JUDGMENT P.K. PALLI, J,—This revision petition is directed against the order dated March 31, 1997 passed by the learned Executing Court whereby the objections filed by the judgment debtor stand allowed and in sequence of which the execution petition filed by the petitioner/ decree holder stands dismissed. The sequence of events appearing here-in-after would by itself reveal as to how the effect of the various judgments and orders passed by the Executing Court, this Court as well as by the Supreme Court has been stalled by the judgment debtor. 2. The parties are real brothers. They had considerable movable, immovable properties as well as joint business. Differences cropped up and the matter was settled by way of arbitration by the real uncle of the parties-Jagat Ram-vide award dated December 27, 1965. It took almost ten years to make the award rule of the Court vide judgment and decree dated March 19, 1975. Revision petition filed by the judgment debtor was dismissed by this Court on April 25, 1980 and SLP filed was dismissed in the year 1981. It, thus, transpires that a long period of time, i.e. from 1965 to 1981, was consumed in making the award rule of the Court. 3. Execution petition was filed in the year 1986. There was some compromise between the parties on November 13, 1987 and the objections were dismissed as the matter had been amicably settled. The matter was agitated again after the report of the Local Commissioner was placed on record. 4. Vide order dated June 12, 1991, the execution petition was revived and warrant of possession was consequently issued against the judgment debtor for delivering possession of the property to which the decree holder was found entitled to. This order passed by the Executing Court was challenged by way of revision by the judgment debtor and was dismissed on July 26, 1991. Review petition for re-calling the said order was also dismissed on December 5, 1991. 5. It was thereafter that the objections filed by the judgment debtor were taken up and dismissed by the Executing Court on July 14, 1992. The matter was challenged by way of appeal and the Appellate Court, after issuing notice, suspended the execution of warrants. Review petition for re-calling the said order was also dismissed on December 5, 1991. 5. It was thereafter that the objections filed by the judgment debtor were taken up and dismissed by the Executing Court on July 14, 1992. The matter was challenged by way of appeal and the Appellate Court, after issuing notice, suspended the execution of warrants. This order was challenged by the decree holder in this Court and vide detailed judgment dated September 15, 1993, the execution petition preferred by the decree holder was ordered to be dismissed as not maintainable. It was further found that the appeal which had been filed before the Additional District Judge shall also stand dismissed as not maintainable and otherwise having become infructuous. This judgment was challenged by way of appeal before the Supreme Court. Vide judgment dated October 28, 1994, the decree holder was granted leave to withdraw the revision petition filed in the High Court and it was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. It was specifically observed that resultantly the impugned order dated September 15, 1993 passed by the High Court is also set aside. It was further held that the appeal pending before the Additional District Judge shall stand revived together with the stay order made therein. 6. In the mean-time, two revision petitions came to be filed before this Court which were disposed of by me vide judgment dated October 15, 1996. Civil Revision No. 145/95 was directed against the order dated July 14, 1992 passed by the Executing Court whereby objections filed by the judgment debtor were dismissed, whereas Civil Revision No. 144/95 was directed against the order dated May 2, 1995 in sequence of the order impugned in the other revision petition dated July 14, 1992 whereby warrants of possession in terms of that order had been issued. Since the appeal before the Additional District Judge was held to be incompetent and not maintainable, a prayer was made for condonation of delay in filing the revision petition which was allowed. 7. On analysis, it was found that though the parties had made statements that the dispute between them stands settled, yet factually it was not so. At one point of time, the case was listed for arguments when some statement was made by the parties on November 13, 1987. Resultantly, the matter rested there. 7. On analysis, it was found that though the parties had made statements that the dispute between them stands settled, yet factually it was not so. At one point of time, the case was listed for arguments when some statement was made by the parties on November 13, 1987. Resultantly, the matter rested there. This commitment was not honoured and I directed that the Executing Court shall now take up the proceedings from the stage of arguments and a speaking order be passed disposing of the objections raised. The matter was further ordered to be disposed of within three months. 8. It is after the above said judgment handed down by me that the matter was taken up again and has been decided vide impugned order. This is, in brief, the history of litigation between the parties. It is really sad to observe that the matter has not reached finality as yet and it is a classic example of the love lost between the two real brothers. 9. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the decree holder, while opening his address of arguments contends that the Executing Court has made a mess of the whole situation. The objections filed by the other side have been dismissed time and again and this time the objections raised and decided finally earlier, were pressed again and have found favour with the Executing Court. 10. It is next sought to be urged that the Executing Court was not correct in its approach for dismissing the execution petition as not maintainable for want of compliance to the provisions contained in Order 21, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code which requires the decree holder to furnish the particulars of the earlier execution petition which in the present case were not mentioned. It is contended by the learned Counsel that the defect, if any, could be cured by inviting the decree holder to supply further information under Order -21, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code. Emphasis is being laid on the words "Court shall allow the defect to be remedied" appearing in the language of Order 21, Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code. 11. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Advocate, further contends that the points in issue stand fully answered in the judgment of this Court dated July 26, 1991 rendered by Honble Mr. Justice V.K. Mehrotra, the then Acting Chief Justice. 11. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Advocate, further contends that the points in issue stand fully answered in the judgment of this Court dated July 26, 1991 rendered by Honble Mr. Justice V.K. Mehrotra, the then Acting Chief Justice. A review petition filed against the judgment was also dismissed on December 5, 1991 by the same Bench. It is, thus, being argued that the matter had reached finality and it was not open for the Executing Court to go beyond the scope of enquiry and thereby nullifying the effect of the judgments and orders passed earlier by the Executing Court as well as this Court. 12. Mr. Shanti Bhushan is further at pains to contend that the learned Court has wrongly held that the present execution petition was not maintainable as the award made by the arbitrator does not include the area possession of which is sought to be delivered to the decree holder. It is further sought to be argued that the Executing Court erred in holding that it was not possible to infer or assume that any property, other than joint property of the parties, was the subject matter of reference and the award was made only in respect of such properties which were held jointly by the parties. Mr. Shanti Bhushan further contends that the Executing Court has further erred in holding that possession in respect of the land comprising Khasra Nos. 388 and 389 could not be delivered as these numbers are not mentioned in the award. 13. It is finally sought to be urged by the learned Counsel for the decree holder that the principles of res judicata have been made applicable to the execution proceedings by the amended Act and the judgment debtor cannot now be permitted to raise these objections on the principles of constructive res judicata as enshrined in Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. My attention has also been brought to the grounds of revision petition taken by Amrik Chand, judgment debtor whereby order dated June 12, 1991 was challenged in this Court. It is being sought to be urged that if the grounds taken therein were not urged, it would mean that these were not pressed and the judgment debtor is estopped from raising such pleas again. 14. Mr. Subhash Kapoor, learned Senior Advocate, appearing with Mr. It is being sought to be urged that if the grounds taken therein were not urged, it would mean that these were not pressed and the judgment debtor is estopped from raising such pleas again. 14. Mr. Subhash Kapoor, learned Senior Advocate, appearing with Mr. Ramakant Sharma for the judgment debtor, in reply, contends that the award is only declaratory in nature and as the property to be given to the decree holder has not been specified, the award cannot be executed. It is further being said in reply that whatever property was given to the decree holder is in his possession and he is not entitled to anything more than this. Mr. Kapoor has further read para 6 of the award to lay emphasis on the point raised that the arbitrator has only declared the shares of the parties and as the property was joint, a regular partition has to be carried out which has not been done. 15. It is sought to be urged that the award, at best, is like a preliminary decree and it does not vest the decree holder with the right, title and interest so as to claim other property which is not even remotely embraced by the award. 