JUDGMENT : Ravi Nandan Sahay, J. By this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner Bihar Air Products Limited, Jamshedpur seeks a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the Presiding Officer-cum-Authority, Labour Court, Jamshedpur dated 29.9.1988, whereby Labour Court allowed B.S.E. Case No. 14 of 1985 under section 26(2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, which had been filed by Anil Kumar Tiwary challenging his termination from service by the petitioner. The complainant-opposite party (Respondent no. 2 herein) was appointed as Assistant Administrative Officer by the petitioner in its establishment with effect from 4.5.1984. Services of the complainant was terminated by letter dated 10.9.1985 without giving him statutory notice or statutory compensation. The complainant's grievance was that termination of his services was malafide and without reasonable cause. There was no charge of misconduct against him and his service was terminated without an enquiry. The complainant prayed for setting aside the ORDER :of termination and for reinstatement with back wages and other benefits. 2. The petitioner company challenged the maintainability of the application under section 26(2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act on the ground that the complainant being employed as Assistant Administrative Officer was responsible for general administration. It was contended that he was not covered under the definition of employee within the meaning of Bihar Shops and Establishment Act. The second objection was that the complainant was employed and posted in the factory of the petitioner situated at Gamaharia which is outside the limit of municipality of notified area committees and as such the provision of Bihar Shops and Establishment Act was not applicable. Third objection was that the complainant was working in the factory of the petitioner which was not an establishment as defined under the Act. The petitioner pleaded justification for termination of services of the complainant on the ground that the complainant never performed his duty satisfactorily. He was on probation and his services could have been terminated in terms of the employment as mentioned in the letter of appointment dated 4.5.1984 and the complainant was not entitled to any notice. However, he was paid one month's salary in lieu of notice along with his letter of termination. The complainant received the same without any protest. The complainant was not entitled to compensation either. The petitioner brought many allegations against the complainant before the Labour Court. However, he was paid one month's salary in lieu of notice along with his letter of termination. The complainant received the same without any protest. The complainant was not entitled to compensation either. The petitioner brought many allegations against the complainant before the Labour Court. It is not necessary to refer to those allegations. 3. The Labour Court in its well considered ORDER :decided all the issues in favour of the complainant and against the petitioner company. Following are the relevant findings of the Labour Court :- (a) On the date of termination of his services the complainant had already completed one year of service and there was nothing on the record to show that probation period of the complainant was extended for any period for his unsatisfactory work. It is a settled law that the probationer continuing even after expiry of maximum period of extension of probation permissible under rules without being confirmed would be deemed to have been confirmed (vide 1986 S.C.C. (L & S) 421 Om Prakash Maurya vs. U.P. Co-operative Sugar Factories Federation). (b) Since there was nothing on behalf of the employer to show that the period of probation was extended for his unsatisfactory work, hence the employer cannot take recourse to the terms of the letter of appointment of the complainant. The decision relied on by the petitioner was A.I.R. 1969 Pat 1498 in support of their stand that the employment was terminated by virtue of an express or implied terms of contract of service which is outside the scope of section 26 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act. It was not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. The decision in A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1242 is also not applicable in the facts of the case. (c) The complainant was appointed on probation for a period of 12 months. His probationary period was not extended. He was deemed to have been confirmed and he was allowed to continue in service on expiry of probationary period. (d) There being serious charge of misconduct against the complainant, the employer should have taken appropriate legal action instead of passing termination ORDER :straightway. This reflected tendency of arbitrariness and high handedness of the employer. (e) The impugned termination ORDER :was not an ORDER :of discharge simpliciter rather it was punitive one. (d) There being serious charge of misconduct against the complainant, the employer should have taken appropriate legal action instead of passing termination ORDER :straightway. This reflected tendency of arbitrariness and high handedness of the employer. (e) The impugned termination ORDER :was not an ORDER :of discharge simpliciter rather it was punitive one. (f) The application under section 26(2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act was maintainable. 4. The complainant after his termination of services joined Indian Oxygen Limited in Delhi with effect from 20th March, 1987. The Labour Court declared the ORDER :of termination to be void ab initio but the Labour Court awarded compensation of Rs.24,402/- only instead of his re-instatement and back wages. 