Judgment : Since the issues involved in both the appeals are one and the same, the appeals may be disposed of by the following common judgment. 2. Defendants in O.S.No.531 of 1980 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Madurai are the appellants in A.S.No.258 of 1084. Plaintiff in O.S.No.489 of 1980 on the file of the same court is the appellant in Transfer Appeal No.837 of 1991. 3. The case of the plaintiff in O.S.No.489 of 1980 is briefly stated hereunder: According to the plaintiff, the suit properties originally belonged to one Koothan Servai, grand-father of the plaintiff, husband of the first defendant and father of the second defendant. The said Koothan Servai had only two daughters, namely, 2nd defen-dant-Koothayi Ammal and one Vellai Ammal. Koothan Servai had no male issues. He had given Koothan Ammal and Vallai Ammal in marriage long ago and had given them sufficient cash and customary presents and married them well. Even during Koothan Servai’s life time, the relationship between the family of the 2nd defendant, namely, her husband (3rd defendant), second defendant’s daughters, defendants 4 and 5 and 2nd defendant’s son 8th defendant was strained. Koothan Servai decided to settle the marriage of the second daughter of Koothayi Ammal to the sister’s son of Koothayi Ammal’s husband, namely, 3rd defendant. Fifth defendant wrote a letter to the said Koothan Servai on 211. 1978 protesting against the marriage of the second daughter of 3rd defendant and abusing Koothan Servai in most undignified and insulting words. 3rd defendant also sent a letter by registered post to Koothan Servai on 211. 1978 protesting against this marriage and threatening to file a civil suit against Koothan Servai. However, in spite of these protests, Koothan Servai celebrated the marriage of the 2nd daughter of Koothayi Ammal as already decided by him. Thus, the relationship of Koothan Servai with the family of Koothayi Ammal was very much strained. Consequently he decided to execute a will bequeathing all his properties only in favour of his grandson-plaintiff through his other daughter, namely, Vellai Ammal. 4. It is further contended that while Koothan Servai was in a sound and disposing state of mind, he voluntarily executed a will on 9. 1979, whereby the Schedule mentioned properties have been bequeathed in favour of the plaintiff. The Will has been duly registered. 4. It is further contended that while Koothan Servai was in a sound and disposing state of mind, he voluntarily executed a will on 9. 1979, whereby the Schedule mentioned properties have been bequeathed in favour of the plaintiff. The Will has been duly registered. Koothan Servai, though a diabetic patient was quite hale and healthy till the last moment of his death. He was running a private school under the name and style Swami Vivekananda, a Middle School at Silukkuvarpatti and he was the Manager and Correspondent of the school. Till his last days, he was personally attending to the day-to-day affairs of the Institution and personally attending to his properties. The plaintiff is in possession of the schedule mentioned properties as per the will through his father and guardian Kandan. The second defendant and her family members felt frustrated because Koothan Servai has not bequeath any property to Koothayi Ammal or her children bom to her. The first defendant also is residing with her elder daughter Koothayi Ammal, the 2nd defendant. The defendants are threatening to commit trespass into the suit properties. The plaintiff constrained to file the present suit for declaration that the plaintiff alone has got title to the suit properties and as a consequence thereof for a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants in any way interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. 5. Defendants 1 to 3 filed common written statement wherein they denied even the relationship of the parties narrated by the plaintiff It is contended that the said Koothan Servai had two brothers and all of them owned joint family properties, which they have divided in or about 1957. In the said partition Koothan Servai was allotted the properties described in Schedules A and B of the plaint in O.S.No.531 of 1980 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Madurai filed by the defendants 1 and 2 against the said Vellai Ammal, the plaintiff herein and another. The said joint family was running a Middle School at Silukkuvarpatti known as Swami Vivekanandaa Middle School and Koothan Servai had been acting as the Manager and Correspondent of the said school prior to partition and continued to act as Manager and Correspondent of the said school. The said joint family was running a Middle School at Silukkuvarpatti known as Swami Vivekanandaa Middle School and Koothan Servai had been acting as the Manager and Correspondent of the said school prior to partition and continued to act as Manager and Correspondent of the said school. The second defendant had passed 8th Standard and Higher Grade training and had been working in the abovesaid institution ever since she got herself trained as a Higher Grade Teacher from 1951. She was married to the 3rd defendant in July, 1952. Third defendant was then employed in the Postal Department of Coimbatore. Subsequently the third defendant got himself transferred to Dindigul. The plaintiff’s mother is also a Higher Grade trained teacher and was working as teacher in the Vivekanandaa Middle School, Silukkuvarpatti and residing in the family residential house with her father and mother, namely, Koothan Servai and the first defendant herein. The plaintiff’s mother was married to the plaintiff’s father in December, 1959. After the marriage with the plaintiff’s father, Vellai Ammal also joined her husband at Periyakulam and was residing at Periyakulam till 1962. in 1962 both of them came to Silukkuvarpati and were employed in the Vivekananda Middle School as teachers of which late Koothan Servai was the Manager and Correspondent. Subsequently the plaintiff’s father was appointed as Headmaster of the said institution from June, 1978 and he was working as Headmaster of the said institution till now. Koothan Servai was doing some other business also. It is further contended that the first defendant, wife of late Koothan Servai had throughout been attending to the physical comforts and needs of her husband late Koothan Servai and they were living very happily. On account of her husband’s avocation, the second defendant had been mostly living only outside Silukkuvarpatti, first at Coimbatore and subsequently at Dindigul. The second defendant has 3 daughters by name Kannaki, Manimegalai and Vasuki and a son by name Ambalavanan. Vellai Ammal has a daughter Mallika and a son, the plaintiff herein. On account of their employment in the Vivekananda Middle School at Silukkuvarpatti, Vellai Ammal and her husband with their children had been living with late Koothan Servai and his wife, the first defendant herein in the same house ever since they came down to Silukkuvarpatti leaving Periyakulam. Vellai Ammal has a daughter Mallika and a son, the plaintiff herein. On account of their employment in the Vivekananda Middle School at Silukkuvarpatti, Vellai Ammal and her husband with their children had been living with late Koothan Servai and his wife, the first defendant herein in the same house ever since they came down to Silukkuvarpatti leaving Periyakulam. Both of them had the advantage of moving with late Koothan Servai closely and to attend to his needs in view of their