Judgment : Y. VENKATACHALAM, J. ( 1 ) INVOKING Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner/management has filed the present writ petition seeking for a writ of certiorari to call for the records pertaining to G. O. Ms. No. 1169, dated June 20, 1989, of the first respondent, referring an industrial dispute over the non-employment of the third respondent for adjudication to the second respondent and to quash the same. ( 2 ) IN support of the writ petition, the writ petitioner/management has filed an affidavit wherein they have narrated all the facts and circumstances that forced them to file the present writ petition and prayed that this writ petition may be allowed as prayed for. The respondents have not filed any counter. However, they have argued the matter. ( 3 ) HEARD the arguments advanced by learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, I have perused the relevant material documents available on record in the form of typed set of papers. I have also taken into consideration the various points raised by learned counsel appearing for the respective parties during the course of their arguments. ( 4 ) IN such circumstances, the only point that arises for consideration in this writ petition is, as to whether there are any valid grounds to allow this writ petition or not. ( 5 ) THE brief facts of the case of the petitioner/management are as follows: The present writ petition has been filed to quash the first respondents order passed, vide G. O. Ms. No. 1169, dated June 20, 1989, referring the dispute over the third respondents nonemployment to the second respondent for adjudication, after a lapse of nearly 15 years from the date of termination of the third respondents services. The petitioner-establishment comprised a regional office and a sales depot employing fifteen workmen, for promotion and sales of fine chemicals manufactured at the factory at Baroda. The third respondent herein was one among the employees who were in employment with the petitioner. He was employed as a peon-cum packer and during his service "he was a chronic absentee" and was also found taking leave without any reasonable cause. While so, he was lastly on leave from November 30, 1973, and was frequently extending his leave on medical grounds. He was employed as a peon-cum packer and during his service "he was a chronic absentee" and was also found taking leave without any reasonable cause. While so, he was lastly on leave from November 30, 1973, and was frequently extending his leave on medical grounds. When he was due to report for duty on March 1, 1974, he again applied for an extension of leave from March 1, 1974, to March 31, 1974. The petitioner hence informed the third respondent, vide its memo dated March 12, 1974, that he had been on leave from November 30, 1973, and that unless he reported to duty on April 1, 1974, his services would be terminated and a substitute appointed in his place. Even though the said memo dated March 12, 1974, was received by him on March 15, 1974, the third respondent neither cared to report to work on April 1, 1974, nor had he extended his leave. The petitioner as such was left with no other option but to issue an order dated April 6, 1974, terminating the third respondents services. Aggrieved by the said action of the petitioner in terminating his service, the third respondent, after a lapse of two years approached the Labour Officer1, Madras, disputing his non-employment under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The third respondent had not explained the reasons for his delayed filing of Section 2-A petition before the Labour Officer. The petitioner has filed its counter-statement detailing the events warranting the termination of the third respondents services, vide its letter dated April 22, 1976. Subsequently, the Labour Officer who could not conciliate the dispute between the parties, submitted his conciliation report datednovember 10, 1976. The first respondent on a consideration of the said conciliation report had issued G. O. Ms. No. 2899, dated December 31, 1976, expressing the view that there was no case to refer the issue in dispute for adjudication as the services of the third respondent were terminated for unauthorised absence and that he had preferred the petition after a lapse of two years. Thereafter, the third respondent herein filed another petition to the Labour and Employment Department, Government of Tamil Nadu, the first respondent herein requesting to reconsider its earlier order dated December 31, 1976. Thereafter, the third respondent herein filed another petition to the Labour and Employment Department, Government of Tamil Nadu, the first respondent herein requesting to reconsider its earlier order dated December 31, 1976. Pursuant to this, the petitioner was called upon to appear before the Labour Officer and the petitioner had filed its letter No. SM/lcjm3866/ 7787, dated June 21, 1977, reiterating its earlier stand. The first respondent is said to have passed an order, vide reference No. 7271/a1/77-4, dated September 26, 1977, declining to review its earlier order dated December 31, 1976. Even thereafter the first respondent passing the abovesaid order refusing to review its earlier order dated December 31, 1976, the third respondent without seeking appropriate remedy, once again submitted a fresh petition dated June 13, 1980, to the first respondent. Consequent upon the same, the Labour Officer once again had taken up the matter on his files and directed the third respondent to file a formal