O. P. GARG, J. ( 1 ) COUNTER and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged; therefore, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, this petition is being finally disposed of at the admission stage in accordance with Rules of Court. ( 2 ) HEARD Sri Ashok Khare, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Sri R. N. Singh, learned counsel for the contesting respondent No. 4, as well as the learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 to 3. ( 3 ) THE dispute relates to the validity or otherwise of the elected Committee of Management of Sri gandhi Adarsh Inter College, Lavedi, Etawah, which is a duly recognised and aided institution. To run the affairs of the institution, there is a Scheme of Administration under which the institution is administered and managed by an elected body compendiously called as Committee of Management, the term of which is 3 years with certain stipulations. It is an admitted fact that the last elections of the members of the Committee of Management and its office bearers were held on 27-6-1995 in which S/sri Krishna Dutt Tripathi and Ishwar Chand Tewari were respectively elected as President and Manager. The term of the Committee was to expire in June, 1998. It is alleged that on 26-6-1998, members of the Committee of Management were elected and on 8-7-1998 the members of the Committee elected the office bearers. According to the petitioners, S/sri Shyam Narain Tewari and Ishwar Chand Tewari were elected respectively as president and Manager of the new Committee of Management. The relevant papers were sent to the DIOS on 9-7-1998. DIOS instead of recognising the petitioners Committee of Management, and attesting the signatures of Ishwarchand Tewari-petitioner No. 2, recosnised the Committee of Management-respondent No. 4, of which Munshi Lal Tewari claims himself to be the manager. The signatures of Munshi Lal Tewari were attested on 21-7-1998. ( 4 ) BY means of this writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is prayed that the order dated 21-7-1998 passed by the DIOS, Annexure-10, attesting the signatures of Munshi Lal tewari-respondent No. 4, be quashed and the respondents be commanded not to interfere in the functioning of the petitioners. ( 4 ) BY means of this writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is prayed that the order dated 21-7-1998 passed by the DIOS, Annexure-10, attesting the signatures of Munshi Lal tewari-respondent No. 4, be quashed and the respondents be commanded not to interfere in the functioning of the petitioners. ( 5 ) IN the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent No. 4, it is asserted that the members of the Committee of Management were elected by the General Body of the Society on 26-6-1998 in which the petitioner No. 2 as well as Munshi Lal Tewari-respondent No. 4 were also elected. Scheme of Administration provides for a two-tier elections, i. e. , members of the Committee of management had to elect amongst themselves the office bearers and for that purpose a meeting was convened on 6-7-98 after complying with all the necessary formalities and due information to the DIOS. In the meeting of 6-7-98, new members assembled to elect the office bearers in the presence of the observer-Ramendra Singh Chauhan who was appointed by the DIOS on 25-6-1998 on the basis of letter of request sent by Ishwar Chand Tewari, petitioner No. 2 on 5-6-1998. In the election of the office bearers held on 6-7-98, Krishna Dutt Tripathi, Munshi Lal tewari and Ishwar Chand Tewari, it is alleged by respondent No. 4, were elected respectively to the posts of President, Manager and Kosadhyaksha besides other office bearers. It is further alleged that it was Ishwar Chand Tewari petitioner No. 2 himself, who had transmitted the relevant documents to the DIOS for recognising the Committee of Management of which munshi Lal Tewari was elected as Manager and accordingly the signatures of Munshi Lal tewari were attested by the DIOS on 21-7-1998. In the rejoinder-affidavit, the above facts, particularly the election of the office bearers held in the meeting of 6-7-98 have been repelled and refuted. In the rejoinder-affidavit, the above facts, particularly the election of the office bearers held in the meeting of 6-7-98 have been repelled and refuted. ( 6 ) SRI Ashok Khare, learned Counsel for the petitioners urged that the DIOS has committed grave illegality in recognising the respondent No. 4 Committee of Management and in attesting the signatures of Munshi Lal Tewari as in view of the dispute between two rival Committees of management, the only option left with the DIOS was to have referred the dispute to the Joint/ deputy Director of Education concerned under the provision of Section 16-A (7) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). To fortify his submission, learned Counsel placed reliance on 1989 All CJ 170 : (1989 All U 273), Committee of management v. DIOS; 1994 (1) ESC 502 : (1995 All LJ 1251) (All), Committee of Management, sri Gridhari Lal Higher Secondary School, Chulhawall (Tundla) v. DIOS Firozabad; 1988 uplbec 515 : (1988 All LJ 912), Urwa Bazar Educational Society, Urwa Bazar, Gorakhpur v. Asstt. Registrar, Firms, Societies and Units Division, Gorakhpur; and (1991) 1 UPLBEC 187 : (1991 All LJ 793), Committee of Management, Nehru Vidyapeeth, Reotipur, District Ghazipur v. DIOS, Ghazipur. There is no dispute about the fact that there is a plethora of rulings on the point and the cosistent view, which has been taken by this Court, is that once a dispute with respect to management of an institution arises, before the DIOS, he has no option but to refer the matter before Regional Joint/dy. Director of Education for decision Under Section 16-A (7) of the Act. It has also been held that the DIOS has no jurisdiction either to recognise any of the committees of Management or pass interim orders regarding Management of the institution. This well-embedded proposition of law, which as a matter of fact, needs no authority, is not of universal application and has to be applied with reference to the peculiar facts of each case. This well-embedded proposition of law, which as a matter of fact, needs no authority, is not of universal application and has to be applied with reference to the peculiar facts of each case. There is another series of decisions in which it has been held that though the DIOS has not been given the power to adjudicate upon the claims of the rival Committees of Management, he has to perform the solemn duty on the administrative side to recognise the newly elected Committee of management and to attest the signatures of the Manager as he has to perform various administrative functions of statutory character in collaboration with the management of High school and Intermediate Colleges. In this connection, a reference may be made to Committee of management, SAV Inter College v. DIOS (Civil Misc. Writ No. 12725 of 1975 decided on 24-11-1997); Committee of Management v. DIOS, Meerut, 1978 All WC 124 : (AIR 1978 NOC 90); (1993) 2 UPLBEC 934), Committee of Management, Vaidik Higher Secondary School, faizpur Ninana v DIOS, Meerut; 1978 All WC 124 : (AIR 1978 NOC 90), Committee of management v. DIOS, Meerut; and 1984 UPLBEC 166 : (1984 All LJ 291), Gauri Shankar Rai v. Dr. Ram Lakhan Pandey. The order of recognition of a Committee of Management and the attestation of signatures of a newly elected Manager do not always attract the provision of section 16-A (7) of the Act, as such an act does not purport directly or indirectly to determine any dispute between the rival Committees of Management. This act of the DIOS does not profess to be an adjudication of the rival claims of the parties. As observed in Gauri Shankar Rais case (supra), it is a plain and simple recognition of a new Committee of Management for day to day work of the department, such as, payment of salary to the teachers and staff of the College. In any case, the impugned order passed in the present case by the DIOS on 21-7-98, Annexure-10, does not purport to decide any dispute and consequently, it cannot be said that the DIOS has arrogated to himself the powers which were exclusively exercisable by the Deputy Director of education Under Section 16-A (7) of the Act. In any case, the impugned order passed in the present case by the DIOS on 21-7-98, Annexure-10, does not purport to decide any dispute and consequently, it cannot be said that the DIOS has arrogated to himself the powers which were exclusively exercisable by the Deputy Director of education Under Section 16-A (7) of the Act. Simply because a dispute about the election is raised and a claim about the rival Committees of Management is set up, the DIOS cannot absolve himself of the responsibilities to recognise a particular Committee and to attest the signatures of its Manager. If the DIOS is allowed to shut his eyes to the realities and to act as Post Office in making reference Under Section 16-A (7) of the Act, it would lead to disastrous results. From the decision in 1995 All WC 181 : (1995 All LJ 11), Committee of Management v. DIOS, Man (Division Bench), an inspiration may be taken to hold that if there is no real dispute within the meaning of Section 16-A (7) of the Act, the DIOS is not bound to refer the dispute. In another case (1997) 1. LBESR 386 (All), Sukhnandan Inter College, Math Mohamadpur through its manager Deepan Singh Chauhan v. State of U. P. , it was held that the DIOS does not act merely as a transmitting agency. He has to satisfy himself before making the reference that the dispute raised is genuine and real one. Therefore, the assertion that in all the cases, in which a rival dispute has been raised, whether real or unreal, bona fide or dishonest, a reference has, of necessity, to be made Under Section 16-A (7) of the Act to the Deputy Director of Education by the DIOS, is not correct. As would be shown presently, in the instant case, the dispute was not real one and, therefore, the DIOS was not bound under the law to make a reference. ( 7 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners further urged that the impugned