Judgment J.C. Gupta, J. 1. This is tenant's writ petition for quashing the order dated 17-11-97 passed by respondent No. 1 whereby the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 11-12-1996 has been reversed. 2. The dispute relates to a portion of house No. C/123/325-A situate in Mohalla Purdilpur, Gorakhpur City which is admittedly governed by the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (briefly, the Act). It is also not disputed that the portion in the tenancy of the petitioner was purchased by one Ramesh Chandra Srivastava from the then landlady Smt. Sarlet Chose and thereafter the said Ramesh Chandra Srivastava sold the same to respondent No. 2 by means of a registered sale-deed dated 18-4-92. The landlady respondent No. 2 moved an application under Section 21(l)(a) of the Act on 25-4-95 for the release of the tenanted accommodation for her personal requirement after serving a notice dated 11-11-92 on the petitioner. In the release application the landlady claimed that in order to cater the need of her family members she required addition al accommodation as her family was facing much difficulty and inconvenience on ac count of acute shortage of space for their comfortable living. The tenant petitioner besides contesting the said application on merits also raised a legal objection that the release application of the landlady was not maintainable under the first proviso to Section 21(l)(a) of the Act. It was pleaded that no notice as contemplated under the said proviso was served upon the tenant and the application was premature having been filed before the expiry of a period of three years from the date of purchase of the property in question by the landlady. With regard to the claim made by the landlady it was pleaded by the tenant that the landlady has with her sufficient accommodation and it was further pleaded that the two 'devars' of the landlady as also father-in-law and mother-in-law were not the members of the family of the landlady nor they were residing with the landlady in the accommodation already in her occupation. They were living separately. The Prescribed Authority rejected the landlady's application holding that the same was not legally maintainable on ac count of the fact that the notice sent by the landlady was not in conformity to the requirements of the proviso to Section 21(1)(a). They were living separately. The Prescribed Authority rejected the landlady's application holding that the same was not legally maintainable on ac count of the fact that the notice sent by the landlady was not in conformity to the requirements of the proviso to Section 21(1)(a). On the question of bonafide need of the landlady, the Prescribed Authority reached to the conclusion that the accommodation already available with the landlady was sufficient to meet out the requirement of the members of her family and it was neither moral nor a social obligation of her to keep her father-in-law and mother-in-law and her Devars with her. The Prescribed Authority further found that even after taking the need of the aforesaid persons into consideration, the landlady still has with her sufficient accommodation and there was no requirement for any additional space. The landlady aggrieved by the judgment of the Prescribed Authority filed appeal under Section 22 of the Act which has been allowed by the impugned judgment by respondent No. 1. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner firstly contended that in the present case notice which is alleged to have been served upon the tenant petitioner by the landlady after purchasing the house in question was not in accordance with the proviso to Section 21(l)(a) of the Act inasmuch as it was simply a notice terminating the tenancy of the petitioner and it nowhere disclosed that release application would be filed against the petitioner by the landlady on the expiry of a period of six months and, therefore, it was rightly held by the Prescribed Authority that the application for release was not legally maintainable and the view taken by the appellate authority contrary to it is illegal. Whereas learned Counsel for the respondent landlady supported the view of the appellate authority by contending that the notice as contemplated under the proviso to Section 21(l)(a) of the Act was duly served upon the tenant in the present case. Both the Counsel placed before the Court a number of judicial authorities of this Court as well as of the Apex Court in support of their respective contentions. Both the Counsel placed before the Court a number of judicial authorities of this Court as well as of the Apex Court in support of their respective contentions. A perusal of the proviso to Section 21(l)(a) of the Act would show that it applies only to a case where the tenant is found to be in occupation of the tenanted building before its purchase by the landlord and such purchase having been made after the commencement of the Act. In such cases the landlord cannot get the tenanted accommodation released before the expiry of period of three years since the date of purchase of building as is provided in the first clause of the proviso. The latter part of the proviso further requires the landlord to give a notice in that behalf to the tenant atleast six months before an application under clause (a) is filed. 