Judgment R.M.Prasad, J. 1. This second appeal arises out of the judgment and decree dated 29.5.1984 passed in Title appeal No. 109/8 of 1979/84 by the 3rd Additional Sub-Judge, Siwan setting aside thereby the judgment and decree dated 21.5.1979 passed by the 3rd Additional Munsif, Siwan in Title Suit No. 395/203 of 1970/78. 2. The suit was for redemption of mortgage deed with respect to three plots, bearing Plots No. 781, 789 and 790 of Khata No. 31 of village Barba measuring 10 Kathas 10 Dhurs on payment of Rs. 250.00 , the consideration amount and for recovery of possession from the defendant No. 1 appellant in the Court below as well as from the defendant/respondent second party in the Court below with costs and any other relief. 3. Plaintiff is the appellant in the present appeal. According to the case of the plaintiff-appellant, the aforementioned plots in question originally belonged to one Babban Parvat who mortgaged it for Rs. 250.00 in favour of Ish Mohammed, who was the ancestor of defendants No. 1 to 9 (respondents No. 1 to 9) and put them in his possession. After the death of original mortgagee, his heirs (respondents No. 1 to 9) came in possession of the suit land and they have been coming in possession as mortgagees. The said Babban Parbat sold the mortgaged land to Janki Sah (respondent No. 10) on 11.11.1942 for Rs 300.00 and the mortgage money was kept as Amanat. However, Janki Sah without paying the mortgage money sold the half share of the mortgaged land in favour of the appellant on 17.8.1963. The mortgage money could not be entered in the sale-deed due to mistake of the scribe. The plaintiff appellant tendered the mortgage amount to defendants No. 1 to 9 but they refused to accept, which necessitated filing of the present suit. 4. The case of respondent No. 2 is that the suit land belonged to Babban Parvat and his brother Brahmdeo Parvat who mortgaged it to Ish Mohammed and put him in possession as mortgagee. Thereafter, lsh Mohammed sold the mortgage on 1.4.1937 in favour of Sadique Mian and his heirs have been coming in possession and the plaintiff has no right of redemption. It was also pleaded that the suit is barred by limitation as it suffers from defect of parties. 5. Thereafter, lsh Mohammed sold the mortgage on 1.4.1937 in favour of Sadique Mian and his heirs have been coming in possession and the plaintiff has no right of redemption. It was also pleaded that the suit is barred by limitation as it suffers from defect of parties. 5. The trial Court held that the contesting defendant had not proved that Sadique Mian and his heirs were in possession of the suit land and that the plaintiffs or the original mortgagor or the plaintiffs vendor had no knowledge of Bechinama dated 1.4.1937 and came to know about it only after the filing of the suit, whereupon defendants No. 11 to 13 were made party to the suit. As such, the trial Court held that the suit was not barred by limitation. The trial Court found that the suit did not suffer from defect of parties and the plaintiff had right to redeem the entire mortgaged land in the capacity of purchaser. The case of tender was also found proved. Accordingly, the suit was decreed on contest against defendant No. 2 and ex parte against defendants No. 1, 3 to 9, 11, 12 and 13 with cost and against defendant No. 10 without cost. 6. The lower appellate Court, however, held that the suit was barred by limitation, in view of Article 61 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 as the period of 30 years expired in March, 1967 counting from 1.4.1937 which is the date of sale of the suit land by original mortgagee in favour of Sadique Mian, the ancestor of defendants No. 1 to 9. The lower appellate Court further held that the plaintiff appellant had no right to redeem the mortgaged land as he was the purchaser of only half portion of the mortgaged land without keeping the mortgage amount in Amanat and, accordingly, set aside the trial Court judgment and decree, vide impugned judgment. 7. While admitting this appeal, the Hon ble Judge found the following substantial questions of law for decision in the present appeal: (i) Whether the suit has been rightly held by the lower appellate Court to be barred by limitation? (ii) Whether the decision of the Court below is erroneous in law in view of the grounds taken in the memorandum of appeal? 8. Despite service of notice none has appeared on behalf of the respondents. 9. (ii) Whether the decision of the Court below is erroneous in law in view of the grounds taken in the memorandum of appeal? 8. Despite service of notice none has appeared on behalf of the respondents. 9. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the lower appellate Court has erred in law in holding that the suit is barred by limitation under Article 61 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 inasmuch as the provision of Sec. 30 of the said Act have been overlooked by the lower appellate Court. 