O. P. GARG, J. ( 1 ) BY means of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is prayed that the impugned order dated 13-1-1998, Annexure 12 to the writ petition, passed by the Deputy Director of Education, (for short dde) (Madhyamik), Saharanpur Region, Saharanpur be quashed and the respondent No. 1 be commanded to appoint Prabandh Sanchalak forthwith in exercise of the powers vested in him under clause 8 of the amended Scheme of Administration with a view to complete the process of elections of the members and the office bearers of the Committee of Management from out of 116 members of the General Body of the Society. ( 2 ) COUNTER and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged and, therefore, this writ petition is being finally disposed of, on merits. ( 3 ) HEARD Sri V. K. Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri S. U. Khan for the respondent No. 3 as well as learned Standing Counsel for the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. ( 4 ) THE only question which arises for consideration and determination in the present writ petition is where in the absence of any provision for appeal or revision, a Regional Deputy Director (Madhyamik) is empowered and authorised to set aside the order of thedistrict Inspector of Schools (for short dios) refusing to recognise the election of a Committee of Management or to put differently, whether the administrative action of a subordinate authority can be annulled by a higher authority, in its supervisory jurisdiction. This legal question has come up in the following circumstances :-Sri Janta Vidya Sabha, Rajupur, District Saharanpur is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. It has established an institution in village Rajupur in district Saharanpur. The said institution was initially a Junior High School and in course of time, it came to be upgraded to High School and then to Intermediate level. The institution is governed by the provisions contained in the Scheme of Administration which has been framed in exercise of power vested under Section 16-A of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the act ). Undoubtedly, the institution is on the list of grants-in-aid of the State Government and the provisions of the U. P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries to the Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 are applicable. Undoubtedly, the institution is on the list of grants-in-aid of the State Government and the provisions of the U. P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries to the Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 are applicable. It is an admitted fact that Sri Saud Ahmad-petitioner No. 2 was the Manager of the Committee of Management and Mohd. Kamil Hasan was its president. Originally there were 56 members of the Society. Therefore, elections for constituting the Committee of Management were held on 23-7-1997 in which, respondent No. 3, of which Sri Iqbal Ahmad was the Manager, was elected. The relevant documents were submitted to the DIOS for recognising the new Committee of Management and attesting the signatures of the newly elected Manager Sri Iqbal Ahmad. By order dated 12-8-1997, which is Annexure 11 to this writ petition, the DIOS did not recognise the Committee of Management as according to him, the elections held on 23-7-1997 were not according to the provisions of the Scheme of Administration. Certain members of the newly elected Committee of Management, made a representation to the DDE (Madhyamik) Saharanpur Region, Saharanpur-respondent No. 1 as well as District Magistrate, Saharanpur. The matter ultimately came to be dealt with by the DDE - respondent No. 1 who by the impugned order dated 13-1-1998, Annexure 12 to the writ petition, set aside the order dated 12-8-1997 passed by the DIOS and recognised the Committee of Management elected on 23-7-1997 by 56 members of the Society and in which Sri Mohd. Kamil Hasan and Sri Iqbal Ahmad were elected as the president and Manager respectively. By the same order, the enrolment of 60 more members of the society at the behest of Sri Saud Ahmad-petitioner No. 2 was held to be illegal. ( 5 ) SRI V. K. Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the impugned order dated 13-1-1998 passed by the respondent No. 1-DDE (Madhyamik) Saharanpur Region, Saharanpur is per se illegal and without jurisdiction, inasmuch as, nowhere under the provisions of the Act the DDE has been vested with the power of appellate authority and consequently, the order dated 12-8-1997 passed by the DIOS Saharanpur refusing to recognise the alleged elections of the Committee of Management held on 23-7-1997 could not be set aside. It was also urged that the DDE can exercise powers only under Section 16-A (7) of the Act on a reference having been made to him if there is a dispute raised about the election by the rival parties and that in that case too, the power of the DDE is limited to determine the fact as to which of the party is in actual control of the affairs of the institution and even this determination by the DDE under Section 16-A (7) of the Act is subject to the final adjudication by the competent Court. According to Sri Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioner, the DDE concerned could not have exercised his powers under Section 16-A (7) of the Act in the present case, as there was no dispute about the rival elections and no reference under the aforesaid provision was made. It was also pointed out that the finding of the DDE that there were only 56 members of the society and the alleged addition of 60 members by the Ex-Manager Sri Saud Ahmad was illegal is also not sustainable as it is against the