Honble SINGH, J.–Heard the learned counsel for the parties and the learned Public Prosecutor. (2). This criminal revision petition under Section 397 read with the Section 401 Cr. P.C. is directed against the order dated 16.6.1995 passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Bhilwara in criminal revision petition No. 5/90 passed whereby the learned District & Sessions Judge allowed the revision petition and quashed and set aside the order dated 18.11.1989 passed by the learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Gangapur on F.I.R. No. 180 of 1989. (3). The facts of the case, so far as they are relevant for the purpose of disposal of this petition, may be summarised as below :- (4). One Smt. Gattu Bai, widow of late Shri Ambalal submitted a complaint in the Court of Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Gangapur on 24.6.1989 against Mohanlal, Ranglal, Kishanlal and Kanhaiyalal alleging therein the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420,467,468,471,474 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. It was alleged in the complaint that on 16.6.1989, the accused No.1 to 4 namely, Mohanlal, Ranglal, Kishanlal and Kanhaiyalal want to her and told her that the proceedings of settlement were in progress and, therefore, she should get the field mutated in her name the revenue record. A document was also produced before complainant by the accused No.1 Mohanlal and it was reported by her that accused No.5 was also present. Kanhaiyalal Surana is the scribe of the document. According to allegation made in the complaint, the complainant Smt. Gattu Bai acted on the representation made before her by the accused 1 to 4 and she affixed her thumb impressions on the document which was produced before her. She was not in the need of money nor she agreed to sell her house to any person. After a few days, the complainants nephew Ganpatlal went to the complai- nants house and inquired from her whether she had executed any sale-deed in respect of her house. She denied the execution of any sale-deed but she stated that her thumb impression was obtained on a document by the accused persons. Ganpatlal further told the complainant that the document was with the accused persons. The complainant did not place full reliance on the statement made by Ganpatlal as her relations with Ganpatlal were strained for the last few years. Ganpatlal further told the complainant that the document was with the accused persons. The complainant did not place full reliance on the statement made by Ganpatlal as her relations with Ganpatlal were strained for the last few years. She collected some members of the community and told them about the incident which had occurred on 16.6.1989, when all the four accused persons went to her and asked her to affix thumb impression on the document after advising her that she should get the field mutated in her name. The members of the community, to whom she narrated the incident, summoned the accused Nos. 1 to 4 but only accused No.3 Kishanlal turned up before them and he stated that a sale-deed in favour of accused No.2 had been executed and the thumb impression of the complainant had been obtained on that sale-deed. Thus, having come to know that a sale-deed had been prepared and on that sale-deed thumb impressions had been obtained in the manner as alleged in the complaint, the complainant filed the complaint against the accused No.1 to 4 alleging the commission of various offences punishable under Secs. 420, 467, 468, 471, 474, read with 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. (5). The complaint submitted by Smt.Gattu Bai was forwarded to the Station House Officer of the Police Station Gangapur under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for inves- tigation. Treating the complaint submitted by Smt. Gattu Bai as the F.I.R., the police registered F.I.R. No.180 of 1989 and after completing investigation submitted the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. (6). By the time, the final report was submitted, complainant Smt.Gattu Bai breathed her last. One Ganpatlal, claiming to be the power of attorney holder of Shri Kamal Kishore, submitted a protest petition before the learned Judicial Magistrate praying therein that the matter should be further investigated and the cognizance be taken of the offences alleged by Smt. Gattu Bai. (7). In para 3 of the protest petition, Shri Ganpatlal alleged that Smt. Gattu Bai had expired and under a will executed by Smt. Gattu Bai, Kamal Kishore was the legal heir to the properties left by Smt. Gattu Bai and that Kamal Kishore executed power of attorney in his favour. (8). (7). In para 3 of the protest petition, Shri Ganpatlal alleged that Smt. Gattu Bai had expired and under a will executed by Smt. Gattu Bai, Kamal Kishore was the legal heir to the properties left by Smt. Gattu Bai and that Kamal Kishore executed power of attorney in his favour. (8). The protest petition dated 5.10.1989, submitted by Shri Ganpatlal, does not contain any such facts as may be said to constitute the alleged offences and, therefore, it cannot be treated as a complaint as defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. It was a simple protest petition which was filed by Shri Ganpatlal who was aggrieved by the filing of the final report by the police. (9). The learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Gangapur, after considering the documents on record ( as submitted by the police with the final report) and hearing the arguments, passed an order on 18.11.1989 whereby he declined to acc- ept the final report submitted by the police and took cognizance of the various offences as mentioned above on the basis of the report submitted by the police under Section 173 Cr.P.C. He issued process against the accused persons under Section 204 Cr.P.C. (10). Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 18.11.1989 passed by the learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Gangapur, the accused persons filed a revision petition No. 5/90 in the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Bhilwara. The learned District and Sessions Judge, Bhilwara, after hearing the arguments of the parties, vide order dated 16.6.1995, allowed the revision petition and quashed and set aside the order dated 18.11.1989 passed by the learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Gangapur. It against this order passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Bhilwara that a revision petition has been filed by Shri Kamal Kishore under Section 397 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. praying that the impugned order passed by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Bhilwara be quashed and set aside. (11). The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Bhilwara was not justified because at the stage of issuing process under Section 204 Cr.P.C., It is necessary to find out whether there are any ground to proceed against the accused persons. (11). The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Bhilwara was not justified because at the stage of issuing process under Section 204 Cr.P.C., It is necessary to find out whether there are any ground to proceed against the accused persons. At that stage, it is not necessary that the evidence should be meticulously examined in the same manner in which it is examined at the time of deciding the case finally and the learned Sessions Judge, Bhilwara has committed a grave error by making meticulous examination of the evidence and then arriving at the conclusion that no prima facie case is made out. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Sessions Judge misdirected himself by holding that Ganpatlal Choudhary (power of attorney holder of Kamal Kishore) had no right to move the revision petition as there was no evidence to show that Kamal Kishore had been adopted by Smt. Gattu Bai. (12). The learned counsel for the non-petitioners No. 1 to 4 has supported the impugned order by the learned Sessions Judge, Bhilwara. The learned counsel for the non-petitioners No. 1 to 4 has submitted that the case in the Court of Munsif and Judicial Magistrate was instituted on the complaint filed by Smt. Gattu Bai and, therefore, it was necessary for the learned Sessions Judge to consider whether Kamal Kishore and his power of attorney holder Ganpatlal had any right to proceed with the prosecution and in the absence of any evidence of adoption of Kamal Kishore by Smt. Gattu Bai, the learned Sessions Judge was justified in coming to the conclusion that Kamal Kishore had no right to continue the prosecution. (13). So far as the merits of the case are concerned, the learned counsel for the non-petitioners 1 to 4 has submitted that the police has rightly come to the conclusion that the offence alleged in the complaint was not prima facie made out and the learned Sessions Judge was justified in looking into the evidence for the purpose of finding out if the offences alleged in the complaint were prima facie made out. In other words, the learned counsel for the non-petitioners 1 to 4 has not only justified the examination of evidence by the learned Sessions Judge, he was further supported the conclusion drawn by the learned Sessions Judge that no prima facie case was made out against the accused persons. It is also submitted by the non- petitioners 1 to 4 that once the learned Sessions Judge has come to the conclusion, after examination of the evidence collected by the Police during inves- tigation, that no case is made out against the accused persons, it would be proper for this Court to up hold the order of the learned Sessions Judge. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on the decision of the Honble Supreme in Tomy Jacob Kattikkaran vs. Thomas Manjaly and Another (1). (14). The learned Public Prosecutor has supported the impugned order pass- ed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bhilwara. (15). I have carefully gone through the arguments and perused the record. Only questions arises for determination in this petition. They are-(i) whether the case had been instituted on a police report or it was instituted on a complaint filed by Smt. Gattu Bai or Ganpatlal and, (II) whether the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge was justified ? (16). So far as first question is concerned, after perusal of the record, I find no reason to come to the conclusion that the case was instituted on the complaint. The complaint filed by Smt. Gattu Bai had been forwarded to the S.H.O. of the Police Station, Gangapur under Sub-Section (3) of Section 156 Cr.P.C. It is well es- tablished that the order passed by the learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is an administrative order and it does not amount to taking cognizance of the offence under clause (a) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 190 Cr.P.C. Thus, the order, by which the complaint was forwarded under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to the police, cannot be treated as an order taking cognizance under clause (a) of Sub- Section (1) of Section 190 Cr.P.C. (17). After the submission of the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. by the police, the Magistrate was required to judicially consider the final report. After the submission of the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. by the police, the Magistrate