petition under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The first respondent once again refused to reconsider its earlier order dated December 31, 1976. Further, yet another application was filed by the third respondent in or about July, 1981, with the first respondent seeking revision of GO. Rt. No. 2899, dated December 31, 1976. Therefore, the petitioner was again asked to appear before the conciliation officer. The petitioner in turn had filed a detailed counter elucidating all the reasons justifying their stand in terminating the services of the third respondent, vide its letter No. M/conf/1107, dated August 25, 1981, addressed to the Labour Officer1, Madras. Thereafter, this petitioner had not received any communication either from the first respondent or from the Labour Officer and it was assumed by the petitioner that the dispute was closed. Thereafter, having slept over for four years, the wife of the third respondent preferred another petition dated March 19, 1985, to the then Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. It was once again called upon to appear before the Labour Officer-1, Madras, where a detailed counter-statement was filed, vide its letter of June 26, 1985, reiterating its earlier contentions. Again, the petitioner was kept in the dark, as it never received any further communication from the Labour Officer. It was once again called upon to appear before the Labour Officer-1, Madras, where a detailed counter-statement was filed, vide its letter of June 26, 1985, reiterating its earlier contentions. Again, the petitioner was kept in the dark, as it never received any further communication from the Labour Officer. Immediately thereafter, the third respondent himself preferred another application dated nil to the then Labour Minister of Tamil Nadu and this petitioner was once again asked to appear before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour-1, Madras, where the petitioner had filed its counter-statement, vide its letter dated October 9, 1985, throwing more ] light on the facts of the dispute. Even at this stage, the petitioner was not kept informed of further developments. In the said counter, the management also explained the subsequent development on its side. It was also submitted therein that during the year 1985, the management had decided to close down the Madras depot with effect from July 20, 1985, where the third respondent was in employment, immediately prior to the date of his termination order and consequently the services of all the employees were terminated. The management decided to close down its operations of the Madras depot, since it was proved that the running of the depot had become uneconomic, unviable and the costs were increasingly becoming higher. All the employees, so terminated barring one Ms. P. V. Kamalam accepted the terminal benefits including closure compensation. The said Ms. P. V. Kamalam raised an industrial dispute under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, the proceedings initiated in pursuance of which culminated in the Government passing G. O. Ms. No. 2682, dated December 19, 1986, declining to refer the dispute. Further, the first respondent who passed the said Government Order accepted the closure as genuine. Thus, the third respondent after having failed in all his attempts to have the industrial disputes referred to the Labour Court for adjudication and having no dearth of will and desire to litigate, eventually has written a letter dated June 16, 1986, to the petitioner claiming the settlement of benefits arising out of Provident Fund and F. P. F. schemes. So it is stated by the petitioner/ management that the third respondent himself indirectly accepted his non-employment and wanted to settle his accounts with the petitioner. So it is stated by the petitioner/ management that the third respondent himself indirectly accepted his non-employment and wanted to settle his accounts with the petitioner. Again, the petitioner received a letter dated December 5, 1986, from the Assistant Commissioner of Labour-in-Charge, Madras-6, and the same was issued directing the petitioner to participate in the conciliation proceedings initiated afresh in pursuance of the third respondents wifes petition dated October 10, 1986, to the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. The petitioner was again forced to appear before the conciliation officer and to file the counter, which was in the lines of its earlier counter-statements. For the reasons not known to the petitioner, again it was not communicated of any further developments. It is stated by the petitioner/management that the third respondent could not go on making representations to the Government seeking reconsideration of its earlier decision, instead he ought to have sought the appropriate remedy like approaching this Court by way of article 226 of the Constitution of India. Further, the petitioner had not heard anything thereafter for nearly two years and all of a sudden to its great surprise the petitioner had received a copy of the impugned Government Order dated June 20, 1989, referring the dispute over the non-employment of the third respondent to the second respondent for adjudication. Hence, this writ petition. ( 6 ) HAVING seen the entire records, it is seen that the impugned Government Order has been passed only on the strength of a mercy petition filed by the wife of the concerned workman and admittedly the Government Order has not been passed on the basis of any petition filed before