JUDGMENT BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, J. 1. This appeal is at the instance of a writ petitioner and is directed against the order dated January 6, 1998 passed by a learned Judge of this court rejecting a writ application filed by the appellant challenging the legality of the notice dated October 18, 1996 issued by the Secretary, State Electricity Board and the calculation sheet and the supplementary bill dated December 3, 1997 issued on behalf of the respondent no.1 for realisation of the alleged shortfall towards Annual Minimum Guarantee (AMG) pursuant to the aforesaid notification. 2. It appears from the order impugned that the learned Trial Judge by a common judgment has disposed of several writ applications filed by different persons challenging the aforesaid notification. 3. The appellant is a private limited company carrying on the business of cold storage. The appellant entered into an agreement for the supply of electricity energy with the respondent no.1 on January 24, 1990 on the terms and conditions mentioned therein. 4. Clauses 15 and 16 of the said agreement which deal with charges of supply and minimum charges respectively are relevant for the purpose of disposal of the instant appeal and as such are quoted below:- "15. (1) The Consumer/s shall pay to the Board for electrical energy supplied under this agreement in accordance with the provision and scale of rates under Rate c (i) as set forth in the Schedule II hereto which shall be deemed to be part of this Agreement. (2) If the Board by a notification makes any alteration in the aforesaid rates for energy, tariff and its associated stipulations such altered rates, tariff and its associated stipulations shall be treated as if the same were part of this Agreement in super-session of the charges set forth in the Schedule II hereto with effect from the date fixed in the notification. 16. (1) Subject to the provision of Clause 16(3) so long as the agreement is not determined or the Consumer/Consumers continues/continue to obtain supply of energy, the Consumer/Consumers shall pay Minimum Charge provided in Schedule I hereto, irrespective of the fact that the Consumer/Consumers could not consume electricity to cover such Minimum Charge during the respective years due to disconnection of supply for any reason whatsoever. (2) For calculation of annual minimum charge, one year period shall be taken from April to the following March. (2) For calculation of annual minimum charge, one year period shall be taken from April to the following March. When connection is given in any intermediate month, the minimum charge shall be calculated from the month of connection to the following March on monthly pro-rata basis:- Provided when connection is given after the 15th day of any month that month shall not be counted in calculating the year of minimum charge. (3) If at any time the Consumer/s is/are prevented from receiving or using the electrical energy to be supplied under this Agreement either in whole or in part owing to any strike, riots, insurrections, command of a civil or military authority, fire, explosions, act of God or any other causes beyond his/their/its control or if the Board is prevented from supplying or is unable to supply such electrical energy owing to all or any of the causes mentioned, then the minimum charge or guarantee payable by the Consumer shall be reduced in proportion to the ability of the Consumer/s to take or the Board to supply such power, provided the Consumer/s notifies/notify the Board in writing within fifteen days of occurrence of any event as noted above with necessary detail to prove that the occurrence is preventing/has prevented the Consumer/s from receiving or using the full amount of contractual demand. The Consumer/s shall also keep the Board informed once in every fortnight of further development regarding the event. No remission in the agreed minimum charge as mentioned in Schedule I hereof, will be considered if no such notice is received by the Board. Subject as aforesaid the Consumer/s shall in any event be liable to pay the minimum charge every year as mentioned in Schedule I hereof." 5. The respondent no.1 by the impugned notification dated October 18, 1996 intended to enhance the rate and charges for supply of electricity and all consumption of electricity commencing from November 19, 1996 in accordance with the revised rates and charges as mentioned therein in suppression of the existing rates and charges. 