Honble MISRA, J.–During the year 1990 Bhupender Rawat, the deceased, was a student of the Yuvraj Pratap Singh Homeopathic College at Alwar. The appellants and Dinesh Chauhan, Rajiv Kasana, Narender Kumar, Ashok Tiwari (since acquitted) and Babloo alias Ajay (absconding) were also the students of the said institution. On July 24, 1990 at about 8.45 PM when PW/4 Shakti Singh, PW/5 Sunil Chaudhary, PW/7 Narender, PW/10 Vinod Kumar and PW/13 Satyabir were at the `Pan Shop of DW/1 Harish Chander near the Mulsisar Chauraha at Alwar the appellants alongwith the acquitted co-accused and Babloo (absconder) reached there on a Honda Motorcycle and a scooter. They are stated to be armed with sarya, hockey, revolver, Knives etc. They opened an attack on Shakti Singh and Narender. In the meanwhile the deceased had also reached there. Leaving Shakti Singh, who had received a knife blow on his left hand at the hands of Rishipal by then the appellants proceeded to-wards Bhupender deceased. The deceased tried in vain to hide himself behind or under the `Khoka wherefrom he was dragged out by the appellants and fatally assaulted with knives. Other colleagues of the appellants are stated to have given beating to PW/7 Narender. Shakti Singh had run away to- wards Military area wherefrom he reached Police Station Sadar, Alwar. A large number of people had gathered at the spot and some one from the crowd gave a telephonic call to the police at Kotwali, Alwar. After having assaulted the deceased and the prosecution witnesses including Sunil Chaudhary and Narender, the appellants and their colleagues retired themselves from the scene of occurrence leaving a dead Bhupender behind them. The cause for such allegedly intended criminal assault by the appellants & their colleagues on the deceased & the prosecution witnesses is stated to be a criminal case which had been registered against the appellant on the previous night by PW/7 Narendra with the help of deceased and other prosecution witnesses. (2). At Police Station Kotwali, Alwar PW/21 Gopal Singh, the then Station House Officer (SHO), received the telephonic message about the incident at 10.05 P.M. and after recording the same in the Daily Diary at S.No. 1538 (Ex.P/33) left for the spot. While he was leaving the police station PW/5 Sunil Chaudhary reached there and lodged the first Information Report of the incident (Ex. P/W). While he was leaving the police station PW/5 Sunil Chaudhary reached there and lodged the first Information Report of the incident (Ex. P/W). PW/18 Kanwar Sen, ASI, registered Crime 515/90 u/SS 147, 148, 149, 324, 307 and 302 IPC against the appellants the their colleagues vide Ex. P/6 and forwarded the formal FIR to Gopal Singh SHO through PW/16 Mool Chand, Constable. (3). Gopal Singh SHO found Bhupender Singh lying in a pool of blood on the ground near the Mulsisar Chauraha. He removed him to the General Hospital where duty doctor declared him dead. On conducting autopsy on his dead body in the following morning Dr. Harsh Chandra Jain, the Medical Jurist at the General Hospital, noted one incised and three steb wounds on his person. The stab wounds had cut middle lobe of left lung and the left vertical of heart of the deceased. Dr. Jain opined that the stab wounds on the chest causing perforation of heart had led to hemorrhage and shock which resulted in the death of the deceased. (4). On being examined medically, PW/4 Shakti Singh, PW5 Sunil Chaudhary, PW7 Narendra were also found having sustained simple injuries with blunt as well as sharp weapons. (5). In the course of investigation the present appellants and the four co-accused, since acquitted by the trial court, were arrested. Two knives are stated to have been discovered pursuant to the disclosure statements allegedly made by the appellants u/S. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act to the police. Those were though sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory for Rajasthan at Jaipur for necessary examination yet the desired report of the Chemical Examiner and/or the Serologist is not available on the record of the lower court. (6). After having completed the investigation a police report u/S. 173(2) Cr.P.C. against the present appellants and four others, as afore-said, was submitted by the Police before the concerned Magistrate. Report u/S. 299 read with Section 173(8) was submitted against Babloo @ Ajay, who is reported to be still at large. (7). On receipt of the case by him, after its commitment, the learned Additio- nal Sessions Judge, Alwar tried the appellants for offences u/SS. 148, 302, 323 and 324 IPC and while acquitting four of the accused of all the charges, convicted the present appellants of offences u/S. 302/34 and 324 IPC. (7). On receipt of the case by him, after its commitment, the learned Additio- nal Sessions Judge, Alwar tried the appellants for offences u/SS. 148, 302, 323 and 324 IPC and while acquitting four of the accused of all the charges, convicted the present appellants of offences u/S. 302/34 and 324 IPC. Both the appellants were awarded imprisonment for life and fine of Rs. 200/- each for the former offence and simple imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs. 100/- each for the later vide judg- ment and order dated June 26, 1995 which have been challenged by the appellants through their separate appeals to this Court. (8). Not challenging the factum of the incident wherein final injuries to Bhupender deceased, one injury with sharp weapon to Shakti Singh, one injury to Sunil Chaudhary and certain injuries to Narender with blunt weapon were caused at the relevant day time and place, the learned counsel for the appellants urged that neither of the two appellants was proved to be the author of injuries caused either to the deceased or the injured witnesses. It was vehemently urged that with PW/5 Sunil Chaudhary, PW/10 Vinod and PW/13 Satybir turning hostile and not supporting the prosecution case there was no satisfactory evidence in the state- ments of the two remaining witnesses namely PW/4 Shakti Singh and PW/7 Narender to connect