JUDGMENT 1. - The office of the Superintendent of Police, CBI, SIU (XI), at New Delhi is stated to have been in possession of an information to the effect that the present appellants were actively engaged in activities of smuggling opium from Jhalawar (Rajasthan) to various parts of the country. A raiding party consisting of V.S. Soman (PW 11) and A.N. Bhattacharya, Inspectors, PC Sharma ASI, Ram Kumar Head Constable, Surjan Singh (PW 1) and some other constables headed by Mehar Singh Dy. S.P? (PW 10) was deputed to verify the information. The raiding party reached Jhalawar on 17-18th of December, 1991 and camped in Poorvaj Hotel, Jhalawar. On 18.12.1991 Mehar Singh contacted the source of the department who informed him that the present appellants, with huge quantity of opium, would reach Jhalawar at about 6.00 a.m. on 19.12.1991. Mehar Singh Dy. S.P. contacted the Income Tax Officer at Jhalawar and requested him to provide two Motabirs to him to witness the search, seizure and arrest proceedings. Accompanied with such Motahirs, namely, Abdul Sattar Yaquini (PW 3) and Ram Narain Income-tax Inspectors and the members of his party Mehar Singh Dy. S.P. reached Jeetmal's Dharamshala, near Bus Stand, Jhalawar, at about 5.00 p.m. on 19.12.1991. At about 7.30 a.m. he was informed by the 'contact' that the appellants were not reaching and that they would be arriving during the night. The raiding party returned. 2. Mehar Singh, Dy. S.P. along with the two Motahirs, Abdul Sattar Yaquini and Ram Narain and the members of his own party, acting on the information of the 'contact', stationed themselves during the night near the Bus Stand, Jhalawar. At about 2.30 a.m. in the night (20.12.1991) the present appellants reached there on a motor cycle. RNR 3213, and stopped their vehicle in front of the gate of Bhagwati Lodge. Mubarak appellant was driving the vehicle and Zakir appellant was sitting on the rear seat with two heavy bags kept in the space between the two. At about 2.30 a.m. in the night (20.12.1991) the present appellants reached there on a motor cycle. RNR 3213, and stopped their vehicle in front of the gate of Bhagwati Lodge. Mubarak appellant was driving the vehicle and Zakir appellant was sitting on the rear seat with two heavy bags kept in the space between the two. The 'contact' signalled the witness that the two were the desired persons, whereupon Mehar Singh approached them and disclosed his identity.The appellants got nervous and tried to escape but were not allowed to do so by the witnesses.The Dy.S.P.disclosed his identity upon and gave the notice to the appellants of his intention to search their persons and belongings and that they may be taken to a Magistrate or to Gazetted Officer, for the purpose, as per their option. He further told them that he himself was a Gazetted Officer and if they so consented they may be searched for their persons and possessions by him. The appellants expressed their readiness to be searched by the Dy. S.P. On being questioned about the content of the big bags with them they reluctantly and hesitatingly told that there was about ninety kilograms of opium in it. The big bags were opened in the presence of the two Motahirs and the members of the raiding party. One of the bags was found having two smaller bags in it, each containing 25 kgs. of opium. The other bag was also containing two bags, each containing 20.00 kgs. of opium. Mehar Singh Dy. S.P. prepared eight samples- two each from the four packets found in the two bags and duly sealed them with his seal. Two fascimile seal (impression of the seal used for sealing the samples) impressions were also separately prepared. The search of the persons of the appellants was also conducted. Certain currency notes ( Rs. 397/- from Mubarak and Rs. 500/- from Zakir) and other belongings like watch and keys were recovered from their persons and were seized vide Ex. P. 3. Their Yazdi make Motorcycle was also seized and they were arrested. Mehar Singh Dy.S.P. took the seized articles and samples and the appellants to Delhi. He submitted his report Ex. P.1, a long with the documents prepared by him, to the SP/CBI /SIU/(XI). New Delhi. P. 3. Their Yazdi make Motorcycle was also seized and they were arrested. Mehar Singh Dy.S.P. took the seized articles and samples and the appellants to Delhi. He submitted his report Ex. P.1, a long with the documents prepared by him, to the SP/CBI /SIU/(XI). New Delhi. The S.P. registered Crime No. RC 12/91-SIU(XI) on 21.12.1991 at about 10.3(1 a.m. against the two -appellants and entrusted the investigation to Mehar Singh Dy. S.P. 3. On conducting investigation of the case, Mehar Singh came to know that Mubarak appellant had purchased the Motorcycle under an agreement deed. On a search of the house of the appellant an 'Igrarnama' was recovered and seized. On interrogation it was also known that the appellants were receiving opium from Rod Singh and Kaloo Singh r/o Village Pipalya Mohammad in Distt. Mandsaur (MP). The premises of Rod Singh and Kaloo Singh were searched at the instance of Mubarak appellants and three polythene bags, one Belcha, one stapler, packets of staple pins, and three weights were recovered from the houseof Rod Singh and seized therefrom. One weighing balance and one stone weight were seized from the house of Kaloo Singh. Since Rod Singh and Kaloo Singh could not be arrested in the course of investigation Mehar Singh Dy. S.P. submitted a charge-sheet against all the four persons. Kaloo Singh was however, arrested later on and was tried jointly with the present appellants. Rod Singh is reported to be still at large. 