position in the house and began to think that they alone should succeed to the estate of late Koothan Servai. The first daughter of defendants 2 and 3 became qualified in M.Sc, B.Ed., by 1976. Though there were offers for the marriage, she was not willing for marriage until she got a job. The second daughter of defendants 2 and 3 is one Manimegalai and she is also a qualified M.Sc, (Botany). Late Koothan Servai spent for her education and was very much attached to her. The third defendant has a sister whose son T.P.Jeyapani is a Medical Graduate. Due to prior misunderstandings between the third defendant and his sister’s family they were not on talking terms. However, late Koothan Servai appears to have thought that the said Medical graduate would be a proper bridegroom for Manimegalai and even without reference to defendants 2 and 3 began to negotiate for the said marriage in October-November, 1978. The third defendant apprehended that there might be a scandal if he celebrated the marriage of the 2nd daughter when the first daughter remained unmarried. However, Koothan servai who was adamant, was arranging for the said marriage only in the interest of his grand-daughter who is also the daughter of defendants 2 and 3. The marriage of Manimegalai with Dr.Jeyapani was performed at Silukkuvarpatti itself to the satisfaction of all concerned. Thereafter there was a cordial relationship between defendants 2 and 3 and late Koothan Servai. 6. It is further contended that late Koothan Servai was a chronic patient of diabetes for more than 11 years and in the circumstances his health deteriorated considerably after the marriage of Manimegalai. He was not in a position to carry on the rice and flour mill business and the same was looked after only by the said employees under the supervision of the plaintiff’s parents. He was not in a position to carry on the rice and flour mill business and the same was looked after only by the said employees under the supervision of the plaintiff’s parents. Though late Koothan Servai can identify people and talk to them, he was not in a position to have any independent thinking or consideration in respect of matters relating to the family affairs also. Taking advantage of the absence of the defendants 2 and 3, the plaintiff’s parents had begun to poison the mind of late Koothan Servai against the 2nd defendant and her husband, the third defendant and her children and had made themselves indispensable for late Koothan Servai and had created an atmosphere in which late Koothan Servai had only to act what the parents of the plaintiff would dictate. Taking advantage of their position, they caused into Koothan Servai to sign the alleged will dated 9. 1979 prepared by them and brought to him and obtained his signature and took him to the Registrar office in a car where late Koothan Servai had been asked to admit the execution of the Will before the Sub-Registrar and have the Will registered in that manner. The attestors of the Will are also very much interested in favour of the plaintiff and his father. The Will itself had been got written only by the plaintiff’s parents and the signature of late Koothan Servai had been obtained in the said document without reading the said document or explaining the contents thereof. There is absolutely no reason for late Koothan Servai not to give any property to his devoted wife, the first defendant herein, who had been serving him throughout his life. The children of the 2nd defendant and the plaintiff and his sister are of the same lien in relationship with late Koothan Servai. The 2nd defendant has also a son Ambalavanan studying in the 8th standard and the 2nd defendant has also two daughters Kannaki and Vasuki to be married. There is no reason for late Koothan Servai to prefer the plaintiff and bequeath all his properties including his right in the lucrative rights in the rice and flour mill business and all his valuable lands to him without making any provision for defendants 1 and 2 and the 2nd defendant’s children. There is no reason for late Koothan Servai to prefer the plaintiff and bequeath all his properties including his right in the lucrative rights in the rice and flour mill business and all his valuable lands to him without making any provision for defendants 1 and 2 and the 2nd defendant’s children. The Will is not the result of any free exercise of mind by late Koothan Servai as he was not in a position to exercise a free mind on the date of the alleged will. The Will had been prepared and brought about only by the actual beneficiaries under the Will. The Will in the circumstances is void and unenforceable in law. The defendants are entitled to ignore the said will and claim their 2/3rd share in all the properties of late Koothan Servai which they have done in the suit filed by them in O.S.No.531 of 1980 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Madurai. With these averments, they prayed for dismissal of the suit. 7. As stated earlier, in O.S.No.531 of 1980 the plain- tiffs (defendants 1 and 2 in the other suit, namely, O.S.No.489 of 1980) prayed for a preliminary decree declaring that plaintiffs are entitled to 2/3rd share in the plaint schedule properties. Since the pleadings of both parties in O.S.No.489 of 1980 are similar to that in O.S.No.531 of 1980, 1 am not referring the same once again. By filing joint memo, common evidence was let in in O.S.No.489 of 1980. Hence the parties are referred to as per their rank in O.S.No.489 of 1980. In other words, the plaintiff in O.S.No.489 of 1980 is referred to as plaintiff and defendants in the said suit are referred as defendants in the common proceedings. The plaintiff has examined 6 witnesses as P.Ws.1 to 6 and marked Exs. A-1 to A-19 in support of his claim. On the side of the defendants, D.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.B-1 and B-2 were marked in support of their defence. Exs.C-1 and C-2 were marked as court documents. The plaintiff has examined 6 witnesses as P.Ws.1 to 6 and marked Exs. A-1 to A-19 in support of his claim. On the side of the defendants, D.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.B-1 and B-2 were marked in support of their defence. Exs.C-1 and C-2 were marked as court documents. In the light of the above pleadings, after forking necessary issues and in the light of the evidence let in by both sides, the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Madurai, after holding that the will Ex.A-3 has not been validly executed, dismissed the suit O.S.No.489 of 1980 and decreed the suit filed by the defendants 1 and 2, namely, O.S.No.531 of 1980. Aggrieved by the said decrees, the unsuccessful plaintiff in O.S.No.489 of 1980 and defendants in O.S.No.531 of 1980 filed the present appeals as stated above. 8.. I have heard Mr.T.R.Mani, learned senior counsel for the appellants in both the appeals and Mr.S.V.Jayaraman, learned senior counsel for the respondent. 9. After taking me through the pleadings and the entire evidence let in by both sides, Mr.T.R.Mani, learned senior counsel submitted that Koothan Servai has executed a will under Ex.A-3 in favour of his grandson, plaintiff in O.S.No.489 of 1980 and inasmuch as the plaintiff has proved the Will as valid by examining the two attestors and scribe, the court below ought to have decreed the suit filed by him. He also submitted that the plaintiff has proved the mental and health conditions of the testator and inasmuch as Ex.A-3 is a natural Will and proved in the manner known to law, it is also a registered one, the court below committed an error in rejecting the same as unacceptable. He further submitted that the widow of the testator, who was examined as D.W.4 on the side of the defendants has admitted the due execution of the Will, the said admission by one co-owner who is also interested in the share is binding on the other parties. He further submitted that the plea of undue influence was also not substantiated by the defendants. On the other hand, Mr.S.V.Jayaraman, learned senior counsel has pointed out the following circumstances as suspicious circumstances which are fatal to the plaintiff’s case: .