5. With regard to maintainability of the complaint under section 26(2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act it was contended by the petitioner that .the preliminary objection was decided without considering the evidence adduced by the petitioner in the light of preliminary objection. It is not in dispute that respondent no. 2 was appointed as Probationer on the post of Assistant Administrative Officer. He was assigned the responsibility and duties mentioned in clause-4 of the appointment letter. By this clause he was made responsible for proper discharge of his duties in the General Administration, Personnel, Public Relation and other job as would be assigned to him from time to time by the Management. One week after the appointment, a circular was issued on 11.5.84 by the Managing Director of the petitioner whereby respondent no. 2 was asked to look after the work of General Administration, Security, Factory up-keep and liaison work with water and electric supply in the factory which is situated at Barubad within Gamharia village and all concerned were instructed to extend "Cooperation to respondent no. 2 for effective administrative control in the factory office as well as for the general factory administration (Annexure-2). 6. Respondent no. 2 filed rejoinder to the preliminary objection and disputed the grounds on which preliminary objection was raised. He contended that he was not working in the factory situated at Gamharia and was all along operating from Bistupur establishment of the petitioner company. It was next contended that there was no doubt that he was designated as Assistant Administrative Officer but he was not free to take any decision of his own. He contended that he was not working in the factory situated at Gamharia and was all along operating from Bistupur establishment of the petitioner company. It was next contended that there was no doubt that he was designated as Assistant Administrative Officer but he was not free to take any decision of his own. At each stage in respect of every matter, instructions were issued to him and he was made to sign all these papers and documents which were against the workmen. He never performed any supervisory or managerial functions. He was only the communicating agency and such communications were based on the direction and decision of General Manager and Managing Director, He was not authorised to show cause, caution any employee, warn or punish or reward them. He was made to sign charge sheets, show cause for which decisions were taken by the General Manager and Managing Director. 7. The petitioner examined three witnesses on the preliminary issues. The Respondent no. 2 examined himself but filed no document in support of his case. The petitioner filed written arguments on the points raised in the rejoinder. The case of respondent no. 2 (complainant) was that he never worked in the factory at Gamharia and was all along working in the office of the petitioner company. Witness no. 1 for the petitioner has stated in his evidence that the complainant was employed in the factory at Gamharia which does not come within the Notified Area Committee. The certificate (Ext.-H and H/1) supported this fact. The other documents like Exts-B, B/1, B/2, C, C/1 and C/2 show that the complainant was working in the factory. These documents show that the complainant used to receive salary in the factory. Exts.-C and C/1 show that the complainant used to mark his attendance at factory. His plea that he used to mark his attendance in the registered office is not correct. Exts.-C/4 and C/5 (In & Out Register) maintained at the factory gate clearly show that the complainant used to work in the factory. It was contended that the Exhibits clearly show that he was appointed in the factory at Gamharia which is outside the Municipal/Notified Area Committee. Gamharia village has not been included in the notification of the State Government (Ext.1). It was contended that the Exhibits clearly show that he was appointed in the factory at Gamharia which is outside the Municipal/Notified Area Committee. Gamharia village has not been included in the notification of the State Government (Ext.1). The complainant in his deposition stated that he was not in a position to show that Gamharia comes within any Notified Area Committee or Municipal Area. On these grounds it was contended that in view of overwhelming evidence that the complainant was employed in the factory at Gamharia which is outside the Municipal/Notified Area Committee, the labour court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint petition. 8. The complainant was employed as Assistant Administrative Officer and was responsible for general administration and personnel, he was not an employee under Shops and Establishment Act. It was submitted that the complainant in his rejoinder had not disputed this fact that he was Assistant Administrative Officer. According to the petitioner, Exts.-A and D show that the complainant was looking after the general administration of the factory. He issued several circulars, and notices to all departments, like Ext.-D/1 to D/4. On the basis of these documents, it was contended that the complainant was looking after the works of all the departments. He was immediate incharge of all the sections. The complainant appointed Mr. Kanhaiya Kumar Pandey as Trainee vide Ext.-D/9 and extensions were also given to Mr. Pandey by the complainant vide Ext.-D/7 and D/8. vide Exts.-E to E/6 the complainant had issued charge sheets and show cause to employees and workmen. The complainant had powers to take disciplinary actions against employees and workmen. He had power to impose punishment. He had issued warning letter to Sri P.N. Singh, Junior Clerk (Ext.-F). The complainant was also entrusted with the job of liaisoning vide Ext.