4. The learned trial Judge framed charges under sections 8/18 r/w Section 29 of the Narcotic Durgs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, (for short, 'the Act') against the appellants and Kaloo Singh. The appellants pleaded not guilty and took the plea of denial simplicitor and false implication in their defence. No evidence in defence was however, produced by them. By his judgment and order dated October 15, 1994, which is under appeal, the learned trial Judge acquitted the appellants and Kaloo Singh of the charge u/ Sections 8/18 r/w Section 29 of the Act. He further acquitted Kaloo Singh of the substantive charges under sections 8/18 of the Act. He however, held the present appellants guilty of the substantive offence under sections 8/18 of the Act, convicted both of them thereunder and sentenced each of them to rigorous imprisonment for ten years and fine of Rs. He further acquitted Kaloo Singh of the substantive charges under sections 8/18 of the Act. He however, held the present appellants guilty of the substantive offence under sections 8/18 of the Act, convicted both of them thereunder and sentenced each of them to rigorous imprisonment for ten years and fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- each or in case of default in payment of fine to undergo further R.I. for two years each. 5. Mr. N.A. Naqvi, the learned Counsel for the appellants, has challenged the validity and correctness of the impugned judgment mainly on three grounds namely, one, that the case property was produced at the trial of the appellant with abnormal and inordinate delay adversely affecting the truthful character of the testimony of Mehar Singh Dy.S.P. and other witnesses, two, Mehar Singh Dy. S.P. is himself the informant and the Investigating Officer in the case and hence an interested witness and that fact diminishes the value of his testimony and, three that mandatory provisions contained in Section 42 of the Act were not complied with inasmuch as the information, which made the basis of search and seizure of the contraband opium in this case and arrest of the two appellants, was though allegedly reduced in writing yet not produced and proved at the trial. 6. The learned Counsel for CBI and the learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, supported the judgment and order under challenge and further submitted that the points, raised by Mr. Naqvi, were not tenable and cannot he given weight to so as to reject the prosecution case when no prejudice is shown to have been caused to the appellants by non-observance or non-compliance of any provision of the Act or rules made thereunder. 7. A study of the record of the Trial Court in this case discloses that the prosecution had examined eleven witnesses in all to prove their case against the appellants and Kaloo Singh, co- accused (since acquitted). PW/1 I V.S. Scmnan, Inspectors and PW /1 Surjan Singh constable are those officials of the CBI who had gone to Ihalawar on 18.12.1991 to verify the information regarding the activities of the appellants. Mehar Singh Dy. PW/1 I V.S. Scmnan, Inspectors and PW /1 Surjan Singh constable are those officials of the CBI who had gone to Ihalawar on 18.12.1991 to verify the information regarding the activities of the appellants. Mehar Singh Dy. S.P. and V.S.Soman have stated the relevant facts in sufficient detail, relating to the seizure of the contraband opium from the possessions of the appellants and their arrest in the midnight of ]Y/ 20.1.1991 at the Bus stand, Jhalawar. They have been cross-examined at length and both stood the test of such cross-examination and did not falter on any material point relating to the seizure of the opium, weighing about more than 90 kgs. from the possession of the appellants and their arrest on the spot. PW /1 Surjan had though deposed in his examination-in-chief that he had delivered the report Ex. P/1 to the S.P. Shri R.K. Sharma at Delhi on 21.12.1991, as per instruction of Mehar Singh Dy. S.P. yet the defence chose to cross- examine him on the point of his accompanying the raiding party to Jhalawar. On being so cross- examined he stated that he had gone with the party from Delhi and that he and other members of the party had stayed at Poorvaj Hotel in Jhaiawar after having arrived there at 10.00 or 11.00 a.m. on 18.12.1991. His