the Government seeking for reference to the Labour Court. Another significant aspect to be noted herein is that the original termination order was issued on April 6, 1974, whereas the impugned Government order is dated June 20, 1989. Thus, there is a very long delay of more than 15 years. Further, this is not the first time a petition has been filed on behalf of the workman seeking reference. The concerned workman has previously tried a number of times to refer the matter by way of his petitions. All of such petitions, filed by him were rejected. Thus, there is a very long delay of more than 15 years. Further, this is not the first time a petition has been filed on behalf of the workman seeking reference. The concerned workman has previously tried a number of times to refer the matter by way of his petitions. All of such petitions, filed by him were rejected. That apart, the wife of the concerned workman/third respondent also has filed an earlier petition before the Chief Minister on March 19, 1985, and on that the petitioner was called upon before the Labour Officer-I, Madras, where a detailed counter-statement was filed, vide its letter dated June 26, 1985, reiterating its earlier contentions. But there were no further communications to the petitioner from the Labour Officer. Thus, the wife of the workman/third respondent in the second round, has filed a petition before the Chief Minister on September 9, 1988, on the strength of the same, the impugned order has been passed referring the dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication. Immediately, after the termination of services, the workman/third respondent did not take any action. But only after a lapse of two years, for the first time, he approached the Labour Officer-I, Madras, disputing his non-employment under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, It is significant to note that he had not explained the reasons for his delayed filing of Section 2-A petition before the Labour Officer. Subsequently, after the filing of counter by the management, the Labour Officer who could not conciliate the dispute between the two parties, submitted his conciliation report dated November 10, 1976, and the first respondent on a consideration of the said conciliation report has issued G. O. Ms. No. 2899, dated December 31, 1976, expressing the view that there was no case to refer the issue in dispute for adjudication, as the services of the third respondent were terminated for unauthorised absence and that he had preferred the petition after a lapse of two years. ( 7 ) THAT had happened in the year 1976. Whereas the impugned order has been passed in the year 1989 on the basis of a petition filed by the wife of the workman and not on the basis of the petition filed by the workman himself. ( 7 ) THAT had happened in the year 1976. Whereas the impugned order has been passed in the year 1989 on the basis of a petition filed by the wife of the workman and not on the basis of the petition filed by the workman himself. It is significant to note that all the earlier petitions filed by the workman on several rounds, were rejected by the Government and it was not ready to reconsider its view taken in G. O. No. 2899, dated December 31, 1976. Subsequently, another petition filed by the wife of the workman on March 19, 1985, also did not bring any fruit. But strangely the Government has considered the second petition filed by the wife of the workman and issued the impugned Government Order in the year 1989 after a lapse of 13 years from the date of its earlier Government Order, refusing the request of the workman to refer the matter to the Labour Court. In such circumstances it is rightly contended by the petitioner/ management that the impugned order is not based on the representations made by the concerned workman in the dispute and is based on his wifes mercy petition, which itself shows the lack of bona fide and is not in accordance with law. It is also contended by the petitioner/management that the first respondent failed to consider the unreasonable delay of 15 years caused after the date of termination of the third respondent, i. e. , April 6, 1974. There is much force in the said contention of the management. Because, the original Government Order dated December 31, 1976, itself was issued rejecting the request to refer the issue on the grounds that the services of the third respondent were terminated for unauthorised absence and that he had preferred the petition after a lapse of two years. That being so, there is no ground at all for the first respondent now to pass the impugned Government Order in the year 1989. It is also not the case of the first respondent that the wife of the workman or the workman himself has now explained the delay in question satisfactorily and that is why they have reconsidered their stand taken in G. O. Rt. No. 2899, dated December 31, 1976, and issued the impugned Government Order referring the matter for adjudication. It is also not the case of the first respondent that the wife of the workman or the workman himself has now explained the delay in question satisfactorily and that is why they have reconsidered their stand taken in G. O. Rt. No. 2899, dated December 31, 1976, and issued the impugned Government Order referring the matter for adjudication. Such intention or any other reason has been given by the first respondent in the impugned order to reconsider their previous view taken in G. O. No. 2899, dated December 31, 1976. ( 8 ) IT is also contended by the management