10. There appears to be substance in the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant. The lower appellate Court held the suit as barred by limitation counting the period of 30 years from 1st April, 1937 which is the period prescribed under Article 61(a) of 1963 Act, the provision of which in the Old Act was Article 148 and the period prescribed therein was 60 years. According to the decision of the lower appellate Court itself, before expiry of limitation of 30 years, 1963 Act came into force. Sec. 30 of 1963 Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the said Act any suit for which the period of limitation is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (old Act) may be instituted within a period of seven years next after the commencement of the said Act or within the period prescribed for such suit by the Old Act, whichever is to expire earlier. By Act 10 of 1969, a proviso was added to Sub-clause (a) of Sec. 30 of 1963 Act, providing that if in respect of any such suit the said period of seven years expires earlier than the period of limitation prescribed therefor under the old Act and the said period of seven years together with so much of the period of limitation in respect of such suit under the old Act as has already expired before the commencement of 1963 Act is shorter than the period prescribed for such suit by 1963 Act, then, the suit may be instituted within the period of limitation prescribed therefor under the Act. 11. In the present case, however, the said proviso is of no application as the period of seven years did not expire earlier than the period of limitation prescribed under the old Act. 11. In the present case, however, the said proviso is of no application as the period of seven years did not expire earlier than the period of limitation prescribed under the old Act. The present case will be governed by Clause (a) of Sec. 30 as in the present case, according to the lower appellate Court itself, the period of limitation is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed under the Old Act. The date of alleged sale of the suit land being 1.4.1937 and the period of limitation under the old Act being 60 years, the limitation would expire in March, 1997. Thus, the provision being to institute a suit within a period of seven years next after the commencement of 1963 Act, or within the period prescribed for such suit by the Old Act whichever is to expire earlier, in my opinion, it has rightly been contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the New Act having come into force on 1st January, 1964, the period of seven years next after the said commencement would be the limitation for filing of the present suit in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 12. Thus, the limitation, in the present case, would expire on 1.1.1971 but the suit was filed on 30th June, 1970 itself. As such, the lower appellate Court was legally not correct in holding that the suit was barred by limitation. Further, the finding in this regard of the lower appellate Court is vitiated in law as the period of limitation is to be counted from the date of knowledge of sale of the suit land by the original mortgagee in favour of Sadique Mian on 1.4.1937, about which the trial Court specifically found and held that the Bechinama was not in the knowledge of the original mortgagor nor of the plaintiffs vendor nor of the plaintiff himself and that the plaintiff came to know about it after filing of the suit, whereupon he impleaded the parties concerned as defendants, which has neither been reversed nor even considered by the lower appellate Court. 13. 13. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the lower appellate Court has erroneously rejected the claim of the plaintiff appellant on the ground that the plaintiff is the purchaser of only half portion of the mortgaged property because his vendor himself had purchased the mortgaged property only from Babban Parvat, although the same stood in the name of Babban Parvat and Brahmdeo Parvat who are full brothers and that it was not the case of the plaintiff that their properties, were partitioned. According to the learned Counsel, the trial Court has rightly held that a mortgagee cannot challenge the title of the purchaser from the original mortgagor. A purchaser of even one anna share shall redeem the entire mortgagee property and thereby the plaintiffs right to redeem the entire mortgaged land has been upheld. 14. I do not find substance in the said submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant. The learned Counsel has failed to assail the finding of the lower appellate Court that the plaintiffs vendor Janki Sah had obtained the sale-deed from Babban Parvat alone and not from Brahmdeo Parvat when both of them mortgaged the property initially with Ish Mohammed in 1927 and lands stands recorded in the name of both brothers. It has, thus, rightly been held by the lower appellate Court that the very sale-deed of Janki Sah in favour of the plaintiff was improper and invalid as he did not derive any title on the basis of that sale-deed with respect to the mortgaged lands. Consequently, the plaintiff, who purchased the half portion of the land from Janki Sah in 1963 without keeping the mortgage amount in Amanat, has also not derived any title! As such, the lower appellate Court has rightly held that the plaintiff cannot have any right to redeem the mortgaged property and thus rightly set aside the judgment of the trial Court. 15. The second appeal is, thus, dismissed, but without costs.