either of the two appellants with the offences committed against the deceased and/or the injured witnesses as much as both the aforementioned two witnesses were enimically disposed of to-wards the appellants on account of the minor incident allegedly having taken place between them and the appellants. (9). The learned Public Prosecutor, supporting the judgment and order under appeal, however, submitted that not only the two injured eye-witnesses had fully supported the prosecution case but also the alleged hostile testimony of PW/5 Sunil Chaudhary, who was also the informant in this case, fully corroborated the prosecution version against the appellants. (9). The learned Public Prosecutor, supporting the judgment and order under appeal, however, submitted that not only the two injured eye-witnesses had fully supported the prosecution case but also the alleged hostile testimony of PW/5 Sunil Chaudhary, who was also the informant in this case, fully corroborated the prosecution version against the appellants. The learned Public Prosecutor further sub- mitted that though this case was based on direct evidence of the eye-witnesses and in such a case the motive on the part of the accused to commit offence against his victim pales into insignificance yet the incident which occurred in the previous night between the appellants and Narender PW/7 and in respect of which the deceased had helped Narender by going to the Police Station Sadar and getting the F.I.R. (Ex.P29) lodged against them and Babloo and by such act of the deceased and the prosecution witnesses the appellants had left annoyed and got enraged, go a long way to establish a motive on the part of the appellants to teach lesson to the deceased and the prosecution witnesses. (10). Before we proceed to appreciate the contentions advanced by the two sides before us we consider it worthwhile to refer to the incident having taken place on the previous day between the appellants on the one hand and PW/7 Narender on the other and which incident is referred to by the prosecution as affording a motive to the appellants to commit offences against the deceased and the prosecu- tion witnesses and by the appellants for their alleged false implication in this case. (11). (11). With regard to the incident which had taken place between the parties a day before the version advanced by the prosecution through the statements of PW/4 Shakti Singh and PW/7 Narender was that they both were residing jointly in a rented room in Daudpur locality of Alwar, that on 23.7.90 at about 8.00PM Naren- der had gone to the Naresh Hotel near the General Hospital and when he was leaving the hotel after taking his mean there Anil Sharma appellant abused him and tried to pick up quarrel with him but the witness returned to his room, that after a while the two appellants alongwith Raju Yadava, co-accused, reached his room on a vehicle and after dragging him from his room beat him, that on his return Shakti Singh took Narender to Police Station Sadar, that on his way he met with Bhupender deceased and Chander Prakash who accompanied Shakti Singh and Narender to the Police Station Sadar and lodged the F.I.R. of the incident. PW/20 Raghubir Singh, the then S.H.O. Police Station Sadar, proved the F.I.R. Ex.p/29 which, he stated, was written as per report of Narender and Crime No. 200/90 u/SS. 323, 341, 452 and 504 IPC was registered against the appellants and Raju Yadava, co-accused since acquitted). On examining Narender on 25.7.90 at General Hospital PW/14 Dr. Mahender Kumar had noted 7 injuries caused with blunt weapon on his person and had opined that four of such injuries were caused to him within the last 24 to 48 hours whereas the rest three were caused within last 24 hours. Such an opinion of the expert witness was based on his observation of scab on three abrasions while no such scab formation was observed by him on other abrasions. The prosecution case was that Narender had also been assaulted on the night of 24.7.90 as well. This part of prosecution evidence satisfactorily proves that in respect of his marpeet by the appellants and Raju Yadava, in the previous night, Narender (PW.7) had lodged a FIR against them at Police Station Sadar and that in lodging such FIR on 23.7.90 at 11.30 PM Shakti Singh and the deceased Bhupender had actively helped him. In fact, in their examinations recorded u/S. 313 Cr.P.C. both the appellants and in his statement as a defence witness Dr. In fact, in their examinations recorded u/S. 313 Cr.P.C. both the appellants and in his statement as a defence witness Dr. Hari Prakash Tyagi (DW.2), the Principal of their College, admitted that a violent incident of marpeet amongst some students of the College had taken place on 23.7.90. (12). Whereas the prosecution witnesses specifically stated on oath that in such an incident on that day Narender had been beaten by the appellants and Raju Yadav and a F.I.R. was lodged by him against his assailants neither the appellants nor their defence witness accused the prosecution witnesses and/or the deceased of any aggression or assault on the appellants and/or any other member of their party. Therefore, the circumstances of the case and conduct and behaviour of the parties involved herein clearly speak that by the act of Narender of lodging F.I.R. (Ex.p29) against them at the Police Station Sadar on 23.7.90 and Shakti Singh and Bhupender deceased helping Narender in such an act against them, the appellants had felt annoyed at and got enraged against the witnesses and the deceased. The appellants had thus a motive to commit acts of aggression and assault against the witnesses and the deceased. (13). It is true that in cases which are based on direct evidence on the acts committed by an accused, like the present one, motive on the part of the accused to commit offence complained of against the victim pales into insignificance but where the motive is pleaded and proved or its existence comes out of the evidence on record in a case, it may be taken note of by the court as it may help it not only in appreciating the ocular evidence