order passed by the DIOS is vitiated on account of the fact that no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioners and that no reasons have been assigned as to under what circumstances, signatures of Munshi Lal tewari have been attested as Manager of the Committee of Management-respondent No. 4. This submission is to be sifted with reference to the various startling facts of the case. As said above, it is an admitted fact that the election process was initiated by Ishwar Chand Tewari, petitioner no. 2, himself and in the meeting dated 26-6-1998, members of the Committee of Management were elected in the presence and observance of Sri Ramendra Singh Chauhan who was appointed as Observer by the DIOS by order dated 25-6-98. Thereafter, a meeting for election of the new office bearers was convened on 9-7-1998 in which Ishwar Chand Tewari himself was also one on the participants. The report of the Observer dated 19-7-1998, a copy of which is annexure-C. A. 13 to the counter-affidavit, clinches the issue. In the report, the Observer has clearly stated that Ishwar Chand Tewari was elected as one of the members of the meeting convened on 26-6-1998 and thereafter in the meeting of 6-7-1998, while Krishna Dutta Tripathi and Munshi Lal Tewari were elected as President and Manager respectively. Sri Ishwar Chand tewari who claims himself to be Manager of the petitioners Committee of Management was elected as Kosadhyaksha. There is hardly any reason to disbelieve the report of Sri Ramendra singh Chauhan. The petitioners have not indicated as to who was observer in the alleged election of the office bearers on 8-7-1998. Since the elections of the office bearers had already taken place on 6-7-1998 in the presence of observer duly appointed, the question of calling a meeting on 8-7-1998 again for the purpose did not arise. It would also not be out of place to mention that ishwar Chand Tewari himself had submitted the papers to the DIOS for recognising the committee of Management which comprised of the members elected on 26-6-1998 and the office bearers elected on 6-7-98. He had also given out that Munshi Lal Tewari was elected as I manager. Sri Ashok Khare, pointed out that the I signatures of Ishwar Chand Tewari on the various documents submitted to the DIOS had been forged. This aspect of the controversy cannot be gone into and sifted in the writ jurisdiction. If the petitioners, for any reason are aggrieved of the elections held on 6-7-1998 of the office bearers of the Committee of management, they can well get adjudication made by the competent Court. This aspect of the controversy cannot be gone into and sifted in the writ jurisdiction. If the petitioners, for any reason are aggrieved of the elections held on 6-7-1998 of the office bearers of the Committee of management, they can well get adjudication made by the competent Court. From the analysis of the above facts, the overall picture which emerges is that the petitioner No. 2 Ishwar Chand tewari had taken part in the election held on 26-6-98 and 6-7-98. Sri Ashok Khare could not convincingly assail the report of the Observer-Ramendra Singh Chauhan dated 19-7-1993 annexure-C. A. 13 to the counter-affidavit. In these circumstances, the two decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, reported in 1994 All CJ 275, C. M. Vaidik Higher secondary School, Faizpur Ninana, Dist. Meerut v. DIOS, Meerut and 1992 All CJ 1192: (1993 all LJ 164), Committee of Management, Dharma Samaj College, Aligarh v. State of U. P. , are not attracted to the facts of the present case. It is a case in which Ramesh Chandra Tewari himself had forwarded the relevant papers of election held in the meeting of 6-7-1998 to the dios. Therefore, it was not necessary for the DIOS to afford an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. In every situation, personal hearing is not necessary. In matters, where observance of principles of natural justice would have made no difference and the admitted or undisputable or irrefutable facts speaking for themselves lead to a situation where only one conclusion is possible under the law, the issuance of writ to compel observance of natural justice is not at all called for. ( 8 ) SRI R. N. Singh, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4 urged that the decision of the DIOS is purely of administrative nature and if the petitioners arc aggrieved by the administrative orderpassed by the DIOS, they may approach the higher and superior authority, i. e. , Deputy Joint director of Education. In support of his contention, he relied upon the decision in Shandar hussain v. Director of Education, XII Region, Moradabad, 1995 All CJ 1244. It has been held in that case that Deputy/joint Director, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction has the power to scrutinise the order passed by the subordinate officers and to correct and rectify the wrong orders. In support of his contention, he relied upon the decision in Shandar hussain v. Director of Education, XII Region, Moradabad, 1995 All CJ 1244. It has been held in