6. In the said notification a new procedure for realising minimum guarantee has been introduced and the same is produced below:- "Under Rates E(a), E(b), E(c), S(d), S(i), S(g), F, F(a), H, E(bt), F(t), T(a) & T(b) Annual Minimum Guaranteed Revenue is Rs. 6. In the said notification a new procedure for realising minimum guarantee has been introduced and the same is produced below:- "Under Rates E(a), E(b), E(c), S(d), S(i), S(g), F, F(a), H, E(bt), F(t), T(a) & T(b) Annual Minimum Guaranteed Revenue is Rs. 1200.00 per KVA of contract demand or actual Maximum demand recorded whichever is higher for the first year of operation and Rs. 2400.00 per KVA contract demand actual maximum demand recorded whichever is higher from the second year of operation and onwards, the consumers shall have to pay for such amount of electrical energy as will in aggregate (excluding fuel, surcharge and 30% of the energy charge) at the current rates produce annually the above minimum guaranteed amount." 7. At this stage it will be profitable to mention the provision relating to minimum guarantee is embodied in the agreement of the parties:- Year of operation Contract Demand Minimum amount payable by the consumer per annum for the contract demand 1st year 200 KVA Rs. 68,267.40 2nd year 200 KVA Rs. 68,267.40 3rd year 300 KVA Rs. 93,583.40 4th year 300 KVA Rs. 93,583.40 5th year 300 KVA Rs. 93,583.40 8. It may further be mentioned here that in clause 20 of the agreement between the parties there is a stipulation to the following effect:- "So long as the agreement is determined as aforesaid or the consumer continues to obtain the supply of energy, the terms and conditions herein contained shall be binding. In such case the contract demand and minimum amount payable as provided in Schedule I shall be same as for the fifth year of operation unless otherwise agreed upon." 9. By applying the procedure for realising Minimum Guarantee as mentioned in the impugned notification, the respondent no.4 issued a supplementary bill alongwith a calculation sheet thereby demanding a payment of Rs. 3,54,338/- as shortfall towards Annual Minimum Guarantee for the period of 1996-97. 10. It appears from the said chart that the respondent no.4 while calculating the total energy charge for the electricity consumed by the petitioner has taken into account the period commencing from April 1996 and ending with March, 1997. 11. Mr. 3,54,338/- as shortfall towards Annual Minimum Guarantee for the period of 1996-97. 10. It appears from the said chart that the respondent no.4 while calculating the total energy charge for the electricity consumed by the petitioner has taken into account the period commencing from April 1996 and ending with March, 1997. 11. Mr. Bhattacharya, the learned senior advocate appearing in support of the instant appeal at the very outset fairly conceded that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in M/s. Jagadamba Paper Industries Pvt. Ltd. & other vs. Haryana State Electricity Board & other, AIR 1983 SC 1296 , he was not in a position to dispute the authority of the respondent no.1 to unilaterally enhance rates and charges if such authority is exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily. But the grievance of Mr. Bhattacharya is that the learned Trial Judge did not at all consider the specific point taken in the writ petition that while demanding the amount as alleged shortfall towards Annual Minimum Guarantee the concerned respondents acted illegally in taking into consideration the total energy charge for the period commencing from April, 1996 notwithstanding the fact that it is specifically mentioned in the impugned notification that the same will be applied to supply of electricity and consumption of electricity commencing from November 19, 1996. 12. In this connection Mr. Bhattacharya contends that if a rate is revised at any intermediate month between April and March of the next year, in that event the minimum charge shall be calculated from the month of coming into operation of revised rate to the following March on monthly pro-rata basis. If new rate is made applicable after the 15th day of any month, that month shall not be counted in calculating the year of minimum charge. In support of the aforesaid submission Mr. Bhattacharya relied upon the Clause 16(2) of the agreement. 13. The second point urged by Mr. Bhattacharya is that the concerned respondents while calculating the alleged shortfall wrongly applied the rate of Rs. 2,400/- per KVA to the case of the appellant although this is the first year of operation of new method of calculation of AMG, the notification having been made effective from November 19, 1996. Thus, Mr. Bhattacharya contends, that the appellant is for the first year of enforcement of the notification entitled to the rate of Rs. 1,200/- per KVA. 14. Mr. Thus, Mr. Bhattacharya contends, that the appellant is for the first year of enforcement of the notification entitled to the rate of Rs. 1,200/- per KVA. 14. Mr. P.K. Roy, the learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the State Electricity Board has opposed the aforesaid contentions of Mr. Bhattacharya and has submitted that the Board is even entitled to realise revised charge and rate from a date interior to the date of publication of the impugned notification. In support of such contention Mr. Roy has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Uttar Pradesh Electricity Board reported in AIR 1987 SC page 364. 