of the eye- witnesses in right perspective but also may help it to know the background of the case and the genesis of the incident occurred. (14). (14). In the instant case whereas the evidence on record and the facts and circumstances attending on the commission of the offences on 24.7.90 loudly speak that the appellants had a motive to commit the offences against the prosecution witnesses and the deceased due to their (appellants) feeling enraged against the lodging of an F.I.R. against them, howsoever such a feeling may be unreasonable and ill-founded, there is no evidence on record, even to remotely suggest, that the prosecution witnesses and/or the deceased had any motive to use criminal force against the appellants and to implicate them falsely in the present case. Presence of injuries on the persons of the prosecution witnesses and the deceased and absence of any sort of injuries on the person of any of the appellants or any other member of their party, which would have ordinarily been caused to them in the normal course had the prosecution witnesses and/or the deceased intended to take revenge on the appellants of the marpeet of Narender on 23.7.1990 and gone to the Mulsisar Chauraha on 24.7.90 to accomplish such an objective. Further affords reliability to and acceptance of the prosecution theory in this case. (15). Now coming to the merits of the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants, relating to the worth and value of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses against the appellants, we find that PW/4 Shakti Singh and PW/7 Naren- der are both injured witnesses. They were living jointly in a rented room in Daudpur. Shakti Singh, after narrating about the incident of the previous night and, which has been discussed above in sufficient detail, stated that on the morning of 24.7.90 when he had gone to the hotel near the General Hospital the two appellants had questioned him about his getting the F.I.R. registered against them and threatened him with dire consequences. Shakti Singh, after narrating about the incident of the previous night and, which has been discussed above in sufficient detail, stated that on the morning of 24.7.90 when he had gone to the hotel near the General Hospital the two appellants had questioned him about his getting the F.I.R. registered against them and threatened him with dire consequences. The witness further stated that on the same day at about 8.30 P.M. he had gone to the pan shop at the Mulsisar Chauraha where PW/5 Sunil Chaudhary and PW/13 Satyabir were also there, that he asked them if they had seen Anil Sharma somewhere but they pleaded ignorance about him, that when he was talking to them he noticed Anil appellant and Babloo going on a Mot- orcycle to Scheme No.10 from the side of Shivaji Park, that after about 10 minutes the appellants alongwith the acquitted accused and Babloo reached the Mulsisar Chauraha on a Motor Cycle and a scooter and opened an assault on him, that during the meanwhile PW/7 Narender, PW/10 Vinod Tyagi and Bhupender deceased reached there, that the appellants and Babloo, leaving him proceed to- wards the approaching witnesses and the deceased, that the witness himself ran from the place of occurrence and hid himself behind a tree close by and from there he saw that the deceased had run for his life and hid himself behind the `Khoka wherefrom the appellants and Babloo dragged him out and started assaulting him with knives. The witness further stated that at that time he ran away towards the Military Area wherefrom he reached Police Station. (16). Giving an account of the earlier incident of his marpeet by the appellants and Babloo on the previous night, PW/7 Narender stated that on 24.7.90, in the early hours of the night, as soon as he, Vinod Tyagi and Bhupender deceased had reached the Manglasar Chauraha on a scooter the appellants and their colleagues encircled them and opened an attack upon them with knives, sarya, revolver etc. that he and Bhupender Rawat deceased though hid themselves behind the Panwalas Khoka yet the appellants dragged them out of there and assaulted them. He further stated that Anil Sharma had caused an injury with Sarya on his head and Richpal appellant with a knife whereupon he got unconscious and Sunil Chaudhary brought him to senses. that he and Bhupender Rawat deceased though hid themselves behind the Panwalas Khoka yet the appellants dragged them out of there and assaulted them. He further stated that Anil Sharma had caused an injury with Sarya on his head and Richpal appellant with a knife whereupon he got unconscious and Sunil Chaudhary brought him to senses. He added that during the meanwhile he had seen the two appellants attacking upon Bhupender deceased who fell down on the ground. The witness further stated that he had then ran away and reached Police Station Sadar. (17). It was urged by the learned counsel for the appellants that though both these witnesses were injured persons and, therefore, their presence at the spot at the relevant time cannot be much disputed yet since injuries had been caused to them in the very beginning of the occurrence they had run away from the place of occurrence and, therefore, they could have no occasion to see the assailants of the deceased causing injuries to him. It was further submitted that both the witnesses were examined late in the course of investigation and that they made improvement in their statements in court over those recorded, during investigation, u/S. 