it.... It is, therefore, the court's duty to make what it can of the Statute, knowing that the Statutes are meant to be operative and not inept and the nothing short of impossibility should allow a court to declare a Statute unworkable. In Whitney v. IRC 1926 AC 37 , Lord Dunedin, said, "A Statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable." 12. The same view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Chittorgarh v. Mahaveer Oil Mills Ltd., AIR 1998 Raj. 5 . 13. As it is settled proposition of law that such an employment is available only to redeem the grieved family which has lost its bread-earner, the case of "presumed death" for the reason that the whereabouts of an employee is not known, will not fall within the ambit of the term "deceased employee" as provided under the Rules, 1996. 14. Thus, in view of the above, I find no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order. The petition is devoid of any merit and hence dismissed.Writ Petition Dismissed as Devoid of Merit. *******