16. It is being said that the award is completely silent as to what would happen in the situation if the parties fail to implement it. Clause 6 of the award has been interpreted and emphasised so as to read in between the lines that "the decree holder by way of the present execution petition cannot be granted the relief that is being prayed for by him." Mr. Kapoor, learned Senior Counsel has further adopted the reasoning given in the judgment dated September 15, 1993 passed by this Court. Reliance is further being placed on AIR 1963 Punjab 387, Mool Chand Wasakhi Ram and another v. Tola Ram Suba Ram and another and AIR 1996 SC 1985, Bibekananda Bhowal v. Satindra Mohan Deb. 17. Mr. Kapoor, learned Senior Advocate has further stressed that Clause 6 of the award is aimed to take into account the properties which the parties held jointly and by no stretch of imagination, the properties held by Amrik Chand, judgment debtor in his individual capacity or jointly with Jagat Ram or others can be taken into account. 17. Mr. Kapoor, learned Senior Advocate has further stressed that Clause 6 of the award is aimed to take into account the properties which the parties held jointly and by no stretch of imagination, the properties held by Amrik Chand, judgment debtor in his individual capacity or jointly with Jagat Ram or others can be taken into account. Learned Counsel further contends that the decree holder has miserably failed to identify the property which he desired to be delivered to him in the present execution petition and till that is done, no relief can be granted. Some confusion is being created that the sale deeds and shares have not been brought on record and in respect of one property which the judgment debtor submits to have taken from one Ishri Prasad, he has only possessory rights. It is also being contended that the built-up portion comprising Khasra No. 160 measuring 18 Marlas also extends to Khasra No. 159 and the judgment debtor is prepared to part with every inch of the property which is found to be in excess of 18 Marlas comprising Khasra No. 160. 18. After having heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and on carefully scrutinising the record, I find that the award was designed to put an end to all disputes between the parties in respect of their business, assets and liabilities including all movable and immovable property owned by them. It is an admitted position that there is no dispute between the parties regarding other properties in respect of the award so given. All disputes stand finally settled between them except in respect of the present controversy for which provision is made in para 6 of the award. Para 6 starts with the words, "That both the parties have other movable and immovable property in their joint ownership and individual ownership. Out of the property owned by them jointly in Khasra No. 160 situated in revenue estate Bangiar, 18 Marlas is given to Amrik Chand, judgment debtor. This property is identified and is described comprising a residential house and two newly constructed shops. The award further clarifies that the remaining land in the said revenue estate; i.e. Bangiar, is given to Ram Swaroop, decree holder, the mutation on the basis of private partition would be got sanctioned in favour of Ram Swaroop and Amrik Chand would be responsible for getting its sanction. The award further clarifies that the remaining land in the said revenue estate; i.e. Bangiar, is given to Ram Swaroop, decree holder, the mutation on the basis of private partition would be got sanctioned in favour of Ram Swaroop and Amrik Chand would be responsible for getting its sanction. 19. Emphasis has been laid by the arbitrator in further clarifying that "except 18 Marlas of the land as mentioned above, the remaining land situated in Tika and Mauza Bhangiar Khas will be in the sole ownership of Ram Sarup, decree holder. 20. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the decree holder, has made a statement at the Bar that the judgment debtor be permitted to mark his 18 Marlas in the manner he chooses and has to surrender every inch of other property which is held by him either individually or jointly with the decree holder or with any other person. The emphasis is that which ever property, where the judgment debtor has any right, title or interest, has to go to the decree holder except 18 Marlas as provided for in the award. The case being set up by Amrik Chand is that only the joint property between the parties is to be noticed and other property which he holds either in his individual ownership or in joint ownership with any other person, is not to be touched. 21. On a careful reading of the award, particularly para 6, I am of the considered opinion that all movable and immovable properties of the parties, whether in their joint ownership or individual ownership, were sought to be embraced and the judgment debtor cannot now be permitted to urge that only the property jointly held by the parties was sought to be settled. Clause 6 of the award has come to be interpreted in various judgments /orders and no second opinion can be given in this respect. 