ORDER S.P. Srivastava, J. 1. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned counsel, Shri Vilas Tikhe, who has put in appearance in this case representing the landlord/respondents. 2. Perused the record. 3. Feeling aggrieved by the decree passed by the First Appellate Court whereunder upholding the decree of eviction passed against the tenant- defendant-appellant and for recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation pendente lite and future, his appeal has been dismissed, he has now approached this Court in Second Appeal seeking redress praying for the reversal of the impugned decree. 4. The suit giving rise to this appeal had been filed on 7-1-1992 on the assertions that the accommodation in dispute had been let out to the defendant on a rental of Rs. 30/- per month and the defendant having not paid the rent due for the month of June 1990 and onwards was a defaulter within the meaning of Section 12(1)(a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act 1961 and since in spite of the requisite notice having been served upon him he had neither cleared off the arrears of rent nor vacated the premises in dispute, hence the suit. 5. The defendant-appellant contested the aforesaid suit asserting that he had paid the rent due upto the month of October 1990 to late Balkishan, the deceased father of the plaintiffs, and had paid the rent due for the months of November and December 1990 to all the three plaintiffs. It was further asserted that so far as the rent due for the month of December 1990 and January 1991 it had been sent through money-order to Balkishan which had been received. Thereafter, the rent due for the month of August 1991 was received by the plaintiffs and no amount of rent remained due. He also claimed that the plaintiffs had not issued any receipt and the suit had been filed on wrong allegations. 6. The trial Court on an appraisal of the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the defendant was a defaulter as contemplated under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. The trial Court has noticed that for the first time during the pendency of the suit the defendant had made a deposit of Rs. 360/- on 7-4-1992 disclosing it to be the rent due for the months of January, 1992 to June 1992. The trial Court has noticed that for the first time during the pendency of the suit the defendant had made a deposit of Rs. 360/- on 7-4-1992 disclosing it to be the rent due for the months of January, 1992 to June 1992. Thereafter, the next deposit was made by the defendant on 5-1-1993 disclosing it as the amount of rent due for the months of September 1992 to January 1993. The trial Court found that no amount of rent due was paid within two months of the service of the notice as contemplated under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. It was further found that there was absolutely no explanation for the inordinate delay in making the deposit of the rent complying with the mandatory requirements envisaged under Section 13(1) of the Act. It was also found that the defendant had neither moved an application seeking condonation of delay in making the deposits nor had furnished any sufficient explanation for the same. 7. It was further found that the defendant could not establish that he had paid any amount of rent to Balkishan as claimed. Even the money-order receipt had not been filed showing payment of rent. It was clearly found that the amount of rent for the period from June 1990 to December 1990 had not been paid at all. It was also found that it was not established that Gyarasilal, the plaintiff No. 2, was a lunatic and the suit was not maintainable. On the findings returned against the defendant the trial Court decreed the suit as prayed. 8. The First Appellate Court has upheld the findings recorded by the trial Court which have been returned against the defendant-tenant. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that the notice dated 20-12-1990 issued by the landlord on the basis whereof the suit had been filed was invalid. The ground of invalidity pointed out is that in the notice the rent due for the period upto 20th December 1990 alone could have been demanded but the landlord had demanded payment of rent upto 31-1-1991. A perusal of the notice indicates that the landlord had asserted that the rent for the month of June 1990 onwards had not been paid. The tenancy was terminated w.e.f. 31-1-1991. A perusal of the notice indicates that the landlord had asserted that the rent for the month of June 1990 onwards had not been paid. The tenancy was terminated w.e.f. 31-1-1991. It was in this view of the matter that the payment of rent had been sought for the period ending on 31st January 1991. 10. The provisions contained in Section 12(1)(a) of the Act provide the lifting of the bar against the filing of the suit for the eviction of a tenant on the ground that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of rent legally recoverable from him within two months from the date on which a notice of demand for the arrears of rent has been served by the landlord in the prescribed manner. 11. In the present case, on the concurrent findings returned against the tenant the whole of the arrears of the rent legally recoverable from the tenant by the date of the service of the notice had neither been paid nor tendered within a period of two months and the mandatory requirement envisaged under the aforesaid provision could not be taken to have been complied with. As a -consequence the bar against the filing of the suit for eviction of the defendant-tenant stood clearly lifted. Considering the circumstance, the mere fact that the landlord in his notice had demanded not only the arrears of rent due but also the rent for the period subsequent to the notice during which the tenancy was to continue could not, it seems to me, invalidate the notice so as to relieve the defendant-tenant of his obligation to clear off the arrears of rent within the stipulated period as required under the provisions of Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is devoid of merits and is not at all acceptable. 12. It has next been contended that the finding returned by the Court below on the question in regard to the non-payment of rent for the period from June 1990 to December 1990 is manifestly erroneous. In this connection suffice it to say that the onus to show payment of rent lies on the tenant. Mere oral testimony in this regard is not sufficient. In this connection suffice it to say that the onus to show payment of rent lies on the tenant. Mere oral testimony in this regard is not sufficient. In a case where the tenant comes forward alleging that the rent was paid but no receipt was issued by the landlord but no explanation is furnished for not sending the rent by money- order, the tenant's version is not liable to be accepted. Observations to this effect were made by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Mohanlal v. Lachmandas, reported in 1991 HRR 510. In the present case both the Courts below have recorded concurrent findings that the defendant-tenant had failed to discharge the onus to establish the payment of rent to the landlord. It has also been noticed that even the money-order receipts have not been filed. Further the Courts below have concurrently found that the defendant had failed to comply with the mandatory requirements contemplated under the provisions contained in Section 13(1) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 13. The learned Single Judge of this Court in the decision in the case of Badrilal v. Rajmal, reported in 1997 MP ACJ 317, had observed that where the tenant did not commit one but committed defaults for several months as if Section 13(1) of the Act did not exist at all such a conduct was simply not condonable. In the present case as has already been noticed hereinabove the tenant-defendant had been a persistent defaulter and had never cared for either moving an application seeking condonation of delay in making the deposit or furnishing any explanation whatsoever for the inordinate delay in making the required deposits as envisaged under Section 13(1) of the Act. The Court below, therefore, did not commit any error in holding him a defaulter as envisaged under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant has tried to assail the findings recorded by the Courts below on material questions of fact. These findings are based on an appraisal of evidence on the record and do not suffer from any such legal infirmity which may justify an interference by this Court in the present proceedings while exercising the limited jurisdiction envisaged under Section 100, Civil Procedure Code. 15. No substantial question of law is involved in this appeal which requires consideration by this Court. 16. 15. No substantial question of law is involved in this appeal which requires consideration by this Court. 16. This second appeal lacks merits and is accordingly dismissed in limine under Order 41, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code.