was required to judicially consider the final report. It is true that Ganpatlal had filed a protest petition before the learned Magistrate praying that the matter should be further inquired into and cognizance should be taken but it cannot be said that on the basis of that protest petition, the Magistrate took the cognizance of the alleged offences. For a complaint it is necessary that there should be allegations relating to the commission of offence and there must be a prayer that action be taken against the offenders. Clause (a) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 190 Cr.P.C. further requires that the complaint must contain ``facts consti- tuting offence. (18). The protest petition submitted by Ganpatlal before the learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Gangapur does not contain any such facts as may be said to constitute any offence. Therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate took cognizance under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 190 Cr.P.C. on the basis of protest petition filed by Ganpatlal. (19). A perusal of the record of the lower Court shows that the learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate did not conduct any inquiry under Secs. 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. Absence of any inquiry under Section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. reinforce the conclusion that the cognizance of the offences was taken on the basis of the final report and other documents submitted by the police. (20). It is well established that when the Magistrate takes the cognizance on the basis of final report submitted by the police under Section 173 Cr.P.C., the cog- nizance is taken under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 190 Cr.P.C. Law in this behalf is well established by a decision of two Judge Bench of the Honble Supreme Court in Abhinandan Jha and Ors. vs. Dinesh Mishra (2). I, therefore, have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that in the instant case, the learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Gangapur had taken cognizance of the alleged off- ences under clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 190 Cr.P.C. As a consequence, it must be held that the case was instituted on the basis of the final report and not the basis of complaint. In a case instituted on the basis of the police report, the prosecution is to be conducted by the State through the P.P. or A.P.P. In view of this legal position, the question whether Kamal Kishore or his power of attorney holder Ganpatlal is or is not entitled to continue the prosecution does not arise. The learned Sessions Judge appears to have misdirected himself in this regard without making any inquiry by perusing the original record of the case to find out whether the case was instituted on a police report or on a private complaint. The first question is decided accordingly. (21). The second important question to be decided in this petition whether the learned Sessions Judge Bhilwara acted within his jurisdiction in setting aside the order passed by the learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Gangapur. It is true that if two opinions can be reasonably possible on the basis of the same evidence, then the order passed by the lower Court should not be disturbed. The reason for the application of this Rule is that when the statute gives to the lower Court the jurisdiction to form an opinion and opinion formed by the lower Court is reasonable, the order passed by the lower Court must be said to be not only within jurisdiction but also just and proper on the ground that it is reasonable having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. But, whether the order passed by the lower Court and the opinion formed by the lower Court is or is not reasonable, deserves to be considered by this Court when a petition challenging the order passed by the lower Court is filed. It is true that a presumption may be drawn by the Court under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that the official acts performed by public servants have been regularly performed. But the presumption of facts, which may be drawn under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, is not obligatory. It is after all a presumption of fact and not of law. But the presumption of facts, which may be drawn under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, is not obligatory. It is after all a presumption of fact and not of law. When this Court has admitted a petition for consideration and the parties are permitted to submit their arguments in support of their respective contentions and the Court, is prepared to look into the matter, itself to find out whether the contentions of the parties are maintainable, resort to presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act and refusal to look into the matter itself would not be justified. In other words, the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that an order passed by the lower Court is in accordance with law and just and proper, cannot be availed of when the Court has admitted a petition for hearing and examines the record itself. As soon as the Court starts applying its mind to the facts, the occasion for applying the presumption about the regularity of the act of the lower Court under Section 114 of the Evidence Act ceases to exist. A reconciliation has to be made between the presumption which may be drawn under Section 114 of the Evidence Act and the judicial duty of the Court to look into the matter itself in exercise of the powers conferred on this Court under Sec. 482 or Section 397 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. (22). Apart