22. In the order dated November 13, 1987, statement was made by judgment debtor Amrik Chand and by Mr. Kultar Chand Rana, learned Advocate appearing for the decree Holder and in sequence of the statements made, the objections filed by the judgment debtor were dismissed as compromised. It is thereafter that a Kanoongo was appointed as a Local Commissioner to visit the spot and carry out demarcation of Khasra No. 160 min old. Kultar Chand Rana, learned Advocate appearing for the decree Holder and in sequence of the statements made, the objections filed by the judgment debtor were dismissed as compromised. It is thereafter that a Kanoongo was appointed as a Local Commissioner to visit the spot and carry out demarcation of Khasra No. 160 min old. Report was made by the Local Commissioner of February 28, 1988. In the order dated June 12, 1991 passed by the Executing Court, I find that the judgment debtor had filed objections which were restricted to Khasra No. 160 alone. The area was got demarcated twice. Report of the Local Commissioner was assailed, the matter was ultimately patched up by the parties when statements were made by them on November 13, 1987. As per their statements, an area of 18 Marlas was to be given to the judgment debtor. Not a word has been pointed out to me in respect of the remaining Khasra number of the land which was to be given to the decree holder. 23. An application under Section 15.1 of the Civil Procedure Code later came to be filed with the request that balance area of Khasra No. 160 be delivered in terms of para 6 of the decree. The application was opposed and it was sought to be urged that the area which is found in excess of 18 Marlas out of Khasra No. 160, was to be given to the decree holder and nothing else. 24. These contentions were considered and the Court was of the opinion that para 6 of the award has clinched the matter totally. On analysis, it was finally held: "The application moved by the decree holder for possession of land situated in village Bhangiar apart from Khasra No. 160 (old) corresponding to new Khasra Nos. 382, 388, 389/1 by excluding the area of 18 Marlas is quite justified." 25. Immediately then the Court allowed the application and passed an order for the issuance of warrants of possession in favour of the decree holder for an area in excess of 18 Marlas out of Khasra No. 160 which was to remain with the judgment debtor and for Khasra No. 159 (old) corresponding to Khasra Nos. 388/1, 391, 392, 394, 397, 389 and 390. 26. According to Mr. 388/1, 391, 392, 394, 397, 389 and 390. 26. According to Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the decree holder, the decree holder shall be fully satisfied if the warrants issued are implemented in letter and spirit. It may be noticed that this order was unsuccessfully assailed by the judgment debtor and the revision petition filed by him laying challenge to this order was dismissed vide judgment dated July 26, 1991 passed by the then Honble Acting Chief Justice V.K. Mehrotra. I have gone through this judgment carefully. It gives the short history of the case as well as stages of litigation right upto the Supreme Court. It was sought to be emphasised on behalf of Amrik Chand, judgment debtor that once the matter has been compromised between the parties resulting in the order dated November 13, 1987, notice of which has already been taken above in this judgment, it was not open to the Court to direct issuance of warrants of possession over any part of land other than the excess area of Khasra No. 160 beyond 18 Marlas over which situate the residential house and the two shops. It was also sought to be urged that the decree holder could not be permitted to include Khasra No. 159 (old) by way of moving miscellaneous application under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. By a detailed examination of the various orders and the award, the learned Judge found that the plea raised by Amrik Chand did not deserve acceptance. It was further found that the award which stands upheld even by the Supreme Court, specifically mentions in para 6, the applicant Amrik Chand would be entitled to 18 Marlas of land out of Khasra No. 160 (old) where a house and shops stood constructed by him. The other land which includes Khasra No. 159 (old), fell to the share of decree holder Ram Swaroop alongwith the remaining portion which was found in excess in Khasra No. 160. 27. Arguments raised on behalf of the judgment debtor that the decree was inexecutable till the shares of the parties are duly partitioned, was negatived as the question does not relate as to what part of the property was to go to Amrik Chand and what was to go to the other brother Ram Swaroop. 27. Arguments raised on behalf of the judgment debtor that the decree was inexecutable till the shares of the parties are duly partitioned, was negatived as the question does not relate as to what part of the property was to go to Amrik Chand and what was to go to the other brother Ram Swaroop. In the concluding part of the judgment it has been observed that the order dated June 12, 1991 assailed in the revision, gives effect to the decision of the arbitrator which has been upheld after several years of litigation by the Supreme Court way back in 1980. It was finally held that it would not be equitable after ten years of the decision even of the Supreme Court to permit Amrik Chand to deprive his brother Ram Swaroop of his share in the property on account of the technical submissions raised on his behalf. 28. A review petition came to be filed by the judgment debtor for recalling of this judgment. The review petition also came to be dismissed on December 5, 1991. 