that the first respondent erred in allowing itself to be influenced by the third respondents wifes petition and referring the dispute without considering the relevant materials to satisfy itself regarding the existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute. They also contend that the first respondent committed a grave error in exercising the powers conferred on it under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which empowers the Government to refer an industrial dispute only when the same exists or is apprehended. There is every force in the said contention of the management. ( 9 ) IT is also contended by the petitioner/management that the first respondent failed to consider the petitioners stand putforth in its counter statement filed in the earlier proceedings that it had already closed its Madras depot, where the third respondent was employed prior to his termination, as early as on July 20, 1985. There is every force in the said contention raised by the petitioner/ management. It is significant to note that during the year 1985, the management had decided to close down the Madras depot with effect from July 20, 1985, where the third respondent was in employment immediately prior to the date of his termination order and, consequently, the services of all the employees were terminated. The management decided to close down its operations of the Madras depot, since it was proved that the running of the depot had become uneconomic, unviable and the costs were increasingly becoming higher. All the employees so terminated, barring one Ms. P. V. Kamalam accepted the terminal benefits including the closure compensation. It is also significant to note that the said Ms. All the employees so terminated, barring one Ms. P. V. Kamalam accepted the terminal benefits including the closure compensation. It is also significant to note that the said Ms. P. V. Kamalam raised an industrial dispute under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, and the proceedings initiated in pursuance of which culminated in the Government passing G. O. Ms. No. 2682, dated December 19, 1986, declining to refer the dispute. Another significant aspect is that the first respondent who passed the said Government Order accepted the closure as genuine. Further, yet another circumstance is there in this case, which is also against the workman. It is stated by the petitioner/management that the third respondent/workman after having failed in all his attempts to have the industrial dispute referred to the Labour Court for adjudication and having no dearth of will and desire to litigate, eventually has written a letter dated June 16, 1986, to the petitioner/management claiming the settlement of benefits arising out of provident fund and F. P. F schemes. Therefore, it is contended by the petitioner/ management that the third respondent himself indirectly accepted his non-employment and wanted to settle his accounts with the petitioner. There is force in this contention also. There is also force in the contention of the petitioner/ management that the third respondent could not go on making representations to the Government seeking reconsideration of its earlier decision, instead he ought to have sought the appropriate remedy. ( 10 ) IN support of the contentions raised by the petitioner/management, they rely on the decision in Shaw Wallace and (Mad), wherein it has been held by the Division Bench of this Court in para 14 at p. 186. "if, on the other hand, the Government comes to the conclusion that the claim made is so patently frivolous or that the admitted facts are so glaringly against the workmen, which would not warrant a trail or adjudication by a Court or Tribunal, then the Government would be justified in refusing to make a reference. Similarly, if the claim is stale and belated, it need not be referred for adjudication. Similarly, if the claim is stale and belated, it need not be referred for adjudication. " ( 11 ) IN this case, it has been already held by this Court that even at the first instance, the workman approached the Labour Court with a delay of about two years and that delay has not been explained at all and the petition on which the first respondent has passed the impugned Government Order has been filed by the wife of the workman, after a lapse of about 14 years. ; Therefore, in the circumstances of the case on hand, the above referred to decision renders much help to the case of the petitioner/management. ( 12 ) PER contra, on behalf of the third respondent, the decision in V. Veerarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 71 FJR 1 (SC), in the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the above decision is not applicable because the subject-matter involved in both the cases are different. Therefore, in this case the above referred to the Supreme Court decision is not helpful to the third respondent herein. ( 13 ) FOR all the foregoing reasons and, in the facts and circumstances of this case, also in view of my above discussions with regard to the various aspects of this case, I am of the clear view that the impugned order has been passed after the lapse of 15 years from the order of termination, it is a stale one and that it is patently frivolous and that, therefore, it is not in accordance with law and that the same is liable to be quashed. ( 14 ) IN the result, the writ petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, the impugned Government order is hereby quashed, and WMP No. 15335 of 1989 is dismissed as not necessary.