testimony thus supported the testimony of Mehar Singh Dy. S.P. and V.S. Soman Inspector. Their testimony stood further corroborated by the testimony of PW/3 Abdul Sattar Yaquini who was then Income Tax Inspector at Jhalawar. He stated thaton instruction from the Income Tax Officer he and Ram Narain had accompanied the officers of the CBI not only at about 5.0(1 a.m. on 19.12.1991 to the Bus-stand where after some time one person had informed the Dy. S.P. that the appellants would arrive in the night and, therefore, the members of the raiding party had retired, but also in the very night and had witnessed the seizure and arrest proceedings in this case. He is an independent witness and is shown to be having no animus against the appellants so as to falsely depose against them. 8. PW/2 Bal Kishan is the Malkhana I/C at New Delhi and stated to have kept the case- property, in sealed condition, in the Malkhana from time to time. 9. He is an independent witness and is shown to be having no animus against the appellants so as to falsely depose against them. 8. PW/2 Bal Kishan is the Malkhana I/C at New Delhi and stated to have kept the case- property, in sealed condition, in the Malkhana from time to time. 9. PW /4 Janki Lai Bairagi, PW/5 Bala Ram, PW/6 Ratan Singh and PW/8 Babloo are the witnesses of the search of the house of Mubarak and Kaloo and Rod Singh, and their testimony is not of relevance for us. 10. PW/9 C.L. Bansal is the scientist of the laboratory who testified that the samples sent for analysis were found as being of opium on chemical examination. 11. The above evidence in my opinion, fully proves the involvement of the two appellants in the commission of the offences under sections 8/18 of the Act. If is however, to be examined if the worth and value of the above evidence stands diminished in anyway, if the arguments advanced by Mr. Naqvi have some merits or the trial of the appellants is found vitiated on the ground of prejudice having been caused to the appellants for non-compliance or violation mandatory provision of the Actor Rules framed thereunder. 12. The first argument by Mr. Naqvi is that the case property was produced and deposited with the Trial Court as late as on 12.1.1993 and such a conduct of the Investigating Officer should cast doubt on his and other witnesses' testimony. In support of such argument Mr. Naqvi relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Imran Khasi v. State of Rajasthan, 1994 Cr. L.J. 1. 13. Section 52A of the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act deals with the subject of disposal of seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Sub-section (1) empowers the Central Government to specify, the narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, having regard to their hazardous nature, vulnerability to theft, substitution and constraints to proper storage space. As per S.O. 381 (E) dated May 29, 1989, issued by the Central Government in exercise of its power under section 52A(1) of the Act, as amended by the NDPS (Amendment) Act, 1988 and elaborated in Standing Order No. 1/89 dated June 13, 1989, a detailed procedure for disposal of the seized contraband has been laid down in conformity with the other provision contained in Section 52A. Opium is one of the notified drugs as per S.O. No. 381. 14. Sub-section (2) requires the seized drug or substance to be inventorised with all the necessary details of its particulars, which are considered relevant to the identity of such material in any proceedings under the Act and forwarded to the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station or to the officer empowered under section 53. The officer concerned is then required to make an application to a Magistrate for purposes of, (i) certifying the correctness of the inventory, or (ii) taking, in the presence of such Magistrate, photographs of such drugs or substances and certifying such photographs as true, or (iii) allowing to draw representative samples of such drugs or substances, in the presence of such Magistrate and certifying the correctness of any list of samples so drawn. Sub-section (3) casts a duty upon the Magistrate to allow, as soon as possible, such application, when one is made before him. Sub section (4) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure, every Court, trying an offence under the Act, shall treat the inventory, the photographs of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances and any list of samples drawn under Sub-section (2) and certified by the Magistrate, as primary evidence in respect of such offence. 