JUDGMENT 1. - This Appeal has been preferred before this Court against the judgment dated 28th July, 1998 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge No. 1, Kota by which he dismissed the Appeal No. 36/1996 preferred by the defendant/appellant and upheld the order passed by the trial court whereby the plaintiff's suit for eviction of the premises of the defendant tenant was decreed with the direction to the tenant to vacate,and handover the peaceful possession of the tenanted premises after two months of the passing of the said decree. 2. The brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that the plaintiff respondent filed a suit bearing number 87/93 on 27th March, 1993 on the sole ground that the premises was reasonable and bonafidely required by the landlord for use and occupation of the premises by him or by the members of his family held under Section 13(1)(h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent Eviction) Act, 1950. In order to substantiate this ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity, the landlord plaintiff advanced the plea that his sons would be getting married and after their marriage they are likely to come and live with the landlord and stay with him with their wives, though all of them are nicely placed and living outside the city of Kota. One of them is employed at USA, second son in the Indian Air Force while the third one is suitably placed. 3. As regards the requirement of his son employed in the Air Force it was contended by the plaintiff that since he is not getting a family station, hence after his marriage his wife will have to stay with the plaintiff. Likewise,he also pleaded for his other two sons that they would also be getting married and would keep on coming to his father's place at Kota. The plaintiff also took the plea that he will require the premises for raising another storey over the existing ground floor and for the said purpose, the premises were required so as to enable him to carry on the construction the first floor properly. As regards his own personal requirement it was contended by the plaintiff that his wife was staying in a house at New Delhi at Vasant Kunj and his wife was keen to stay at both the places at Kota as well as at Vasant Kunj at New Delhi. 4. As regards his own personal requirement it was contended by the plaintiff that his wife was staying in a house at New Delhi at Vasant Kunj and his wife was keen to stay at both the places at Kota as well as at Vasant Kunj at New Delhi. 4. Yet another reason for bona-fide need to occupy the suit premises was that the plaintiff would be retiring from the Government service in the year 1997 and hence he will be requiring the vacant possession of the premises immediately and after his retirement from service upon attaining the age of superannuation for himself and members of his family. The defendant appellant contested the bona-fide need of the plaintiff on the ground that the suit was filed by him in the year 1993 and since this plea regarding his intended date of superannuation was not imminent as it was likely to happen on a future date, the bonafide necessity of the landlord to occupy the suit premises could not be established since there was no link between the two i.e. 27.3.1993, when the suit for eviction was filed and the intended date of retirement which was likely to happen in the year 1997. Hence, it was sought to be urged that this requirement was imaginary and hypothetical and there was no requirement existing when the suit was filed. It was further contended that future requirement of long distance for five years could not be said to be the reasonable and bonafide within the ambit of the principles as laid down under Section 13(i)(h) of the Act. 5. As regards the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the suit premises by his three sons who were all of marriageable age and were keen to live with their parents after their marriage with their wives, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant during the course of arguments that this requirement of the plaintiff was also hypothetical and imaginary in nature since it did not exist as on the date when the suit was filed. It was further contended in this regard that this requirement if at all would arise when the events on which the said requirement was based actually took place namely, the marriages of the said sons and hence, there was no immediate cause of action and therefore, the suit deserved to be dismissed. 6. It was further contended in this regard that this requirement if at all would arise when the events on which the said requirement was based actually took place namely, the marriages of the said sons and hence, there was no immediate cause of action and therefore, the suit deserved to be dismissed. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant at length and also examined the findings recorded by the trial court on all the issues and also the findings of the First Appellate Court, confirming the findings of the trial court. 7. Prima-facie I am of the considered view that the landlord is the best judge of his bona-fide need which has to be objectively considered as has rightly been observed by the trial court and also confirmed by the first appellant court. In a suit where the ground for eviction is the bona-fide need of the landlord/owner to occupy the suit premises what has to be examined by the trial court at the outset is as to whether the said need is co-related to the purpose sought to be achieved by the same. It has further to be seen whether his need is actually bona-fide which fact has to be gathered from his intention and other surrounding circumstances and not merely from his wish or desire to occupy the suit premises. It has further to be seen whether his need is actually bona-fide which fact has to be gathered from his intention and other surrounding circumstances and not merely from his wish or desire to occupy the suit premises. If the said need is fanciful or imaginary then the suit does not deserve to be decreed and if the said need is really bona-fide based on his definite intention to occupy the suit premises even in near future on happening of particular contingencies which are positively and likely to take place i.e. (i) the future intended date of retirement from the Government service after attaining the age of superannuation; (ii) the marriage of his sons or daughters who are of marriageable age in near future, the bona-fide need of the landlord cannot be said to be imaginary or false since if the landlord is to wait for both the events as aforesaid to happen in near future and thereafter to file all eviction petition against the tenant on his bona-fide