5. As far as the first requirement of the proviso is concerned, in the present case the same has been fulfilled as undisputedly the application for release was instituted before the Prescribed Authority on 25-4-95, Le., after the expiry of a period of more than three years from the date of purchase of the house by the landlady and the same was decided by the Prescribed Authority in the year 1996 by the order dated 11-12-96. 6. The question, however, that arises for consideration by this Court is whether the notice which was served upon the petitioner tenant by the landlady after she purchased the accommodation in question fulfilled the requirement of the latter part of the proviso, which requires the service of notice on the tenant at least six months before the filing of an application for release. Learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that as per the requirements of the proviso, the notice must mention (a) that the tenanted accommodation has been purchased by the notice giver; (b)hat the same is bona fide required by him for his personal need; (c) that the tenant should be asked to vacate the same in favour of the landlord ; (d) for that purpose the tenant should be given at least a period of six months ; and (e) that the release application shall be moved if the tenant does not vacate within the notice period. It was urged by the learned Counsel that the notice in question did not specify the aforesaid facts and it was simply a notice terminating tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, therefore, no valid notice is proved to have been served upon the petitioner and consequently application of release was not maintainable. Learned Counsel referred to certain observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Nanak Jahan and Ors. v. Addl. District Judge and Ors., AIR 1981 SC 1549 . It was observed in the aforesaid decision that the notice contemplated by the proviso to Section 21 of the Act cannot be a casual or oral request to the tenant but a formal demand, ordinarily in writing and clearly insisting on vacant possession after the requisite period. In the aforesaid decision, however, the Supreme Court declined to grant leave and to examine the matter further because the plea about the factum or legality of the notice was not raised in the trial Court and also because an undertaking to the High Court was given to vacate the tenanted accommodation within a specified period. Therefore, the occasion to examine the question in detail as to what particulars are to be clearly specified in the notice did not arise before the Supreme Court. 7. The next case relied upon by the petitioner's Counsel is Abdul Jabbar v. VII District Judge, Gorakhpurand Ors., 1989 ACJ 137, and the attention of the Court was invited to paragraph 8 of the report wherein the following observations were made: "the words in the proviso 'in that behalf are very significant. The notice spoken of in the proviso is not merely, a notice to the tenant of the factum of the purchase of the property by a subsequent landlord, but the notice has to be in regard to the fact that the purchaser wants to move an application for release under Section 21(l)(a) of the Act. The notice contemplated, in my opinion, is only an intimation to the tenant to the effect that the landlord wants to move an application for release in respect of the property which he has purchased. The legislative intent is that the notice should be in writing. The notice contemplated, in my opinion, is only an intimation to the tenant to the effect that the landlord wants to move an application for release in respect of the property which he has purchased. The legislative intent is that the notice should be in writing. It is not necessary, however, to state the grounds in the said notice but the notice should be specific and not vague intimating to the tenant that the purchaser bona fide required the building in question and the building be vacated within six months and if he does not vacate then the release application shall be filed against him. The providing of a notice by the legislature appears to me, for the reason so as to give notice to the tenant of the fact that a release application will be filed by the purchaser and in the meanwhile the tenant may make an alternative arrangement for his resident, if he can so make. This notice, in my opinion, is mandatory be cause it is a condition precedent for the entertainment of an application under Section 21(l)(a) of the Act in respect of the purchaser of a property where a tenant had already been in occupation of the said property." In the case of Abdul Jabbar (supra) since no notice as contemplated under the proviso was at all given the application for release was held to be not maintainable. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then placed before the Court the decision rendered by Hon'ble M.C. Agrawal, J. in Vijay Bahadur Singh v. IV A.D.J. Etawah, 1997 (2) ARC 59, wherein the learned Single Judge held that service of notice is a requirement of law for the maintainability of a petition under Section 21(1) of the Act, and, therefore, illsincum bent on the landlords to specifically and unequivocally allege that they had com plied with the requirements of the proviso and the vague plea that legal notice had been served was of no consequence. In this case, the landlord in the release application merely stated that a legal notice was served on the tenant and it was not specifically stated that the notice was in compliance of the provisions of first proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act. In the written statement the tenant made a complete denial and it was further stated that the application of the landlord was premature. In the written statement the tenant made a complete denial and it was further stated that the application of the landlord was premature. Admittedly, when the landlords did not file copy of the alleged notice, the tenant filed the same before the Prescribed Authority and after examining the same the learned Judge was of the view that the notice was patently not a notice satisfying the terms of the proviso and was simply a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy of the petitioner on the expiry of thirty days. Reliance has also been placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the latest decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Martin and Harris Ltd. v. VIth Addl. District Judge and others, AIR 1998 SC 492 , wherein it has been held that the provision of six months' notice before initiation of proceedings under Section 21(l)(a) is mandatory. 9. 1 May now refer to the decisions relied upon by the respondents Counsel in support of his argument that the notice served upon the tenant in the present case fulfilled the requirement of the second clause of the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act. The first case relied upon by the Counsel for the respondents is Mahendra Pal Singh v. IInd addl. District Judge, Dehradun and Ors., 1993 (1) ARC 210 , wherein it was held by Hon'ble S.R. Singh, J. that the notice contemplated by first proviso to Section 21(1) cannot be treated at par with a notice for determination of tenancy contemplated by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 10. Reliance has also been placed on the case of Misri Lal v. IXth Addl. District Judge, Gorakhpur and Ors., 1992 (2) ARC 545. In this case the notice which was served showed that it was a combined/composite notice purporting to be a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as well as a notice envisaged under the first proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act. In the notice it was asserted by the landlord that he urgently required the accommodation in question for his personal use and also asked the tenant to vacate the same. In the notice it was asserted by the landlord that he urgently required the accommodation in question for his personal use and also asked the tenant to vacate the same. The notice, however, did not make any mention that the tenant should vacate the premises in question within six months or that a release application will be filed after the expiry of the six months' period. The question which arose for consideration before the Court was whether the notice could be deemed to be sufficient compliance of the requirement as envisaged under the first proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act and it was held that the notice was valid. The learned Judge held that the first proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act prohibits the entertainment of the application for release contemplated there under on the ground mentioned in clause (a) unless the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before moving such an application. Section 21(l)(a) of the Act provides that the application for release may be entertained on the ground that the building is bona fide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any member of his family or any person for whose benefit it is held by him either for residential purposes or for the purposes of any profession, trade or calling or where the landlord is the trustee of a public: charitable trust for the objects of the trust. The proviso does not cast any duty on the landlord to specify in the notice that the tenant should vacate the premises within six months. The requirement of the proviso is only that the tenant must be informed of the grounds for seeking eviction and since in that case the landlord had clearly informed the tenant about the ground for release, the notice fulfilled the requirement as the application for release was filed on the expiry of period of six months from the date of service of notice. In para 12 of the report it was further held that "it is, therefore, obvious that the non-mentioning of the period of six months in the notice itself could not invalidate the notice. In para 12 of the report it was further held that "it is, therefore, obvious that the non-mentioning of the period of six months in the notice itself could not invalidate the notice. The release application based on such notice, in case, it is filed after the expiry of six months calculated from the date of service of the same on the tenant, cannot be dismissed as not maintainable." Similarly in the case of Muslim Parwez v. Mohd. Jalil and Ors., 1985 (2) ARC 377, where the application for release was moved after the expiry of six months' period from the date of receipt of notice, it was held that sufficient compliance of the proviso was made as the tenant was made aware that the tenanted accommodation has been purchased by the landlord and was being required by him for his personal use. 11. In the light of the aforesaid decisions, it is to be examined whether the notice in question fulfills the requirement contemplated by the first proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act? A bare reading of the notice whose copy has been annexed as Annexure-3 to the writ petition would show that the landlady in that notice clearly intimated the tenant-petitioner that the accommodation in question has been purchased by the landlady from the erstwhile landlord Ram Chandra Srivastava by a registered sale-deed dated 11-4-1992 and the tenant was also informed by the erstwhile landlord that since the date of purchase the petitioner has become the tenant of respondent No. 2. It was further clearly stated that the landlady has purchased the house in question for her personal need and it was promised by the tenant petitioner that he would make alternative arrangement for himself and would vacate the house in question at the earliest so that the need of the landlady could be fulfilled but the tenant has neither paid rent nor has vacated the same. On the other hand he has started causing damage to the same. It would thus be seen that in the notice it was clearly indicated by the landlady that she has purchased the house in question for her personal need and she required the same for that purpose and also asked the tenant to vacate the same. On the other hand he has started causing damage to the same. It would thus be seen that in the notice it was clearly indicated by the landlady that she has purchased the house in question for her personal need and she required the same for that purpose and also asked the tenant to vacate the same. It is true that it was not specifically mentioned therein that six months period was being given to the tenant to vacate the house, however the hard fact remains that the landlady did not file the release application until the period of six months expired, rather the same was moved before the Prescribed Authority after the expiry of period of more than three years from the date of purchase of property, that is, much after the period of six months from the date of service of notice. In the circumstances, no prejudice is shown to have been caused to the petitioner. It is well established law that if substantial justice has been done and no prejudice has really been caused to the petitioner, this Court would not make interference in exercise of powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and for this proposition of law reference may be made to the decisions of Muslim Parwez (supra); Devi Dayal v. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Ghaziabad and Ors., 1983 (1) ARC 763; Paushari Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation, Deoria and Ors., 1980 All LJ 618; Smt. Sarwati Devi v. The District Judge, Lalitpur and Ors., 1978 ARC 403 and Ram Swaroop v. U.P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. Tilhar, Sahjahanpur and Ors., 1990 (1) ARC 425. It was also held in the Full Bench decision in the case of Mahesh Chandra and Am v. Tara Chand Modi, AIR 1958 All 374 , that where issue of writ was to be futile this Court in its discretionary power would rarely issue such a writ. 12. From the perusal of the judgment in the case of Martin and Harris (supra), it would be seen that the protection avail able to a tenant in the said proviso is personal to him as six months' breathing time is given to him after service of notice to enable him to put his house in order and get the matter settled amicably or to get alternative accommodation if he realised that the landlord has a good case. Hon. V.K. Khanna, J. in the case of Muslim Par wez (supra) had also observed that the legislature has provided six months time so that the tenant may get sufficient time to search an alternative accommodation for himself. In the present case the-tenant had with him much more time than six months' period to search out an alternative accommodation for himself as undisputedly application for release was made after expiry of period of more than three years from the date of service of notice and no prejudice appears to have been caused to him as he was specifically told through the notice that the landlady required the accommodation in question for her personal need. On a careful scrutiny of the notice in question this Court finds that the notice fulfills the requirements of the first proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act and mere non-mentioning therein of the period of six months would not make the same invalid specially where no prejudice is shown to have been caused to the tenant as he was fully made aware that the premises in question has been purchased by the landlady for her personal requirement and he was also intimated of her intention to get the same vacated for that purpose. The contention of the petitioner's Counsel that the release application was not maintainable for want of a proper and legal notice, therefore, can not be accepted. A writ of certiorari is not a writ of right and therefore, in the circumstances appearing in the case this Court does not find any sufficient ground to quash the impugned order on the basis that the notice served upon the tenant petitioner was not in accordance with the requirement of first proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act. The view taken by the Appellate Authority on the question of validity of notice is upheld. 