15. The express provisions contained in Section 52A read with the orders notified by the Central Government and exclusion of the provision contained in the Evidence Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in giving effect to the directory requirements contained therein clearly go to suggest that having regard to the hazardous nature, vulnerability to theft, substitution and contraints of proper storage space, the seizure drugs or as specified in S.O. No. 381(E) dated 29.5.1989, are required to be disposed of, even during the pendency of the trial of the offender in respect to the seized drugs or substances, in accordance with a particular procedure specified therein. The seized drug or substance, as are specified in S.O. 381 (supra), are not required to be deposited with the Court. The seized drug or substance, as are specified in S.O. 381 (supra), are not required to be deposited with the Court. The inventory which is mandatorily required to be prepared as per mandate contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 52A and which has to be got certified as correct by a Magistrate, or the photographs which have been taken of the drug or substance in the presence of the Magistrate and certified by him as true, or the representative samples drawn in the presence of Magistrate and certified as correct by him, make primary evidence in respect to the offence committed. In view of such specific provisions contained in Section 52A, the arguments advanced by Mr. Naqvi carries no weight, irrespective of the fact that even on query from the Bench it could not be explained as to what purpose was to be served by deposit of the seized opium with the Court and how was any prejudice caused to the appellant by its deposit with delay. The samples from the seized opium had already been taken and prepared by Mehar Singh Dy. S.P. as per requirement of the relevant provisions and a report from the Chemical Scientist regarding the nature and character of the drug seized obtained. The appellants, unlike the accused in food adulteration cases, were having no right to call for the other sample and get it examined by some higher authority. The deposit of the seized opium with the Trial Court was not to serve any purpose, at the trial. Whatever benefit the appellants intended to get from the production of the case-property they could have asked for the inventory, photographs or list of representative samples to be produced but they do not appear to have done that. Even then, it could not be told as to how the appellants were to be benefitted by the production of the inventory, photographs or list of representative samples. 16. I would like to avail this opportunity to observe that it has generally been noticed that the Trial Courts do insist upon the production of the seizure narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances before them and many a times the hearing of the cases is adjourned for a number of times for want of such case property and the witnesses returned un-examined. Many Courts are lacking even in proper storage space or accommodative Malkhanas. Many Courts are lacking even in proper storage space or accommodative Malkhanas. It causes delay in disposal of cases and inconvenience to the parties and their witnesses. In so far as the disposal of the seized narcotic drugs and/or psychotropic substances, during the pendency of the trial of the accused, is concerned the statutory position has been explained above. Looking to the hazardous nature, vulnerability to theft, substitution and constraints of proper storage space of such drugs and substances, it is to be emphasised and enjoined upon the subordinate Courts, trying offences under the Act, not to insist upon the production of the narcotic drugs and/or psychotropic substances in Court at the trial of the accused. Production of such articles only as are shown to be connected with the commission of the crime either by evidence of identification or by other evidence like opinion of expert or are stated to have been seized from the place of occurrence and the relevant to the appreciation of a fact in issue in the case maybe insisted upon and allowed deposit in Malkhana of the Court. Case property like drugs or substances, referred to in S.O. No. 381 (supra) should not be deposited. They shall, therefore, not receive and deposit any such drug or substance, as is specified in S.O. 381(E) dated May 29, 1989, published by the Central Government in the Gazette of 'India, Extra. Part II, Section 3 (ii) dated 29.5.1989, and in respect of which primary evidence can be given in terms of Section 52A of the Act. The Registry may place these observations and directions of this Court before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for considering the desirability of issuing appropriate order, direction guidelines, circular in this behalf to the subordinate Courts, if considered proper by his Lordship for better administration of criminal justice in the State. 17. The case cited by Mr. Naqvi is distinguish able on facts as well as in law inasmuch as a provision like Section 52A of the Act was not considered therein. 18. Coming now to the next arguments advanced by Mr. Naqvi that the trial of the appellants got vitiated by Mehar Singh's Dy. S.P. being himself the informant-complainant and the Investigating Officer in this case. I find no substance in this argument either. 