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. (18). We have closely scrutinized the testimony of both these witnesses. It is noted that though both of them were cross- examined at length yet they stood such test and did not falter on any material point. Save minor contradictions regarding the sequence of their own and some witnessess arrival and making some improvements over their statement recorded in the course of investigation they narrated all the relevant facts and material features of the prosecution case. They have unani- mously deposed that they were there at the place of occurrence, that the deceased Bhupender was also there when the appellants and Babloo in particular and their other colleagues in general had opened an armed attack on them and the deceased. They have specifically stated that both the appellants were armed with knives and Richpal appellant had caused an injury with the same on the left elbow of Shakti Singh and that injury to Narender had also been caused with a Sarya. (19). Both the witnesses are injured persons and their presence on the place of occurrence is beyond doubt. They have specifically stated that both the appellants were armed with knives and Richpal appellant had caused an injury with the same on the left elbow of Shakti Singh and that injury to Narender had also been caused with a Sarya. (19). Both the witnesses are injured persons and their presence on the place of occurrence is beyond doubt. It is also gathered that in the course of investigation Shakti Singh was examined u/S. 161 Cr.P.C. (Ex. D/1) on 27.7.90 and u/S. 164 Cr.P.C. (Ex. D/2) on 18.8.90 and Narender was examined u/S. 161 (Ex. D/3) on 25.7.90. The incident had taken place in the night of 24.7.90 and both these witnesses were injured persons. One of their colleagues had become victim of brutal assault and as a result of that had lost his life. (20). Both of them were examined for their injuries on 25.7.1990 on police request and both have stated that on running from the place of occurrence they had gone to the police station. There is no reason to assume that they were not available to the police. Late examining of Shakti Singh on 27.7.90 was for no fault of his and, therefore, his testimony cannot be rejected on the ground that he was examined a bit late by the police. Narender was examined on 25.7.90 and there was no delay in examining him by the police. Therefore, for these reasons the tes- timony of both these witnesses cannot be rejected. (21). It is no doubt true that Shakti Singh in his statements u/S. 161 (Ex. D/1) and u/S. 164 Cr.P.C. (Ex. D/2) had not stated that after sustaining a knife injury at the hands of Rishi Pal appellant he had hid himself behind a tree near the place of occurrence. That is an improvement in his statement and therefore, his testimony may be accepted to the extent that on seeing the appellants and their colleagues opening an assault with knives and saryas and after having himself sustained a knife blow from Rishipal on his left elbow the witness had run away from the place of occurrence. He was, therefore, not in a position to exactly see as to who of the two appellants had caused which injury to the deceased and which of the other collea- gues of the appellants did cause which of the injuries to other witnesses. He was, therefore, not in a position to exactly see as to who of the two appellants had caused which injury to the deceased and which of the other collea- gues of the appellants did cause which of the injuries to other witnesses. But that fact does not rob his testimony of the element of truth that is there in it with regard to the active role played by the present appellants in that bloody drama against him, other prosecution witnesses and Bhupender deceased. He had specifically stated that both the appellants were armed with knives and that they had used such wea- pons against him and other members of the prosecution party including the deceased. (22). The only material contradiction in the statement of Narendra with his statement before the police u/S. 161 (Ex. D/3) is that whereas in his statement in court he stated that Anil appellant had caused injury to him on the head with a sarya, in his statement u/S. 161 Cr.P.C. (Ex. D/3) he had stated that as soon as he, Vinod Tyagi and Bhupender deceased had reached the Manglasar Chauraha on their scooter and got down therefrom the present appellants alongwith 2 or 3 more, whom he did not know, fell upon them, that he and Bhupender deceased ran for their lives and hid themselves behind the Khoka, that the appellants dragged them out from there, that when the deceased began to run the present appellants attacked upon him with knives and that when he himself tried to run away some one from behind assaulted him with a Sariya on his head causing his fall on the ground. The contradiction was with regard to his own injury which he attributed to Rishipal appellant having been caused with a sarya. On the other points there was no contradiction between the two statements. In both the statements he had stated that he and the deceased had, in their effort to save themselves, hid themselves behind the khokho wherefrom the appellants had dragged them out and started assaulting them. In those hours of threatened attack and horror the witness and the deceased would have naturally tried to save themselves from an armed assault and run hither or thither to save their lives. In those hours of threatened attack and horror the witness and the deceased would have naturally tried to save themselves from an armed assault and run hither or thither to save their lives. In such moments, it appears more probable, the witness, while running from the place of occurrence, had sustained injury with a sarya on his head from behind. But on the other aspect of the prosecution case the witness has given a truthful account of the prosecution case and fully incrimi- nated the appellants. (23). Therefore, there are no cogent reasons to discard the testimony of Narender PW7 on the ground that he being an injured witness is an interested witness. The appellants alleged no enemity with him and there are no reasons for the assumption that the witness would try to falsely implicate the present appellants in the incident of 24.7.90 merely for the reason that he had been assaulted by them in the previous night. The sequence of the events and the naturality in the conduct and behaviour of the witness makes him a truthful witness and, therefore, he has rightly been relied upon by the learned trial court in respect to the the acts done by the present appellants in the bloody incident of 24.7.90. (24). PW/5 Sunil Chaudhary is the