ORDER K.V. Sankaranarayanan, J. 1. The first respondent in R.C.P. No. 62/93 on the file of the Rent Controller (Munsiff), Taliparamba, who was the first respondent before the Rent Control Appellate Authority (District Judge), Thalassery (hereinafter referred to as the tenant) is the revision petitioner. Deceased first respondent (hereinafter referred to as the landlady) filed R.C.P. No. 62/93 against the revision petitioner and his brother, the second respondent in all these proceedings, claiming eviction of the tenants from the shop building with Old Door No. TP VI/440 of the Taliparamba Panchayat and New No. XII/783 of the Taliparamba Municipality for the purpose of own occupation under S.11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and also on the ground that the tenant had other buildings in his possession in the same Municipality under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act. In the rent control petition she alleged that the building had been taken on lease by the two respondents as per Ext. A1 rent chit dated 29/11/1977 on a monthly rent of Rs. 75/-. The lease was for a period of six months, but was continued even after the expiry of the term. She further stated that the second respondent was not in possession or enjoyment of the building and the first respondent (revision petitioner) alone was in possession and he was paying the rent also. She alleged that he had other buildings in the municipality sufficient for his requirements. She also stated that one of her sons, khalid was unemployed and was dependent on her and the building was required for him for conducting a business. The revision petitioner resisted the petition. In his counter statement he contended that the two respondents were the brothers of the landlady. The building originally belonged to their Tharavad Mammed, the father of the petitioner as also the respondents had taken the building on rent from his wife's family in 1930 for conducting a business in groceries and handloom textiles. He contended that he was originally helping his father in the business, but, later took over the entire business when the father fell sick. As per the partition in the family, the building was set apart to the share of the petitioner landlady and possession was continued under her. Thus he claimed possession prior to 1/4/1940 and protection from eviction under S.11(17) of the Act. As per the partition in the family, the building was set apart to the share of the petitioner landlady and possession was continued under her. Thus he claimed possession prior to 1/4/1940 and protection from eviction under S.11(17) of the Act. He denied the landlady's claim that her son, Khalid was unemployed and was depending on her. All the sons of the landlady were engaged in one kind of business or other. They had business establishments in Taliparamba, Payyannur and Kannur and a shopping complex was also coming up in Kannur. There was no necessity for Khalid to conduct a business of his own. They had also other landed property in different places. He further contended that his brother, second respondent had joined the rent deed only as insisted upon by the landlady's husband, but, at the same time, disputed the statement that he had no interest in the business. He also denied the averments that he had other buildings in his possession, sufficient for his requirements. He stated that the shop building possessed by him was very old and was not sufficient for business conducted by him. 2. At the trial, the landlady's son, Khalid, whose need was projected in the petition, was examined as PW 1. The revision petitioner, tenant was examined as RW 1 and two other witnesses as RWs 2 and 3. Exts. A1 to A5 series documents were marked on the side of the landlady and Exts. B1 to B11 series documents on the side of the revision petitioner tenant. On a consideration of the evidence, the Rent Control Court by its order dated 24/6/1994 found that the landlady had failed to establish the claim for eviction on both grounds and dismissed the petition. However, in R.C.A. No. 110/94, the appeal filed by the landlady, the appellate authority has reversed the findings and found that she was entitled to eviction under S.11(3) as also S.11(4)(iii) of the Act. The correctness of the order is challenged in this revision. 3. It is argued for the revision petitioner that the appellate authority has gone wrong in finding a bona fide need in the landlady and also possession of their other buildings with the tenant. It is also urged that the appellate authority should have accepted the tenant's contention based on S.11(17) and also the second proviso the S.11(3) of the Act. 4. It is also urged that the appellate authority should have accepted the tenant's contention based on S.11(17) and also the second proviso the S.11(3) of the Act. 4. The claim under S.11(17) of the Act can he considered first. The revision petitioner has put forward a case that he is in possession in continuation of his father, who had taken the building on lease in 1930 or there - about from his wife's family. It is an admitted case that the building belonged to a Muslim Marumakkathayam Family taking in the landlady and her two brothers, who were the respondents before the Rent Control Court. In a partition the building is set apart to the share of the landlady. It is admitted that the two brothers have executed Ext. A1 rent deed in her favour in 1977. Ext. A1 shows that the property was set apart to the share of the Thavazhi consisting of the landlady and her children as per Ext. B3 partition deed of the year 1963 and the building had been reconstructed by her husband. The document also shows that there were some disputes regarding the building. All such disputes were settled and it was taken on rent by the two brothers from the landlady on a monthly rent of Rs. 75/-. Any previous possession had been put an end to by the terms of Ext. A1. Even if the revision petitioner's father was in possession as a tenant earlier, it must be noted that the landlady is also one of his children. The revision petitioner stated that his father was the tenant and when he fell sick the revision petitioner took over the business sometime in 1955 and continued the trade. In his evidence as RW 1, he has stilted that his father was running a business in groceries and handloom textiles. At present, he is conducting a business in mats, coir products, beddings etc.. in the petition schedule premises. None of the records produced by him help to trace possession with him or his father to a date prior to 1-4-1940. Whatever was the position prior to 29-11-1977, any previous tenancy must be deemed to have been put an end to with the execution of Ext. A1 rent deed in 1977. So the revision petitioner cannot claim protection under S.11(17) of the Act. It has been correctly so found by the authorities below. 