(a) In Ex.A-3 no provision made for wife. .(b) No reason to exclude the other grandson. .(c) No reason to exclude the other branch, namely, the other daughter. On the other hand, Mr.S.V.Jayaraman, learned senior counsel has pointed out the following circumstances as suspicious circumstances which are fatal to the plaintiff’s case: .(a) In Ex.A-3 no provision made for wife. .(b) No reason to exclude the other grandson. .(c) No reason to exclude the other branch, namely, the other daughter. .(d) No reference to the existence of other grandson. .(e) By saying that both the daughters are well placed no animosity against any one, no reason to exclude the other heirs. .(f) P.W.1 father of the beneficiary was present from the beginning of the execution of the Will. .(g) P.W.1 played a major role in bringing about Ex.A-3. .(h) The health condition of the Testator did not allow him to execute such a Will. .(i) Both the attestors are employed by P.W.1 in his school; hence they are interested, (j) One of the attestors, namely, P.W.3 is related to P.W.1. .(k) P.W.4 scribe herein a professional document writer had written Ex.A-3 for the first time. .(l) The signature of the Testator in Exs.A-3 and A-15 differs on each page. In other words, there is a vast difference in the signature in Ex.A-3 and Ex.A-15. By pointing out the above aspects, he submitted that the court below has rightly rejected Ex.A-3 and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff and granted decree filed by the defendants. 10. I have carefully considered the rival submissions. 11. In the light of the above factual position and the contentions raised by both sides, I have to consider whether Ex.A-3 has been validly executed and whether the propounder of the Will has proved the same in accordance with law. Before considering the merits of the parties concerned, I shall refer general principles enunciated by the Apex Court in various decisions as well as decisions of this court cited by both the learned senior counsel. 12. Regarding execution of Will, it is observed in Motibai v. Jamset Jee, A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 28, thus: “....A man may act foolishly and even heartlessly; if he acts with full comprehension of what he is doing the court will not interfere with the exercise of his volition...” 13. In C.Silva Bai v. J.Noronha Bai, A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 12. Regarding execution of Will, it is observed in Motibai v. Jamset Jee, A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 28, thus: “....A man may act foolishly and even heartlessly; if he acts with full comprehension of what he is doing the court will not interfere with the exercise of his volition...” 13. In C.Silva Bai v. J.Noronha Bai, A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 566, a learned Judge of this Court has observed that a comparison of handwriting as a mode of proof is at all times hazardous and inconclusive, and specially when it is made by one not conversant with the subject and without such guidance as might be derived from the arguments of counsel and the evidence of experts. It is a dangerous method to find in favour of a will or against it be a mere comparison of the signatures of the testator with the other signatures of his, and especially so when the dissimilarity relied upon is not that of a general character but merely of particular letters. Where the variation is due to the fact that the signature of the deceased is found to be shaky but not uncharacteristic, this is a point in favour of the will being genuine. The superficial dissimilarities in particular letters would be due to the pens used, the space available, the position in which the signature was made, etc. The proper way to decide is to base the finding on the evidence of attestors and the scribe if they are available and if not on other cogent direct and circumstantial evidence which throw light upon the execution of the will. Therefore, when the opinion of the Judge is based upon the difference in particular letters and nothing more and in the case of a will in Canarese when he himself is not a Canarese knowing gentleman and little acquainted with Canarese signatures, the opinion is of little value. It is also held that the will is one of the most solemn documents known to the law. By it a dead man entrusts to the living the carrying out of his wishes, and as it is impossible that he can be called either to deny his signature or to explain the circumstances in which it was executed, it is essential that trustworthy and effective evidence should be given to establish compliance with the necessary forms of law. By it a dead man entrusts to the living the carrying out of his wishes, and as it is impossible that he can be called either to deny his signature or to explain the circumstances in which it was executed, it is essential that trustworthy and effective evidence should be given to establish compliance with the necessary forms of law. The burden of proving due execution is upon the person propounding the will, and he must satisfy the conscience of the court that the instrument so propounded is the last will of a free and capable testator. But it is always improper to presume a will to be a forgery primarily from a consideration of its contents. It is not permissible for the courts to do what courts are often invited to do on behalf of objectors, namely, to make up their minds about the iniquitous character of the contents of the will and then to look at the positive or direct evidence in favour of the execution of the will from that standpoint. It is also improper for a court to start making all kinds of speculation as to the circumstances and suspicions which make it impossible that the will could have been executed. It is bound to consider the evidence regarding the execution and attestation and if satisfied with that evidence it must pronounce in favour of that will. Finally there is no presumption either in fact or in law as seems to be commonly supposed that a will if propounded must be a forgery. The learned senior counsel submitted that Exs.A-1 and A-2 are not genuine transactions and in any event the suit is barred by limitation. 