-D. Evidence was led by the management to show that the complainant was to check water supply in the factory (Ext.C/7). The complainant also represented the Management outside works. He signed the Tripartite agreement for and on behalf of the Management (Ext.-G). Exts.-E to E/6 show that concerned workmen were charge sheeted and explanations were called for by the complainant. But nowhere in these Exhibits were mentioned that the charge sheets were issued under the ORDER :s of the Managing Director or General Manager and to submit explanation to them. Exts.-E to E/6 show that concerned workmen were charge sheeted and explanations were called for by the complainant. But nowhere in these Exhibits were mentioned that the charge sheets were issued under the ORDER :s of the Managing Director or General Manager and to submit explanation to them. The petitioner therefore contended that the documentary evidence mentioned above clearly show that the complainant was engaged in general administrative work and he was immediate incharge of the general administration. 9. Section 2(5) of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act defines 'employer'. This section says that the person who is the immediate incharge of the general management or control of the establishment also comes within, the purview of employer. The complainant had powers to issue directions to all departments, sections, employees (Exts.D/1 to D/5), to issue interview letter (Ext.-D/6), to appoint person (Ext.-D/9), to extend probationary periods (Ext.-D/7 and D/8), to issue charge-sheet (Exts.-E to E/6) , to impose punishment (Ext.-F), to enter into settlement on behalf of the petitioner (Ext.-G), to make payment for renewal of factory licence registration (Ext.-D/10) and to check and supervise the position of water in the factory. All these works are squarely covered under the definition of employer as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act. It was contended that the management relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in 1964 (1) LLJ 47 had contended that the complainant being not an employee within the definition of an employee is not entitled to invoke the provisions of section 26(2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act. 10. Labour Court, Jamshedpur by his ORDER :dated 27th June, 1987 decided the preliminary objection against the petitioner. The labour court held that Ext.-A, the appointment letter dated 4.5.1984 had been issued from the registered office of the petitioner which was within the Jamshedpur Notified Area Committee. This letter does not mention actual place of working of the complainant. It has simply been mentioned that the complainant was appointed as Assistant Administrative Officer in the Organisation of the petitioner. According to the learned labour court the word 'Organisation' is elastic enough to include the establishment of the petitioner at the Head quarter at Bistupur as well as the factory premises at Gamharia. It could not be said that the complainant was employed for working exclusively at and within the factory premises at Gamharia. According to the learned labour court the word 'Organisation' is elastic enough to include the establishment of the petitioner at the Head quarter at Bistupur as well as the factory premises at Gamharia. It could not be said that the complainant was employed for working exclusively at and within the factory premises at Gamharia. There was presumption in favour of the complainant that he was appointed to work at and from the Head Office of the petitioner. 11. The labour court held that the pay sheets (Ext.-B) for the month of June 1984 and other pay sheet for the month of June, 1985 do not indicate that the pay sheets related to the factory employees of the petitioner. Labour Court noticed that other senior executives were also included in the salary sheets referred to by the petitioners. According to the Labour Court "It does not appear to be convincing that the aforesaid executives and the officers of the O.P. will have their working place at the factory of the O.P." Learned Labour Court on consideration of Ext.-D the circular of the Managing Director dated 11th May, 1984 found that the complainant was required to work under the direct control and supervision of the General Manager whose working place was at Registered Office, Bistupur. 12. Learned Labour Court held that Ext.-B/2 salary sheet of January, 1985 of the workers, sub-staff, office staff and supervisors show that the complainant had signed it as Administrative Officer but this document was signed by the Works Manager and the Managing Director as well. Therefore, on the strength of this Ext.-B/2, it could not be said that the complainant's working place was factory premises of the petitioner. Learned Labour Court rejected Ext.-C, the attendance register of the Executives holding that he was unable to form an opinion that the attendance register was maintained at Gamharia factory. Similarly Ext.C/2 and C/3, attendance registers of the employees working in the registered office was rejected because the officers, who proved these exhibits had not said anything in their deposition as to in whose pen these registers had been maintained. It lacked authentication by the competent authority. So far register of Entry Gate (Exts.-C/4 and C/5) are concerned, they did show that the complainant was working in the factory premises but the Labour Court found that the register had not been authenticated by the competent authority. It lacked authentication by the competent authority. So far register of Entry Gate (Exts.-C/4 and C/5) are concerned, they did show that the complainant was working in the factory premises but the Labour Court found that the register had not been authenticated by the competent authority. Ext.