JUDGMENT Petitioner was appointed Constable by order dated 22.5.95, on compassionate grounds, on the death of his father, who died in harness in terms of Circular dated 10.6.94. While he was trying to find his feet, he was discharged vide order dated 11.7.95, passed by the Superintendent of Police under Regulation 59 of Police Regulations. He challenged this in O.A. No. 294/96 before SAT on the ground that he was not liable to be discharged under Regulation 59. His petition was resisted by State respondent on the ground that he could not be appointed on compassionate grounds because his elder brother had availed of this facility already. Petitioner refuted this and pointed out that his brother was appointed as "Boy orderly" under Regulation 60. The Tribunal on consideration of the matter tested petitioner's order of discharge in reference to the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution and took the view that it did not attach any stigma or impose any punishment on him and therefore could not be faulted. It accordingly dismissed his application. Hence this writ petition. Petitioner's case is that Respondent's stand was a contradiction in terms. On the one hand his order of discharge was purportedly passed under regulation 59 which empowers the Superintendent to discharge a recruit only "if he was unlikely to become police officer" and on the other it, was being attributed to his elr1er brother's alleged compassionate appointment. Mr. Chitale, GA, however justified the order on the plea that petitioner, on probation, could be discharged on month's notice in terms of his appointment order itself. According to him a mistake had crept in the order of discharge making it referable to Regulation 59. It is apparent on the face of Tribunal order that it proceeds on a wrong premise. The Tribunal seems to have lost sight of the facts that petitioner's discharge order was passed under Regulations 59 which vests power in the Superintendent to discharge a recruit if he was unlikely to become a satisfactory police officer and that respondents had taken a diametrically opposite stand that he was discharged because of his elder brother's compassionate appointment. If the order was taken to be passed under Regulation 59, it required to be tested in terms of its requirement viz whether petitioner was likely to become "a satisfactory police officer", which obviously would postulate observance of principles of natural justice. If the order was taken to be passed under Regulation 59, it required to be tested in terms of its requirement viz whether petitioner was likely to become "a satisfactory police officer", which obviously would postulate observance of principles of natural justice. And if it was to be examined on the other stand taken by respondents that petitioner could not be appointed because of his elder brother's compassionate appointment, it would naturally involve an inquiry to ascertain the correct position. The Tribunal has dealt with neither aspect and has sidetracked both issues to take a third route which was unnecessary. It ought to have noticed the glaring contradiction in the stand of respondents to set aside petitioner's discharge order. After all petitioner could be discharged from service only in exercise of valid power. If it was exercised under Regulation 59, then requirement of this regulation had to be satisfied. Similarly if the other stand of respondents was to be taken as the basis of discharge, it surely required to be seen whether it constituted a valid basis more so when appointment of petitioner's elder brother was under Regulation 60 and not on compassionate grounds. Mr. Chitale's submission that petitioner being on probation was liable to be discharged on one month's notice any way does not make any sense. If that was so, it was for the appointing authority to say so and not to pass his discharge order under Regulation 59. For all this, we find that Tribunal had proceeded in the matter is a slipshod manner and had failed to come to grips with the real points in issue. This petition is accordingly allowed and petitioner's order of discharge set aside. He shall, but, be reinstated in service prospectively and would not be entitled to any service benefits for the disputed period. This shall also leave respondents free to proceed against him, if desired and so advised in accordance with law.