Judgment M.Y.Eqbal, J. 1. This Civil revision application at the instance of the defendant-tenant under Sec. 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control, 1982, is directed against the judgment and decree dated 19.3.1997 passed by the Munsif 1st, Gaya, in Eviction Suit No. 45 of 1994, whereby he decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff-Opposite Party for eviction of the defendant-petitioner from the suit premises. 2. The plaintiff instituted the aforementioned suit seeking a decree for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises, bearing Holding No. 126-A situated at Sarai Road, in the district of Gaya on the ground of personal necessity. The plaintiffs case is that the acquired the suit premises by registered deed of sale from Smt. Rampati Devi, wife of Murari Prasad. The name of the plaintiff was duly recorded in the demand register of Municipal Corporation, Gaya and she had been paying rent and taxes in her own name. The further case of the plaintiff is that in August, 1973 the defendant requested the plaintiff to let out the suit premises on a monthly rent of Rs. 500.00 for doing business. The plaintiff agreed to the request of the defendant and let out the premises from 1.9.1993. It is alleged that the defendant paid rent upto June, 1994. The plaintiffs further case is that she required the suit premises for her eldest son who has decided to carry on business in the suit premises. It is stated that the suit premises is most suitable place for business and the plaintiff has no other holding in that locality. The plaintiff accordingly requested the defendant to vacate the suit premises on many occasion but later refused to vacate the same. Hence the suit. 3. The defendant contested the suit by filing written statement denying and disputing the allegations made in the plaint. After the leave was granted, the defendant contested the suit stating, inter alia, that no relationship of landlord and tenant exists and actually the suit premises was purchased by the Defendant No. 1 in the name of the plaintiff who is his daughter-in-law. The defendants case is that the plaintiff is the trustee of the Hindu Joint Family consisting of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and the plaintiff and her husband and one Shyam Sunder Prasad. The defendants case is that the plaintiff is the trustee of the Hindu Joint Family consisting of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and the plaintiff and her husband and one Shyam Sunder Prasad. The defendants further case is that the said Shyam Sunder Prasad has also filed a partition suit No. 16 of 1995 for partition of the joint family property including the suit premises. The defendants further case is that Defendant No. 1 got settled his eldest son and decided to open another shop. The defendant has provided full capital from his personal earning and got engaged second son Shyam Sunder with him. Since both sons were running shop and the income of the business was jointly used earned by the whole family. It is stated that out of the income of the aforesaid business the suit premises was purchased in the name of the plaintiff. The defendant also denied and disputed the allegation of unemployment of the eldest son of the plaintiff. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the trial Court framed the following eight issues: 1. Is the suit as framed maintainable? 2. Has the plaintiff got any cause of action to sue? 3. Is the suit barred under the jurisdiction of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act? 4. Is there any relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant? 5. Whether the plaintiff requires the suit premises reasonably and in good faith to settle her eldest son in business? 6. Whether the partial eviction of the defendant will fulfil the requirement of the plaintiff? 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs as prayed for? 8. To what relief or reliefs the plaintiff is entitled to? 5. Learned Court below decided the issue of relationship of landlord and tenant and issue of personal necessity in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit. 6. Mr. Ram Kumar Sharma, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner assailed the impugned judgment and decree as being illegal and contrary to the facts and evidence on record. 5. Learned Court below decided the issue of relationship of landlord and tenant and issue of personal necessity in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit. 6. Mr. Ram Kumar Sharma, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner assailed the impugned judgment and decree as being illegal and contrary to the facts and evidence on record. Learned Counsel firstly submitted that the entire judgment and decree passed by the Court below is vitiated in law on the sole ground that although leave was granted to the defendants-petitioners to contest the suit, but the Court below erroneously held that the leave was granted only to contest the suit on the ground of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant and on the ground of personal necessity. Further submission of the Counsel is that the Court below committed serious illegality insofar as it held that the defendant was debarred to raise the point of ownership of the suit premises as it is hit by the provision of Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988. Learned Counsel submitted that once the leave is granted to a tenant to contest the suit the defendant has every right to contest the suit on all the grounds available in law. Refuting the aforesaid submission the learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff-opposite party drawn my attention to the order dated 20.5.1995 and order dated 24.6.1996 and submitted that the Court below very categorically refused to grant leave to defendant to contest the suit on the ground of title and the said order was not challenged by the defendants before any superior Court. According to the learned Counsel, therefore, the petitioner is debarred from raising this point at this stage. 7. Before appreciating the contention of the learned Counsel to would be appropriate to look into the provision of Sec. 14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act which reads as under: 14. Special procedure for disposal of cases on ground of bona fide requirement.-- (1) Every suit by a landlord for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in Clauses (c) and (e) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 11 shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this section. (2) The Court shall issue summons in the prescribed form is every suit referred in Sub-sec. (1) without delay. (1) of Sec. 11 shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this section. (2) The Court shall issue summons in the prescribed form is every suit referred in Sub-sec. (1) without delay. (3)(i) The Court shall, in addition to, and simultaneously with, the issue of summons for service on the tenant or tenants, also direct the summons to be served by registered post with acknowledgment due, addressed to the tenant or his agent empowered to accept the service at the place where the tenant or his agent actually and voluntarily resides or carried on business or personally Works for gain and may, if the circumstances of the case so require also direct the publication of the summons in the Official Gazette or in newspapers circulating in the locality in which the tenant is last known to have resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain. (ii) When an acknowledgment purporting to be signed by the tenant or his agent is received back with an endorsement purporting to have been made by a postal employee to the effect that the tenant or his agent has refused to take delivery of the registered article, the Court may declare that there has been a valid service of summons. (4) The tenant on whom summons is duly served (whether by ordinary mail or by registered post) shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affidavit stating the ground on which he seeks to make such contest and obtains leave from the Court as hereinafter provided; and in default of the appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave the statement made by the landlord in the suit for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground aforesaid. (5) The Court shall give to the tenant leave to contest the suit if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for eviction on the grounds specified in Clause (c) and (e) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 11. (5) The Court shall give to the tenant leave to contest the suit if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for eviction on the grounds specified in Clause (c) and (e) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 11. (Emphasis added) (6) When leave is granted to the tenant to contest the suit, the latter may, within fifteen days from the date of the order, pray after filing the requisite Court fee, required for a written statement that the affidavit may be treated as the written statement or if he chooses to file a separate written statement he may do so within fifteen days of the grant of leave to contest the suit and if he does not file the written statement within the period he shall not be allowed to do so later. The Court shall thereafter commence the hearing of the suit as early as practicable. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) or any other law, the Court while hearing a suit under this section shall follow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes including the recording of evidence. (8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made in accordance with procedure specified in his section: Provided that on an application being made within sixty days of the date of the order of eviction the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order under the section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit. (9) Where no application has been made to the High Court in revision as laid down in Sub-sec. (8) above, the Court, which passed the order for eviction may exercise the powers of review in accordance with the provision of Order XLVII of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Provided that no such review shall be made unless an application is filed for the same within ninety days of the date of order of eviction. 8. 8. From perusal of the aforesaid provision it is manifest that after service of summons a tenant is required to apply for grant of leave to contest the suit for eviction by filing an affidavit and the Court can grant leave to contest only if the conditions mentioned therein are fulfilled. Sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 14 of the Act very specifically provides that the Court shall grant leave to the tenant to contest the suit if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such fact as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction on the ground specified in Clauses (c) and (d) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 11 of the Act. In other words, if the Court prima facie find from the affidavit that the facts stated in the affidavit, if proved, will not make out a case of personal necessity or expiry of the period of lease as a ground for eviction then the Court shall grant leave to the tenant to contest the suit. It is, therefore, clear that the Court may or may not grant leave to a tenant to contest the suit on all the grounds stated in the affidavit. The Court has power to refuse to grant leave to contest the suit on the ground of title. Once leave is not granted to the tenant to contest the suit on the ground of raising the question of title, then the tenant is debarred from challenging the title of the plaintiff-landlord at the stage of hearing of the suit. In the instant case, from perusal of the order dated 20.5.1995 it appears that leave was not granted to the defendant to contest the suit on the ground that the plaintiff is not the owner of the suit premises rather she is a Benamidar. Relevant portion of the order dated 20.5.1995 reads as under: First ground taken by the defendant is that the suit house has been purchased by him in the name of the plaintiff. It is submitted that she is a trustee for the benefit of the Hindu Joint Family. In my view, this plea cannot be taken by the defendants in view of the provision of Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 because Joint Hindu Family cannot be treated as trust. 9. It is submitted that she is a trustee for the benefit of the Hindu Joint Family. In my view, this plea cannot be taken by the defendants in view of the provision of Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 because Joint Hindu Family cannot be treated as trust. 9. From the later part of the order dated 20.5.1995 it appears that the Court below discussed the facts and evidence stated in the affidavit on the question of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the case of personal necessity and held that these two issues can be decided only after recording evidence of the parties. The Court, below, therefore, accorded permission to the defendants to contest the suit. It further appears that the defendants-tenants filed an application on 29.3.1996 for stay of the eviction suit till the disposal of the partition suit. That application was rejected by the Court below in terms of the order dated 24.6.1996. In that order also the Court below held that since the question with regard to acquisition of the suit premises out of the joint family income and in Benami name of the plaintiff is not the issue in the eviction suit, the same suit cannot be stayed till the disposal of the partition suit. Admittedly these two orders dated 25.3.1995 and 24.6.1996 were not challenged by the defendants by filing appeal or revision. In my opinion, therefore, the defendants cannot now be allowed to say that once leave is granted under Sec. 14(5) of the Act, the defendants-tenants can contest the suit on all the grounds available in law including the question of title of the plaintiff. 10. Be that as it may, the Court below while deciding the issue of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant has gone into the question of title incidently and after considering the evidence, both oral and documentary came to a finding that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit premises and the defendant-petitioner, as used to pay rent to the plaintiff. The Court below has also come to a specific finding that no positive evidence has been adduced by the defendants to show that the suit premises was purchased in Benami name of the plaintiff. I do not find any reason to differ with the finding of the Court below on these issues. 11. The Court below has also come to a specific finding that no positive evidence has been adduced by the defendants to show that the suit premises was purchased in Benami name of the plaintiff. I do not find any reason to differ with the finding of the Court below on these issues. 11. On the issue of personal necessity the Court below also discussed the evidence of the witnesses including the plaintiff. Sufficient evidence have been adduced by the plaintiff to show that her son after passing B.A. Examination in 1992 is sitting idle and the plaintiff wants to engage him in business. I do not find any perversity in the finding recorded by the Court below on the issue of personal necessity. It further appears that the Court below has also considered the question of partial eviction and found that the width of the shop on the road side is only 9 ft. and there is no evidence from the side of the defendants that they can be accommodated in a portion of the suit premises. On the contrary the plaintiff led evidence to show that the necessity cannot be satisfied by evicting the defendants from part of the suit premises. In that view of the matter the finding on the issue of partial eviction is also in accordance with law. 12. Having regard to the facts of the case and the discussions made above I am of the view that the judgment and decree passed by the Court below is in accordance with law. It does not appear that the findings of the Court below is perverse in law or in any way contrary to the law, facts and evidence on record. There is, therefore, no merit in this revision application which is accordingly dismissed.