-C/4 had been written by several security personnel’s but none of them appeared to prove their writings thereon. The Labour Court therefore held that these exhibits could not prove that the working place of the complainant was factory premises at Gamharia. 13. Labour Court found that Ext.-D the circular dated 11.5.84 issued by the Managing Director of the petitioner shows that the complainant was to work under direct control and supervision of the General Manager whose sitting place was registered office. This circular does not specify particular working place of the complainant. The complainant's sitting place for general administrative purposes was registered office and that he also looked after security and other factory upkeep works for which he often visited the factory at Gamharia. So far Ext.-D series are concerned, according to the Labour Court, close scrutiny of these exhibits revealed that they were issued from registered office of the company. There was no evidence to show that they were issued from the factory premises. 14. The Labour Court similarly rejected Ext.-G, the Memorandum of settlement arrived at between the management and their workmen. This Memorandum of settlement was also signed by the complainant alongwith Secretary-cum-General Manager as Management representative, whose working place was at registered office, Bistupur. Thus, Ext.-G is of no help to the petitioner. The Labour Court held that there was no conclusive evidence to show that the factory at Gamharia of the petitioner was outside Addityapur Notified Area Committee. This, however, was not relevant in view of the finding that the complainant was working not in the factory premises but in the registered office. 15. The Labour Court held that on careful reading of Ext.-D series it was difficult to say that the complainant discharged managerial and supervisory functions and was independent to take decision in the managerial affairs of the petitioner. 15. The Labour Court held that on careful reading of Ext.-D series it was difficult to say that the complainant discharged managerial and supervisory functions and was independent to take decision in the managerial affairs of the petitioner. Ext.-E series, copies of the letters calling for explanation from the employees, show that the complainant was authorised to call for explanations from the employees but the petitioner has failed to bring on record relevant document and original application to connect that, in fact, the decision to take action was of the complainant. They appear to have been written as part of administrative affairs in routine manner. Ext.E/4 is the charge sheet issued to one P.Pant under the signature of the complainant but no paper was filed to show that actually the complainant took the decision to issue charge sheet. 16. Learned labour Court for the reasons stated above, came to the conclusion that there was no evidence to show that the complainant was appointed in the supervisory and managerial capacity. The complainant completed 12 months of probation period before his services were terminated by the petitioner. There was no evidence that the probationary period of the complainant was extended upto a further period of six months and that his work was not found satisfactory. The complainant was rendering administrative and clerical services appertaining to the establishment of the petitioner at Bistupur registered office and as such he was an employee within the meaning of Bihar Shops and Establishment Act. 17. By ORDER :dated 29.9.88 the labour Court found that the complainant was in service of the petitioner. There was nothing to show that the probationary period of the complainant was extended for his unsatisfactory work and as such the termination of the services of the complainant therefore was not justified. 18. In Prem Sagar Vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company, 1964(1) L.L.J. 47 , the Supreme Court held that the High Court while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should (sic) interfere with the finding of the Labour Court Tribunal unless it appeared from the impugned ORDER :that in dealing with the status of the employee patently erroneous test has been applied by the Tribunal. 19. In Parry & Co. Ltd. Vs. 19. In Parry & Co. Ltd. Vs. Commercial Employee Union, Madras, 1952(1) L.L.J. 769 , Mukherjee, J. stated that no certiorari is available to quash a decision passed with jurisdiction by a inferior tribunal on the mere ground that such decision is erroneous. 20. In Prem Sagar's case (supra) observation made by Mukherjee, J. referred to above was considered and was observed "...we do not think that this observation can be read as laying down a categorical and unqualified proposition that unless an error of jurisdiction is established, or fraud proved, no writ of certiorari can be issued." 21. In Nagendranath Vs. Commissioner of Hills Division, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 398, it was held that one of the grounds on which jurisdiction of the High Court on certiorari may be invoked is an error of law apparent on the face of the record and not every error either of law or fact which can be corrected by a superior court, in exercise of its statutory powers as a court of appeal or revision. 