14. The other leading judgment on this point is the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in H.Venkatachala v. B.N.Thimmajamma, A.I.R. 1959 $ C. 443. In the said decision their Lordships have observed thus: “18. What is the true legal position in the matter of proof of wills? It is well known that the proof of wills presents a recurring topic for decision in Courts and there are a large number of judicial pronouncements on the subject. In the said decision their Lordships have observed thus: “18. What is the true legal position in the matter of proof of wills? It is well known that the proof of wills presents a recurring topic for decision in Courts and there are a large number of judicial pronouncements on the subject. The patty propounding a will or otherwise making a claim under a will is no doubt seeking to prove a document and, in deciding how it is to be proved, we must inevitably refer to the statutory provisions which govern the proof of documents. Secs.67 and 68, Evidence Act are relevant for this purpose. Under Sec.67, if a document is alleged to be signed by any person, the signature of the said person must be proved to be in his handwriting, and for proving such a handwriting under Secs.45 and 47 of the Act the opinions of experts and of persons acquainted with the handwriting of the person concerned are made relevant. Sec.68 deals with the proof of the execution of the document required by law to be attested; and it provides that such a document shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution. These provisions prescribe the requirements and the nature of proof which must be satisfied by the party who relies on a document in a Court of law. Similarly. Secs.59 and 63 of the Indian Succession Act are also relevant. Sec.59 provides that every person of sound mind, not being a minor, may dispose of his property by will and the three illustrations to this section indicate what is meant by the expression ‘‘a person of sound mind” in the context. Sec.63 requires that the testator shall sign or affix his mark to the will or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction and that the signature or mark shall be so made that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a will. This section also requires that the will shall be attested by two or more witnesses as prescribed. Thus the question as to whether the will set up by the propounder is proved to be the last will of the testator has to be decided in the light of these provisions. This section also requires that the will shall be attested by two or more witnesses as prescribed. Thus the question as to whether the will set up by the propounder is proved to be the last will of the testator has to be decided in the light of these provisions. Has the testator signed the will? Did he understand the nature and effect of the dispositions in the Will? Did he put his signature to the will knowing what it contained? Stated broadly it is the decision of these questions which determines the nature of the finding on the question of the proof of wills. It would prima facie be true to say that the will has to be proved like any other document except as to the special requirements of attestation prescribed by Sec.63 of the Indian Succession Act. As in the case of proof of other documents so in the case of proof of wills it would be idle to expect proof with mathematical certainty. The test to be applied would be the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. 19. However, there is one important feature which distinguishes wills from other documents. Unlike documents the will speaks from the death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a Court, the testator who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his will or not; and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the departed testator. Even so, in dealing with the proof of wills the court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of documents. The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in ? sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in ? sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. Ordinarily when the evidence adduced in support of the will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of the testator’s mind and his signature as required by law, courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of the propounder. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts just indicated. 20. There may, however, be causes in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The alleged signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder’s case that the signature in question is the signature of the testator may nor remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature; the condition of the testator’s mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated; and evidence adduced may not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will may appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or, the will may otherwise indicate that the said dispositions may not be the result of the testator’s free will and mind. In such cases the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. It is true that, if a caveat is filed alleging the exercise of undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the will propounded, such pleas may have to be proved by caveators; but, even without such pleas circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will in executing the will, and in such circumstances, it would be a part of the initial onus to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter. 21. Apart from the suspicious circumstances to which we have just referred in some cases the Wills propounded disclose another infirmity. Pro-pounders themselves take a prominent part in the execution of the Wills which confer on them substantial benefits, if it is shown that the propounder has taken a prominent part in the execution of the will and has received substantial benefit under it, that itself is generally treated as a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and the propounder is required to remove the said suspicion by clear and satisfactory evidence. It is in connection with wills that present such suspicious circumstances that decisions of English courts often mention the test of the satisfaction of judicial conscience. It may be that the reference to judicial conscience in this connection is a heritage from similar observations made by ecclesiastical courts in England when they exercised ju- risdiction with reference to wills; but any objection to the use of the word “conscience” in this context would, in our opinion, be purely technical and academic, if not pedandtic. The test merely emphasizes that, in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last will of the testator, the court is deciding a solemn question and it must be fully satisfied that it had been validly executed by the testator who is no longer alive. 22. It is obvious that for deciding material questions of fact which arise in applications for probate or in action on wills, no hard and fast or inflexible rules can be laid down for appreciation of the evidence. 22. It is obvious that for deciding material questions of fact which arise in applications for probate or in action on wills, no hard and fast or inflexible rules can be laid down for appreciation of the evidence. It may, however, be stated generally that a propounder of the will has to prove the due and valid execution of the will and that if there are any suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will the propounder must remove the said suspicions from the mind of the court by cogent and satisfactory evidence. It is hardly necessary to add that the result of the application of these two general and broad principles would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and on the nature and quality of the evidence adduced by the parties. It is quite true that, as observed by Lord Du Patcq in Harmes v. Hindkson. 