Judgment This second appeal is at the instant of a defendant in a suit for declaration and permanent injunction and is directed against the judgment and decree dated February 19, 1992 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 3rd Court, Alipore in Title Appeal No. 30 of 1989 thereby affirming those dated September 21, 1988 passed by the Munsif 6th Court. Alipore in Title Suit No. 125 of 1979. 2. The plaintiff/respondent, a former employee of the defendant/appellant filed the aforesaid suit for declarations, that his date of birth is December 25, 1926 and not May 2, 1919 as alleged by the appellant, that the letter dated March 20, 1979 issued by the Personal Manager of the appellant was illegal, that his service will continue upto December 25, 1986 and for permanent injunction obtaining the appellant from giving effect to the order of dismissal by virtue of the letter dated March 29, 1979 till the respondent attains 60 years on December 25, 1986. 3. The aforesaid suit was contested by the appellant thereby contending inter alia that the suit was not maintainable and that the Company acted in accordance with the date of birth declared by the plaintiff himself in his employment proposal form. 4. The snit was initially decreed by the Trial Court. On an appeal by appellant the first appellate Court set aside the decree and remanded the matter to the Trial Court to proceed in terms of the guidelines given in the body of the judgment. This Court, on an appeal by the plaintiff modified the order of remand passed by the first appellate Court and ordered an open remand. 5. Thereafter further evidence was taken and the learned Trial Judge decreed the suit in part thereby declaring that the letter dated March 20, 1979 issued by the Personal Manager of the appellant was illegal and inoperative and that the date of birth of the respondent was December 25, 1926 and not May 2, 1919. However the prayers for further declaration that the appellant was not entitled to terminate the service of the respondent prior to attaining his age of 60 and for permanent injunction to that effect were turned down. 6. However the prayers for further declaration that the appellant was not entitled to terminate the service of the respondent prior to attaining his age of 60 and for permanent injunction to that effect were turned down. 6. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge the appellant preferred an appeal but the learned first appellate Court by the judgment and decree impugned in the instant second appeal has affirmed the decree passed by the learned Trial Judge. 7. It appears from the judgments of the Courts below that both the Courts concurrently found on the basis of materials on record including the documents issued on behalf of appellant that the date of birth of the respondent was December 25, 1926 and the date recorded of Ext.-F was wrong. The learned Courts below also drew adverse presumption, and in my opinion rightly, against the appellant for not disclosing the contents of Ext.-F. The learned Courts below took into consideration Ext.-18 and Ext.-19 issued on behalf of the appellant in 1948 and 1954 respectively which would show that the appellant itself certified the date of birth of the respondent to be December 25, 1926. The learned Court below took notice of the fact that the appellant failed to explain those exhibits and on the contrary withheld the other papers of the service file of the respondent. Such being the position it cannot be said that the finding recorded by the Courts below are either based on no evidence or on the basis of inadmissible evidence or perverse so as to bring the case within the narrow compass of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. Mr. Ghosh, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in (1) Burn Standard Co. Ltd. v. Dinabandhu Mazumdar and Another reported in AIR 1995 SC page 1499 in support of his contention that an employee should not be permitted to dispute the correctness of his date of birth at the far end of his service period. Ltd. v. Dinabandhu Mazumdar and Another reported in AIR 1995 SC page 1499 in support of his contention that an employee should not be permitted to dispute the correctness of his date of birth at the far end of his service period. In the aforesaid decision the Apex Court held that the extraordinary nature of the jurisdiction vested in the High Court's under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not meant to make employees of the Government or its instrumentalities to continue in service beyond the period of their entitlement according to the date or birth accepted by their employees, placing reliance upon the so called newly found materials. In the instant case the allegation of the respondent was that he never disclosed May 2, 1919 as his date of birth but maintained that he supplied December 25, 1926 as his date of birth and the same was accepted by the Company as will appear from Ext.-18 and Ext.-19 issued on behalf of the Company more than 35 years back and the Courts below have accepted the case of the respondent on consideration of the materials on record as indicated earlier. 9. Thus, the aforesaid decision cited by Mr. Ghosh is of no avail to his client. 10. Therefore, there is no illegality in the judgment and decreed passed by the Courts below justifying interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeal is thus dismissed with costs which is assessed at 100 Gms.