from this, the best evidence rule is one of the most important Rules of the evidence. The best evidence, if available, must be looked into for the purpose of arriving at the correct conclusion and in such cases the presumption under Sec- tion 114 of the Evidence Act cannot be carried too far so as to deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to look into the matter itself. (23). The learned counsel for the non-petitioner No. 1 to 4 has cited the decision given by the Honble Apex Court in Tomy Jacob Kattikkarans case (supra) in support of this contention that once the Sessions Judge, Bhilwara has passed an order after going through the evidence, it should be that the order is correct. I have carefully gone through the judgment. In that case, the High Court had set aside the order of discharge passed by the lower Court. I have carefully gone through the judgment. In that case, the High Court had set aside the order of discharge passed by the lower Court. The Honble Supreme Court observed at page 367 :- `` However, impugned judgment of the High Court so far as it set aside the order of discharge passed in favour of the appellant cannot be sustained from perusal of the record we find that the trial Court was fully justified in concluding that the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent was insufficient to make out a prima facie case against the appellant. (24). These observations itself clearly shows that the Honble Supreme Court itself considered the evidence produced in the case to find out whether the order passed by the Courts below was or was not justified. Honble Supreme Court did not draw any presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act in favour of the order of discharge. Therefore, the decision cited by the learned counsel for the non- petitioner 1 to 4 does not support him. (25). For the reasons mentioned, I propose to look into the orders passed by the Courts below to find out whether the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge was or was not justified. (26). Before I proceed, further, it would be proper to mention that the princi- ples which are applied to appreciation of evidence at various stages of the investigation , inquiry and trial, must be kept in mind because jurisdiction of the Court making order in the case is to be ascertained in light of those principles. Under Section 157 (1) Cr.P.C. what is necessary for the purpose of commencing an investigation, is reasonable suspicion, on the part of the Station House Officer of the Police Station, that a cognizable offence has been committed. At that stage, a reasonable suspicion is sufficient for the purpose of commencing any investigation. For the purpose of making arrest of any person, it is not necessary that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is sufficient that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is involved in a cognizable offence. At that stage, a reasonable suspicion is sufficient for the purpose of commencing any investigation. For the purpose of making arrest of any person, it is not necessary that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is sufficient that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is involved in a cognizable offence. For the purpose of forming the opinion whether challan should be filed or a final report should be given in the case, the consideration is the same as is indicated by Section 204 Cr.P.C. i.e. whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused person for committing the alleged offence/offences. The expression ``sufficient ground to proceed has not been defined anywhere but it has been repeat- edly held by the Honble Supreme Court and this Court that at the stage of taking cognizance of the offence and issuing process against the accused persons, it is not necessary for the Magistrate to examine the evidence with a view to find out whether the guilt of the accused is proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, there is a legal duty to find out if there are sufficient ground to proceed. On the other hand, after conducting trial when the matter is to be finally disposed of, the Court must consider the evidence with a view to find out whether the allegations made by the prosecution are proved beyond reasonable doubt because the burden of proving the allegations relating to an offence always lies on the prosecution and this burden must be fully discharged so that within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act which defines the words ``proved or ``not proved, the Court either believes that the accused is guilty or the Court comes to the conclusion that a prudent man, in the circumstances, ought to act on the supposition that the accused is guilty. Thus, the extent which the evidence direct or circumstantial can be appreciated at various stages of investigation, inquiry and trial varies and at different stages the jurisdiction of Court must be exercised in accordance with law laid down by the superior Courts. Thus, the extent which the evidence direct or circumstantial can be appreciated at various stages of investigation, inquiry and trial varies and at different stages the jurisdiction of Court must be exercised in accordance with law laid down by the superior Courts. Since at the issuing process under Section 204 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate is not required to meticulously examine the evidence so as to find out whether the offence is proved beyond doubt, the revisional Court cannot expect more from the Magistrate who has passed the order under Section 204 Cr.P.C. In view of this fact, the learned Sessions Judge, while hearing a revision against