JUDGMENT Heard the learned counsel for the appellant. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, who has put in appearance in this appeal has also been heard. Perused the record. The appellants feel aggrieved by the decree passed by the First Appellate Court whereunder allowing the appeal of the plaintiff and reversing the decree of the trial Court, the suit for eviction of the defendant from the accommodation in dispute has been decreed. The plaintiff had filed the suit asserting that there existed relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendants. It was asserted that the defendant was defaulter within the meaning of section 12(1) (a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. It was also asserted that the requisite conditions contemplated under section 12(1) (a), 12(1) (c) and 12(1) (e) of the aforesaid Act also stood satisfied and the defendant was liable for eviction on these grounds also. The defendants contested the suit denying the plaint-allegations asserting that he himself was the owner in possession of the accommodation in dispute. In paragraph 8 of the written statement it was specifically asserted that no relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the plaintiff and the defendants. In paragraph 16 of the written statement it had been asserted that the defendants were in possession of the house in dispute as a owner to the knowledge of the plaintiff. The First Appellate Court has found that the relationship of the landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant stood amply proved and in this connection has placed reliance upon the rent-note executed by the defendant, the execution whereof was found to have been proved. The First Appellate Court has further found that the need set up by the plaintiff was bonafide and genuine. It has also been held that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree on the ground of disclaimer of title by the defendant which was taken to be an act on the part of the defendant which was inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation and which was likely to effect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein. The learned counsel for the appellants has urged that the suit could not be decreed on the ground of disclaimer of title as the disclaimer had to be anterior to the filing of the suit. The learned counsel for the appellants has urged that the suit could not be decreed on the ground of disclaimer of title as the disclaimer had to be anterior to the filing of the suit. In the present case it is urged that the disclaimer, if at all was contained in the written statement and as such it could not furnish a ground for the eviction of the tenant. In this connection suffice it to say that the effect of disclaimer of title by a tenant in the written statement filed by him in a suit for eviction was considered by the Apex Court in its decision in the Case of Mahati Subbarao v. P.V.V. Krishna Rao, reported in AIR 1989 SC 2187 . The Apex Court had clearly indicated .in its aforesaid decision that in a case where the denial of the landlord's title by the tenant has been expressly made a ground for eviction under the Rent Act it is not open to insist that a denial of title in the written statement cannot be taken advantage of in that suit but can be taken advantage of only in a subsequent suit to be filed by the landlord. The Apex Court had approved of the view taken by the various High Courts that even a denial of the landlord's title by a tenant in a written statement in an eviction petition under the Rent Act furnishes a ground for eviction and can be relied upon in the very proceedings in which a written statement containing the denial had been filed. In the aforesaid view of the matter the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the disclaimer of the title of the plaintiff contained in the written statement filed by the tenant-defendant was not sufficient and could not be made a basis for the decree for eviction is devoid of merit and is not at all acceptable. The finding returned by the First Appellate Court that the need of the plaintiff for the accommodation in dispute was genuine and bonafide and no other suitable alternative accommodation was available to the plaintiff which could satisfy his need, is a finding based on an appraisal of the evidence and the materials on record. This finding does not appear to suffer from any such legal infirmity which may justify an interference in the present proceedings by this Court. This finding does not appear to suffer from any such legal infirmity which may justify an interference in the present proceedings by this Court. Further, on the own showing of the defendant he had not paid any rent. He was, therefore, clearly a defaulter as contemplated under section 12(1) (a) of the Act and was liable to eviction. The finding even so far as this aspect is concerned which has been returned against the defendant is based on an appraisal of the evidence and the material on record, and does not appear to suffer from any such legal infirmity which may justify an interference in the present proceedings by this Court while exercising the limited jurisdiction envisaged under section 100 CPC. No substantial question of law is involved in this appeal which requires consideration by this Court. This second appeal lacks merits and is accordingly dismissed.