50 C.W.N. 895: A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 156: (1945)2 M.L.J. 156: 227 I.C. 295: 1946 M.W.N. 520. “where a will is charged with suspicion, the rules enjoin a reasonable skepticism, not an obdurate persistence in disbelief. They do not demand from the judge, even in circumstances of grave suspicion, a resolute and impenetrable incredulity. He is never required to close his mind to the truth,” It would sound platitudinous to say so, but it is nevertheless true that in discovering truth even in such cases the judicial mind must always be open though vigilant, cautious and circumspect. “ 15. In Indu Bala v. Manindra Chandra, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 133: (19X2)1 S.C.C. 20: (1982) 1 S.C.J. 138: (1982)1 S.C.R. 188, it is held as follows: ”This Court has held that the mode of proving a will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a will by Sec.63 of the Succession Act. The onus of proving the will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstance surrounding the execution of the will, proof of testammtary capacity and the signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. Where however there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the court accepts the will as genuine. Where however there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the court accepts the will as genuine. Even where circumstances give rise to doubts, it is for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the court. The suspicious circumstances may be as to the genuineness of the signature of the testator, the condition of the testator’s mind, the dispositions made in the will being unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances, or there might be other indications in the will to show that the testator’s mind was not free. In such a case the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. If the propounder himself takes a prominent part in the execution of the will which confers a substantial benefit on him, that is also a circumstances to be taken into account, and the propounder is required to remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence. If the propounder succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstances the court would grant probate, even if the will might be unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part near relations. Needless to say that any and every circumstance is not ‘a suspicious’ circumstance. A circumstance would be ‘suspicious’ when it is not normal or is not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal person. Learned counsel relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Rani Purnima Devi v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Dev, (1962)2 M.L.J. (S.C.) 27: (1962)2 An.W.R. (S.C.) 27: (1962)2 S.C.J. 729: (1962)3 S.C.R. 195 : A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 567. In this case the will in question gave the entire property by the testator to a distant relation of his to the exclusion of the testator’s widow, sister and his other relations, and even his daughter, who would be his natural heirs, but subject of course, to the condition that the legatee would maintain the widow and the sister of the testator. The testator’s signatures were not his usual signatures, nor in the same ink as the rest of the will; the testator used to sign blank papers for use in his case in court and he used to send them to his lawyer through his servants; the testator did not appear before the Sub-Registrar for the purpose of registration of the will but the Sub-Registrar sent only his clerk to the residence of the testator for the purpose of registration; there were 16 attesting witnesses who attested the will, but of them, only 4 interested witnesses were examined to the exclusion of dis-interested witnesses. The above are undoubtedly suspicious circumstances, circumstances creating doubt in the mind of the court. In spite of these circumstances, it was held by the trial court that the will was duly executed and attested. On appeal, the High Court affirmed the order of the trial court. On further appeal, the court held that the circumstances were suspicious and were not satisfactorily explained and hence held that “the due execution and attestation of the will were not proved.” 16. In Rajesh v. Raja, (1994)1 M.L.J. 216 , the Division Bench of this Court has held in the following manner: “In this connection it is necessary to refer to Sec.63(c) of the Succession Act which runs as under: The Will shall be attested by two or more witness, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the will or has seen some other person sign the will in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgement of his signature or mark, or of the signature of such other person, and each of the witnesses shall sign the will in the presence of the testator, but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary.” Sec.68 of the Evidence Act, 1872 provides that if a document is required by law to be attested it shall not be used as evidence until one of the attesting witnesses at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. This section lays down the mode of proof of a Will by calling at least one witness, but it does not set out or purport to define what is required to be proved. That however has been laid down in Sec.63(c) of the Succession Act. Even if one witness, who is called, is able to depose to all that is required by Sec.63(c) of the Succession Act, for the valid execution of a Will, that would suffice for Sec.68 of the Evidence Act. Sec.68 of the Evidence Act does not in any manner change or alter the requirements to be proved by Sec.63(c) of the Succession Act. A reading of Sec.63(c) of the Succession Act with Sec.68 of the Evidence Act, establishes that a person propounding a Will has to prove that the Will was duly and validly executed and that should be done by not merely establishing that the signature on the Will was that of the testator, but also that the attestations were made in the manner contemplated by clause (c) of Sec.63 of the Succession Act. It is not necessary under Sec.68 of the Evidence Act, to examine both or all the attesting witnesses....." It is also held that, "...It is true that registration would go a long way to dispel the doubt as to the genuineness of the will. But where the execution is proved by cogent and acceptable evidence, the court should not disbelieve the will merely because it is not registered...." It is further held that, "....Once a will is proved to be true and it was executed by testator, it is not for the court to embark upon an enquiry whether the dispositions made therein are fair and just." 17. In the light of well established principles as seen above, now I shall consider the case of both parties with the available oral and documentary evidence. 18. I have already narrated the pleadings of both sides. hence there is no need to repeat the same. For the convenience, I am referring plaintiff in O.S.No.489 of 1980 as plaintiff and defendants therein as defendants as described by the court below. The important document for re-consideration is Ex.A-3 dated 9. 1979 wherein the testator late V.K.Koothan Servai had bequeathed his entire properties in favour of the plaintiff who is a grandson through his second daughter. For the convenience, I am referring plaintiff in O.S.No.489 of 1980 as plaintiff and defendants therein as defendants as described by the court below. The important document for re-consideration is Ex.A-3 dated 9. 