the order passed by the Magistrate under Section 204 Cr.P.C., cannot travel beyond the limits set out for the Magistrate in the matter of appreciation of evidence. There are several matters which are required to be proved after the accu- sed persons appears before the Court and the parties are to be given opportunity to produce the evidence in support of their allegation or averments. It may be pointed out here that in police cases, after the appearance of the accused, when the arguments and charge are heard, a charge is required to be framed even if there is a strong suspicion against the accused that the accused has committed an offen- ce. An order of discharge can be passed only if there is no ground framing charge. Section 239 Cr.P.C. provides that if, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing. The grounds which may be sufficient for finding of discharge against the accused persons in a warrant trial initiated on the basis of police report, must be deemed to sufficient for the proceedings against the accused persons under Section 204 Cr.P.C. (27). The grounds which may be sufficient for finding of discharge against the accused persons in a warrant trial initiated on the basis of police report, must be deemed to sufficient for the proceedings against the accused persons under Section 204 Cr.P.C. (27). In the instant case, a perusal of the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge shows that the learned Sessions Judge without ascertaining whether the case was instituted on the basis of final report or on the basis of complaint, held that Ganpatlal had no right to file the petition because the alleged adoption of Kamal Kishore by Smt. Gattu Bai was not proved. The learned Sessions Judge has considered the evidence produced by the prosecution and the circumstances attending the commission of the alleged offences. The application dated 17.6.1989 submitted by Smt. Gattu Bai before the Sub Registrar, praying that the document should not be registered, has been discarded the learned Sessions Judge on the ground that Smt.Gattu Bai was a woman of ordinary prudence and it was not expec- ted from her that she would execute a document under pressure or at the instance of some other persons. The entire approach of the learned Sessions Judge in dealing with the evidence circumstantial as well as direct, appears to be not justified at that stage. It is true that while passing the final judgment, the Court is called upon to consider every piece of evidence with such meticulous care as may be necessary to find out whether the case has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. At the stage of issuing process under Section 204 Cr.P.C., such meticulous examination of evidence is not necessary. On record, there is an application dated 17.6.1989 filed by Smt.Gattu Bai before the Sub Registrar. It may also be argued that if Smt. Gattu Bai had voluntarily executed the sale-deed in favour of the accu- sed No. 2, what was the necessity before her to have moved the application dated 17.6.1989 before the Sub Registrar. In my considered opinion, the view taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate at the stage of Section 204 Cr.P.C. could not be said to be reasonable or perverse. The learned Sessions Judge was, therefore, not justified in quashing and setting aside the order passed by the learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Gangapur. (28). For the above reasons, the petition deserves to be allowed. The learned Sessions Judge was, therefore, not justified in quashing and setting aside the order passed by the learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Gangapur. (28). For the above reasons, the petition deserves to be allowed. The order dated 16.6.1995 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bhilwara is hereby quashed and set aside and the order dated 18.11.1989 passed by the learned Munsif and Ju- dicial Magistrate is restored. The case is sent back to the Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Gangapur with the direction to proceed in accordance with law and dispose of the case as early as may be possible. (29). While parting with this case, it may be pointed out that in the instant case the State did not file any revision against the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bhilwara. The Honble Mr. Justice B.J. Shethna, before whom this file was placed on 2.9.1997, directed that the Law Secretary should remain present personally to explain why a revision or other petition was not filed. The Law Secretary appeared on 25.9.1997 and in way of the explanation offered by him, he was discharged from attendance. If the State has its wisdom not cared to file a revision petition, it does not mean that the Court is debarred from exercising its powers under Section 397 or 482 Cr.P.C. No inference of the legality of the impugned order can be drawn from the fact that the State has omitted to file a revision petition against the impugned order. The law in this behalf is well settled. A presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act regarding the legality and propriety of a certain order on the basis of some act or omission on the part of the public servant cannot be drawn when this Court has deemed fit to look into the matter itself in order to do justice in this case. Therefore, omission on the basis of the State to file a revision petition against the impugned order does not lead to any inference in favour of the legality and propriety of the impugned order. (30). The revisions petition is disposed of accordingly. The learned Judicial Magistrate is directed to proceed with the hearing of the case and disposed of the case according to law.