JUDGMENT S.C. Pandey, J. 1. This appeal, under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is directed against the judgment and decree dated 27.3.1989, passed in Civil Appeal No. 172-A/83, by IInd Additional District Judge, Raigarh, arising out of Civil Suit No. 55-A/83, decided by 1st Civil Judge Class-II, Raigarh on 10.12.1983. 2. Shortly stated the facts of this case are as follows. The respondents filed Civil Suit No. 55-A/83 against the appellant Shakarlal under Section 12 (1) (f) of the MP. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (henceforth 'the Act'). The respondents also claimed arrears of rent between July, 1982 to February, 1983 amounting to Rs. 616/- (Rupees Six Hundred Sixteen). This Court is not required to consider any other ground of eviction, except Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act' and confines itself to the allegations regarding it in the plaint. It was claimed in the plaint that the respondent No. 2, who was one of the co-owners of the suit shop required it for his business and for this purpose, he had no other alternative accommodation of his own. It was claimed that the respondents requested his tenant, the appellant in the month of September, 1972 to vacate the suit shop, but the appellant promised to vacate it after his shop, which situate in Ward No. 14 of Raigarh known as Banjari Stores, was vacated by his tenant. It was claimed that despite the vacation of Banjari Stores, the appellant did not vacate and demanded Pagaree for vacating the suit shop. 3. The appellant, in his written statement, denied that the suit shop was required by the respondent No. 2 for his business and claimed that he is not liable to be evicted. 4. The trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that neither the respondents had pleaded nor proved what was the requirement of the respondent No. 2. He had not stated in his plaint whether he wanted to open a new business or wanted to continue his old business which had expanded in the meanwhile so that his requirement had increased. In absence of such pleadings, it was held that the requirement of the respondent No. 2 was not real or true. The trial Court also held that in evidence also the respondent No. 2 did not state his felt need. In absence of such pleadings, it was held that the requirement of the respondent No. 2 was not real or true. The trial Court also held that in evidence also the respondent No. 2 did not state his felt need. It was held that there was a mere desire on the part of the respondents to get the suit shop vacated and it is clear from the evidence that respondent No. 2 had not even decided what he shall do after getting the suit shop vacated. It was also said that there was an alternative accommodation. It was held that the corridor, which was about eight feet in length and which was being used for coming in and out, could be used by the respondent No. 2 for his business. In doing so, the learned trial Judge relied on the decision of Mainabai Vs. Keshavlal, reported in 1972 MPLJ 250 . 5. The lower appellate Court has reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court, holding in paragraph 17 that it was not necessary for the appellant to show what business the respondent No. 2 was likely to do so. Further, the Court below has also reversed the finding of the trial Court that the requirement is not bona fide. 6. This appeal was admitted by this Court by order dated 22.6.1989 on the following substantial question of law - Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case the landlords have proved their case within the meaning of the provisions of section 12 (1) (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act for starting new business by proving and establishing the nature of the business? 7. Under Section 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act', a plaintiff is required to plead that- (i) the accommodation was let out for non-residential purposes; (ii) it is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing his business; or (iii) for starting his business; (iv) that he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in the city of his occupation. These are some of the ingredients of Section 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act' which are relevant for determination of this case. These are some of the ingredients of Section 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act' which are relevant for determination of this case. When a landlord files a suit under Section 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act', he must specify that for what purpose he needs the non-residential accommodation because the statute itself says that he may get the suit shop vacated either for continuing his business or starting new business. In such situation, the landlord is required to plead the material facts for showing how the suit shop is required for continuing his business. This can only be done by briefly stating that his business has expanded. The second ground, on which a person can get a suit house vacated for starting his business. Since there are two catagories for vacating the suit house, it would be reasonable to hold that it is incumbent upon the landlord to state under what category he wants to bring his suit. Thirdly, continuing or starting the business of the plaintiff may have a rational relation to the other non-residential accommodation if he has one. He is also required to show that if he is in possession of any other acommodation. If so, it is not reasonably suitable for continuing his business or starting a new business as the case may be. Therefore, it is essential that the landlord must briefly state what business he wants to start. In the plaint, there is no specific allegation whether the suit premises were required for starting a new business or for continuing his business. The words used in paragraph 4 at page 2 of the plaint are as follows - From these pleadings, it is clear that the appellant wanted to open a shop because it is implicit in the pleadings of paragraph 4 that the requirement is for shop because the appellant has said that he had no alternative shop in the city of Raigarh. However, there is no allegation in the plaint that what kind of business for which the suit shop was required. However, there is no allegation in the plaint that what kind of business for which the suit shop was required. It is clear from the evidence on record that the appellant himself was not very sure for what purpose he required the suit shop because he stated in his evidence in paragraph 5 of his deposition that he wanted to open his shop and he had no shop in his possession, therefore, he wanted the suit shop to be vacated by the appellant. The witness stated that he had not decided what business he shall do. He stated that after he shall get the suit shop vacated, only then, he will start the business of a General Store or a shop of medicines. Even in this statement, it is not very clear what kind of Medicine shop or kind of General Store he wanted to open. Whether this shop would be of the type which admittedly was being carried on by the respondents themselves in another shop or he wanted to open a new medical store. Since the respondent No. 2 Niranjan, who was to start his business, was not himself very sure about the business that he was to do, the evidence of Hariram, PW/2 would be of no consequence to the effect that he wanted to open a general store. Under these circumstances, the trial Court relying on the statement of the appellant specifically came to the conclusion that the requirement of the appellant did not appear to be bona fide. As already pointed out, it had also held that there was an alternative