22. In Prem Sagar's case (supra), one of the question for consideration was with regard to the status of the complainant whether he was an employee in the position of Management and hence was not entitled to invoke Madras Shops and Establishments Act. The Supreme Court held that it is difficult to lay down exhaustively all the tests which can be reasonably applied in deciding this question as several considerations would naturally be relevant in dealing with this problem. It may be enquired whether the person had power to operate on the bank account or could he make payments to third party and enter into agreements with them on behalf of the employer, was he entitled to represent the employer to the world at large in regard to the dealings of the employer with the strangers, did he have authority to supervise the work of the clerks employed in the establishment, did he have control and charge of the correspondence, could he make commitments on behalf of the employer, and has he power to appoint members of the staff or punish them. The Commissioner of Labour in that case found in the application under section 51 of the Madras Shops and Establishment Act that the concerned employee had no power of appointment of labour, had no power to take disciplinary action against them, had no power to grant leave to persons subordinate to him, had no discretion in the matter of incurring expenditure of his own accord as the expenditure had to be sanctioned by the General Manager, he had no power to bind the company by his acts. Hence he came to the conclusion that the concerned employee was not employed in the position of management within the section 4(1)(a) of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act. The writ petition preferred by the company in respect of the ORDER :of Commissioner of Labour was dismissed. The writ appeal preferred by the complainant was however allowed. 23. The Supreme Court set aside the ORDER :of the Madras High Court on the ground that the ORDER :of the Commissioner of Labour did not suffer from error of law apparent on the face of the record. The conclusion was arrived at after applying the correct legal tests. The distinction between the present case and the Supreme Court case is that no case was made out by the employer before the Tribunal that the complainant was employed in the control of General Manager of the Establishment. The Supreme Court found that the Labour Commissioner in his ORDER :applied the test to which no exception could be taken. After discussing the evidence, the Commissioner had held that the complainant could not be said to have managerial power in the Head Office of the employer. The Madras High Court quashed the ORDER :of Commissioner on the ground that the ORDER :on the face of it was patently and manifestly erroneous. The Supreme Court held "....the Commissioner naturally had to consider this aspect of the matter, and so, he observed that the appellant did not have managerial functions, duties or authorities. It would, we think, be unfair to hold that the whole approach of the Commissioner was vitiated by the fact that he concentrated on the question about managerial functions and authority and did not apply the other tests which have been expressly set out by him in the earlier part of his ORDER :. It would, we think, be unfair to hold that the whole approach of the Commissioner was vitiated by the fact that he concentrated on the question about managerial functions and authority and did not apply the other tests which have been expressly set out by him in the earlier part of his ORDER :. Therefore, we do not think that the Division Bench was right in coming to the conclusion that the impugned ORDER :suffers from any error of law which is apparent on the face of the record..." 24. The question for consideration in this application is therefore whether the ORDER :of the Labour Court suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record warranting interference. 25. Having decided the preliminary objection against the petitioner, learned Labour Court proceeded to consider the question whether the services of the complainant can be terminated as per the terms and conditions of contract of service. If the answer was affirmative, then in view of the decision of this Court in S.C. Das, Chairman, HEC vs. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1969 Pat 1498 (sic), the employer could not invoke section 26 of the Act. Learned Labour Court was confronted with this decision by the petitioner. The learned Labour Court held that the principle laid down in that decision was not applicable to the facts of the present case because in that case the employee was appointed purely on temporary basis for three months only. Finding of the Labour Court is that the complainant completed 12 months of probationary period and when his probationary period was not extended then it was deemed that he was confirmed in service. More so, when he had been given three additional increments at a time. The clause in the appointment letter on which the employer relied could not be available for terminating the services of the complainant since he was no longer on probation. Even during probation period, his services could not be terminated unless the work of the complainant was found unsatisfactory. 26. The Labour Court held the termination ORDER :to be bad on the following grounds :- (a) Complainant was confirmed employee and his service was terminated because of misconduct, without any domestic enquiry. (b) ORDER :of termination was not an ORDER :of discharge simpliciter, rather the same was punitive one. 26. The Labour Court held the termination ORDER :to be bad on the following grounds :- (a) Complainant was confirmed employee and his service was terminated because of misconduct, without any domestic enquiry. (b) ORDER :of termination was not an ORDER :of discharge simpliciter, rather the same was punitive one. (c) Complainant was not paid full notice pay and statutory compensation equivalent to 1½ months salary. 