1979 wherein the testator late V.K.Koothan Servai had bequeathed his entire properties in favour of the plaintiff who is a grandson through his second daughter. The recital in the said document reads thus: It is seen from the said document that the testator was aged about 70 years and he was hale and healthy. Since he had performed marriage of his two daughters as per the rites of his caste and religion and presented ail "seer" (Seervarisai) including jewels etc., and in the absence of any male heir, he bequeathed his entire properties in favour of his grand-son born through his second daughter. No doubt, he has not marie any arrangement for his wife, nor the first daughter and her children. Here it is pointed out that the plaintiff and his parents alone were living with the said Koothan Servai from 1964 and were helping him throughout. On the other hand, Koothayi Ammal, first daughter of Koothan Servai was living only with her husband at Dindigul, hence nothing is unnatural for Koothan Servai in choosing second daughter’s son as his legatee. Hence it is contended that Ex.A-3 is a natural Will. In this regard, it is relevant to point out the oral evidence of the plaintiff’s father by name K.Kandan, who was examined as P.W. 1. [After setting out the evidence of P.W.1 His Lordship proceeded - Ed.] One more factual position to be noted in this case is Koothan Servai was very much interested in having the marriage of Manimekalai, second daughter of Koothayi Ammal with one Dr.Jeyapal, son of Kuzhandai Ammal and Ponnusamy. This was objected to by Rathinasamy, third defendant and husband of Koothayi Ammal and Kannagi, fourth defendant, who is the 1st daughter of Koothayi Ammal. The said Rathinasamy, son-in-law of koothan Servai, has written a letter under Ex.A-1, dated 211. 1978 condemning the proposed action of Koothan Servai in arranging marriage for Manimegalai, his second daughter with Dr.Jeyapal, son of Ponnusamy before the marriage of Kannagi (fourth defendant). Likewise, Vasuki (5th defendant), third daughter of the said Rathinasamy has also sent a similar letter under Ex. A-2 dated 211. 1978 threatening Koothan servai for arranging marriage of Manimegalai with Dr.Jayapal. 1978 condemning the proposed action of Koothan Servai in arranging marriage for Manimegalai, his second daughter with Dr.Jeyapal, son of Ponnusamy before the marriage of Kannagi (fourth defendant). Likewise, Vasuki (5th defendant), third daughter of the said Rathinasamy has also sent a similar letter under Ex. A-2 dated 211. 1978 threatening Koothan servai for arranging marriage of Manimegalai with Dr.Jayapal. A reading of Exs.A-1 and A-2 shows the strained relationship between the family of Koothayi Ammal and Koothan servai. [After referring to the relevant evidence His Lordship proceeded - Ed.] The above factual position as seen from the evidence of P.Ws.1, 3 and D.Ws.3 and 4 would go to show that in view of the action of Koothan servai in arranging the marriage of Manirnekalai with Dr. Jayapal without taking steps for the marriage of the first daughter of Koothayi Ammal, there was a strained relationship between the members of Koothayi Ammal and Koothan Servai. Further, admittedly the first daughter of Koothan Servai, namely Koothaayi Animal was living with her husband at Dindigul. Only the second daughter of Koothan servai and her husband were living with the said Koothan Servai till his death and they alone were assisting Koothan servai. xxx xxx xxx xxx In view of the above circumstances, 1 am in agreement with the argument of the learned senior counsel for the appellants that there was strained relationship between the members of Koothayi Ammal and koothan Servai. because of the service rendered by the second daughter and her family members and of the fact that Koothan Servai had no male descendant, he rightly executed Ex.A-3 bequeathing his entire property in favour of the plaintiff, namely, Shanmughasundaram. Hence the will executed under Ex.A-3 is a natural one. 19. Now let me consider whether the will has been proved in the manner known to law. I have already extracted the salient features with regard to the proof of a will from various decisions. [After setting out the evidence in this regard His Lordship proceeded - Ed] The abovesaid two attesting witnesses clearly explained the execution of the will by the testator and their part in attesting the said document. Even though it is admitted that several important persons are available in Silukkuvarpatti village, I do not find anything wrong in asking P.Ws.2 and 3 to attest the will. Even though it is admitted that several important persons are available in Silukkuvarpatti village, I do not find anything wrong in asking P.Ws.2 and 3 to attest the will. As stated earlier, P.W.2 is employed even from 1945 and he was very close to Koothan Servai. As also stated earlier, the other attesting witness, namely, P.W.3 is related to all the parties concerned. After carefully considering their evidence, in the light of other factual position, I am unable to accept the objection raised by the learned senior counsel for the respondents. xxx xxx xxx xxx The evidence of P. W.4 supports the case of the plaintiff with regard to due execution of Ex.A-3. In the light of the above factual position, I hold that the will has been proved in the manner known to law by examining the two attestors as P.Ws.2 and 3 as well as the scribe as P.W.4. Even though the will need not be registered, the fact remains that the said document was registered particularly on the same day when it was executed. Both P.W.2 and P.W.3 identified the executant before the Sub-Registrar. All the above aspects support the due and proper execution of Ex.A-3. 20. During the course of argument it was also brought to my notice that the signature of testator is admitted by the defendants. In para 14 of the plaint in O.S.No.531 of 1980 they specifically pleaded that, “Taking advantage of that position, they had caused Koothan Servai to sign a Will dated 9. 1979 prepared by them and brought to him and had obtained the signature took him to the Sub-Registrar’s Office at Nilakottai in car, where late Koothan Servai had been asked to admit the execution of the will before the Sub-Registrar and had also registered the same.” Likewise in the other suit, namely, O.S.No.489 of 1980 in para 11 the defendants in that suit had pleaded the very same averments with regard to execution and signature of Koothan Servai. In such circumstances inasmuch as the signature of the testator in Ex.A-3 is admitted as seen from the above pleadings, the evidence of attesting witnesses, viz., P.W.2 and P.W.3 are conclusive and of the fact that the scribe P.W.3 corroborated the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 4, the will being registered on the same day, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has proved the will in the manner known to law. 21. Even though the defendants have pleaded undue influence and ill-health, a perusal of the pleadings as well as the evidence would clearly go to show that they failed to substantiate the plea of undue influence. As a matter of fact, no witness had spoken to about undue influence as contended. It is settled law that in order to prove undue influence there must be a specific pleading followed by acceptable evidence. In this regard, It is relevant to note the law laid down in Mt.Gomtibai v. Kanchhedilal, (1949)2 M.L.J. 469 , in which the Privy Council has held as follows: "Undue influence in order to invalidate a will, must amount to coercion or fraud. Its existence must be established as a fact and it must also appear that it was actually exercised on the testator. Where once it has been proved that a will has been executed with due solemnities by a person of competent understanding and apparently a free agent the burden of proving that it was executed under undue influence is on the party who alleges it." 22. In Naresh Charan v. Paresh Char an, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 363: (1955)1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 183:1955 S.C.J. 293: (1955)1 S.C.R.1015 , it is also held as follows: "When once it has been proved that a will has been executed with due solemnities by a person of competent understanding and apparently a free agent, the burden of proving that it was executed under undue influence is on the party who alleges it." (1967)2 S.C.J. 159: (1967)1 S.C.R. 381. 