Judgment Amaresh Kumar Singh, J.-By this petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is prayed that the order dated 30th November, 1995 passed by the Civil Judge (Jr. Division) and Judicial Magistrate in criminal complaint case No. 474/95 Vishwa Karma Steel Sales vs. Bhanwarlal be quashed. By the above mentioned order, the learned Judicial Magistrate, on the basis of the complaint filed by the non-petitioner No. 2 took cognizance of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 2. Vishhwakarma Steel Sales, Merta City, represented by non-petitioner No. 2, filed a complaint with Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Merta on 9th June, 1995. It was alleged in the complaint that the accused persons purchased some goods from the complainant for a consideration of Rs. 53,174.04. The transaction was duly entered into the accounts books of the complainant. Two cheques one dated 15-10-1994 for Rs. 20,000/-and the other dated 25-12-1994 for Rs. 20,000/-were given by the accused. The complainant sent the cheques to the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur, Merta City-Branch for encashment. Both the cheques were dishonoured by the bank on 10th May, 1995 on the ground that there are no sufficient funds in the accounts of the drawer of the cheque. The bank returned both the cheques to the complainant with their letter dated 10th May, 1995. On 23rd May, 1995, the complainant sent a registered letter to the accused persons demanding the sum of Rs. 40,000/-within a period of 15 days. It was also stated in the letter that the amount should be paid within the period mentioned in the letter otherwise civil as well as criminal proceedings would be instituted. 3. The letter sent by the complainant could not be served on the accused persons. It was returned unserved. The complainant, thereafter submitted the complaint in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Merta City against the accused persons alleging the commission of offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 4. Thelearned Judicial Magistrate, Mertacity took cognizance of the offence on 30th June, 1995. In this order, the learned Magistrate observed that the notice had been sent by the complainant within the prescribed time but it was returned unserved. Statement of Deehdayal was recorded on 27-9-1995 under S.200 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 4. Thelearned Judicial Magistrate, Mertacity took cognizance of the offence on 30th June, 1995. In this order, the learned Magistrate observed that the notice had been sent by the complainant within the prescribed time but it was returned unserved. Statement of Deehdayal was recorded on 27-9-1995 under S.200 of the Criminal Procedure Code. After conducting inquiry under Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the learned Magistrate issued process against the accused persons vide order dated 30th November 1995. In his order, the learned Magistrate observed that notice has been sent by the complainant within prescribed time i.e. on 23rd May, 1995 and after that the complaint had been filed. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the impugned order dated 30-11 -1995 on two grounds. The first ground on which the order dated 30-11-1995 has been challenged is that in this case the notice was not sent by the complainant within a period of 15 days from the date of dishonouring of two cheques and, therefore, the complainant was not entitled to initiate prosecution. The second ground is that the notice sent by the complainant, requiring to pay a sum of Rs. 40,000/-was not served on the accused persons and unless the notice was served, the petitioner could not have initiated the proceedings in respect of offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision given by the single Judge of this Court in Kishan Lal vs. Krishna Sales 1996 Raj Cri C 508. In Kishan Lal’s case (supra), the learned single Judge of this Court held that looking to the Cls. B and C of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, service of the notice by any of the modes which may be by refusal, also, is essential to constitute an offence under Section 138 of the Act. 6. With great respect, I agree with the view that service of notice by the complainant on the drawer of the cheque is essential in order to constitute an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. But it is not necessary that the service must be effected personally on accused persons as observed by the learned single Judge in the case of Kishanlal (1996 Raj Cri C 508) (supra). But it is not necessary that the service must be effected personally on accused persons as observed by the learned single Judge in the case of Kishanlal (1996 Raj Cri C 508) (supra). The service of the notice may be effected by any other mode recognized by law including the refusal by the accused to accept service of the notice. 