need then it will not be possible for the landlord to get his another rented accommodation at prevailing market rates which he may be ill afford after his retirement since his own premises will not be available and likewise it is not necessary that the landlord shold first get his sons married and thereafter create a ground for them to occupy the suit premises alongwith their families in near future resulting in great hardship. What has to be examined as a matter of fact in appreciating the bona-fide need of the landlord in its true perspective, is as to whether the need to occupy the suit premises is actuated by any malafide intention or has all sincerity of approach and this fact is to be gathered from all surrounding circumstances as to be assessed and analysed objectively if substantiated by cogent evidence on record. Hence, in view of the above analysis, the future requirement of the landlord of three to five years or may be more in appropriate cases as regards the above aspect of the matter in view, it cannot be said that the need of the landlord to occupy the suit premises is not bona-fide, malafide or imaginary and therefore, it cannot be said to be hypothetical as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant during the course of hearing of this appeal. It will be pertinent to mention that from the findings recorded by the trial court it is apparent that the respondent-landlord had himself deposed in evidence regarding his intended date of retirement from Government service and also the need of his sons to live with him who are all of marriageable age. This finding of fact is not open to challenge in second Appeal. 8. As regards the contention of the appellant that there is no finding recorded by the trial court on comparative hardship of the parties, I am of the view that even on this aspect of the matter, the appellant has failed to make-out any case for interference with the concurrent findings of the fact recorded by the courts below which have been recorded on due appreciation of evidence as against which this second appeal is not maintainable. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the wife cannot refuse to live with her husband except on the grounds as mentioned in Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, for the purpose of divorce, I am also of the view that the said ground can hardly be said to be available to the appellant particularly when there is no evidence as regards the parties living in separation due to alleged strained relations on record. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the following decisions T. Sunil Kumar and Ors. v. M/s. S.G. Edulgiri & sons and others, AIR 1993 (AP) 205 ; Chuni Singh v. Subedar Raghubir Singh, RCJ 1985(2) 638 ; Mohammad Hussain & Anr. v. Abdul Rahim (deceased) through his L.Rs. Abdul Karim and ors., RLR 1988(2) 112 ; M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. v. Jai Prakash Goyal, RLR 1990(2) 787 ; The Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Hukam Chand Jain, RLR 1984-495 ; Dilbagh Rai Punjabi v. Sharad Chandra, 1988 Suppl. SCC 710 . I have examined the ratio of the said decisions. Abdul Karim and ors., RLR 1988(2) 112 ; M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. v. Jai Prakash Goyal, RLR 1990(2) 787 ; The Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Hukam Chand Jain, RLR 1984-495 ; Dilbagh Rai Punjabi v. Sharad Chandra, 1988 Suppl. SCC 710 . I have examined the ratio of the said decisions. In my view, the same are neither attracted nor applicable to the instant case since the courts below have duly considered the ratio of the said decisions by discussing all relevant evidence on record and no interference is called for against concurrent findings recorded by both the trial court as well as the appellate court on the aspect of bona-fide need of the plaintiff respondent to occupy the suit premsies. 9. As a result of above discussion, no interference is called for against the judgment and order dated 28.7.1998 Additional District Judge No. 1, Kota in Appeal No. 36/96 whereby the order dated 2.8.1996 of A.C.J.M. (Jr. Division), Kota in suit No. 87/93 was confirmed decreeing the suit. My aforesaid observations with regard to the bona-fide need of the landlord to occupy the suit premises in question are also fortified from the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Om Prakash and ors. v. Sunhari Devi, (1993) 2 SCC 397 wherein the appellants-landlords filed an eviction petition against the tenant-respondents under section 21(i)(a) of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 on the ground that they bona-fide required the tenanted shop premises for their own use. The prescribed authority constituted under the said Act dismissed the eviction petition holding that the appellants' requirement was not bona-fide and that greater hardship would be caused to the respondents than the appellants. The appellants filed an appeal and the appellate authority allowed the same holding that the requirement of the appellants was genuine and bona-fide. It also held in favour of the appellants on the aspect of comparative hardship. In Appeal before the Apex Court, it was observed that reassessment of evidence was not called for and the High Court's power of interference was restricted only to question of law and consequently the order of appellate authority allowing eviction petition was restored. 10. It also held in favour of the appellants on the aspect of comparative hardship. In Appeal before the Apex Court, it was observed that reassessment of evidence was not called for and the High Court's power of interference was restricted only to question of law and consequently the order of appellate authority allowing eviction petition was restored. 10. As regards the contention of the appellant that the courts below have failed to examine or record any finding on the question of partial eviction and comparative hardship of the parties, I am of the view that both the aspects have been fully considered by the courts below and this fact is borne out from the judgment of the trial court as well as the First Appellate Court on issue Nos. 1, 2 and 5 and the findings are well reasoned and not open to challenge in this appeal. 11. The result of the above discussions is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant has stated at bar that he intends to prefer an appeal against this order to Supreme Court. The appellant is at full liberty to do so. Three weeks time is allowed to the appellant to file the so appeal before the Supreme Court. The period of three weeks shall commence from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order.Second Appeal Dismissed. *******