weight of the evidence on record. ( 6 ) SRI S. U. Khan, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 repelled the various submissions raised on behalf of the petitioners and urged that a wrong order passed by the DIOS on the administrative side can always be corrected by the DDE who is superior administrative authority under its supervisory administrative jurisdiction and that this legal position has received judicial recognition in a number of cases decided by this Court. ( 7 ) TO begin with, it may be mentioned that it is an admitted fact that there were only 56 members of the society. The petitioner No. 2 - Saud Ahmad has asserted that he enrolled 60 more members on 23-12-1996 to which act the then DIOS put the seal of approval on 26-12-1996. ( 7 ) TO begin with, it may be mentioned that it is an admitted fact that there were only 56 members of the society. The petitioner No. 2 - Saud Ahmad has asserted that he enrolled 60 more members on 23-12-1996 to which act the then DIOS put the seal of approval on 26-12-1996. The case of the petitioners, therefore, is that under the provision of para 5 (v) of the Scheme of Administration, all the 116 members of the society should have taken part in the election of the new Committee of Management and since the elections were held by inviting only 56 old members and excluding the newly enrolled 60 members, it was not in accordance with the Scheme of Administration and was consequently not approved and recognised by the DIOS by his order dated 12-8-1997. The DDE has dealt with this controversy with all specificity and has come to the conclusion that the enrolment of 60 more members by Saud Ahmad-petitioner No. 2 was illegal. The respondent No. 3 in his counter-affidavit has alleged that the list of the alleged enrolment of 60 members was not required to be put up for approval before the DIOS and that the list of the new members was ante dated and signed by the then DIOS - Sri O. P. Saini in a back date after his retirement in collusion with Saud Ahmad-petitioner No. 2. When the fact that list has been ante dated and the signatures of the then DIOS were obtained on a back date, after his retirement, was brought to the notice of the DDE, Saud Ahmad-petitioner No. 2 behaved in a funny manner, inasmuch as he removed the relevant list and tore it out in pieces. Mohd. Kamil Hasan president pleaded his total ignorance about the enrolment of the new members. The relevant documents about the deposit of the enrolment fee and other charges were also missing. It was in these circumstances that the DDE had come to the conclusion that the enrolment of 60 members, as alleged by Saud Ahmad, was illegal. The society as a body, had 56 members only. These 56 members only could be associated in electing the new Committee of Management. It was in these circumstances that the DDE had come to the conclusion that the enrolment of 60 members, as alleged by Saud Ahmad, was illegal. The society as a body, had 56 members only. These 56 members only could be associated in electing the new Committee of Management. According to the DDE - respondent No. 1, the question of validity of the enrolment of the new 60 members by Saud Ahmad was not thoroughly scrutinised by the DIOS and that he has, in a most mechanical and perfunctory manner, refused to recognise the newly elected Committee of Management. It was in the background of above facts that the DDE set aside the order dated 12-8-1997 and by the impugned order dated 13-1-1998 recognised the Committee of Management as having been duly elected on 23-7-1997 of which Sri Iqbal Ahmad is the Manager. ( 8 ) THE main thrust of Sri V. K. Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioner to assail the impugned order is that the DDE concerned had no jurisdiction, whatsoever, to set aside the order dated 12-8-1997 passed by the DIOS for one simple reason that no provision for appeal has been made and that the jurisdiction of DDE can be invoked only in one situation, i. e. , under Section 16-A (7) of the Act, when a dispute of the rival Committees of management is referred to him and in which he has to record a finding as to which of the rival committees of management has been in actual control of the affairs of the institutions. Without repeating the facts all over again, suffice it to say that it is not the case of the respondents that the impugned order dated 13-1-1998 has been passed by the DDE as an appellate authority or under the provisions of Section 16-A (7) of the Act. On the other hand, Sri S. U. Khan, learned counsel for the respondents frankly conceded that it is not a case in which powers under Section 16-A (7) of the Act could be invoked by the DDE nor it is a case in which he had exercised powers as an appellate authority. It is accepted at all hands that appeal is a creature of statute and in the absence of any statutory provisions, no appeal would lie. It is accepted at all hands that appeal is a creature of statute and in the absence of any statutory provisions, no appeal would lie. Therefore, in the instant case, the question of preferring an appeal against the order dated 12-8-1997 passed by the DIOS to the DDE did not arise. No rival Committee of management has been set up and, therefore, the question of making reference under Section 16-A (7) of the Act also did not arise. ( 9 ) AS said above, the only moot point for determination is whether the DDE in exercise of his supervisory powers could rectify the order passed by the DIOS on administrative level. ( 10 ) IT is well established that neither under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act nor under any statutory provision, the DIOS has been given the power to adjudicate