JUDGMENT In this appeal, the following substantial question of law was framed, by order dated 11.11.1998 : "Whether the lower appellate Court rightly held that the appellant has not made out a case for condonation of delay?" This appeal is being heard and decided finally with the consent of learned counsel for both the parties. It appears that the appeal in the Court below was barred by six days. The appellant filed an application for condonation of delay. He alleged that the judgment and decree impugned was passed on 9.2.1996. The appellant was sick during 25.9.1995 to 14.3.1996. Thereafter, on 16.3.1996, he applied for certified copy and obtained it on 25.3.1996. The appeal was filed on 26.3.1996. He, therefore, claimed that on account of his illness, there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within thirty days of that judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. This application, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, was opposed by the respondents. It was claimed that the appellant was not sick between the period of 25.9.1995 to 14.3.1996. It was also claimed that the allegation, made in the application, that the appellant was treated in Nasik at Maharashtra State was also unfounded. Learned appellate Judge decided the application on the basis of affidavits instead of calling for the evidence and held that there was discrepancy in the affidavit and the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act as against the medical certificate which stated that the appellant was being treated between the period from 25.1.1996 to 26.3.1996. The lower appellate Court held that the medical certificate did not accompany the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the medical certificate was suspicious. Therefore, that application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was dismissed soa1so the appeal. Having heard the learned counsel for both the parties, this Court is of the view that the fact that the appellant did not file a medical certificate alongwith the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, especially when he was being treated at Nasik, cannot be a ground for rejecting the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is true that there is a discrepancy between the application and the affidavit as well as in the medical certificate, but discrepancy could be explained by the appellant if he was given an opportunity by the Court below. It is true that there is a discrepancy between the application and the affidavit as well as in the medical certificate, but discrepancy could be explained by the appellant if he was given an opportunity by the Court below. No opportunity was given to the appellant. The Court below has also not found that the case of the appellant, that he was ill, was totally false. It hardly matters if the appellant was ill for a long period prior to the date of hearing or not. What was relevant consideration was whether the appellant was sick when the case was heard finally against him so that he could not file the appeal. This is not a case for setting aside the ex parte decree. This is a case for explaining the delay in filing the appeal. It appears from the medical certificate, if believed, that the appellant was sick during the period when he could have filed an appeal within the limitation. Under such circumstances, the impugned order dated 7.1.1998, rejecting the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, is hereby set aside. It is directed that the case shall go back to the Court below for determining, after recording of the evidence, if the appeal is barred by time. In case, the delay is not condoned by the Court below, the appeal would be liable to be dismissed as such. In case, the Court below comes to the conclusion that there was sufficient cause for delay in filing the appeal, then there would be a case for condonation of delay. The Court below shall decide the case in accordance with law and on the facts produced before it. The case is remitted back to the lower appellate Court for decision in accordance with law. Consequently, the second appeal succeeds and is allowed to the extent already indicated. There shall be no order as to costs.