27. The validity of this finding requires consideration, if it is held that the complainant was competent to invoke jurisdiction of the Court under section 26(2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the finding of the Labour Court that there was no reliable evidence that the complainant was working in the factory at Gamharia is a perverse finding. The salary sheets exhibited on behalf of the petitioner was rejected on unenable grounds ignoring the evidence of M.W.3, who had said that the Managing Director had got his office at both places i.e. registered office and factory. Similarly attendance register of the factory showing attendance of the complainant was rejected since there was no certificate and/or signature of the competent authority on the first page of the registers. The finding is perverse because the complainant had not denied the fact that it was not his attendance register. There appears to be substance in this contention. 29. It was also contended on behalf of the petitioner that the complainant was assigned the work of general administration of the factory office vide Ext.-D. It was contended that In and Out Register maintained at the factory as had been proved by M.W.2 A.N. Pandey, Security Incharge was wrongly rejected on the ground that the individual security personnel were not examined to prove the writing in the register. It appears that the Labour Court has taken technical view. Similar is comment with regard to other documents. 30. The moot question for consideration is whether the impugned ORDER :of the Labour Court suffers from error of record warranting interference by this Court ? I have examined the documents and the evidence adduced by the parties and the comment of the Labour Court on those documents. Now the first error in the ORDER :I have noticed is that the Labour Court with reference to the appointment letter of respondent no. I have examined the documents and the evidence adduced by the parties and the comment of the Labour Court on those documents. Now the first error in the ORDER :I have noticed is that the Labour Court with reference to the appointment letter of respondent no. 2 said that he was appointed for the Head office, which is not the case. From the appointment letter (Annexure-1) it is clear that the respondent Anil Kumar Tiwary was appointed as Assistant Administrative Officer in the Organisation of the petitioner which includes the factory at Gamharia. There is substantial evidence that the complainant-Respondent no. 2 was mostly employed in the factory and the nature of job was supervisory. The Labour Court as it appears strangely was too far in appreciation of the evidence. It was rightly contended on behalf of the employer petitioner that the complainant-respondent no.2 had not disputed the fact that he was working in the factory at Gamharia. 31. The second point to be noticed is that the probationary period of the complainant was extended twice. The Labour Court was under impression that no further extension was granted which deemed that he was confirmed to his service. It is not correct legal position. An employee cannot be deemed to be confirmed in absence of express ORDER :in that behalf. Some service rule requires that the probationary period in no case will be extended beyond the period. In those cases, it has been held that the employees allowed to continue beyond maximum probationary period without express ORDER :, was deemed to be confirmed. 32. Clause 2 of the appointment letter reads as follows : "You will be on probation for a period of 12 months from the date of your joining duty. The probation period may be extended up to a further period of six months at the sole discretion of the company. If, during the period of probation your work is found to be unsatisfactory, your services may be terminated at any time without assigning any reason thereof and without notice or any payment in lieu of notice." 33. The complainant respondent no. 2 was not confirmed by express ORDER :and hence the Labour Court erred in holding that clause 2 of the contract of appointment became ineffective, because the complainant worked for 16 months or so. The complainant respondent no. 2 was not confirmed by express ORDER :and hence the Labour Court erred in holding that clause 2 of the contract of appointment became ineffective, because the complainant worked for 16 months or so. The complainant was appointed on 4.5.1984 and within one week of his appointment a circular was issued by the Managing Director of the petitioner company that the complainant will took after the general administration, security, Factory up-keep and liaison work with water and electric supply etc. and other jobs as may be allocated to him. He was mostly employed at Gamharia. He had also issued various charge-sheets to the workmen vide Exts.-E to E/5. 34. In Express Newspaper Limited vs. Labour Court, Madras, 1964(1) L.LJ.9, an employee was appointed on probation for six months. The appointment letter further stated that if during this period his work was found satisfactory he would be confirmed in service. The service of the employee, however, was terminated before the expiry of probation period on the ground that this work was not found satisfactory. The employee challenged his termination before the Industrial Labour Court. The Labour Court held the termination of the services of the employee to be illegal and directed his reinstatement with back wages from the date of termination. The Employer Express Newspapers Limited challenged the award of the Labour Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The main contention urged before the High Court was that the services of the employee who was on probation for a period of six months could have been terminated at the end of that period without giving rise to any claim. The writ petition was dismissed. The Express Newspaper Limited preferred appeal before the Supreme Court. It was urged before the Supreme Court on behalf of the employer that once