upon the claims of the rival contending Managing Committees but it is equally clear that under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act as also under the U. P. High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971, the DIOS has to deal with the committee of managementof a recognised educational institution in respect of various affairs of the institution, i. e. , granting of approval as contemplated by sub-section (3) of Section 16-C of the Act and dealing with the management of such an institution under Section 5 of the U. P. High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971. Not only this, the DIOS has to perform various administrative functions of statutory character in collaboration with the management of High School and Intermediate Colleges. These duties cannot be discharged by the DIOS unless he is in a position to find out on an administrative level as to who are the real office bearers of the Committee. For this limited purpose, the DIOS must, of necessity, satisfy himself as to who, according to him, are validly elected office bearers of the institution. Mere raising of a dispute about the election of the members of the Managing Committee and its office bearers would not absolve the DIOS from its duty to find out on an administrative level as to who are the real office bearers of the College in order to perform his statutory functions under the aforesaid two Acts. Mere raising of a dispute about the election of the members of the Managing Committee and its office bearers would not absolve the DIOS from its duty to find out on an administrative level as to who are the real office bearers of the College in order to perform his statutory functions under the aforesaid two Acts. Viewed from the angle of administration, the DIOS is duty bound to take a decision to recognise the Committee of Management and to attest the signature of the Manager who has been elected, after satisfying himself as to who according to him are validly elected office bearers of the institution. An administrative enquiry may always be necessary whenever some sort of dispute or doubt is raised about the election of the new Committee of Management and its office bearers. This aspect of the matter came to be considered in an earlier decision in the case of Committee of Management SAV Inter College v. District Inspector of Schools Civil Misc. Writ No. 12725 of 1975, decided on 24-11-1997, by a Division Bench of this Court. The said decision again came to be considered by another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Committee of Management v. District Inspector of Schools, Meerut, 1978 All WC 124 : (AIR 1978 (NOC) 90) in which the earlier view was reiterated. To the same effect is another decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in (1993) 2 UPLBEC 934; Committee of Management, Vaidik Higher Secondary School Faizpur, Ninana v. DIOS Meerut. ( 11 ) IN Gauri Shankar Rai v. Dr. Ram Lakhan Pandey, DIOS Ballia, (1984) UPLBEC 166, it was observed that the DIOS recognises a new committee of management for day to day work of the department, such as payment of salary to the teachers and staff of the college. In discharging this administrative function, it cannot be said that the DIOS decides any dispute relating to election of rival committee of management. There can, therefore, be no escape from the conclusion that the DIOS stands vested with sufficient jurisdiction for the limited purpose, as indicated above, to satisfy himself as to who accordingly to him is validly continuing as manager or representative of the committee of management. There can, therefore, be no escape from the conclusion that the DIOS stands vested with sufficient jurisdiction for the limited purpose, as indicated above, to satisfy himself as to who accordingly to him is validly continuing as manager or representative of the committee of management. If any party feels dissatisfied with such administrative decision, he is always at liberty to file a suit for adjudication of his rights either as an office bearer of the committee of management or member of such committee. Simply because a dispute has come to be raised in regard to the validity or a particular election, DIOS cannot shirk in his duty to recognise a particular committee and to attest the signatures of its manager. He would not be justified in waiting for the dispute to be resolved by the civil Court or wash his hands off by making reference u/s. 16-A (7) of the Act. If the apathy or inaction on the part of the DIOS in discharging his administrative function is upheld it is likely to lead to disastrous results. ( 12 ) IT is well embedded and established proposition of law that the DIOS has to perform certain administrative functions even though there is no statutory sanction for the performance of such administrative duty. The Deputy Director of Education is undoubtedly a superior and senior officer to whom the DIOS is subordinate. Sri S. U. Khan, learned counsel for the respondents urged that in the case of Shandar Hussain v. Dy. Director of Education XII Region Moradabad, 1995 All CJ 1241, it has been held that Deputy/joint Director, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction has the power to scrutinise the order passed by the subordinate officers and to correct and rectify the wrong orders. It was urged that a superior officer cannot shut his eyes to the mistakes committed by his subordinates and the propriety demands that the senior officer should step in to correct the mistakes. It was urged that a superior officer cannot shut his eyes to the mistakes committed by his subordinates and the propriety demands that the senior officer should step in