Honble CHAUHAN, J.–These writ petitions have been filed against the impugned awards passed by the Labour Court, wherein the Labour Court has found that the services of the petitioner- workmen had been terminated in violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as ``the Act) and the Labour Court granted the relief of compensation in lieu of reinStatement. Though various issues had been raised in the writ petitions, but learned counsel for the petitioners have limited their case, at the time of argu- ments, only to the extent that the Labour Court had no power to grant the relief of compensation in lieu of reinStatement, once it came to the conclusion that the retrenchment was not in consonance with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. The case of petitioner Mana Ram is to be treated as the leading case for the purpose of considering the factual matrix. (2). Shri Parihar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has placed reliance on the Division Bench of this court in Udaipur Mineral Development Syndicate Pvt. LtD. vs. M.P.Dave (1), where in it has been held that the legal effect of an invalid order of retrenchment is to continue the relationship of employer and employee between the parties and it is not permissible for the Labour Court to ter- minate that relationship on its own in breach of the mandate of Sec. 25-F of the Act. (3). In Gammon India Ltd. vs. Niranjan Das (2), the Apex Court has relied upon a large number of its earlier judgments and held that termination of the services, which is not in consonance with the provision of Section 25-F of the Act, would render the retrenchment itself void ab-initio and will be deemed tha t master and servant relationship continued through-out. Similar view has been taken by this Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Ram Kumar & Anr. (3); and Executive Engineer, Garhi & Anr. vs. Kalia & Anr. (4), wherein after placing reliance on a large number of judgments of the Honble Apex Court, the court came to the conclusion that any retrenchment, which is not in consonance with the provision of Section 25-F, ren- ders the order of retrenchment invalid and inoperative and such a termination would not bring a session of service. (4). (4), wherein after placing reliance on a large number of judgments of the Honble Apex Court, the court came to the conclusion that any retrenchment, which is not in consonance with the provision of Section 25-F, ren- ders the order of retrenchment invalid and inoperative and such a termination would not bring a session of service. (4). Therefore, there is no dispute regarding the proposition of law that in case the retrenchment is found to be invalid or in flagrant violation of the statutory provisions of Section 25-F of the Act, the termination would be void and its natural corollary would be that the workman would be deemed to be in service continuously as if the order of retrenchment had never been passed. (5) .The only issue, which requires consideration in these cases is whether in an appropriate case, the Labour Court has power to mould the relief and competent to grant relief other than the reinStatement ? In Sant Raj & Anr. vs. D.P. Singhla & Ors. (5), the Honble Apex Court placed reliance on its earlier judgments in Hindustan Steel Ltd., Rourkela vs. A.K. Roy (6), and Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. Employees of Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. (7), where in had been held that the Labour Court has, however, the discretion to award compensation instead of reinStatement if the circumstances of a particular case are unusual or exceptional so as to make the reinStatement inexpedient or improper. In Sant Raj, the Apex Court held that ordinarily relief of reinStatement should be granted consequent upon the finding that the termination of service of the employee was bad and illegal. However, in exceptional circumstances, compensation can be awarded in lieu of reinstatement. The ratio of the aforesaid cases is that normally, the relief of reinsta- tement should be granted unless the peculiar facts and circumstance of the case present special features warranting the grant of compensation in lieu of reinStatement. In Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs. A.K. Roy (supra), the Apex Court has held that an Industrial Tribunal may create new obligations or modify contracts in the interest of industrial peace and it has jurisdiction to make a proper and reasonable order in any industrial dispute. In Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs. A.K. Roy (supra), the Apex Court has held that an Industrial Tribunal may create new obligations or modify contracts in the interest of industrial peace and it has jurisdiction to make a proper and reasonable order in any industrial dispute. However, it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the Labour Court has to examine whether there are unusual or exceptional circumstances which warrant the deviation from the normal rule of reinstatement and whether it is not expedient to grant the relief of reinStatement. Therefore, the purpose of examining the whole issue by the Labour Court would be to determine what would be fair and would meet the ends of justice. (6). In Chandu Lal Versus the Management of M/S. Pan American World Airways (8), the Apex Court, instead of granting the relief of reinStatement, granted compensation. In Jitendra Singh Rathore vs.Vaidhyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. (9), the Apex Court has held that under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court had been enclothed with wide discretion in the matter of awarding relief according to the circumstances of the case. The Apex Court has observed as under:- ``Under Section 11-A of the Act, advisely wide discretion has vested in the tribunal in the matter of award of relief according to the circumstances of the case. But it is not a case of dismissed or discharge. In O.P. Bhandari vs. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors. (10), the Apex Court has that held that it was the obligation on the part of the Court to direct reinStatement when the termination, or the rule, regulation or statutory provision under which the termination order had been passed, was found to be void. The Apex Court observed that reinstatement would be the rule and compensation in lieu there of a rare exception. The Apex Court propounded the formula to award compensation equivalent to 3.33 years salary (including allowances as admissible) on the basis of the last pay and allowances drawn by he appellant therein, to be a reasonable amount to be awarded in lieu of reinstatement as the appellant there in had served for eight years. Similarly, in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. Similarly, in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. vs. Malu Amra (11) the Honble Apex Court considered the aspect of long lapse of time between the termination and the Labour Court award held that the grant of lump-sum compensation in lieu of reinStatement, was proper. Similar view has been taken in Rolston Johan vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Labour Court & Ors. (12), and the Apex Court granted compensation in lieu of reinStatement. (8). In Rajvanat Singh Rawat vs. the District Food and Supply Controller, Feroz- pur (13), and Gidbhaba Cooperative Marketing and Processing Society Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court & Anr. (14), the Punjab & Haryana High Court has awarded compensation in lieu of reinStatement in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of those cases. (9). In Raveendra Nath Kamot vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ernakulam (15), the Kerla High Court placed reliance on a large number of the judgments, particularly M.S Fransis Klain Company Ltd. vs. their Workmen (16); the Workmen of Sudder Office, Cinnawara vs. Manager of Sudder Office (17); Binny Ltd. vs. their Workmen (18); and Chambarn Cooperative Industrial EState vs. M.K. Chhatre (19), and held that relief of reinStatement need not be granted automatically in all the case. (10). The Labour Court must consider all the pros and cons and must mould the relief according to the facts and circumstances of the cases. Thus, in view of the above, there is no force in the submissions made by Mr.Parihar and Mr.Choudhray, learned counsel for the petitioners that the Labour Court cannot change the terms and conditions of the contract of service. (11). The issue of adequacy of the compensation etc. has not been raised by the learned counsel. Even otherwise, this Court has a very limited scope of interference in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution as per the law laid down in Mohammed Yunus vs. Mohammed Mustaqim & Ors. (20), wherein it has been held that even the errors of law cannot be corrected in exercise of revi- sional jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution sparingly when it comes to the conclusion that the Court below has exceeded its jurisdiction or proceeded under erroneous presumption of jurisdiction. The high Court cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decision. The high Court cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decision. For intervention, there must be a case of flagrant abuse of fundamental principle of law or justice or where order of the Court below has resulted in grave in justice (vide D.N.Banerji vs. P.R. Mukherjee (21); Nagendra Nath Bora vs. Commissioner Hills Division (22); Nibaran Chandra Bag vs. Mahendra Nath Ghughu (23); Rukamanand Bairoliya vs. the State of Bihar & Ors. (24); Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & Ors. (25); Laxmikant R. Bhojwani vs. Pratap Singh, Mohan Singh Pardeshi (26); Reliance Industries Ltd. vs. Pravinbhai Patel & Ors. (27); and M/S. Pepsi Food Ltd. & Anr. vs. S.J. Magistrate & Ors. (28). In Jitendra Singh Rathore (supra), the Court has observed as under :- ``The High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, does not enjoy such power though, as a superior Court, it is vested with the right of Superintendence. The High Court is undisputedly entitled to scrutinize the orders of subordinate Tribunals within the well accepted limitations. As the High Court is not entitled to exercise the powers of the Tribunal and substitute an award in place of one made by the Tribunal as in the case of an appeal where it lies to it . (12). In the instant case, the Labour Court had awarded the compensation in lieu of reinStatement after observing that (i) petitioner had worked only for 211 days if counted backward from the date of termination. However, counting the Sunday and other paid-holidays, the petitioner might have completed 240 days and it might have made him entitled for the relief under the Act; (ii) the petitioner did not initiate any proceeding whatsoever for a period of four years after termination of his services nor he has explained the reasons for such delay; and (iii) if workman himself was responsible to agitate the issue at a belated stage, he cannot claim the normal relief of reinStatement as a matter of right. The factors, i.e., special features of the case warranted the Labour Court to deviate from the normal rule of granting the relief of reinStatement and the Labour Court is fully justified to grant the relief of compensation. (13). In view of the above, I find no force in the petitions and the same are accordingly dismissed without issuing notice to the respondents.