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Rajasthan High Court · body

1998 DIGILAW 879 (RAJ)

Paras Mal Bhansali v. State of Rajasthan

1998-08-14

AMRESH KUMAR SINGH

body1998
Honble SINGH, J.–Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor and perused the impugned order dated 16.07.96 passed by the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate No.4, Jodhpur in complaint case No.648/92 State Vs. Paras Mal, whereby the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate held that the complaint had been filed within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 106 of the Factories Act, 1948. (2). Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned Addl. Chief Judl. Magistrate No.4, Jodhpur is not correct because the facts of the case disclose that the complainant obtained the knowledge about the commission of the offence much beyond the period of 3 months before filing of the complaint and, therefore, it should be held that the complaint had been filed beyond the period of limitation of 3 months prescribed by Section 106 of the Factories Act, 1948. (3). The learned Public Prosecutor has opposed this petition and supported the impugned order passed by the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate No.4, Jodhpur. (4). The petitioner is a partner of M/s. Bright Metals, Jodhpur. An accident took place in the factory of the petitioner on 17.12.91 at 5.40 A.M. The information about the accident was sent on 20th December, 1991. After receiving the information, inspection of the petitioners factory was conducted on 27.01.92. After conducting investigation, report was sent to the Chief Inspector stating therein that no offence has been committed. The Chief Inspector did not agree with the report. Under his direction, a second inspection was conducted on 08.05.92. After the second inspection, it was ascertained that an offence had been committed under the Factories Act. Consequently, the complaint was filed on 4th August, 1992. Cognizance of the offence was, however, taken by the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate No.4, Jodhpur on 14.09.92 when the complaint was submitted before him with the office-report. (5). After the second inspection, it was ascertained that an offence had been committed under the Factories Act. Consequently, the complaint was filed on 4th August, 1992. Cognizance of the offence was, however, taken by the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate No.4, Jodhpur on 14.09.92 when the complaint was submitted before him with the office-report. (5). Relying on the decision given by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in (1), R.S. Sharma vs. State learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the knowledge about the alleged offence must be deemed to have been obtai- ned by the complainant on 27.01.92 when the first inspection was conducted and, therefore, the complaint ought to have been filed within 3 months from 27.01.92 and since this was not done the complaint deserves to be held to be barred by limitation. (6). On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the first inspection dated 27.01.92 did not result in imparting any knowledge to the complainant about the commission of the alleged offence because it was reported by the Inspector that no offence had been committed and, in fact, it was after the second inspection dated 08.05.92 was made that it was ascertained that the alleged offence had been committed and, therefore, on facts and on law, the complainant obtained the knowledge about the commission of the offence on 08.05.92 and, if period of limitation is calculated from 08.05.92 the complaint would be found to be within the period of 3 months prescribed by Section 106 of the Factories Act. The learned Public Prosecutor has, therefore, submitted that the impugned order passed by the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate No.4, Jodhpur is just and proper and needs no interference by this Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. (7). Section 106 of the Factories Act, 1948 reads : ``106. Limitation of prosecution.-No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act unless complaint thereof is made within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector; Provided that where the offence consists of disobeying a written order made by an Inspector, complaint thereof may be made within six months of the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section,- (a) in the case of a continuing offence, the period of limitation shall be computed with reference to every point of time during which the offence continues; (b) where for the performance of any act time is granted or extended on an application made by the occupier or manager of a factory, the period of limitation shall be computed from the date on which the time so granted or extended expired. (8). A bare reading of Section 106 makes it clear that the point of time relevant for the computation of limitation is that point of time when the knowledge about the commission of offence is obtained by the complainant. The expression ``knowl- edge as used in Section 106 of the Factories Act has not been defined anywhere in the Act. However, the ordinary meaning of the expression ``knowledge may be assigned to the expression ``knowledge as used in Section 106. (9). Information about any material fact does not necessarily impart knowledge to the person to whom the information is given because the information may or may not be reliable and the person receiving it may or may not believe it to be correct. If the person receiving the information does not believe the information to be correct or reliable as indicative of the material fact about which the information has been given, no amount of knowledge could be said to have accrued to the receiver of the information. Therefore, I am of the opinion that receiving informa- tion is not equivalent to acquiring knowledge. If we keep in view the provisions of Section 3 of the Evidence Act, in which the words ``Proved and ``Discovered have been defined, it will have to be said that knowledge accrues to a person either when he believes in the existence of a fact about which he has received the information or he considers the existence of that fact to be so probable that a pru- dent man ought, under the circumstances of the case, to act upon the supposition that the fact exists. Receiving information is, therefore, not tantamounting to receiving knowledge. Development of a belief or at least the awareness of a probability about the existence of a fact, is required for acquiring knowledge about any material fact. Receiving information is, therefore, not tantamounting to receiving knowledge. Development of a belief or at least the awareness of a probability about the existence of a fact, is required for acquiring knowledge about any material fact. Knowledge of facts is required for all those acts/omissions which require a decision on the part of the concerned person whether he should or should not act in a certain manner and in view of Section 80 of the Indian Penal Code if any action is taken on the basis of an information and if such action incurs any criminal liability, Section 80 of the Indian Penal Code may be applicable. Under Section 80, I.P.C., besides satisfying other conditions laid down in section 80, it will have to be shown by the person acting on the information received by him, to show that he acted with due care and caution. Unless a person after receiving an information acts with due care and caution and satisfies himself as to the correctness of the information received by him it cannot be said that he has obtained any knowledge of the fact about which the information was imparted to him. Their Lordships of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in R.S. Sharma vs. State (supra) have used the expression satisfaction in relation to the acquisition of the knowledge by the complainant for the purposes of Section 106 of the Factories Act, 1948. For the reasons given above I am in respectful agreement with the view that satisfaction of the complainant about the commission of the offence after receiving information about the incident is essential for acquisition of the knowledge by him so as to visit him with the legal obligation to file the complaint within three months. (10). In the instant case, the Inspector, notwithstanding the first inspection conducted on 27.01.92 reported that no offence had been committed. The satisfaction about the commission of the offence was in fact the consequence of second inspection conducted on 08.05.92, therefore, I find sufficient force in the submission made by the learned Public Prosecutor that the information prima facie accrued to the complainant on 08.05.92 and, therefore, the complaint must be dee- med to be within limitation. (11). My attention has also been drawn to the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in S.B. Criminal Appeal No.124/96 decided on 24.05.96. (11). My attention has also been drawn to the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in S.B. Criminal Appeal No.124/96 decided on 24.05.96. In the decision, it was held that even if there is a delay in filing the complaint within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 106, Factories Act such delay can be con- doned by the Court under Section 473, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Since I have come to the conclusion that in the instant case there is no delay in filing of the complaint and the complaint was filed within the period of limitation, the question of condoning the delay does not arise and I, therefore, express no opinion whether delay in filing the complaint in respect of offence punishable under the Factories Act, 1948 is or is not condonable under Section 473, Cr.P.C. (12). For the reasons mentioned above, the petition has no force. It deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. The record of the lower Court alongwith a copy of this order be returned.