injured-informant in this case. In his examination-in-chief he stated that on the relevant day, time and place when he was chewing a pan at the Pan Shop of (DW/1) Harish at the Mulsisar Chauraha Satbir (PW/13) also reached there, that after some time Bhupender deceased and Shakti Singh too reached there, that when the deceased was telling him that a day earlier he had a quarrel with some students of the College, 10-12 students reached there and opened an assault on the deceased and Shakti Singh. He further stated that he could not identify whether the present appellants and other accused were there amongst the assailants of Shakti Singh and Bhupender deceased. At this stage, with the permission of the court, the witness was declared hostile. On being cross-exa- mined by the Public Prosecutor the witness admitted that he had lodged the FIR Ex.P/5 and was examined by the Magistrate u/S. 164 Cr.P.C. as well and his statement Ex. P/8 was also recorded. At this stage, with the permission of the court, the witness was declared hostile. On being cross-exa- mined by the Public Prosecutor the witness admitted that he had lodged the FIR Ex.P/5 and was examined by the Magistrate u/S. 164 Cr.P.C. as well and his statement Ex. P/8 was also recorded. On being cross- examined by the defence counsel he stated that he had taken the injured Naresh and Shakti Singh to the General Hospital and it was on the basis of the knowledge obtained by him from the two injured persons in the hospital that he narrated the details of the incident, of the assailants and the victims and the acts done by the present appellants. He further stated that after having written the F.I.R. Ex. P/5 in that way at the Hospital he had delivered the same at the police station at about 11.00 P.M. or so. With regard to his statement u/S. 164 Cr.P.C. (Ex. P/8) he stated that the police had asked him to give statement in terms of the FIR, Ex.P.5 and that it was after reading the FIR that he had given the same statement to the Magistrate as was there in the FIR. He, however, admitted that he himself had sustained an injury above his left eye and that he had been medically examined therefore. (25). In the FIR Ex. He, however, admitted that he himself had sustained an injury above his left eye and that he had been medically examined therefore. (25). In the FIR Ex. P.5, PW.5 Sunil Chaudhary had stated that when he and Satyabir Rathore were there at the Pan Shop, Shakti Singh and Bhupender deceased had also reached there, that soon thereafter the present appellants and their colleagues came on two vehicles and Rishipal appellant questioned Shakti Singh and Bhupender deceased about their getting a FIR registered against him and his friends, that saying so Rishipal attacked upon Shakti Singh with a knife and caused an injury to him on the left hand, that Shakti Singh ran away to the Military area, that he (the witness) and Satyabir caught hold of Dinesh and Babloo, that Bhupender deceased ran and hid himself behind the pan Khoka, that the appellants and their colleagues dragged him out from that place and then the present appellants gave one knife blow each to the deceased on his chest, that during the meanwhile Dinesh and Babloo got themselves freed from the hold of the witness (Sunil Chaudhary) and Satbir and attacked upon Bhupender causing injury to him on the shoulder, that the deceased got himself rescued any how from his assailants and ran towards the Bhagat Singh Chauraha but fell down at some distance and that af- ter having so beaten the prosecution witnesses and the deceased the assailants retired on their Motor Cycle and Scooter. It was also stated in the FIR that several local students were there with and amongst the assailant party and that some of the students were having fire- arm also. Narenders presence was also mentioned in the FIR and it was stated about him that he too had sustained injuries with a sa- riya. Almost to the same effect was the statement given by the witness to the Magistrate when examined u/S. 164 Cr.P.C. (26). A First Information Report in a criminal case has a place of importance in the realm of Crime and Punishment. When given in respect of a cognizable offence it lays down the foundation for state action through its appropriate agency for investigation into the offence, trace out the criminal and get him punished for his criminal act. A First Information Report in a criminal case has a place of importance in the realm of Crime and Punishment. When given in respect of a cognizable offence it lays down the foundation for state action through its appropriate agency for investigation into the offence, trace out the criminal and get him punished for his criminal act. It assumes much significance when given by an eye-witness to the commission of the offence reported in which case it may be used to corroborate or contradict its maker with his substantive evidence in court. Of course, it cannot be used to corroborate the statement of a person who is not its maker. (27). It was, however, submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that since a telephonic message about the incident had already been received at the police station, Kotwali, and on the basis of such information a report had been made in the Daily diary (Ex.P.33), it is Ex.P.33 that may be said to be the First Information Report in this case and, therefore, Ex.P. 5 cannot be pressed into ser- vice to corroborate or contradict the statement of PW.5 Sunil Chaudhary at the trial. In our opinion the argument advanced is not correct. (28). The telephonic message (Ex.P/) simply informed the place at police station Kotwali that at the Mulsisar Chauraha a person had died in a quarrel. This information made no reference either to the maker thereof or to the deceased or to the relevant and material details of particulars about the incident reported. It is in evidence that soon after the recording of the telephonic message PW.5 Sunil Chaudhary had reached the police station and presented the written report Ex.P.5, which contained the necessary details of the incident and the persons