19. 18. Coming now to the next arguments advanced by Mr. Naqvi that the trial of the appellants got vitiated by Mehar Singh's Dy. S.P. being himself the informant-complainant and the Investigating Officer in this case. I find no substance in this argument either. 19. It is true that it is always desirable that the informant or complainant in a case should not also be the investigator in that case. The reason for this proposition is that more often than not the informant or complainant, who himself may be the aggrieved person, may be consciously or unconsciously prejudiced against the offender and for that reason may feel tempted to collect evidence in the case as he considers favourable to his cause and the success of the case. But this a rule neither of law nor of evidence. It is a rule of care and caution requiring the Judge to scrutinise more closely and carefully the evidence of such a witness, who himself happens to be the complainant as well as the investigator in a given case. This rule may be more applicable to the cases of private complaints than the complaints by public servants, discharging official duties by virtue of the colour of their off ice. Public servants are not ordinarily, supposed interested in the causes registered by them and put them up before the Court, after investigation for bringing the culprits to books. They cannot be termed as interested witness simply on the ground of expecting the success of the case, they had registered and investigated. Therefore, unless something contrary to this rule is shown, the testimony of such informant-cum- investigator public servant cannot be brushed aside on the sole ground that he happens to be the informant- cum-investigator in the case. The rule of care and caution shall he applied in appreciating his testimony and after so appreciating his testimony, if he is found to be a truthful and reliable witness his evidence may he accepted. To he on vigilant side, corroboration to his testimony may be had from some other independent evidence including the facts and circumstances naturally attending upon the commission of the crime in the given case. 20. In the instant case Mehar Singh Dy. S.P. is, for all practical purposes, the informant and the investigator. To he on vigilant side, corroboration to his testimony may be had from some other independent evidence including the facts and circumstances naturally attending upon the commission of the crime in the given case. 20. In the instant case Mehar Singh Dy. S.P. is, for all practical purposes, the informant and the investigator. It was certainly desirable that when he had submitted his report, disclosing the commission of offences under sections 8/18 of the Act by the appellants and others, to his Superintendent, the S.P. should have entrusted the investigation of the case to some' other officer. But merely because Mehar Singh was entrusted the investigation and he conducted such investigation in the case his testimony does not get diminished in value. It is to he appreciated that almost all the material evidence regarding the commission of offence under sections 8/18 by the appellants had been collected at the time of the seizure of the opium from their possession and their arrest on 29.2.1991 itself. No substantial investigation remained to be made in the case save the sending of the samples for chemical examination which was done by other witnesses. In the course of investigation by Mehar Singh an effort to establish a charge under section 29 of the Act was certainly made but the appellants and Kaloo co-accused have been acquitted of that charge. Therefore, their acquittal from the charge under section 29 does not adversely affect their conviction u/ Sections 8/18. Thus the investigation made by Mehar Singh subsequent to the search, seizure and arrest proceedings was having no material effect on the value of the acts already done by him in the case. 21. That apart, Mehar Singh is not shown to be knowing either of the two appellants from before. He had no enmity with them so as to collect false evidence against them. 22. Above all the testimony of Mehar Singh is corroborated in all material aspects of the case by PW/11 V.S. Soman Inspector and even by PW/3 Abdul Sattar Yaquini, Income Tax Inspector, who was quite an independent witness having no animus to falsely depose against the appellants. The argument advanced by Mr. Naqvi has thus no merit and is hereby rejected. 23. In the end Mr. The argument advanced by Mr. Naqvi has thus no merit and is hereby rejected. 