that case that Deputy/joint Director, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction has the power to scrutinise the order passed by the subordinate officers and to correct and rectify the wrong orders. It was urged that a superior officer cannot shut his eyes to the mistakes committed by his subordinates and the propriety demands that the senior officer should step in to correct the mistake. Sri Ashok Khare, on the other hand, urged that Shandar Hussains case (supra) is not a good law in view of the later decision of this Court reported in (1995) 2 UPLBEC 784 : ( AIR 1995 All 434 ), Committee of Management, Lakhauri Inter College, Moradabad v. DDE 12th region, Moradabad, which is based on the Full Bench decision of this Court in 1980 UPLBEC 6 , magan Ram Yadav v. DDE. I have thoroughly studied both these above rulings and find that they do not eclipse Shandar Hussains case (1995 All CJ 1244) (supra ). In Lakhori Inter College case (supra), there was some serious dispute about the correctness and legality of inclusion and exclusion of 122 persons as life members of the general body of the society. It was held that in the absence of any specific provision in the Act or Regulations, it was absolutely clear that the dios had exceeded his jurisdiction in entering into the complex question about the validity of the election and also validity of 122 persons as life members of the society. It was also observed that the Deputy Director of Education does not sit in appeal over the judgment of the DIOS to have approved election and attested the signatures of the Manager. The direction of the Dy. Director in that case appointing the Authorised Controller was found to be patently unwarranted and without jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on Magan Ram Yadavs case (supra) for the limited purpose that the Education code is nothing but a mere exclusive instruction and could not be given status of statutory rules. It is true that the provisions in the Education Code do not supersede the statute and Regulations as the provisions therein are mere compilations of the administrative orders and instructions of the Department. It is true that the provisions in the Education Code do not supersede the statute and Regulations as the provisions therein are mere compilations of the administrative orders and instructions of the Department. There can, therefore, be no quarrel about the proposition of law laid down in the decision of Lakhori Inter College (supra ). As amatterof fact, Shandar Hussains case (supra) is clearly in keeping with a number of decisions on this Court, discussed above in which it has been held that the DIOS exercises certain powers at the administrative level. In Shandars case (supra), it was held that the administrative power exercised by the DIOS is subject to correction and scrutiny by the higher authorities on the administrative side. Shandars case (1995 All CJ 1244) (supra) came to be referred and discussed before a Division Bench of this Court in (1998) 1 UPLBEC 429 : (1998 All LJ1564), Committee of Management, Tagor Ucchattar Madhyamik Vidhyalaya, Dilawarganj, Farrukhabad v. DIOS, farrukhabad. Though Shandars case (1995 All CJ 1244) (supra) was distinguished and found to be inapplicable to the facts of the case before the Division Bench, it was impliedly approved. In carrying on the general administrative functions of the State, executive functions are performed by hierarchy of officers who are supposed to act according to rule of law. A superior officer has the implied and implicit administrative power to perform the functions which its subordinate can discharge. If a subordinate officer has omitted to perform his administrative duty or administrative function, the superior would certainly step in to pass appropriate correct order on administrative side. If the illegal and incorrect administrative orders of the subordinates are allowed to exist and continue, the very purpose of creating the hierarchy in the civil services would frustrate. I am, therefore, of the view that the Deputy/joint Director of Education has the power and authority to scrutinise and correctness of the orders passed by the DIOS on administrative side. The decision in Shandar Hussains case (1995 All CJ 1244) (supra) still survives and it cannot be ignored particularly when it is based on a perfect rationale of administrative exigency and expediency. The Joint Director petitioners, therefore, have an option open to them to approach the Deputy Director of Education. The decision in Shandar Hussains case (1995 All CJ 1244) (supra) still survives and it cannot be ignored particularly when it is based on a perfect rationale of administrative exigency and expediency. The Joint Director petitioners, therefore, have an option open to them to approach the Deputy Director of Education. ( 9 ) IN the result, I find that the impugned order passed by the DIOS does not suffer from any illegality or irregularity, calling for interference by this Court under its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs. .