By this common judgment. Civil Rule Nos.2393 of 1994 and 2394 of 1994 are disposed of as the questions of law involved are identical in nature. 2. The petitioners in both the cases being aggrieved with the penalty imposed upon them on conclusion of disciplinary proceeding have challenged the legality and validity of the orders passed. 3. Charges framed against the petitioner in Civil Rule No.2393 of 1994 reads as follows : “Articles of charge framed against SI DK Thungon, SI, A. Chama and H/C BN Jha 1st APPBN, Itanagar. Article I: That on 24.9.91 morning SI DK Thungon while performing duty as OC of Police Station Naharlaguu. SI A. Chama and H/C BN Jha while posted at PS Naharlagun beat Shri Nikh Kamin, alleged accused on Naharlagun PS Case No.71/91 U/s 448/323/506IPC, causing bodily injuries to him and this committed excesses. This act on the part of SI DK Thungon, SI A. Chama and H/C BN Jha amounts to gross misconduct and abuse of legal powers and acting without proper authority of law. Article II: Thai m the above transaction SI DK Thungon arrested Smti Nida Nima wife of the alleged accused and put her inside the PS lockup without any detailed verification and going through the details of the report received by him. This act on the part of SI DK Thungon amounts to gross misconduct and abuse of legal powers and acting without proper authority of law/” 4. The disciplinary authority vide Annexure C imposed penalty in exercise of powers under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. 1965. The relevant portion of the order is quoted below : “1. SI DK Thungon (U/s) is reinstated with effect from the date of issue of this order. 2. SI DK Thungon and SI A. Chama, be reduced to the lowest stages of pay scale in the scale of Sub Inspector from their present pay scale with effect from the date of issue of this order for a period of 3 (three) years with cumulative effect. 3. During the period of suspension subsistence allowance of SI DK Thungon and SI A. Chama, is limited to the extent which they have already drawn as the charge is proved against them. 4. 3. During the period of suspension subsistence allowance of SI DK Thungon and SI A. Chama, is limited to the extent which they have already drawn as the charge is proved against them. 4. H/C BN Jha, is exonerated of the charges framed against him and his period of suspension will be treated as spent on duty for all purposes.” 5. In Civil Rule No.2394 of 1994, the following charges were framed against the petitioner : “Articles of charge framed against SI DK Thungon. SI. A. Chama and H/C BN Jha 1st APPBN, Itanagar. Article I: That on 24.9.91 morning SI DK Thungon while performing duty as OC of Police Station Naharlagun, SI A. Chama and H/C BN Jha while posted at PS Naharlagun beat Shri Nikh Kamin, alleged accused on Naharlagun PS Case No.71/91 U/s 448/323/506IPC, causing bodily injuries to him and thus committed excesses. This act on the pail of SI DK Thungon, SI A. Chama and H/C BN Jha amounts to gross misconduct and abuse of legal powers and acting without proper authority of law. Article II: That in the above transaction SI DK Thungon arrested Smti Nida Nima wife of the alleged accused and put her inside the PS lockup without any detailed verification and going through the details of the report received by him. This act on the part of SI DK Thungon amounts to gross misconduct and abuse of legal powers and acting without proper authority of law. Annexure II : Statement of imputation of gross misconduct in respect of article of charges framed against SI DK Thungon. SI A. Chama and H/C BN Jha.” 6. On conclusion of the departmental proceeding, the Inquiry Officer recorded the following findings : “As such injuries caused in body of accused Kikh Kamin by SI DK Thungon and SI A. Chama is proved though they had taken action as per provision of law (see section 46 (2) CrPC). But the Enquiry Officer could not prove any involvement of H/C BN Jha in this case. Secondly, the Inquiry Officer could not prove arrest of Smti Nida Nima wife of Nikh Kamin and putting her inside the PS Lock up by SI DK Thungon without any verification as charged against him as there is no record of doing this and there is no witness other than statements of Nikh Kamin and his wife themselves. Secondly, the Inquiry Officer could not prove arrest of Smti Nida Nima wife of Nikh Kamin and putting her inside the PS Lock up by SI DK Thungon without any verification as charged against him as there is no record of doing this and there is no witness other than statements of Nikh Kamin and his wife themselves. Submitted for favour of further necessary action.” 7. The disciplinary authority on consideration of the report of the Inquiry Officer vide order dated 10th December, 1992 accepted the report of the Inquiry Officer and imposed the following penalty as per provisions of Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 : “LSI DK Thungon (U/s) is reinstated with effect from the date of issue of this order. 2. SI DK Thungon and SI A. Chama, be reduced to the lowest stages of pay scale in the scale of Sub Inspector from their present pay scale with effect from the date of issue of this order for a period of 3 (three) years with cumulative effect. 3. During the period of suspension subsistence allowance of SI DK Thungon and SI A. Chama, is limited to the extent which they have already drawn as the charge is proved against them. 4. H/C BN Jha, is exonerated of the charges framed against him and his period of suspension will be treated as spent on duty for all purposes.” 8. On being aggrieved, the petitioner preferrred an appeal before the competent authority. The competent authority vide order dated 8th November, 1993 rejected the appeal. 9. The common question of law involved in these two cases is as to whether the findings of the Inquiry Officer as quoted hereinbefore could be construed as a finding of guilt. 10. The report submitted by the Inquiry Officer in both the cases show that the petitioners who are Police Officers attached to the Naharlagun Police Station at the relevant time applied force to effect arrest of accused in Naharlagun PS Case No.71/91 under sections 448/323/506IPC and in course of such application of force, the accused sustained injuries. 10. The report submitted by the Inquiry Officer in both the cases show that the petitioners who are Police Officers attached to the Naharlagun Police Station at the relevant time applied force to effect arrest of accused in Naharlagun PS Case No.71/91 under sections 448/323/506IPC and in course of such application of force, the accused sustained injuries. The Inquiry Officer at page 7 of his report observed that the accused Nikh Kamin started abusing both the petitioners and challenged them pointing his fingers towards them and then both the officers used force to effect his arrest and in the process, caused bodily injuries to the accused. Thereafter, the Inquiry Officer has drawn conclusion by observing that injuries caused in the body of the accused Nikh Kamin by SI DK Thungon and SI A. Chama is proved though the officers had taken action as per provisions of law i.e. under section 46 (2) of CrPC. 11. The observation of the Inquiry Officer as above, in my opinion, does not show positively whether the delinquent officers are guilty o'r not. We may now refer to the provisions of section 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Section 46 of the Code reads as follows : “46. Arrest, how made : (1) In making an arrest the police officer or other person making the same shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested unless there be a submission to the custody by word or action. (2) If such person forcibly resists the endeavour to arrest him, or attempts to evade the arrest, such police officer or other person may use all means necessary to effect the arrest. (3) Nothing in this section gives a right to cause the^death of a person who is not accused of an offence punishable with death or with imprisonment for life.” 12. From the provisions of sub-section (2) above, it would appear that law authorises the police officer to use all means necessary to effect arrest which otherwise implies application of force. In the instant case, the force applied by the petitioner resulted into simple injuries on the person of Nikh Kamin. Whether the force applied was in excess of the permissible limit under the said section has not been discussed by the Inquiry Officer and no positive finding has been recorded by him. In the instant case, the force applied by the petitioner resulted into simple injuries on the person of Nikh Kamin. Whether the force applied was in excess of the permissible limit under the said section has not been discussed by the Inquiry Officer and no positive finding has been recorded by him. In fact, there is no discussion at all on this point. On this context, the observation of the Inquiry Officer that the injuries caused in course of application of force as per provisions of section 46 (2) CrPC cannot be construed as a finding of guilt. The language used by the Inquiry Officer is confusing and on scrutiny thereof it cannot be said that he wanted to convey that the charges framed against the petitioner have been proved. 13. The disciplinary authority agreed to the findings of the Inquiry Officer and imposed punishment by way of reduction of pay to the lowest slab for a period of 3 years with cumulative effect. The ambiguity in the findings of the Inquiry Officer has not been taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority and it has in a routine manner, accepted the finding of the Inquiry Officer without application of mind and imposed punishment. 14. The learned counsel appearing for the State of Arunachal Pradesh submits that the findings of the Inquiry Officer in both the proceedings and the punishment imposed was subsequently affirmed by the appellate authority and it calls for no interference. Mr. Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner opposed this submission and argued that the findings of the disciplinary authority is one of no guilt and as such, the order passed by the disciplinaty authority agreeing with the findings and imposing punishment on the basis of such findings is vitiated in law. That apart, he has also argued that if it is a case of taking a divergent view, the disciplinary authority ought to have recorded reasons thereof, 15. That apart, he has also argued that if it is a case of taking a divergent view, the disciplinary authority ought to have recorded reasons thereof, 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1963 SC 1612 (State of Assam vs. Bimal Kumar Pandit): “If the dismissing authority accepts all the said findings in their entirety, it is another matter; but if the dismissing authority accepts the findings recorded against the delinquent officer and differs from some or all of those recorded in his favour and proceeds to specify the nature of the action proposed to be taken on its own conclusions, it would be necessary that the said conclusions should be briefly indicated in the notice. In this category of cases, the action proposed to be taken would be based not only on the findings recorded against the delinquent officers in the inquiry report, but also on the view of dismissing authority that the other charges not held proved by the enquiring officer are according to the dismissing authority, proved. In order to give the delinquent officer a reasonable opportunity to show cause under Article 311 (2), it is essential that the conclusions provisionally reached by the dismissing authority must, in such cases, be specified in the notice.” 16. Relying on the principles highlighted in this decision, the learned counsel argued that the findings of the Inquiry Officer being one of no guilt, the disciplinary authority ought to have served a copy of the inquiry report to the deliquent officers and thereafter pass neccssaiy orders after recording reasons. The learned counsel also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur & others vs. Prabhu Dayal Grover, (1995) 6 SCC 279 . In para 3 of the judgment, the Supreme Court laid down the law that “only in those cases where the disciplinary authority considers it necessary to direct fresh or further inquiry or disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, it has to record the reasons for such direction, but there is no such obligation if it agrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer'. After going through the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the above two cases, this Court is of the opinion that in the instant case, findings given by the Inquiry Officer cannot be interpreted as a finding of guilt and. therefore, the action of the disciplinary authority in accepting the said findings and then imposing penalty on such findings without giving any reason cannot be sustained in law. In addition, the decision making process by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority appears to have been based on incorrect reading of the report submitted by the Inquiry Officer and as such, the order passed by the disciplinary authority stands tainted. 17. In the result, both the writ petitions are allowed. The penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority vide order dated 10th December, 1992 and confirmation thereof on appeal by the appellate authority vide order dated 8th November, 1993 are hereby quashed. The matter is remanded back to the Inquiry Officer to record his findings in clear language in accordance with law.