23. In the end Mr. Naqvi urged that though a prior information regarding the involvement of the present appellants in the activities of smuggling opium from Jhalawar to other parts of the country was stated to be in possession of the prosecution and also reduced in writing but no such information was produced and proved at the trial of the appellants and, therefore, their trial stood vitiated for non-compliance of the mandatory provisions contained in Section 42 of the Act. 24. Mehar Singh, Dy. S.P. has stated that the information was in possession of his S.P. and was communicated to him in writing also. That fact has been stated in the report Ex. P/1 and the seizure memo also. It is a fact that such information was not produced at the trial of the appellants. However, the question is that should this position of fact vitiate the trial of the appellants ? 25. The question posed above appears to have been considered by their Lordship of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, 1994 Cr.L.R. (SC) 241 : 1(1994) CCR 146 (SC) and after. having examined a number of its own and of several High Courts decisions on the point in sufficient details their Lordships observed in para 27 of the report as under : "The questions considered above arise frequently. before the Trial Courts. Therefore, we find it necessary to set out our conclusions which are as follows : (1) If a police officer without any prior information as contemplated under the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act makes a search or arrests a person in the normal course of investigation into an offence or suspected offence as provided under the provisions of Cr.P.C. and when such search is completed at that stage. Section 50 of the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act would not be attracted and the question of complying with the requirements thereunder would not arise. If during such search or arrest there is a chance recovery of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance then the police officer, who is not empowered, should inform the empowered officer who should thereafter proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act. If during such search or arrest there is a chance recovery of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance then the police officer, who is not empowered, should inform the empowered officer who should thereafter proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act. If he happens to he an empowered officer also, then from that stage onwards, he should carry out the investigation in accordance with the other provisions of the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act. (2A) Under Section 41(1) only an empowered Magistrate can issue warrant for the arrest or for the search in respect of offences punishable under Chapter IV of the Act etc. when he has reason to believe that such offences have been committed or such substances are kept or concealed in any building, conveyance or place. When such warrant for arrest or for search is issued by a Magistrate who is not empowered, then such search or arrest if carried out would be illegal. Likewise only empowered officers or duly authorised officers as enumerated in Sections 41(2) and 42(1) can act under the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act. If such arrest or search is made under the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act, by any one other than such officers, the same would be illegal. (2B) Under Section 41(2) only the empowered officer if has a prior information given by any person, that should necessarily be taken down in writing. But if he has reason to believe from personal knowledge that offences under Chapter (IV) have been committed or materials which may furnish evidence of commission of such offences are concealed in any building etc. he may carry out the arrest or search without a warrant between sunrise and sunset and this provision does not mandate that he should record his reasons of belief. But under the proviso to Section 42(l) if such officer has to carry out such search between sunset and sunrise, he must record the grounds of his belief. To this extent these provisions are mandatory and contravention of the same would affect the prosecution case and vitiate the trial. (3) Under Section 42(2) such empowered officer who takes down any information in writing or records the grounds under proviso to Section 42(1) should forthwith send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior. To this extent these provisions are mandatory and contravention of the same would affect the prosecution case and vitiate the trial. (3) Under Section 42(2) such empowered officer who takes down any information in writing or records the grounds under proviso to Section 42(1) should forthwith send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior. If there is total non-compliance of this provision the same affects the prosecution case to that extent it is mandatory. But if there is delay whether it was undue or whether the same has been explained or not, will be question of fact in each case. (4A) If a police officer, even if he happens to be an "empowered" officer while effecting an arrest or search during normal investigation into offence purely under the provisions of Cr.P.C. fails to strictly comply with the