5. Whatever was the position prior to 29-11-1977, any previous tenancy must be deemed to have been put an end to with the execution of Ext. A1 rent deed in 1977. So the revision petitioner cannot claim protection under S.11(17) of the Act. It has been correctly so found by the authorities below. 5. The landlady had sought eviction for the purpose of own occupation by PW 1, Khalid, one of her sons. In the petition it is alleged that he is unemployed and is depending on her. In his evidence as PW 1, Khalid has reiterated that he has no business or employment and he is depending on his mother for the purpose of accommodation. He has stated that he wants to conduct a business in textiles. He has also stated that he is undergoing training in Tejus Vasthralaya in Payyannur run by one of his brothers and has become conversant with the business. According to PW 1, he has no money of his own, but his brothers would render financial help for the proposed business. In cross examination it was suggested that his father owned business establishments in Taliparamba, Payyannur and Kannur and he had a share in them. PW 1 stated that those businesses were run by his brothers and he had been disinherited by his father by a will. But, no such will was produced to show that he was excluded from inheritance. But the suggestions in cross examination show that those businesses are actually run by his elder brothers. The suggestion in cross examination was that he had a 25% interest in Tejus Vasthralaya, where he claimed to be an apprentice only. But even in accepting that he has a share in other businesses, there is no bar in starting a business of his own in the petition schedule premises. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submits that for an order of eviction a bona fide need must be alleged and proved. Expression of a mere desire is not sufficient. The evidence on record shows that PW 1 is a young man aged 24 years and the youngest son of the landlady. It is seen that his father had left behind some businesses, which were actually run by his brothers, though he may also have share or propriety interest in those businesses. Expression of a mere desire is not sufficient. The evidence on record shows that PW 1 is a young man aged 24 years and the youngest son of the landlady. It is seen that his father had left behind some businesses, which were actually run by his brothers, though he may also have share or propriety interest in those businesses. It is only natural that PW 1 may want to start a business of his own. What the landlady has to allege and prove is a need for accommodation, which must be a genuine one. It need not be a dire need or an absolute necessity for the purpose of livelihood. As held in Standard Cashew Industries v. Krishnan ( 1980 KLT 897 ), a 'need' is something more than a mere 'requirement', but is not something which a person cannot well do without. It depends on the facts of each case. In this case, it is not possible to say that the need put forward is a mere desire much less an irrational one as sought to be made out by the revision petitioner. In the facts and circumstances, PW1's evidence that he wants to conduct a business of his own must be accepted as genuine and bona fide. So the appellate authority was perfectly justified in finding that the landlady had made out a case for eviction under S.11(3) of the Act. In the counter statement the tenant had claimed protection under Second proviso to S.11(3) of the Act. The evidence showed that he had other properties and other source of income. There was no evidence that the business in the petition schedule premises was the main source of income for his livelihood. He had also no case that it was not possible to get other accommodation in the locality. In his cross examination he admitted that new buildings were coming up in Taliparamba Bazar and rooms were available in those buildings. Moreover, in this case the landlady has also proved that other buildings were in the possession of the tenant himself. So the revision petitioner cannot claim the protection of second proviso to S.11(3) of the Act. 6. As regards the claim for eviction under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act, the landlady at the time of evidence before the Rent Control Court, relied on Exts. So the revision petitioner cannot claim the protection of second proviso to S.11(3) of the Act. 6. As regards the claim for eviction under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act, the landlady at the time of evidence before the Rent Control Court, relied on Exts. A2 and A3, extracts from Municipal Assessment Register, to show that the tenant had possession of two other buildings, Door Nos. XII/780 and V/ 857. In the petition the landlady had made only an averment that the revision petitioner (first respondent in the trail court) had other buildings sufficient for his requirements in the same Municipality. No building was specifically mentioned. In the counter statement, the revision petitioner stated that one shop building available with him was old and it was insufficient for his business purposes. Ext. A2, extract of the Municipal Assessment Register, regarding the Building No. 780 in Ward No. XII was produced well before the start of the trail. It was proved through PW 1. However, Ext. A3, extract of the Municipal Assessment Register, regarding Building No. V/857 was produced only during the cross examination of RW 1. There was no mention about this document when PW 1 was examined. 7. As regards the building with Door No. XII/780, the revision petitioner let in evidence to the effect that it was in the possession of RW 3, Abdul Khader on the basis of Ext. B11 vadaka chit dated 17.11.1987. The Rent Controller accepted his evidence. As regards the building in Door No. V/857, the Rent Controller observed that Ext. A3 document was produced very late during cross examination of RW 1 only and he did not have a proper opportunity to answer the point or adduce counter evidence. So the Rent Controller declined to place reliance on Ext. A3 to find that the tenant had possession of that building. The Rent Controller also found that the landlady's plea was only that the revision petitioner, first respondent in RCP, had other buildings in his possession. There was no plea or evidence to show that the other respondent had any such building and so the provisions in S.11(4)(iii) of the Act were not satisfied. 