JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner in this writ petition was elected as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat 4 B.L.D. on 31.1.1995. Some of the elected Members of the Gram Panchayat resolved to bring a resolution against the petitioner expressing no confidence. On 8.6.1998 a notice was given to the Chief Executive Officer on behalf of the elected Members of the Gram Panchayat. Pursuant to the notice Annex. P/1. Annexure P. 4 notice was issued for convening the meeting of the Gram panchayat for considering the no-confidence motion against the petitioner on 8.7.1998. In the intervening period the Chief Executive Officer wrote to the Tehsildar, Srivijay Nagar for fixing the date of the meeting on 25.6.1998 but on being objected by the petitioner, the meeting was not convened as ordered and ultimately the meeting was convened on 8.7.1998. 2. The petitioner challenges the validity of the meeting convened pursuant to notice Annex. P.4. The petitioner has said that in terms of Section 37(3)(ii) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (referred to, hereinafter as 'the Act') the meeting for the consideration of the motion should have been convened within 30 days from the date on which the notice under sub-Section (1) of the Act was delivered to the competent authority. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the notice Annex. P. 1 was admittedly received by the Chief Executive Officer in terms of Section 37(1) of the Act on 8.6.1998 and the meeting was convened on 8.7.1998 which was beyond the period of 30 days and, therefore, the notice was vitiated. 3. He has placed reliance on a case decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Balasinor Nagrik Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya & Ors., (1987) 1 SCC 606 . In this case Section 36 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 was under consideration of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, wherein a resolution of the society was required to be approved or disapproved by the Registrar within a period of 3 months from the date of such submission and after the period provided in the proviso to Section 36(1) of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 it was held that the Registrar became functus official. On the strength of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, the learned counsel for the petitioner states that in terms of Section 37(3)(ii) of the Act the Chief Executive Officer became functus official after 30 days. The notice for consideration of the no-confidence motion was given to the competent authority on 8.6.1998 and, therefore, he could not have fixed the meeting on 8.7.1998 because it was beyond 30 days. 4. Another argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Chief Executive Officer has authorised the Tehsildar, Srivijay Nagar to preside over the meeting whereas under Section 37(4) it is provided that the competent authority shall preside over the meeting. It is only when the competent authority for, reasons to be recorded, nominates another authority, then such authority can exercise its power. In the instant case from a perusal of Annex. P. 5 it is clear that no reasons are available on record to say that the competent authority has recorded any reasons and, therefore, the meeting was presided over by an unauthorised person and, therefore, the meeting was vitiated. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further raised a ground that the notice of the meeting was required to be issued in Form II under Rule 21(2) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996. The notice issued is not in Form II and, therefore, the proceedings were vitiated. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that notice for the meeting as given was not accompanied by the proposed motion of no-confidence. Since, the notice for the meeting was not accompanied by the proposed motion, therefore, the notice is bad. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents has urged that the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners are misconceived. The provisions of Section 37(3)(ii) are not mandatory in character. They are only directory in nature. The similar provision of the earlier Panchayat Act came up for consideration before this Court in Amrit Lal v. The State of Rajasthan, 1970 RLW 164 . The provisions of Section 37(3)(ii) are not mandatory in character. They are only directory in nature. The similar provision of the earlier Panchayat Act came up for consideration before this Court in Amrit Lal v. The State of Rajasthan, 1970 RLW 164 . In this case, this Court has held that the period of 30 days provided for fixing of the meeting is directory and for holding this this Court has quoted the following observations made by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Montreal State Railway v. Normandin, AIR 1917 PC 142 : "When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience, or injustice to persons who have no control over those who are entrusted with the duty, and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only." 7. Learned counsel for the respondents has urged that the Supreme Court case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner will not govern the facts of this case because there the proposal of the society was for approval or disapproval of the Registrar and the Registrar has not acted within the stipulated period, therefore, the Registrar became functus official. In the instant case if the Chief Executive Officer in his wisdom has delayed the fixing up of the meeting, that too on the request of the petitioner. The democratic process cannot be permitted to be defeated because of a lapse in the ministerial act of calling the meeting for consideration of the no-confidence motion. Therefore, he has contended that the provisions of Section 37(3)(ii) of the Act should be held directory. The meeting was scheduled to be held on 25.6.1998 but for the objection raised by the petitioner the meeting was deferred to 8.7.1998. 8. As regards the objection of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the notice was not in Form II in terms of Rule 21, the provisions of Section 113 of the Act have been pressed into service by the learned counsel for the respondents, which reads as under: "113. 8. As regards the objection of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the notice was not in Form II in terms of Rule 21, the provisions of Section 113 of the Act have been pressed into service by the learned counsel for the respondents, which reads as under: "113. Validity of notice.-No notice issued under this Act shall be invalid on account of any defect or omission in its form." 9. In terms of Section 113 of the Act no notice on account of any defect or omission in its form shall be invalid. Therefore, if the notice was not issued in Form II then it cannot be said to be bad. Though it is not correct but even if the notice was not accompanied by a copy of the proposed motion then too it was only a defect in its form and under Section 113 the notice cannot be held to be invalid. As a matter of fact, a harmonious reading of Section 113 of the Act would make the notice valid. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent has further relied upon a decision of this Court in Hazara Ram v. Panchayat Samiti, Padampur & Ors., SB Civil Writ Petition No. 1785 of 1997 decided on 21.10.1997 regarding the objection that the notice Annex. P/4 was not being a 15 days clear notice. The argument has been repelled by the learned counsel for the respondents on the basis of Hazara Rain's case (supra) because it only requires dispatch of the notice and not service of the notice. 11. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 12. As regards the objection regarding the form of notice suffice it to say that Section 113 of the Act takes care of all the formal defects in the notice. Therefore,,the argument of the learned counsel in regard to the defect in the form of notice deserves to be rejected. This may however be noted that the respondents in their reply have categorically stated that the copy of the proposed motion of no-confidence was accompanied with the notice. Therefore, any objection of the petitioner in this regard has been refuted by the respondents and, therefore, becomes a disputed question of fact. 13. This may however be noted that the respondents in their reply have categorically stated that the copy of the proposed motion of no-confidence was accompanied with the notice. Therefore, any objection of the petitioner in this regard has been refuted by the respondents and, therefore, becomes a disputed question of fact. 13. The question regarding presiding over of the meeting without there being any proper recording of reasons by the competent authority before assigning it to another officer under sub-Section (4) of Section 37 of the Act also cannot be held to be detrimental to the meeting. The matter only relates to procedure. There is an express provision for providing delegation to another officer nominated by the competent authority. Recording of the reasons by the competent authority cannot be held to be imperative because in its form it does not speak of any imperativeness in its character. Further no prejudice has been shown by the petitioner in the meeting so held and, therefore, it cannot also be held that any miscarriage of justice has occurred. Therefore, this argument of the learned counsel is also rejected. 14. As regards the 15 days clear notice, the ratio laid down in Hazara Ram's case (supra) will take care of the argument of the learned counsel. The notice was required to be dispatched 15 days prior to the meeting. The notice was dispatched on 22.6.1998 and the meeting was scheduled for 8.7.1998. There is a clear fifteen days gap in these two dates. 15. The most important aspect of the argument of the learned counsel circles around the fixing of the date of 8.7.1998 for consideration of the no-confidence motion. No doubt, Section 37(3)(ii) of the Act provides that the meeting should be held not later than 30 days.Section 37(3)(ii) of the Act reads as under "(ii) convene a meeting for the consideration of the motion at the office of the concerned Panchayati Raj Institution on a date appointed by him which shall not be later than thirty days from the date on which the notice under sub-Section (1) was delivered to him; and" 16. By reading Section 37(3)(ii) of the Act it can be seen that the Legislature has used negative words in this section that the meeting for consideration of the motion should be called on a date appointed by the competent authority not later than thirty days from the date on which the notice under sub-Section (1) was delivered to him. Curiously the expression used "shall not be later than thirty days" is not followed by any suggestive consequences for not appointing a date beyond 30 days. 17. In Secretary of State v. I.M. Lall, AIR (32) 1945 Federal Court 47 and Amalgamated Electricity Co. Ltd. v. N.S. Bathena & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1598 the Apex Court has held the legislative enactment even with negative words as non mandatory because using of the negative words have not been. held alone to be a condition sufficient to hold the legislative enactment mandatory. 18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chet Ram Vashist v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 653 has observed as under : "Sub-sections (3) and (5) of Section 313 prescribe a period within which the Standing Committee is expected to deal with the application made under sub-Section (1). But neither sub-section declares that if the Standing Committee does not deal with the application within the prescribed period of sixty days it will be deemed that sanction has been accorded. The statute merely requires the Standing Committee to consider the application within sixty days. It stops short of indicating what will be the result if the Standing Committee fails to do so. If it intended that the failure of the Standing Committee to deal with the matter within the prescribed period should imply a deemed sanction it would have said so. They are two distinct things, the failure of the Standing Committee to deal with the application within sixty days and that the failure should give rise to a right in the applicant to claim that sanction has been accorded. The second does not necessarily follow from the first. A right created by legal fiction is ordinarily the product of express legislation. It seems to us that when sub-Section (3) declares that the Standing Committee shall within sixty days of receipt of the application deal with it, and when the proviso to sub-sec. The second does not necessarily follow from the first. A right created by legal fiction is ordinarily the product of express legislation. It seems to us that when sub-Section (3) declares that the Standing Committee shall within sixty days of receipt of the application deal with it, and when the proviso to sub-sec. (5) declares that the Standing Committee shall not in any case delay the passing of orders for more than sixty days the statute merely prescribes a standard of time within which it expects the Standing Committee to dispose of the matter. It is a standard which the statute considers to be reasonable. But non-compliance does not result in a deemed sanction to the lay-out plan." 19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhikraj Jaipuria v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 113 has observed that the Court may consider inter alia the nature and design of the statute and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other; the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided; the circumstances, namely that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions; the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty; the serious or trivial consequences, that flow therefrom; and above all, whether the object of the legislature will be defeated or furthered. 