7. Learned counsel for the non-petitioner No. 2 has submitted that the complaint filed by the non-petitioner No. 2 was legally maintainable and both the objections raised against the filing of the complainant are without any merit. Regarding the date of notice which was sent by the complainant, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner No. 2 that the complainant had sent the notice on 23rd May, 1995 as is evident by the photostat copy (Ex. 7-A) produced in the trial Court. The cheques were dishonoured on the 10th May, 1995 and the notice was sent on 23rd May, 1995 and, therefore, there was sufficient compliance of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, as the notice had been sent within the prescribed period of 15 days. 8. Regarding the second ground on which the impugned order dated 30-11-1995 is challenged, learned counsel for the non-petitioner has submitted that in the instant case, the notice was sent by registered post and it was returned unserved with the endorsement made by the Postal Authorities that the addressee’s garage was closed. The contention of the non-petitioner is that the address given on the notice by the non-petitioner was the address which was known to the non-petitioner No. 2 and it was correct to the best of the knowledge of the non-petitioner No. 2. After the delivery of the notice to the postal authorities for service, the non-petitioner No. 2 had no control over the service of the notice and if the notice could not be served with accused persons, it was not on account of the fault of the non-petitioner No. 2 but on account of the conduct of the accused persons inasmuch as they closed the garage and went to the village. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner No. 2 that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the statutory obligation on the complaint to send a notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was fully discharged, even if the service of the notice could not be effected personally because the garage of the accused was found to be closed. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner No. 2 on a decision given by the single Bench of this Court in (1998) 2 WLC 304 (Raj) Pavan Kumar vs. Shakuntala. In that case notice was sent but could not be served upon the accused. The notice had been returned with a postal endorsement “Not found.” In view of the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Madan and Company vs. Wazir Jai Vir Chand reported in AIR 1989 SC 630 , the Court held that there was no legal infirmity in taking cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate. In other words, the Court held that if the notice had not been served on the accused person but had returned with the postal authorities “Not found,” the statutory obligation imposed by Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, should be deemed to have been fully discharged. I am respectfully in agreement with the view taken by the learned single Judge in that case. 9. In the instant case, the non-petitioner No. 2 sent the notice on 23rd May, 1995 by the registered post. There is nothing to show that the address given in the notice was wrong. Postal endorsement shows that the postman took the registered notice to the garage of the accused-persons but the garage was found to be closed and, therefore, the notice could not be served. In the light of the decision given by this Court in Pawan Kumar vs. Shakuntla 1998 (2) WLC 304 (supra), it must be held that the statutory obligation imposed on the non-petitioner No. 2 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act to send a notice within 15 days of the dishonour of the cheques was fully discharged. I have carefully considered all the facts and circumstances and the submission made by the learned counsels for the parties. I do not find any force in the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. I have carefully considered all the facts and circumstances and the submission made by the learned counsels for the parties. I do not find any force in the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. When the Judgment was dictated in the open Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that even it is assumed that if a notice was, by implication, served on the accused persons on 30th May, 1995 on the date when their garage was found to be closed i.e. on 31st May, 1995 the date on which the postal endorsement was made, the accused persons had right to make the payment with a period of 15 days calculated from the 31st May, 1995 and, therefore, the non-petitioner No. 2 was not entitled to file a complaint on 9-6-1995 as no offence said to have been committed before the expiry of period of 15 days within viz, the accused persons were permitted by law to make the payment. 11. Assuming that the complaint was premature, the Magistrate was fully within his right to take cognizance on the face of the complaint after 15th June, 1995 because in any case under the Negotiable Instruments Act (an offence) had been committed prima facie when the sum demanded was not paid within the period of 15 days after the service of the notice. Shri Deen Dayal was examined by the trial Magistrate on 7th September, 1995. I, therefore, do not find any such infirmity which may justify the quashing of the proceedings initiated by the learned Judicial Magistrate. 12. For the reasons mentioned above, there is no force in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. This petition has no force and deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. 13. Nothing contained in this order shall prevent the petitioner from raising such objections during trial or setting up of such cases in defence as he may be advised, during the trial. 14. A copy of the order be sent to the learned Judicial Magistrate, Merta city along with original record of the case within a period of 15 days from today. It is expected that the learned Magistrate shall take every legal step for expeditious disposal of the case.