13. The next submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the order of the appellate authority is vitiated in law on account of non-consideration of material evidence on record. The view taken by the Appellate Authority on the question of validity of notice is upheld. 13. The next submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the order of the appellate authority is vitiated in law on account of non-consideration of material evidence on record. He submitted that the Prescribed Authority recorded a specific finding of fact that the two Devars of the landlady with their families, the mother-in-law and father-in-law were neither members of the landlady's family nor they were proved to be residing with her in the accommodation in her occupation, therefore, while considering the landlady's need their requirements could not be taken into account. The appellate authority while reversing the finding of the Prescribed Authority has not specifically touched the said finding as far as the mother-in-law and father-in-law are concerned. After examining the record, I find substance in the aforesaid submission of the learned Counsel. It may be seen that though the finding with regard to the living of the Devars of the landlady with her has been reversed by the lower appellate authority but the finding of the Prescribed Authority that father-in-law and mother- in-law were not proved to be living with the landlady as they were living in their village has not been specifically touched and reversed. While giving the finding on this question, the Prescribed Authority placed reliance on the evidence adduced by the tenant and drew adverse inference against the landlady for not filing any documentary proof in order to show that the aforesaid persons were living with the landlady. The appellate authority has neither discussed the said evidence nor has touched the reasons assigned by the Prescribed Authority in support of that finding and finding has remained totally untouched. It is well settled law that where the appellate authority records a reversal order, it must record its own reasons after examining each and every reason given by the Prescribed Authority in support of his finding and the exercise of appellate powers while reversing the decision of the Prescribed Authority without giving reasons for the reversal will be against law. It is well settled law that where the appellate authority records a reversal order, it must record its own reasons after examining each and every reason given by the Prescribed Authority in support of his finding and the exercise of appellate powers while reversing the decision of the Prescribed Authority without giving reasons for the reversal will be against law. In the present case if one goes through the judgment of the appellate authority closely, there is no escape from coming to the conclusion that the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority that the mother-in-law and father- in-law of the landlady were not proved to be living with her, rather they are proved to be living in their village, has not been specifically set aside. While laying the claim of the requirement of the additional accommodation, the case of the landlady was that the space already in her occupation was not sufficient and adequate for a comfortable living of her family members living with her who also included her father-in-law and mother-in-law, in such a situation if the aforesaid finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority remained intact, it would have material bearing on the question of bonafide need of the landlady. It is also well settled that where the appellate authority reverses the judgment or the Prescribed Authority without taking into consideration all the relevant facts and factors which were taken into consideration by the Prescribed Authority while recording a finding on a particular issue, the judgment of the appellate authority is not sustainable specially if the untouched finding of the Prescribed Authority has an effect on the vital issue involved in the case. For this proposition, I would not burden this judgment by referring to the principles laid down by this Court from time to time and it would be suffice to refer to some of the decisions namely, Mahavir Jain v. Ist Addl. District Judge, Jhansi and Ors., 1985 (1) ARC 368, Ramesh Chandra v. IInd Addl. District Judge, Allahabad and Ors., 1996 (2) ARC 617; Ram Niwas Pandey v. VII Addl. District Judge, Kanpur and Ann, 1982 (1) ARC 246. 14. District Judge, Jhansi and Ors., 1985 (1) ARC 368, Ramesh Chandra v. IInd Addl. District Judge, Allahabad and Ors., 1996 (2) ARC 617; Ram Niwas Pandey v. VII Addl. District Judge, Kanpur and Ann, 1982 (1) ARC 246. 14. For the above reasons, the order of the appellate authority reversing the finding of the Prescribed Authority on the question of bona fide need cannot be upheld and the case requires to be sent back to the appellate authority for re-examining the matter afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. Since the finding on this issue has also a direct bearing on the question of comparative hardship, the said question shall also be re-examined afresh. For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition is allowed. The order of the lower appellate authority dated 17-11-1997 is set aside and the case is sent back to the appellate authority for a fresh decision in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. In the circumstances the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.