29. As I read these judgments, I find that the submissions which are now being urged, could not be permitted to be re-agitated as these judgments and orders have attained finality between the parties. When the matter came up before me, I noticed that the case after the conclusion of evidence by the parties had reached the stage of arguments when statements were made by the parties and the matter was left there itself. Since the parties did not honour their commitment, I only directed that the matter be taken up from that stage and be disposed of by a speaking order after hearing arguments of the parties. It is in this situation that the impugned order has come on the surface. 30. The Executing Court, in my view, has further confused the matter on wholly unjust and erroneous considerations. Simply because the particulars as required by Order 21, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code were not detailed as required by Clause (f) of sub-rule (2), the defect in the execution petition could not be held to be fatal. Order 21, Rule 17 lays down the procedure on receiving application for execution of decree. Simply because the particulars as required by Order 21, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code were not detailed as required by Clause (f) of sub-rule (2), the defect in the execution petition could not be held to be fatal. Order 21, Rule 17 lays down the procedure on receiving application for execution of decree. Sub-rule (1) casts a duty on the Court to ascertain whether the requirements of Rules 11 to 14 as may be applicable have been complied with and if not, the Court shall have to allow the defect to be remedied then and there or within a time to be fixed by it. It is only when the defect is not remedied the application shall be rejected by the Court. Admittedly, the decree holder was not allowed to remove the defect. Nothing hinges on this point and the Executing Court was certainly wrong in holding the execution petition as not maintainable. I also find that the Court went wrong in holding under Issue No. 5-D that the award is completely silent in respect of the execution for possession of land comprising Khasra Nos. 388 and 389 and the execution petition has been held not maintainable. It has further been wrongly held that the award is silent in respect of the land comprising in Khasra No. 159. Khasra No. 160 corresponds to new Khasra Nos. 388 and 389/1. It has been said that the judgment debtor has the exclusive proprietary rights in it and he has joint rights with Jagat Ram, arbitrator which was not subject matter of the reference and, therefore, no possession in respect of Khasra No. 388/1 can be granted. 31. As I look at the matter, this controversy already stood settled and has reached finality after the revision petition filed by the judgment debtor was dismissed vide judgment of this Court dated July 26, 1991. 32. I have further noticed that in para 22 of the impugned order the Executing Court has taken into consideration the report made available by the Local Commissioner in pursuance of the directions given by this Court as well as observations made by Honble Mr. Justice Devinder Gupta have been relied upon in resolving the controversy in respect of old and new Khasra numbers and the property for which the decree holder was seeking possession. 33. Justice Devinder Gupta have been relied upon in resolving the controversy in respect of old and new Khasra numbers and the property for which the decree holder was seeking possession. 33. With utmost respect, it may be said that the judgment stands set aside by the Supreme Court in the judgment dated October 28, 1994. The incidental proceedings taken during the pendency of that revision petition shall have no effect what-so-ever to resolve the controversy as the judgment itself stands set aside. 34. I further find that there is no force in the contention raised by Mr. Subhash Kapoor, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the judgment debtor, that the award was only declaratory in nature and could not be enforced by way of execution petition. It may be emphasised that right from 1965 till date the objector /judgment debtor has successfully delayed implementation of the award as well as orders and judgments passed by the Executing Court, first Appellate Court, this Court and finally by the Supreme Court. It may be observed with restraint that this all has happened on account of procedural delays and the remedies as provided by the Civil Procedure Code. I had suggested the learned Counsel appearing for the parties that the impugned order cannot be sustained and in that situation only two courses were open for me. One was to send the case back with certain directions for decision afresh; the second course open to me was to decide the matter myself after appraisal of the record. Both the parties, through their learned Counsel, insisted that the case be not sent back and be disposed of here itself. It is in this situation that I had to go through the entire record comprising proceedings held by different Courts from 1965 till date and I am of the firm opinion that the objections raised are too technical and have already been dealt with at a number of occasions earlier. Even on merits I have glanced through the entire record and notice has been taken in detail about the happenings and I find that the decree holder has been denied his due unjustly and motivatedly to prolong the agony. The property in question is a very very small fraction of what they own and possess. Even on merits I have glanced through the entire record and notice has been taken in detail about the happenings and I find that the decree holder has been denied his due unjustly and motivatedly to prolong the agony. The property in question is a very very small fraction of what they own and possess. The Courts of law have, thus, to be very careful in dealing with such situation and such a futile exercise of litigation has to be curbed as well as condemned. 