involved therein. Under such circumstances the learned trial Judge did not err in law in trea- ting Ex.P.5 and not the telephonic message Ex.P.33 as the First Information Report in this case for the purpose of corroboration and/or contradiction. (see Sakha Ram vs. State of Maharashtra (1). (29). Under such circumstances the learned trial Judge did not err in law in trea- ting Ex.P.5 and not the telephonic message Ex.P.33 as the First Information Report in this case for the purpose of corroboration and/or contradiction. (see Sakha Ram vs. State of Maharashtra (1). (29). Be that as it may, we are of the opinion that though Sunil Chaudhary was declared hostile and he stated that he had given, in the FIR, detailed account of the incident as per knowledge acquired by him from Narender and Shakti Singh yet his testimony cannot be totally discarded from scrutiny and consideration and the FIR Ex.P.5 can be used to corroborate or contradict him. It cannot be lost sight of that this witness is an injured person himself, that he admits the presence of other injured persons and the deceased and sustaining injuries by them in the course of the incident and that he further admits the version given by him in his statement u/S. 164 Cr.P.C. in contradiction to what he stated in the court. The version given by him in the FIR Ex.P.5 was the version given by him in the FIR Ex.P.5 was the version based on his personal knowledge as an injured eye-witness and such ver- sion gets all support and stands proved to our satisfaction by the substantive evidence, direct and circumstantial. Therefore, the testimony of Sunil Chaudhary cannot be outrightly rejected and has to be considered to the extent it is found relevant and material by the court, as discussed above, and stands corroborated by his version in the FIR and by the substantive evidence of other witnesses. (30). PW.10 Vinod and PW.13 Satyabir are also hostile witnesses, whereas Satyabir stated that though he had seen some persons assaulting the deceased at the relevant day, time and place as he himself was present there at that time yet he did not know the assailants of the deceased. Vinod, on the other hand, has stated that as soon as he, Narender Sharma and the deceased had reached the Mulsisar Chauraha he saw a crowd gathered there, that Narender and the deceased started running after getting down from the fallen Scooter but two or three persons from the crowd chased the deceased and that he himself ran away from the spot and later on came to know of the death of the deceased. The testimony of these witnesses may be accepted to the extent the same stands corroborated by other witnesses regarding the presence of the injured witnesses and the deceased, and their assailants on the spot at the relevant time and an assault on them. (31). To sum up, on a thorough examination of the entire evidence on record and keeping in mind the totality of circumstances to the case, we hold that the deceased had died on the spot, that he had died of the injuries sustained by him, that other witnesses had also sustained injuries at the hands of the assailants, that the incident had been promptly reported to the police and that the FIR was lodged within an hour or so of the incident and therein not only the detailed particulars of the incidents were given and the present appellants were specifically named as the authors of the fatal injuries caused to the deceased but also the prosecution version given therein stands proved by the statements of the prosecution witnesses Shakti Singh, Narender, Sunil Chaudhary and Vinod, as discussed above in detail. We are, therefore, satisfied that it is proved beyond doubt that the present appellants were the authors of the fatal injuries caused to Bhupender deceased and simple hurt with sharp edged weapon like a knife to Shakti Singh. We are further satisfied that the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge with regard to the complicity of the two appellants before us was fully substantiated by cogent and reliable evidence of the eye- witnesses which in turn got satisfactory corroboration from medical evidence on record and the facts and circumstances of the case attending upon the commission of the offences against the deceased and the injured persons in this case. (32). It was next urged by the learned counsel for the appellants that in the facts and circumstances of the case an intention to cause death of the deceased cannot be attributed to either of the two appellants and, therefore, in the death of the deceased no offence punishable u/S. 302 IPC was committed. (32). It was next urged by the learned counsel for the appellants that in the facts and circumstances of the case an intention to cause death of the deceased cannot be attributed to either of the two appellants and, therefore, in the death of the deceased no offence punishable u/S. 302 IPC was committed. In any case, ur- ged the learned course, if it found that one of the assailants of the deceased had caused a fatal injury to him, then, since such an assailant did not act in prosecution of the common object of an unlawful assembly, a position which the learned trial court has found, and since no community of intention to cause death of the deceased is established between such offender and the present appellants, they cannot be held liable for the offence or murder with the help of Sec. 34 IPC. In support of such contentions the learned counsel relied upon the cases of Mahender Singh vs. State (2), Rabinder Kumar Day vs. State of Orissa (3) and Kailash vs. State (4). We find no force in such arguments. (33). The learned trial Judge had no doubt tried the present appellants and other four accused as members of an unlawful assembly but on appreciation of the evidence placed before him he held that the commission of offence u/S. 148 IPC and the appellants being members of an unlawful assembly were not proved by the prosecution beyond doubt. He could have made such an opinion on the basis of the evidence on record which had, in his opinion, left it doubtful whether the number of the known and