23. In Subbas Chandra v. Ganga Prosad, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 878, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held thus: "Before, however, a court is called upon to examine whether undue influence was exercised or not, it must scrutinise the pleadings to find out that such a case has been made out and that full particulars of undue influence have been given as in the case of fraud. See O.6, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This aspect of the pleading was also given great stress in the case of Ladli Prasad Jaiswal v Karnal Distillery Company Ltd., A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1279: (1964)1 S.C.R. 270 . (1964)2 S.C.J. 12, above referred to. See O.6, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This aspect of the pleading was also given great stress in the case of Ladli Prasad Jaiswal v Karnal Distillery Company Ltd., A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1279: (1964)1 S.C.R. 270 . (1964)2 S.C.J. 12, above referred to. In that case, it was observed: "A vague or general plea can never serve this purpose, the party pleading must therefore be required to plead the precise nature of the influence exercised, the manner of use of the influence, and the unfair advantage obtained by the other." 24. In Surendra Pal v. Saraswati, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1999: (1974)2 S.C.C. 600 . their Lordships of the Supreme Court have emphasized the following observation made by the Privy Council in Motibai Hormusjee v. Jamsetjee Hormusjee, A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 28: "It is quite clear that the onus of establishing capacity lay on the petitioner. It is also clear that if the caveator impugned the will on the ground that it was obtained by the exercise of undue influence, excessive persuasion or moral coercion, it lay upon him to establish that case." 25. The principles laid down in the above cases clearly show that it is for the person who alleges undue influence to establish and prove by acceptable evidence. In paragraph 15 of the plaint in O.S.No.531 of 1980 the plaintiffs very lightiy pleaded as follows: "...Taking any view of the matter, the will is one vitiated by undue influence, coercion and fraud and the same is also void in law..." Even such allegation is not found in the written statement in O.S.No.489 of 1980. In view of the vehement argument made by the learned senior counsel on this aspect, I have carefully considered the oral evidence of D.Ws.1 to 3 and I am unable to find any evidence from any one of them in support of the above plea. xxx xxx xxx xxx Hence, I conclude that the plea of undue influence has not been established by the defendants and I am in agreement with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the case of undue influence has been given up by the defendants. 26. Now 1 shall consider the mental capacity and health condition of the testator at the time of execution of Ex.A-3. 26. Now 1 shall consider the mental capacity and health condition of the testator at the time of execution of Ex.A-3. It is specifically pleaded in O.S.No.489 of 1980 that while Koothan Servai was in a sound and disposing state of mind, he voluntarily and without the instigation of any body, executed a will on 9. 1979, whereby the properties have been bequeathed in favour of the plaintiff, who is the grandson of Koothan Servai by his daughter Vellai Ammal. In para 7 it is also pleaded that koothan Servai, though a diabetic patient was quite hale and healthy till the last moment of his death, that he was running a private school under the name and style ‘Swami Vivekananda, a Middle School at Silukkuvarpatti and he was the Manager and Correspondent of the school, that till his last days he was personally attending to the day-to-day affairs of the institutions and he was personally attending to his properties and that the said Koothan Servai died on 13. 1980. xxx xxx xxx xxx The above evidence clearly show that the testator of the Will was in a sound and disposing state of mind and he had executed the Will Ex.A-3 on his own. Hence, the contra argument made by the learned counsel for the respondents cannot be accepted. xxx xxx xxx xxx Inspite of the above admission by D.W.4, nothing was clarified in the reexamination. In other words, she explained that her husband had spent money for the education of not only for Manimekalai, but also for other daughters of Koothayi Ammal, that he had also made arrangements for marriage of first daughter of koothayi Ammal. namely, kannagi, that he was in a sound and disposing state of mind on the date of Ex. A-3, and that inspite of her objection and as Koothan Servai was firm in all his activities, he bequeathed his entire properties in favour of the plaintiff. Since she is also one of the parties to the proceedings, the said admission is binding and conclusive and it also binds other parties. A-3, and that inspite of her objection and as Koothan Servai was firm in all his activities, he bequeathed his entire properties in favour of the plaintiff. Since she is also one of the parties to the proceedings, the said admission is binding and conclusive and it also binds other parties. In this regard, the following conclusion in a decision reported in Amber Ali v. Lutfe Ali, 25 C.L.J. 619, is relevant which reads thus: “When several persons are jointly interested in the subject matter of a suit, an admission of one of these persons is receivable not only against himself but also against the others, whether they be all jointly suing or sued, provided that the admission relates to the subject-matter in dispute and be made by the declarant in his character of a person jointly interested with the party against whom the evidence is tendered. The requirement of the identity in legal interest between the joint owners is of fundamental importance. The joint ownership must exist at the time the statement was made.” 27. In Ramjhari Kuer v. Deyanand Singh, A.I.R. 1947 Pat. 278, a Division Bench of Patna High Court has reiterated the same position in the following manner: “When several persons are jointly interested in the subject-matter of the suit, an admission of any one of these persons is receivable not only against himself, but also against the other defendants, whether they be all jointly suing or sued, provided that the admission relates to the subject-matter in dispute and is made by the defendant in his character of a person jointly interested with the party against whom the evidence is tendered. The requirement of the identity in legal interest between the joint owners is of fundamental importance.” 28. In Harihar v. Nabakishore, A.I.R. 1963 Ori. 45, a Division Bench of Orissa High Court has also reiterated the same position. 