the period of six months expired there would be automatic termination of services unless an ORDER :of confirmation was made. Rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court observed:- "This contention is, in our opinion, wholly unsound. There can, in our opinion, be no doubt about the position in law that an employee appointed on probation for six months continues as probationer even after the period of six months if at the end of the period his services had either not been terminated or he is confirmed. There can, in our opinion, be no doubt about the position in law that an employee appointed on probation for six months continues as probationer even after the period of six months if at the end of the period his services had either not been terminated or he is confirmed. It appears clear to us that without anything more an appointment on probation for six months gives the employer no right to terminate the services of an employee before six months had expired except on the ground of misconduct or other sufficient reasons in which case even the services of a permanent employee could be terminated. At the end of the six months period the employer can either confirm him or terminate his services, because his services is found unsatisfactory. If no action is taken by the employer either by way of confirmation or by way of termination, the employee continues to be in service as a probationer. The High Court was therefore right in rejecting the management's contention that there was an automatic termination of Bobb's services after 28th August 1957." 35. In the present case the respondent was appointed on 4.5.1984 on probation for a period of 12 months. According to the appointment letter, probation period could be extended upto further period of six months on the sole discretion of the company. His services could be terminated during the period of probation if the work of respondent was found unsatisfactory. Services of the respondent was terminated during extended probation period. Termination ORDER :(Annexure-3) does not say that the services of the respondent employee was terminated for unsatisfactory work. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Express Newspaper's case (supra), the services of the respondent could not be terminated before the end of the extended probation period. The award of the labour court can be interfered with only when there is apparent error of record or the findings of the labour court is perverse. This Court has no power to appreciate the evidence of the Labour Court. 36. In a recent decision of this Court in Jitendra Prasad Singh vs. Tata Eng. The award of the labour court can be interfered with only when there is apparent error of record or the findings of the labour court is perverse. This Court has no power to appreciate the evidence of the Labour Court. 36. In a recent decision of this Court in Jitendra Prasad Singh vs. Tata Eng. & Locomotive Co., 1998 (3) PLJR 277 ., Ganguly, J. on review of several decisions of the Supreme Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot ordinarily interfere with the decision of the tribunal except in cases in which the decision is patently perverse. Learned Judge referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sadhuram vs. Delhi Transport Corporation, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1467, wherein the Supreme Court laid down the principle as follows :- "We are afraid, the High Court misdirected itself. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is truly wide but, for that very reason, it has to be exercised with great circumspection. It is not for the High Court to constitute itself into an appellate court over Tribunals constituted under special legislation to resolve the disputes of a kind qualitatively different from ordinary civil disputes and to readjudicate upon question of fact decided by those Tribunals. That the questions decided pertain to jurisdictional facts does not entitle the High Court to interfere with the findings on jurisdictional facts which the Tribunal is well competent to decide. Where the circumstances indicated that the Tribunal has snatched at jurisdiction, the High Court may be justified in interfering. But where the Tribunal gets jurisdiction only if a reference is made and it is, therefore, impossible ever to say that the Tribunal has clutched at jurisdiction, we do not think that it was proper for the High Court to substitute its JUDGMENT : for that of the Labour Court." In Jitendra Prasad Singh's case (supra), it was further held that this court has no power to review the evidence, give finding of fact arrived at by the Tribunal and there are cogent grounds that the findings under review are perverse. 37. In Nagendranath's case (supra), it was held that not every error either of law or fact can be corrected by the superior court in exercise of its statutory powers as a court of appeal or revision. 38. 37. In Nagendranath's case (supra), it was held that not every error either of law or fact can be corrected by the superior court in exercise of its statutory powers as a court of appeal or revision. 38. The facts of the present case is somewhat similar to the facts of Prem Sagar's case (supra) referred to above. The Supreme Court set aside the ORDER :of the Madras High Court on the ground that the ORDER :of the Commissioner of Labour did not suffer from error of law apparent on the face of record, and the conclusion arrived at apply correct legal position. 39. In this view of the matter, I am not inclined to quash the impugned award which does not direct reinstatement of the respondent employee but only granted some compensation, a part of which has been paid to him. This writ application is, therefore, dismissed but there shall be no ORDER :as to costs.