to correct the mistakes. Sri V. K. Shukla learned counsel for the petitioners, urged that Shandar Hussains case (1995 All CJ 1241) (supra) is not a good law in view of the later decisionof this Court reported in (1995) 2 UPLBEC 704 : ( AIR 1995 All 434 ); Committee of Management, Lakhori Inter College, Moradabad v. DDE 12th Region Moradabad which is based on the Full Bench decision of this Court in 1980 UPLBEC 6 : ( AIR 1980 All 66 ); Magan Ram Yadav v. DDE. I have thoroughly studied both these above rulings and find that they do not eclipse Shandar Hussains case (1995 All CJ 1241) (supra) In Lakhori Inter College case ( AIR 1995 All 434 ) (supra), there was some serious dispute about the correctness and legality of inclusion and exclusion of 122 persons as life members of the general body of the society. It was held that in the absence of any specific provision in the Act or Regulations it was absolutely clear that the DIOS had exceeded his jurisdiction in entering into the complex question about the validity of the election and also validity of 122 persons as life members of the Society. It was also observed that the Deputy Director of Education does not sit in appeal over the judgment of the DIOS to have approved election and attested the signatures of the Manager. The direction of the Deputy Director in that case appointing the Authorised Controller was found to be patently unwarranted and without jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on Magan Ram Yadavs case ( AIR 1980 All 66 ) (supra) for the limited purpose that the Education Code is nothing but a mere executive instruction and could not be given status of statutory rule. It is true that the provision in the Education Code do not supersede the Statute and Regulations as the provisions therein are mere compilations of the administrative orders and instructions of the Department. There can, therefore, be no quarrel about the proposition of law laid down in the decision of Lakhori Inter College ( AIR 1995 All 434 ) (supra ). There can, therefore, be no quarrel about the proposition of law laid down in the decision of Lakhori Inter College ( AIR 1995 All 434 ) (supra ). As a matter of fact, Shandar Hussains case (1995 All CJ 1241) (supra) is clearly in keeping with a number of decisions of this Court, discussed above in which it has been held that the DIOS exercises certain powers at the administrative level. In Shandars case (1995 All CJ 1241) (supra), it was held that the administrative power exercised by the DIOS is subject to correction and scrutiny by the higher authorities on the administrative side. Shandars case (1995 All CJ 1241) (supra) came to be referred and discussed before a Division Bench of this Court in (1998) 1 UPLBEC 429 ; Committee of Management, Tagore Ucchattar Madhyamik Vidhyalaya Dilawarganj Farrukhabad v. DIOS Farrukhabad. Though Shandars case (1995 All CJ 1241) (supra) was distinguished and found to be inapplicable to the facts of the case before the Division Bench, it was impliedly approved. In carrying on the general administrative functions of the State, executive functions are performed by hierarchy of officers who are supposed to act according to rule of law. A superior officer has the implied and implicit administrative power to perform the functions which its subordinate can discharge. If a subordinate officer has omitted to perform his administrative duty or administrative function the superior officer would certainly step in to pass appropriate correct order on administrative side. If the illegal and incorrect administrative orders of the subordinates are allowed to exist and continue, the very purpose of creating the hierarchy in the civil services would be frustrated. I am, therefore, also of the view that the Deputy/joint Director of Education has the power and authority to scrutinise and correct the order passed by the DIOS on administrative side. The decision in Shandars case still survives and it cannot be ignored particularly when it is based on perfect rationale of administrative expediency and exigency. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Deputy Director of Education-respondent No. 1 was not legally entitled for want of jurisdiction to review or revise the order passed by the DIOS is not tenable. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Deputy Director of Education-respondent No. 1 was not legally entitled for want of jurisdiction to review or revise the order passed by the DIOS is not tenable. In the absence of any provision for appeal or review, the Deputy/joint Director of Education concerned has supervisory power to correct and rectify the mistakes committed by the DIOS in his administrative orders. ( 13 ) A faint suggestion was also made that the respondent no. 1 - Deputy Director of Education did not afford an opportunity to the petitioners before passing the impugned order. In matters where observance of principles of natural justice would have made no difference and the admitted and undisputable or irrefutable facts speaking for themselves lead to a situation where only one conclusion is possible under the law, the issuance of a writ to compel observance of principles of natural justice is not at all called for. In every case and situation, personal hearing is not necessary. In the circumstances of the present case, it was not necessary for the Joint Director to have given an opportunity of hearing to the petitionersbefore passing the administrative order by which the administrative order passed by the DIOS was substituted. ( 14 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, the present petition has no merits and is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.