29. In Raj Kumar v. Official Receiver, M/s Chiranji All Ram Chand, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 941, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed that ad- mission by one of the co-owners is binding on the other co-owners. 30. I have already extracted the admission of D.W.4 and in the light of the principles enunciated in the above decisions. I hold that the admission of D.W.4 is binding on other parties also. 30. I have already extracted the admission of D.W.4 and in the light of the principles enunciated in the above decisions. I hold that the admission of D.W.4 is binding on other parties also. Moreover, the said admission of D.W.4 is against her pecuniary interest; hence certainly her admission is binding and conclusive and also binds other parties to the proceedings. 31. Mr.S. V.Jayaraman, learned senior counsel for the respondents relying on the decisions reported in Ramachandra v. Champabai, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 354: (1965)1 S.C.J. 98; Surendra Pal v. Saraswati, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1999, Kalyan Singh v. Chhoti, (1990)1 S.C.C. 266 and Guro v. Atma Singh, (1992)2 S.C.C. 507 submitted that if there are suspicious circumstances, it is for the propounder of the will to remove that suspection. He also submitted that inasmuch as the father of the propounder has taken a prominent part in execution of the Will which confers substantial benefits on him, the said action would itself be a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the Will. After going through the above referred decisions in the light of the detailed discussion in the earlier paragraphs, I am unable to accept his contention. I have already concluded that the testator was in a sound and disposing state of mind and he was not influenced by any one. He understood the contents of the will, the same was explained by the scribe, P.W.4, and thereafter he signed. The signature of the testator was attested by two attesting witnesses. The said will was also registered on the very same day. No doubt, the father of the propounder P.W.I was there at the beginning of the execution of the will and the evidence let in on the side of the plaintiff shows that thereafter he left for school and returned back around noon. No doubt, the said Will was completed in the presence of P. W. 1. In the light of the principles enunciated in the decisions cited by Mr.S.V.Jayaraman, learned senior counsel for the respondents and in view of my reasons and discussions stated earlier, and of the fact that the witnesses examined on the side of the plaintiff have explained that even though the father of the propounder was there some time at the beginning and at the end, it is clear that his presence had not caused or affected the mind of the testator. As a matter of fact, for the sake of repetition, I am once again referring the evidence of D.W.4, the wife of the testator, namely, In other words, the evidence of D.W.4 is very clear that the testator was aware of the existence of other daughter as well as male child through his elder daughter etc. As a matter of fact, D.W.4 after knowing the exclusion of other daughter, has gone to the extent of saying, that This shows that Koothan Servai was conscious of all the aspects and he determined to bequeath his property only in favour of the plaintiff namely his grand son through his second daughter. In this regard, it is also relevant to refer the recent decision of the Apex Court reported in R.N.Mukherjee and another v. R.Banerjee (dead) by L.Rs , and others, J.T. (1995)7 S.C. 177, is which for similar contention, namely, deprivation of the other legal heir in the property of the testator, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held in the following manner: "As to the first circumstance, we would observe that this should not raise any suspicion, because the whole idea behind execution of will is to interfere with the normal line of succession. So natural heirs would be debarred in every case of will, of course it may be that in some cases they are fully debarred and in others only partially. As in the present case, the two executors are sons of a half-blood brother of Saroj Bala, whereas the objectors descendants of a full blood sister, the disinheritance of latter could not have been taken as a suspicious circumstance, when some of her descendants are even beneficiaries under the will." The abovesaid observation in that case is squarely applicable to our case. In other words, If the testator is in a sound disposing mind and aware of the facts and determined to bequeath his properties in favour of one of two heirs and deviate the normal line of succession, it is not for the court to interfere and find fault with him. A will contains the last desire of testator/testatrix. The courts, therefore, normally act in accordance with the wishes of the person concerned. A will contains the last desire of testator/testatrix. The courts, therefore, normally act in accordance with the wishes of the person concerned. The further observation of their Lordships in the said decision, namely, "But then if the courts were to doubt either genuineness or voluntariness of the maker of the will, they would be loathe to work in accordance with what has been stated in the will, is quite relevant. 32. To sum up in the light of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence let in by both sides, I am of the view that the suspicious circumstances said to have taken place in the execution of Ex.A-3 by the respondents are unacceptable. As a matter of fact, the plaintiff has produced better evidence to prove the will. Both the attestors were examined, one of the attestors, namely, P.W.2 belongs to other community and the other attestor, namely P.W.3 is related to both the branches. The scribe was also examined. The witnesses examined on the side of the plaintiff have explained the mental capacity of the testator. The case of undue influence was given up by the defendants. The evidence also shows that the testator educated three daughters of the other branch. He made sincere attempt for the marriage of the first daughter (Kannagi) through Koothayi Ammal and also performed the marriage of the second daughter Manimekalai. Apart from the above fact, the due execution and the signature of the testator has been accepted by the defendants in their pleadings. In such circumstances, the plaintiff has proved his case by acceptable evidence that the will-Ex.A-3 has been executed and proved in the manner known to law. In such a circumstance, 1 am reminded by the decision of the Privy Council Motibai v. Jamset Jee, A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 28, that a man may act foolishly and even heartlessly; if he acts with full comprehension of what he is doing the court will not interfere with the exercise of his volition. In the light of the above discussion, the contrary conclusion arrived at by the court below cannot be sustained and the same is liable to be set aside. 33. Under these circumstances, both the appeals are allowed and there shall be a decree for declaration and permanent injunction in O.S.No.489 of 80 as prayed for. Consequently, O.S.No.531 of 80 filed for partition and separate possession is dismissed. 33. Under these circumstances, both the appeals are allowed and there shall be a decree for declaration and permanent injunction in O.S.No.489 of 80 as prayed for. Consequently, O.S.No.531 of 80 filed for partition and separate possession is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case and of the fact that the parties are related, there shall be no order as to costs throughout.