8. A landlord is entitled to an order of eviction, if the tenant has already in his possession a building or subsequently acquires possession of or puts up a building reasonably sufficient for his requirements in the same city, town or village. 8. A landlord is entitled to an order of eviction, if the tenant has already in his possession a building or subsequently acquires possession of or puts up a building reasonably sufficient for his requirements in the same city, town or village. In this case, the landlady has averred in the petition that the present revision petitioner alone is in possession of the petition schedule building. The contention of the revision petitioner was that the second respondent had joined the vadaka chit only as insisted upon by the husband of the landlady and he had actually no interest in the business. In evidence also he stated that his brother had a separate business and had no interest in the business conducted in the petition schedule premises. As noted earlier, the second respondent has remained absent throughout and has not come forward to contest this case. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner has pointed out certain decisions of this Court that if more that one person is interested in the tenancy and one of them has another building, that will not be a ground for eviction under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act. Though the second respondent is also a tenant by virtue of his being a party to the lease arrangement, the pleadings and evidence on both sides is that he has actually no interest in the business conducted in the premises. The revision petitioner as RW 1 has stated that there had been a partition between him and his brother as early as in 1 980. It is possible that second respondent had joined the rent deed on]y byway of assurance to the landlady for the obligations on the tenant thereunder and as desired by her husband. The evidence of RW 1 himself shows that the second respondent is conducting another business in the town. So in the facts and circumstances of this case, the availability of another building with the revision petitioner alone is relevant. 9. As noted above, the landlady has put forward a case that the tenant has two other buildings. The building with Door No. 780 is close to the petition schedule premises, with Door No. 783. Though not specifically pleaded in the petition, it is clear from the counter statement that the respondent understood that the reference to the other building must be to Door No. 780. The building with Door No. 780 is close to the petition schedule premises, with Door No. 783. Though not specifically pleaded in the petition, it is clear from the counter statement that the respondent understood that the reference to the other building must be to Door No. 780. In the counter statement he has stated that the other building in his possession was an old one and so it was not sufficient for his requirement. But the evidence adduced shows that the petition schedule premises and premises with Door No. 780 each have an extent of one cent. RW 1 has also admitted that the building has been renovated by putting rolling shutters. He has not adduced any acceptable evidence to show that the building, if it is actually in his possession, is not sufficient for his requirements to conduct a trade in mats, coir products, beddings, etc. now being conducted in the petition schedule premises. But his contention is that it is in the possession of his brother in law Abdul Khader, who is examined as RW 3. RW 3 also stated that it is in his possession. The learned appellate authority has rejected Ext. B11 suspecting it to be a fabricated document between the brother in law. But the document by itself does not appear to be a fabrication nor the lease can be disbelieved for the reason that the parties are brothers in law, especially when the parties to this petition are brothers and sister. But Ext. A2 assessment register for the period commencing from 1992 shows that the building is in the own possession of the revision petitioner. It also shows that it was found closed by the municipal authorities who had gone there for the purpose of a quinquennial revision. It is also to be noted that in the counter statement though he did not admit that he was in actual possession, the revision petitioner did not state that it was in the possession of his brother in law. Ext. B1 shows that earlier the building was in the possession of a tenant, who but vacated it pursuant to rent control proceedings. The circumstances under which Ext. B11 was executed is not known. Any how, there was nothing to show that actually the tenancy created by Ext. Ext. B1 shows that earlier the building was in the possession of a tenant, who but vacated it pursuant to rent control proceedings. The circumstances under which Ext. B11 was executed is not known. Any how, there was nothing to show that actually the tenancy created by Ext. B11 subsisted as at the time of the petition or when the municipal assessment was revised for the period commencing from 1992. RW 3 has admitted that he had a business in another place close by for which he had a licence. He had no licence for any business in this building. Though he claimed that it was used as a godown, he did not explain whether he really required a godown for the purpose of his business. In the circumstances, the appellate authority was perfectly justified in concluding that the building was in the possession of the tenant atleast during the assessment period commencing from 1992-93. As noted earlier, from the description available, it must be sufficient for the purpose of the tenant to conduct his present business; As regards the other building, we must agree with the Rent Controller that evidence about its possession was produced only very late. The explanation offered by RW 1 was produced only very late. The explanation offered by RW 1 was that he had such a building, but it was not a shop building and so it was not suitable for his purpose. Since there was only his evidence along with Ext. A3 about the availability of that building, his explanation was that it was not a shop building sufficient for his purpose must also be accepted. It is also stated to be about 2 kms away from the petition schedule shop room. But, on the basis of the availability of shop room with Door No. 780, the order for eviction under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act granted by the appellate authority can be confirmed. For the reasons stated above the order for eviction granted by the appellate authority under S.11(3) and 11(4)(iii) of the Act is confirmed and this revision petition is dismissed. Parties to bear the costs. Revision petitioner is granted two months time to vacate the premises.