provisions of Sections 1(X1 and 165, Cr.P.C. including the requirement to record reasons, such failure would only amount to an irregularity. (4B) If an empowered officer or an authorised officer under Section 41(2) of the Act carries out a search, he would be doing so under the provisions of Cr.P.C. namely Sections 1(X1 and 165, Cr.P.C. and if there is no strict compliance with the provisions of Cr.P.C. then such search would not per se be illegal and would not vitiate the trial. The effect of such failure has to be borne in mind by the Courts while appreciating the evidence in the facts and circumstances of each case. (5) On prior information, the empowered officer or authorised officer while acting under Section 41(2) or 42 should comply with the provisions of Section 50 before the search of the person is made and such person should be informed that if he so requires, he shall be produced before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate as provided thereunder. It is obligatory on the part of such officer to inform the person to be searched. Failure to inform the person to be searched and if such person so requires, failure to take him to the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate, would amount to non- compliance of Section 50 which is mandatory and thus it would affect the prosecution case and vitiate the trial. After being so informed whether such person opted for such a course or not would be a question of fact. After being so informed whether such person opted for such a course or not would be a question of fact. (6) The provisions of Sections 52 and 57 which deal with the steps to be taken by the officer after making arrestor seizure under Sections 41 to 44 are by themselves not mandatory. If there is non-compliance or if there are lapses like delay etc. then the same has to be examined to see whether any prejudice has been caused to the accused and such failure will have a hearing on the appreciation of evidence regarding arrest or seizure as well as on merits of the case. (Emphasis supplied) 26. In subsequent decisions in the cases of State of Punjab v. Jasbir Singh, 1996 (1) SCC 288 : 1 (1996) CCR 51 (SC) and State of H.P. v. Prithi Chand, 1996 (2) SCC 37 : 1 (1996) CCR 89 (SC) , their Lordships emphasised that evidence collected during investigation in violation of statutory provisions does not become inadmissible and the trial on the basis thereof does not get vitiated. Each case must be considered on its own back drop. 27. A combined reading of the above decisions and several others on the subject informs us that technicalities and irregularities which do not occasion failure of justice cannot be allowed to defeat the ends of justice, State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, 1996 3 SCC 364 , and even non- compliance of mandatory provisions, which do not make precondition of the initiation of prosecutions and do not materially and substantially affect adversely the merits of the criminal trials otherwise, do not ipso facto go to) vitiate the trial without proof of prejudice have been caused to the accused. In the instant case, 1 find no prejudice having been caused to the appellants by mere non-production of the information in possession of Mehar Singh and / or his S.P. and reduced to writing as required by Section 42(1) of the Act. In the nature of their duties the officers of the CBI could have been in possession of information relating to commission of offences against the Act by certain persons generally and by the appellants particularly. The S.P. could have under such circumstances, depute Mehar Singh to verify such information and do the needful. The argument advanced is rejected. 28. In view of the above, this appeal has to be dismissed. The S.P. could have under such circumstances, depute Mehar Singh to verify such information and do the needful. The argument advanced is rejected. 28. In view of the above, this appeal has to be dismissed. 29. Before leaving the record of the case I would like to observe that in the trials of offences under the Act the authorities concerned are expected to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Act, in view of the fact that the offences are anti-economy of the nation and anti- health of the people. Such offences are severely punished in view of their grievous nature. Therefore, compliance of the relevant provisions of the Act has to be made to avoid unmerited acquittals. Unmerited acquittals of offenders, recorded due to the non-observance of relevant provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder by the authorities concerned, not only encourage breach of the law in force but also tell upon credibility of the law enforcement machinery of the State and adjudicatory process of the Court. 30. In the result, this appeal lacks merits and is hereby dismissed accordingly.A copy of this judgment be sent to the sub- ordinate Courts trying the offences under the Act.Appeal dismissed. *******