identified assailants of the deceased and the prosecution witnesses were at least five. He had accordingly acquitted the appellants and other accused of the charge u/S. 148 and consequently of the vicarious liability u/S. 149 IPC for offence u/S. 302 IPC and convicted both the accused of the offence of mur- der with the help of Section 34 IPC. Question arises whether the learned trial Judge could have legally done so. (34). He had accordingly acquitted the appellants and other accused of the charge u/S. 148 and consequently of the vicarious liability u/S. 149 IPC for offence u/S. 302 IPC and convicted both the accused of the offence of mur- der with the help of Section 34 IPC. Question arises whether the learned trial Judge could have legally done so. (34). After the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nanak Chand vs. State of Punjab (5) the legal position of the question, as addressed by us to ourselves, appears to have remained some-what uncertain till the same was clea- red up by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Willie (Willium) Slaney vs. State of M.P. (6) wherein the following exposition of law was made: ``Section 34, 114 and 119 of the Indian Penal Code provide for criminal liability viewed from different angles as regards actual participants, accessories and men actuated by a common object or a common in- tention; and the charge is a rolled up one involving the direct liability and the constructive liability without specifying who are directly liable and who are sought to be made constructively liable. In such a situation, the absence of a charge under one or other of the various heads of criminal liability for the offence cannot be said to be fatal by itself, and before a conviction for the substantive offence, without a charge, can be set aside, prejudice will have to be made out. In most of the cases of this kind, evidence is normally given from the outset as to who was primary responsible for the act which brought about the offence and such evidence is of course relevant. (35). It is true that there is a difference between the scope of Section 34, which requires active participation by one in the commission of the offence in order to be liable for the act done by the other participant in ``prosecution of the common intention, and Section 149 IPC which does not require such active participation or overt act by all the members of the unlawful assembly and casts vicarious liability upon others of the act done even by one member of such assembly ``in furtherance of the common object of such assembly of which others are members. But as held by the Privy Council in the case of Narender Kumar Ghosh vs. King Emperor (7), and which view does not appear to have ever been departed from by our courts, that Sections 34 and 149 IPC have some sort of resemblance between them and are, to some extent, over-lapping, conviction of the appellants with the aid of Sec. 34, though, therefore, charged for vicarious liability with the help of Sec. 149 IPC does not, in our opinion become bad in law. (36). Be that as it may, the authoritative pronouncement in Willies case (supra) by the Apex Court sets the controversy, if any, at rest and following the ratio deci-den-di of the said decision we hold that it is open to the court to convict an accused with the help of Section 34 IPC even if the said section was not specifically mentioned in the charge made against him and, instead, Section 149 IPC was stated in the charge, provided a finding that the assailant had a common intention with the another is/or can be recorded in a given case. Such a view, we think, gets sup- port from the decisions in the cases of Amar Singh vs. State of Haryana (8), Bhoor Singh vs. State of Punjab (9) and Dhanna vs. State of M.P. (10). (37). On the other limb of the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants regarding the offence committed in this case, we agree that the present case does not fall within the ambit of Clause Firstly and Secondly to Section 300 IPC. It squarely falls under Clause Thirdly and we can do no better than to refer to the observations of Vivian Bose, J. of the Supreme Court in Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab (11), which observations, in the words of A.P. Sen, J. of the Apex Court in Jagrup Singh vs. State of Haryana (12) ``have become locus classicus and ``the test laid down in Virsa Singhs Case (supra) for the applicability of Clause Thirdly is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law. (38). (38). In his classic judgment Vivian Bose, J. held that before the prosecution succeeds in bringing its case under Clause ``Thirdly to Section 300 IPC it must prove the following facts, viz.: ``First it must establish quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. The above two elements are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, i.e. to say, that it was not accidental or inten- tional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once the above three elements are proved the enquiry should proceed further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type, just described, made up of the three elements set out above, is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. Explaining the third ingredient the learned Judge observed: ``The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a vital one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in ques- tion and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion. The learned Judge further observed that : ``Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under Sec. 300, 3rdly. The learned Judge further observed that : ``Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under Sec. 300, 3rdly. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a license to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injury of that kind they must fact the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced, that the injury was accidental or otherwise un-intentional. (39). In the instant case PW.11 Dr. Harish Chand Jain, the then Medical Jurist at the General Hospital Alwar, had conducted the autopsy on the dead body of Bhu- pender deceased at 9.30 AM on 24.7.90 and noted the following external injuries on his person; 1. Incised wound 2cm x1/2cmx scalp deep, horizontal, on fore-head, mid-line; 2. Stab wound 3cm x1-1/2cmx muscle deep, elliptical shaped. With margins sharp and direction forward to down ward, on left deltoid region, obliquely placed; 3. Stab wound 2cm x1cmx muscle deep, elliptical shaped, with margins sharp and direction forward to downward, on left deltoid region. 1/2" anterior to injury No.2, obliquely placed, and 4. Stab wound 3cm x1-1/2cmx cavity deep, ledge shaped with margins sharp and direction medially, inward and upward almost horizontally placed 2" away from the left nipple at 5 Oclock position. (40). Dr. Jain opined that the above injuries had been caused to the deceased with sharp object within six hours before his death. (41). On opening the dead body Dr. Stab wound 3cm x1-1/2cmx cavity deep, ledge shaped with margins sharp and direction medially, inward and upward almost horizontally placed 2" away from the left nipple at 5 Oclock position. (40). Dr. Jain opined that the above injuries had been caused to the deceased with sharp object within six hours before his death. (41). On opening the dead body Dr. Jain had noticed a wound in the 5th inter-costal space, corresponding to the external injury on that part of the body of the deceased, with blood clots, perforation through and through, 2cm. in length, on medical border, horizontally placed on the middle lobe of left lung. He had further observed perforation of left vertical of heart, about 2cm in length, with blood and fluid in cavity corresponding to external injury. The expert witness, therefore, opined that the stab wound on the chest, causing perforation of heart, had led to haemorrhage and shock resulting in the death of the deceased. (42). On the facts found existing on and in the body of the deceased by the witness it is fully established that as many as three injuries with sharp weapon were caused to him on the chest part and that one of those injuries had caused perforation of left lung and the other of left vertical of the heart. Both those injuries were, therefore, quite serious and grievous. (43). As has been discussed above in sufficient detail while appreciating the testimony of Shakti Singh, Sunil Chaudhary and Narender, the three injured witne- sses, it is established beyond doubt that the present appellants were the authors of the above mentioned injuries to the deceased. It need not be recalled that the appellants and their colleagues had gone to the place of occurrence duly armed with weapons like knives, iron rods, hockey, etc. and had attacked upon the prosecution witnesses with such weapons. It is fully established on record that both the present appellants were armed with knives and that after having dragged the helpless deceased from his hiding place behind the Pan Khoka they both had caused injuries to him on the chest part with their respective deadly weapons. The injuries found on the chest part of the deceased were the result of the intentional acts of the appellants. The injuries found on the chest part of the deceased were the result of the intentional acts of the appellants. We entertain no doubt, on the evidence before us and in the facts and circumstances of the case, that both the appellants had intentionally inflicted those injuries on the chest part of the body of the deceased in furtherance of a common intention on their part and that those injuries, caused by them to the deceased, were not at all accidental or un-intended. (44). On the basis of the facts found by Dr. Jain on and inside the dead body of the deceased and which facts are fully established on record. We hold that the injuries so intentionally, caused by the two appellants to the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and did, in fact, cause his death. (45). In view of the above discussion we hold that all the four elements of the test laid down in Virsa Singhs case (supra) are found satisfactorily present and proved in the instant case and, therefore, we are in agreement with the learned trial Judge, that in the death of Bhupender deceased the offence of murder punishable u/Sec. 300 Thirdly IPC was committed and that both the appellants are guilty of the same. (46). The conduct and behviour of the appellants and of the deceased and the other prosecution witnesses, as exhibited in the facts and circumstances of this case, leave us in no doubt that the appellants had intentionally inflicted injuries to Bhupender deceased, which injuries were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death and did cause his death, in furtherance of a common intention on their part to cause such bodily injuries to him. They have, therefore, been rightly held guilty u/S. 302 with the aid of 34 IPC. (47). We have appreciated the facts of the present case in the light of the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants and the defence evidence led by DW.1 Harish Chand Panwala and DW.2 Dr. Hari Prakash, the Principal of the Homeopathic College Alwar which evidence does not adversely affect the value of the positive and reliable prosecution evidence regarding the complicity of both the appellants in the crime, committed in this case. Hari Prakash, the Principal of the Homeopathic College Alwar which evidence does not adversely affect the value of the positive and reliable prosecution evidence regarding the complicity of both the appellants in the crime, committed in this case. In our opinion since the principles of law laid down therein are not different from those we have referred to above and which, in our opinion apply on all fours to the facts of the instant case, we need not discuss them. (48). We further hold that Richpal had caused a simple injury with a sharp weapon to Shakti Singh in furtherance of the common intention of both the appellants. Therefore, their conviction u/S. 324 IPC r/w Sec. 34 IPC is well in order. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed.