JUDGMENT C.K. Prasad, J. 1. This is Plaintiff's second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. Plaintiff filed the suit for possession of the suit house as also for the value of the iron chest or for compensation in regard thereto. Civil Judge, Class II, Mungeli, by judgment and decree dated 23.11.1978 passed in C.S. No. 6-A/73 partly decreed the Plaintiffs suit by granting decree of joint possession. Plaintiff aggrieved by the same preferred appeal which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 1-A of 1989 whereas the appeal preferred by defendeant No. 2 was registered as Civil Appeal No. 2-A of 1989 before the lower appellate Court. Fifth Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, disposed of both the appeals by common judgment and decree dated 28.2.1989. He dismissed the appeal preferred by the Plaintiff, but allowed the appeal preferred by Defendant No. 2. Result to the same is that the entire suit of the Plaintiff has been dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, Plaintiff has preferred this appeal and by order dated 13.12.1996 appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law: i. Wheher on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Court below was justified in holding that the property was joint Hindu Family property without appreciating the admission made by the Defendant Lal Chand himself ? ii. Whether under the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the relinquishment deed would convey any title in favour of the Lal Chand when admittedly on the date of the execution of the document he had no existing title in his favour ? iii. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sale deed executed by Jasraj in favour of Lal Chand was sham and not to be acted upon and being without consideration, obsolutely invalid ? 3. Plaintiff Askaran is the father whereas Defendant No. 2 Lal Chand is his son. Plaintiff Askaran died during the pendency of this appeal and this appeal is being pursued by his heirs and legal repesentatives. According to the Plaintiff, the suit house belonged to him and his father Jasraj which was purshased in the year 1929 in an auction sale. Suit house was mortgaged and the same was redeemed in the year 1949. Plaintiff Askaran died during the pendency of this appeal and this appeal is being pursued by his heirs and legal repesentatives. According to the Plaintiff, the suit house belonged to him and his father Jasraj which was purshased in the year 1929 in an auction sale. Suit house was mortgaged and the same was redeemed in the year 1949. According to the Plaintiff in the year 1957 partition took place in his family in which suit house fell into the share of Jasraj and he had absolute right over the same. It is the assertion of the Plaintiff that on 28.11.1957, he executed a deed of relinquishment, in which the name of Defendant No. 2 Lal Chand has also been mentioned. In spite of that, he did not derive any title over the suit house as he had no title in the same prior to the execution of deed of relinquishment. It is the case of the Plaintiff that Jasraj had debts of several persons and in order to seve the property from attachment and auction, he executed a nominal sale deed with respect to half share of the suit house on 15.7.1959, but Jasraj continued in possession of the house till his death on 30.4.1964. After the death of Jasraj, acording to the paintiff, he inherited the suit house. According to the Plaintiff in the suit accommodation there was an iron chest valued at Rs. 500/-, key of wihch is in his possession. 4. Case of the Plaintiff further is that Defendant No. 2 Lal Chand never resided in the suit house and he had gone Bhilai -Charoda for business purpose and presently he resides at Sobhani in the district of Rajnandga on. According to the Plaintiff Lal Chand has no title over the suit house and the sale deed executed by him in favour of his brother-in-law Defendant No. 1 Prithwiraj on 2.8.1972 for a consideration of Rs. 3,000/- is illegal. It is the assertion of the Plaintiff that on the basis of the aforesaid sale deed, Defendant no 1 broke open the lock, took possession of the house and removed the iron chest. Further case of the Plaintiff is that Defendants 1 and 2 have no right to induct Defendant No. 3 as the tenant. 3,000/- is illegal. It is the assertion of the Plaintiff that on the basis of the aforesaid sale deed, Defendant no 1 broke open the lock, took possession of the house and removed the iron chest. Further case of the Plaintiff is that Defendants 1 and 2 have no right to induct Defendant No. 3 as the tenant. In the aforesaid premises, Plaintiff filed the suit for possession, for value of the iron chest as also for damages at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month till the possession of the house is restored to him. 5. It is relevant here to state that originally the Plaintiff filed suit only impleading Defendant No. 1 Prithwiraj as the Defendant who filed his written statement. Later on, Defendant No. 2 and 3 have been impleaded as parties. 6. According to the Defendants, suit house was a joint Hindu family property of the Plaintiff Askaran and his father Jasraj and the same was acquired by the joint family found and Defendant No. 2 Lal Chand had right over the same since his birth. Case of the derendants further is that by virtue of deed of relinquishment dated 28.11.1957 Defendant No. 2 also got title over the suit house. It is case of the Defendants that on 15.7.1957 Jasraj sold his half share in the suit house to Defendant No. 2 Lal Chand and he is in possession of the same. According to the Defendants, Defendant No. 2 carried on the business of Flour Mill, Rice Mill, Soap-manufacturing and Cycle shop in the suit accommodation. Their further case is that Defendant No. 2 kept his family in the suit accommodation when he had gone to Bhilai-Charoda for business. According to the Defendants by virtue of deed of relinquishment dated 28.11.1957 and sale deed dated 15.7.1959, Defendant No. 2 got half share each of the suit accommodation. It is the case of the Defendants that Defendant No. 2 is the son of the Plaintiff from his first wife and when the Plaintiff married second time, after the death of his first wife relation between the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 2 became soar. On account of this, partition took place between Plaintiff and Jasraj in which Plaintiff got the house situated at Mungeli which was later on sold. On account of this, partition took place between Plaintiff and Jasraj in which Plaintiff got the house situated at Mungeli which was later on sold. According to the Defendants, from the consideratioon money of the aforesaid house, Plaintiff constructed another house for the children born out of second wedlock. In the aforesaid premises, the case of the Defendants is that Defendant No. 2 Lal Chand is the sole owner of the suit house who has sold the same on 19.7.1972 to Defendant No. 1, but has not handed over the possession to him. Defendant No. 2 being the owner of the suit house has inducted Defendant No. 3 as the tenant. 7. Trial Court on the basis of pleadings of the parties framed various issues and on consideration of the materials, found that the suit house belonged to the joint family over which Defendant No. 2 had title till partition took place in the year 1957. Trial Court further found that the sale deed executed by Jasraj in fovour of Defendant No. 2 on 15.7.1959 to be valid. Accordingly, trial court found that after the death of Jasraj, Plaintiff and Defendant No. 2 Lal Chand had title to the extent to half share and accordingly granted the decree for joint possession. Defendant No. 2 being aggrieved by the decree of joint possession, preferred appeal which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 2-A of 1989. Appeal preferred by the Plaintiff before the lower appellate Court was registered as Civil Appeal No. 1-A of 1989. Both the appeals were decided by the lower appellate Court by common judgment and decree dated 28.2.1989. Appeal preferred by the Defendant No. 2 was allowed and the appeal preferred by the Plaintiff was dismissed. As a result thereof, entire suit of the Plaintiff has been dismissed. 8. Shri Ravindra Shrivastava appears on behalf of the Appellant and submits that the Court below erred in law in holding that the property was the joint family property. He points out that said finding has been recorded without appreciating the admission of Defendant No. 2 Lal Chand himself. According to Shri Shrivastava admission of Lal Chand (D.W.1) is the best piece of evidence and the Courts below ought not to have ignored the same. He points out that said finding has been recorded without appreciating the admission of Defendant No. 2 Lal Chand himself. According to Shri Shrivastava admission of Lal Chand (D.W.1) is the best piece of evidence and the Courts below ought not to have ignored the same. In support of the aforesaid submission that admission is best piece of evidence, Shri Shrivastava has drawn my attention to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Narayan v. Gopal AIR 1960 S.C. 100 ; and my attention has been drawn to the folllowing possage- An admission is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon, and though not conclusive, is decisive of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous. 9. Defendant No. 2 Lal chand (DW 1) in paragraph 1 of his depostition has stated that the suit house was self acquired property of his grand father Jasraj and excepting the ancestral house at Rajasthan, there was no other source of income from there. However, Plaintiff Askaran (PW 1) in his evidence has stated that from the capital of the Rajasthan property suit property was acquired at Mungeli. Thus from the Plaintiff's own evidence it is apparent that for purchase of the suit house funds came from the ancestral property. It is well settled that Plaintiff in order to succeed in the suit cannot bank upon the weakness of the other side. Further in paragraph 10 of his cross-examination Defendant Lal Chand has stated that in the year 1957 partition took place between his father Plaintiff Askaran and his grand father Jasraj and the entire suit house fell into the share of later. In my opinion, had the suit house not the joint family property, there was no occassion for its partition between Plaintiff Askaran and his father Jasraj in the year 1957. In view of the evidence of the Plaintiff himself and further evidence of DW 1 Lal Chand in paragraph 10 of his cross-examination referred to above, In am not inclined to accept that the suit house was acquired by Jasraj on the basis of evidence of Defendant Lal Chand in paragraph 1 of his evidence. In my opinion, admission of a witness may be a best evidence, but not conclusive evidence. In my opinion, admission of a witness may be a best evidence, but not conclusive evidence. I am further of the opinion that in the facts of the present case ratio of the judgment in the case of Narayan (supra) has no assistance to the Plaintiff and in the said case also the Supreme Court has not laid down the law that the admission is a conclusive evidence. I concur with the finding of the lower appellate Court that the suit house is a joint family properly. 10. Shri Ravindra Shrivastava, then submits that the deed of relinquishment (Ex. D-3) executed by the Plaintiff although is in favour of Jasraj and Lal Chand but the same will not convey title to Lal Chand as on the date of the execution of the said document, i.e., 28.11.1957 Lal Chand had no existing title. In support of his submission Shri Shrivastava has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kuppuswami v. Arunmugam, AIR 1967 S.C. 1395 ; and my attention has been drawn to the following passage from paragraph 6 of the judgment: Now it cannot be disputed that a release can be usefully employed as a form of conveyance by a person having some right or interest to another having a limited estate, e.g. by a remainderman to a tenant for life, and the release then operates as an enlargement of the limited estate. But in this case, we are not concerned with a release in favour of the holder of a limited estate. Here the deed was in favour of a person having no interest in the property, and it could not take effect as enlargement of an existing estate. It was intended to be and was a transfer of ownership. A deed called a deed of release can, by using words of sufficient amplitude, transfer title to one having no tile before the transfer. 11. Shri A.K. Pathak, however, appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 2 submits that the very assumption of the Plaintiff that at the time when the relinquishment deed was executed, Lal Chand had no title is erroneous and hence the authority relied on by the Appellants is clearly distinguishable. I find substance in the submission of Shri Pathak. As held earlier, suit house is a joint family property. I find substance in the submission of Shri Pathak. As held earlier, suit house is a joint family property. Lal Chand is one of the co-parceners and is is well settled that in joint family property every co-parceners has a joint interest and a joint possession. Thus, Lal Chand had title over the joint family property and Askaran in order to give effect to the partition had executed the deed of relinquishment in favour of his father Jasraj and Lalchand. Defendant Lal Chand being a co-parcener had one-third share in the suit house whereas Askaran had same share and after the deed of relinquishment executed by the Plaintiff Jasraj and Lal Chand got half share each in the suit house. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the whole assumption of the Plaintiff that Lal Chand did not had existing title at the time when the Plaintiff executed the relinquishment deed is erroneous. I do not find any substance in this submission of Shri Shrivastava and the authority relied on is clearly distinguishable. 12. Shri Shrivastava lastly submits that the sale deed dated 15.7.1959 (Ex. D-4) executed by Jasraj in favour of his grand-son Lal Chand is a sham and illegal transaction and was not to be acted upon as the same was without any consideraion. It is relevant here to state that according to the Plaintiff Jasraj had executed the aforesaid sale deed to save the property from being attached as Askaran had debts of several persons. However, in his evidence Plaintiff has not given the name of any of such creditors. Further it has been pointed out by Shri Shrivastava that Jasraj executed the sale deed but no consideration money was paid to him by Lal Chand. In this connection he has drawn my attention to evidence of Lal Chand in which he has stated that he has paid the consideration money at home, where as endorsement of the Registrar on the sale deed (Ex. D-4) shows that it was received in presence of the Registrar. Further Lal Chand has stated in his evidence that he was not present at the time of execution of the sale deed. Jasraj is none other than the grand father of Defendant No. 2 Lal Chand. D-4) shows that it was received in presence of the Registrar. Further Lal Chand has stated in his evidence that he was not present at the time of execution of the sale deed. Jasraj is none other than the grand father of Defendant No. 2 Lal Chand. It has come in evidence that Lal Chand is the of Askaran from his first wife where as Askaran had married a second lady after the death of his first wife, and he had children from the second wife. In the sale deed Askaran is not a party. In that view of the matter I am of the opinion that the Plaintiff cannot be permitted to contend that sale deed executed by Jasraj is sham as no consideraion money was paid. I am fortified in my view from the judgment of this Court in the case of Sukaloo v. Punau, 1960 M.P.L.J. 1326. Relevant, portion of the same reads as follows: The position that a stranger to a deed has no right to dispute the validity of the deed for want of consideraion was conceded by both the sides in the arguments before us. 13. Having negatived all the submissions made by Shri Shrivastava on behalf of the Appellant, all the substantial questions of law framed: have to be necesarily answered against the Plaintiff and In favour of the Defendants, and 1 do it accordingly. 14. In the result, I do not find any merit in this appeal and is dismissed accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.