35. In the case law cited from the side of the judgment debtor, I find that in the judgment of the Punjab High Court, AIR 1963 Punjab 387 (supra), the decree was passed on the award declaring contingent rights and liabilities. In the given situation, suit to reimburse was held to be maintainable and there was no bar to it under the Arbitration Act. 36. In the other case cited at the Bar, the observations made by the Supreme Court were on the basis of a compromise decree execution of which was sought. The terms of the decree provided that the defendants would be liable to be ejected after a given period by appropriate action in Court of law. It was in the given set of situation that the defendants were ordered not to be evicted in the execution of compromise decree but by filing fresh suit for ejectment as permissible in law. Both these judgments are not even remotely applicable to solve the present controversy. 37. It would be most appropriate to observe here that even in the judgment passed by me in the second para appearing at page 4, it was held like this :— "It is not disputed that the parties jointly owned land in Khasra Nos. 159 and 160 in the said revenue estate but in the award, reference is made only to Khasra No. 160 where the petitioner has raised a building and shops and 18 Marlas comprising this construction was ordered to be awarded to him. The difficulty appears to have arisen because the Tatima was not got prepared by the Arbitrator himself and nothing was said in respect of the joint holding in Khasra No. 159. It is how this litigation has travelled over the years to resolve this controversy." 38. The difficulty appears to have arisen because the Tatima was not got prepared by the Arbitrator himself and nothing was said in respect of the joint holding in Khasra No. 159. It is how this litigation has travelled over the years to resolve this controversy." 38. Para 3 of the order dated July 14, 1992 passed by the Executing Court reads like this: "3. As stated earlier the objector Amrik Chand has foiled in obstructing the execution of the decree which has been made the rule of the Court on the basis of the award made by the uncle of the parties. Entire Khasra Nos. 159 and 160 was taken into possession by the Arbitrator. Objector/J.D. cannot be re-heard on the same point for one reason or the other that the D.H. is not entitled to the land which has been allotted to him by the Arbitrator. In my opinion this is a deliberate attempt on the part of the J.D. to prolong the litigation. I find no merits in the objection filed by the J.D. as the same type of objection has already been filed by him which was dismissed by this Court on 12.6.1991 and the revision of J.D. objector against the order was dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court on 26.7.1991 and further revision review petition of J.D. again dismissed on 15.12.1991 by the Honble High Court. In view of above, I dismiss the objection petition dated 27.6.1992 against J.D. Amrik Chand and in the given facts and circumstances of the case that the objections were filed deliberately by him to deprive the D.H. from the possession of the property in suit, objector is directed to pay costs of Rs. 100/- for making frivolous objections. The file after due completion, be consigned to the record room." judgment debtor are frivolous, wholly devoid of merit and is an attempt to put the machinery of law and the impact of the judgments and orders passed by the Courts earlier to a grinding halt. The objections are dismissed and the impugned order is set aside. The Executing Court shall now proceed with the execution so as to deliver possession of the property being claimed by the decree holder in sequence of the order dated June 12, 1991 passed by that very Court and upheld by this Court in its judgment dated July 26, 1991. The objections are dismissed and the impugned order is set aside. The Executing Court shall now proceed with the execution so as to deliver possession of the property being claimed by the decree holder in sequence of the order dated June 12, 1991 passed by that very Court and upheld by this Court in its judgment dated July 26, 1991. All out efforts be made to deliver the possession to the decree holder without any further delay and in case the police help is required, the Executing Court shall pass orders to that effect. The record is ordered to be sent back forthwith and the parties are directed to appear before the Executing Court on June 22nd whereafter the Executing Court shall proceed in the light of the observations and directions made above in this judgment. 39. The revision petition is allowed in the above said terms with costs which are assessed at Rs. 15,000/-. Petition allowed.