20. In Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1954 SC 210 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considering Section 82 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 observed that the section requires certain candidates to be joined as respondents to an election petition. Such provision has held to be directory before amendment of the Act by the Act 27 of 1956 as no consequence of non-joinder was till then provided by the Act. 21. When we read Section 37(3)(ii) of the Act we only find that the Legislature has only said that the meeting should be convened not later than 30 days from the date on which the notice under sub-Section (1) was delivered and no consequences whatsoever has been indicated. 22. Thus, it is seen that Section 37(3)(ii) of the Act does not provide for any consequence for not holding the meeting within 30 days. 22. Thus, it is seen that Section 37(3)(ii) of the Act does not provide for any consequence for not holding the meeting within 30 days. If the object of the enactment is seen then in such situation, the guidance can be had from what the Courts have been considering in such situations. 23. The Courts have consistently held that if the object of the enactment will be defeated by holding the same directory, it will be construed as mandatory, whereas if by holding it mandatory serious general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons without very much furthering the object of enactment, the same will be construed as directory. 24. Justice G.P. Singh in the Book on Principles of Statutory Interpretation (Fifth Edition) at page 244 has quoted Denman, J. as under : "a balance may be struck between the inconvenience of sometimes rigidly adhering to, and the convenience of sometimes departing from its terms. It was held in that case that where a Public Officer is directed by a statute to perform a duty within a specified time the cases established that provisions as to time are only directory.' 25. In the instant case, Section 37 of the Act provides for bringing up for motion of no confidante. Appointing of a date within 30 days can be best at construed to be a limit provided for fixing up of the date for consideration of the motion. But if there is no meeting held within the proximity of the time limit of 30 days then it cannot be said that the purpose for which the time limit was prescribed would be defeated. If the object of the Act in fixing the time limit is not defeated then it cannot be said that the time limit prescribed by Cl. (ii) of sub-Section (3) of Section 37 of the Act is mandatory. 26. Part of the section "on a day appointed"though is mandatory part, but "shall not be later than 30 days" can only be held to be directory. This is because any marginal violation in these 30 days will not violate any provisions of the Act or defeat the provisions of the Act. If for any ministerial lapse or administrative exigency the competent authority could not fix the meeting within the period of 30 days then a democratic process cannot be permitted to lapse. This is because any marginal violation in these 30 days will not violate any provisions of the Act or defeat the provisions of the Act. If for any ministerial lapse or administrative exigency the competent authority could not fix the meeting within the period of 30 days then a democratic process cannot be permitted to lapse. For such a reason, more particularly when in this case it was held on 31st day, it cannot by any stretch of imagination be said that such fixing up of the meeting has resulted into such dereliction of duty that the whole act can be held to be null and void. By not holding this would otherwise result into a serious general inconvenience and injustice to the persons who had no control over the person who was entrusted with the duty to fix up the meeting. 27. The elected representatives who have asked for bringing up a motion of no-confidence had no control whatsoever over the competent authority so as to fix up this date. This Court in Amrit Lal (supra) have quoted with approval the observations of the Privy Council in Montreal State Railway v. Normandin (supra). Therefore, I don't see any reason to depart from the view taken by this Court in Amrit Lal's case (supra). As regards the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner Balasinor Nagrik Co-operative Bank Ltd. (supra), it may be mentioned that in this case the rule was held mandatory because consequences were provided in the rule for non-consideration of the resolution by the Registrar. The resolution being not approved, the Registrar was held to befunctus officio. 28. Another aspect of the matter is that in a democratic process if an elected member/ representative losses the confidence of the voters then he should not be permitted to continue and in such matters a writ of mandamus or certiorari cannot be issued. This Court in Bhoorekhan v. The State of Rajasthan, 1975 RLW 591 ; Bhurekhan v. State of Rajasthan & 14 Ors., 1976 WLN 73 & Bhawani Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, 1977 RLW 158 , has taken this view. 29. In the instant case, the meeting for consideration of the no-confidence motion has already taken place and whatever is the result of such meeting that should govern the fate of the petitioner. 30. 29. In the instant case, the meeting for consideration of the no-confidence motion has already taken place and whatever is the result of such meeting that should govern the fate of the petitioner. 30. In the result, the writ petition has no force and the same is dismissed.Writ disallowed. *******