15. Secondly, Mr. Roy contends that by demanding the shortfall towards Annual Minimum Guarantee the respondent no.1 has not charged at a revised rate for any consumption prior to November 19, 1996 but has merely applied a method of calculation of AMG where the charge of electricity prior to the date of coming into force of the notification has been taken into consideration. 16. As regards the second contention of Mr. Bhattacharya, Mr. Roy submits that the expression for the first year of operation as used in the notification means the first year of the original agreement between the parties for supply of electricity. According to Mr. Roy the State Electricity Board has given the aforesaid concessional rate to the new industries. The petitioner herein having established their industry in the year 1990, is not entitled to the said concessional rate. 17. As regards the first contention made by Mr. Bhattacharya, we find considerable force in it. There is no dispute that by the impugned notification the revised rate has been made applicable for the supply and consumption of electricity from a future date. Therefore the new method of calculation of AMG must also be effected from the date of commencement as mentioned in the notification. By the supplementary bill, the respondent no.4 sought to realise the alleged shortfall towards AMG and while calculating the alleged shortfall, took into account the energy charge payable for the period from April 1996, a period prior to the commencement of the revised rate and new method of calculation mentioned in the notification. We are unable to subscribe to the view of Mr. We are unable to subscribe to the view of Mr. Roy that it is merely a method of calculation of AMG not based on consumption of electricity prior to November 19, 1996. If by adopting a method of calculation, the amount of electricity consumed by the appellant prior to the date of coming into operation of the notification is taken into account and thereupon a figure is arrived at, we are left with no other alternative but to conclude that the revised rate or new method has been given effect to retrospectively from an earlier date notwithstanding the fact that the notification gives a future date to take effect. 18. There is no doubt that if the new method was earlier known to the appellant, it could regulate its consumption to avoid unnecessary payment. 19. As regards the decision of the Apex Court in New Central Jute Mill Co. Ltd. (supra) cited by Mr. Roy, in our opinion, the same is of no avail to his clients for two reasons. 20. Firstly, in this case, by the notification the revised rates and method of calculation having been enforced from a future date, the same must be strictly followed and as such we are not called upon to decide whether the respondent no.1 has power to realise revised rate by adopting new method of calculation retrospectively inasmuch as the notification did not authorise such power of realisation. 21. Secondly, the decision of New Central Jute Mill Co. Ltd. (supra) is, in our opinion, no authority for the proposition that by virtue of the power conferred by section 49 of the Electricity Act, the State Electricity Board is entitled to revise its charge retrospectively. 22. In the aforesaid case, the State Electricity Board levied and collected surcharge from consumers in respect of electricity supplied in excess of the limit on supply imposed by the State Government under section 22 of the Electricity Act at the request of the consumers by purchasing it at a higher rate from other authority. 22. In the aforesaid case, the State Electricity Board levied and collected surcharge from consumers in respect of electricity supplied in excess of the limit on supply imposed by the State Government under section 22 of the Electricity Act at the request of the consumers by purchasing it at a higher rate from other authority. Therefore, collection of surcharge would be legal when the agreement between the parties itself did not envision the supply of electricity in violation of ban imposed by the State Government under section 22-B of the Electricity Act nor did the agreement stipulate the rate at which such supply should be charged if inspite of ban against the supply, a consumer draws electricity in excess of the permissible quantity. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the notice contemplated by the agreement in the matter of enhancement of tariff need not be given as the Board had the statutory authority to impose surcharge in respect of electricity supplied in excess of the permissible quota and the supply was made after obtaining it from another authority at a higher rate. In the aforesaid decision the Apex Court upheld the view of the High Court that the effect of the notification therein to recover surcharge in respect of the energy which was supplied in excess of the permissible quota for the period anterior to the date of such notification did not amount to altering the tariff. 23. Thus, the aforesaid decision is of no assistance to Mr. Roy's clients. 24. Let us now have a glance over Clause 16(2) of the agreement between the parties. According to the said Clause, for calculation of annual minimum charge, one year period shall be taken from April to the following March. However, when connection is given in any intermediate month, the minimum charge shall be calculated from the month of connection to the following March on monthly pro-rata basis. According to the proviso to the aforesaid Clause, if the connection is given after the 15th day of any month, that month shall not be counted in calculating the year of minimum charge. In our opinion, the aforesaid provision agreed to by the parties should be made applicable in a case where a revised rate or new mode of calculation is sought to be introduced at an intermediate month of the year. 25. In our opinion, the aforesaid provision agreed to by the parties should be made applicable in a case where a revised rate or new mode of calculation is sought to be introduced at an intermediate month of the year. 25. Thus, keeping in view of the aforesaid Clause 16(2) of the agreement between the parties, we are at one with Mr. Bhattacharya that in the instant case, the AMG at the revised rate and in the new method should be calculated from the month of December, 1996 to March, 1997 on monthly pro-rata basis as the notification became effective from November 19, 1996. 26. As regards the second ground urged in support of the instant appeal, we find no substance in the submission of Mr. Bhattacharya that his client should get the benefit of the expression for the first year of operation and the rate applicable to his client should be Rs. 1,200/- per KVA. In our opinion, Mr. Roy has rightly contended that by the said expression, the old consumers who started taking electricity from the Board more than one year back are not included. The expression first year of operation does not mean the first year of operation of the said notification but it means the first year of operation of the contract of the consumer with the Board. 27. The learned Trial Judge, as it appears from the order impugned, took no notice of the points discussed above. 28. Therefore the appeal succeeds in part. In partially setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge, and based upon our observations, we quash and set aside the impugned supplementary bill and direct the respondents to issue a fresh supplementary bill to the appellant writ petitioner by calculating the AMG at the revised rates and in accordance with the new methodology of calculation as per the notification dated 18th October, 1996, but by making and basing such calculation effective from the month of December, 1996 up till 31st March 1997 on monthly pro-rata basis. The respondents are also at liberty to levy and recover AMG at the aforesaid revised rates and based on the aforesaid new methodology from 1st April, 1997 onwards. 29. Since the points involved in the other connected appeal are same, let the other appeal be disposed of in terms of the instant order. 30. The respondents are also at liberty to levy and recover AMG at the aforesaid revised rates and based on the aforesaid new methodology from 1st April, 1997 onwards. 29. Since the points involved in the other connected appeal are same, let the other appeal be disposed of in terms of the instant order. 30. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. 31. After the judgment was pronounced by us it was pointed out in the open Court by the learned Advocate for the appellant that the supply of electricity has been disconnected. A request has been made for directions upon the respondents to re-connect the electric supply. We direct that on the appellant paying the re-connection charges, the electric supply shall be re-connected within 48 hours from the time of receipt of the re-connected charges. The appellant, however, shall be liable to pay the amount of the newly raised supplementary Bill, in accordance with our aforesaid directions within two weeks from the date of receipt of such Bill. If the said amount is not paid by the appellant within the said period the respondents shall be at liberty to disconnect the electric supply at the expiry of the said period. 32. Let a plain copy of the operative part of this judgment countersigned by the Assistant Registrar (Court) be given to the learned Advocates for the parties. I agree. Appeal allowed in part.