accommodation. The lower appellate Court has held in paragraph 17 that it is not necessary to plead the kind of requirement the appellant wanted for the vacation of the suit shop. For this purpose, the learned Judge has relied on the decision in the case of Omprakash Vs. Kanhaiyalal and another, reported in 1973 MPLJ 474 . That case is an authority for the proposition that in case the requirement was not pleaded in accordance with Section 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act' and the application for better particulars too was dismissed by the Court, even then, a decree could be passed provided the Court came to the conclusion that the tenant was not prejudiced as he had fully cross-examined the landlord on the relevant aspect of the matter. This authority does not say that it is not necessary to plead the requirement as stated earlier. It is said that it is not a statutory requirement. However, the Court, in that case, has not considered the effect of Section 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act'. All it says is that the Statute does not call upon the landlord to state what business he would carry on. 8. In the opinion of this Court, it is essential that the plaintiff must go to the Court stating clearly whether he wants to start his business or wants to continue his old business. These allegations must be there in the plaint, for the reason, the Statute itself distinguishes the two and mentions them specifically. Secondly, mentioning of the nature of the business would be necessary for judging the nature of the alternative accommodation, if any, in the possession of the landlord. Further more, these allegations are necessary for proving the felt need' within the meaning of decision of Full Bench of this Court in the case of Damodar Haridas Sharma and another Vs. Nandram Deviram, reported in 1960 MPLJ 925 . Therefore, the conclusion of the lower appellate Court is not accepted that it is not necessary to specify the nature of the business which the plaintiff is likely to pursue. The lower appellate Court has also reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court on the question of bona fide requirement. In the opinion of the learned Judge, the version of PW/2, Hariram was enough for getting the decree ignoring the version of Niranjan. Niranjan had stated that he shall decide the question only after the suit shop is vacated, even though, it was for his business the suit shop was being vacated. Now, it appears to this Court that here the lower appellate Court fell in to error in forgetting the question that the statutory requirement is that suit shop is required bona fide i.e. in good faith. The Full Bench in the case of Damodar Haridas Sharma and another, 1960 MPLJ 925 (supra) specifically says that the word 'requirement' is stronger than the word desire. The Court further stated that genuine requirement is a state of mind (At the relevant time the words under Section 4 (g) of the Accommodation Control Act, 1955 were genuinely requires, which is the same thing as bona fide requirement). The Court further stated that genuine requirement is a state of mind (At the relevant time the words under Section 4 (g) of the Accommodation Control Act, 1955 were genuinely requires, which is the same thing as bona fide requirement). The Court went on to say further that it is different from reasonable requirement which belonged to the knowledge of the law. In this particular case, the above discussion of the pleadings and the evidence shows that the respondents were not clear regarding their requirement on the date of filing of the suit. It is very difficult to agree with the lower appellate Court that, even if, the respondent No. 2 had not made-up his mind regarding the business which he wanted to open, his requirement could be said to be bona fide or genuine. He did not disclose to the Court the facts whereby the Court was in a position to determine objectively that his requirement was made in good faith. All that he says is that he desired the occupation of suit shop without proving that he required it in good faith. The lack of evidence on record did not give the power to add something which the respondent No. 2 himself did not say. Under such circumstances, the absence of pleadings played much important role than in other cases where the parties go to the trial in full knowledge of facts. Here the respondents may have wanted to suppress the nature of requirement from eyes of the appellant or perhaps, they themselves were not sure, whether the respondent No. 2 shall start any business. Under such circumstances, the lower appellate Court could not have held that the requirement is genuine and bona fide. Learned counsel for the respondents relied on the decision in the case of Murugesan and another Vs. Ramalingam Pillai (Dead) and others, reported in 1995 Supp (3) SCC 107. This decision is distinguishable because their Lordships of the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the High Court on the ground that the tenant was not prejudiced because the landlord did not specify in his plaint if the suit house was required for his son. It was argued before the Supreme Court by the appellant that the son had stated in the witness box that he required the suit shop for himself and he had no alternative accommodation of his own. It was argued before the Supreme Court by the appellant that the son had stated in the witness box that he required the suit shop for himself and he had no alternative accommodation of his own. The Supreme Court upset the judgment of the High Court on the ground that no prejudice was caused to the tenant. The other ground on which the Supreme Court allowed the appeal that this point was not taken before the Rent Controlling Authority or the lower appellate Court. The other decision, relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents, is the case of Patny and Company Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Dundoo Balakrishnamborthy and others, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 734 . In this particular case, the landlord did not plead that he had no non-residential building in the city or he was not in possession of such premises. In this case, landlord succeeded that despite the ruling of Hasmat Rai and another Vs. Raghunath Prasad, reported in (1981) 3 SCC 103 , wherein it has been laid down that it is necessary to make averment regarding the alternative accommodation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal mainly on the-ground that absence of specific plea had not caused any prejudice to the appellant. The version of the landlord, that he required the suit premises alongwith the adjacent premises for constructing a hotel, was accepted and the appeal was dismissed. However, the case of Hasmat Ral and another, (1981) 3 SCC 103 (supra) was held to be correctly decided. 9. Having considered the arguments and facts of this case, the opinion of this Court is that this appeal, filed by the tenant, should succeed on the ground that the respondents have neither pleaded nor proved their bona fide requirement for opening a shop for the respondent No. 2 in accordance with the requirement of Section 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act'. The pleadings and evidence on record are lacking in essential elements necessary to prove to get a suit shop vacated. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court has no option but to allow this appeal. No other point was raised before this Court. 10. Consequently, the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court are hereby set aside and that of the trial Court are restored. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.