JUDGMENT 1. - In nutshell, the facts giving rise to this writ petition are that the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Director (Industry) after having been selected by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission vide order dated 26-11-1982 (Ann. 1) and was promoted as Deputy Director (Industry) vide order dated 8-8-1989 (Ann. 2). A criminal complaint was filed at the behest of Shri Karni Singh Rathore, Project Director, District Rural Development Agency about some misappropriation of Government funds on the allegations inter alia that the petitioner without inspecting concerned Institutions submitted his inspection reports. On the basis of aforesaid criminal complaint, FIR No. 346/89 was registered at Police Station Bani Park (Jaipur) on 812-89 for offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 471 & 120-B, IPC, which was later on transferred to the Anti-corruption Department, Jaipur for additional offences under Sections 477-A, IPC and 13 (1) (c) (d) and 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 2. Due to pendency of the investigation in aforesaid criminal cases, the petitioner and some other officials were placed under suspension vide order dated 22-5-1990 (Ann. 5). According to the petitioner, one Shri B.K. Meena, IAS, who at that time was Project Director, being co-accused in aforesaid criminal cases was also placed under suspension but later on was reinstated vide order dated 7-10-93 (Ann.6). This order of reinstatement was passed without prejudice to the departmental enquiry and criminal cases pending against him before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaipur City. After reinstatement of Shri B.K. Meena in service, the petitioner along with one Shri Bhanwarlal Verma, RAS and others submitted their joint representation to the respondent. Thereupon Bhanwarlal Verma, RAS, who was also co-accused in aforesaid criminal case and against whom allegations were of grave nature than the petitioner had also been reinstated in service vide order dated 6-11-1993 (Ann. 9) on the same analogy of Shri B. K. Meena. The petitioner further averred that when no action was taken on his representation, he through his Association submitted another representation to the respondent on 23-2-1994 (Ann. 10), followed by yet another representation specifically mentioning therein that similarly placed officials like Shri B. K. Meena, IAS & Shri Bhanwarlal Verma, RAS had been reinstated in services and, so he should also be given similar treatment. There-upon, according to the petitioner, he was asked by the Dy. 10), followed by yet another representation specifically mentioning therein that similarly placed officials like Shri B. K. Meena, IAS & Shri Bhanwarlal Verma, RAS had been reinstated in services and, so he should also be given similar treatment. There-upon, according to the petitioner, he was asked by the Dy. Secretary to the Chief Minister of the State vide order dated 27-5-94 (Ann. 13) to appear before him on 1-6-96, and thereafter also submitted his representation dated 4-6-94, but all in vain, hence this writ petition. 3. It is relevant to mention here that in October, 1993, memorandum of charge along with allegations of charges was issued to the petitioner under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958, (for brevity, "CCA Rules"). 4. The petitioner has challenged the impugned order of suspension dated 22-5-90 (Ann. 5) as being illegal, unconstitutional and contrary to the Rules, seeking relief of his reinstatement in service by revoking his suspension on the same terms and conditions, on which co-accused S/Shri B.K. Meena, IAS and B.L. Verma, RAS, were reinstated by the respondent-State. The petitioner has also sought relief for payment of annual grade increments which fell due after his suspension till date. 5. In reply to the show cause notice, the respondent contended that pursuant to the aforesaid first information reports, criminal cases are pending trial wherein there are allegations of misappropriation of a sum of Rs. 95.52 lacs by various accused, who were allegedly involved by creating false institutions for self-employment scheme for the Rural & Urban Unemployed Youths belonging to the SC/ST. With regard to the petitioner, the respondent alleged that he had misappropriated the amount to the tune of Rs. 1.71 lacs and by way of investments in Indira Vikas Patras and shares for that amount have also been seized from his possession, for which he was not able to give any satisfactory explanation, and likewise various amounts were also seized from co-accused and the challan has already been filed against them in a competent criminal court on 15-5-93 for aforesaid offences and for which trial is pending against the petitioner and 32 other accused. The matter was placed before the High Power Committee constituted for the purposes of review on many occasions but the competent authority was of the view that in view of seriousness of the charge, the petitioner does not deserve reinstatement in service. 6. During the course of arguments this Court was informed at the bar that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner and other co-delinquents under R. 16 of the CCA Rules for grave misconduct were in progress but the same were, however, stayed pursuant to the orders passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jaipur against IAS officers since it was a case of joint inquiry against other eight co-delinquents, and as a result of aforesaid stay order, disciplinary proceedings have come to stand still and unnecessarily delayed. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and considered the arguments advanced at the bar, as well as legal position on the subject. Rule 13 of the CCA Rules envisages that the appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or any other authority empowered by the Government in that behalf may place a Government servant under suspension (a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending, or (b) where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial : provided that where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower than appointing authority, such authority shall forthwith report to the Appointing Authority the circumstances in which the order was made. 8. The impugned order of suspension was passed against the petitioner and co-accused in criminal cases after obtaining prior approval of the Governor. However, as already mentioned above, co-accused persons namely Shri B. K. Meena, IAS was directed to be reinstate in services without prejudice to the criminal cases pending against him in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. 9. Shri M. K. Shah learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner has been discriminated qua co-accused Sarva Shri B. K. Meena. 9. Shri M. K. Shah learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner has been discriminated qua co-accused Sarva Shri B. K. Meena. IAS & B. L. Verma, RAS, on whom similar charges have been framed by the department, while the case of Shri B. K. Meena is distinguishable in the sense that no recovery could be made from him and co-accused Shri B. L. Verma, and he had remained in the department only for a period of two months and, therefore, in compliance of the order dated 17-9-93 of the Tribunal he was reinstated. In reply to it, it has been contended that the matter has yet to be heard and finally decided by Criminal Court of competent jurisdiction on the basis of the evidence to be adduced before it and hence the matter is subjudice. The documentary and oral evidence collected during investigation will be placed before the trial Court. Shri N.K. Maloo learned Panel Lawyer appearing on behalf of the respondent also contended that even otherwise, the petitioner is not entitled to seek appreciation of evidence, which is yet to be recorded by the learned trial Court while challenging the order of suspension since the Apex Court has time and again held that the order of suspension can be interfered with only on account of mala fide or lack of jurisdiction. The order of suspension was issued on the basis of the facts on record and the case has been earlier reviewed on many occasions by the department. In this context, it may be observed that the respondents have failed to point out distinguishing features which may distinguish the case of the petitioner from co-accused namely Sarva Shri B.K. Meena & B. L. Verma, who have been reinstated in service. In the absence of any sparing reasons it was not proper for the respondent to have passed contradictory orders by keeping the petitioner under suspension for indefinite period while treating similarly placed persons like Sarva Shri B.K. Meena and B. L. Verma on different footing. Since the proceedings are pending before the competent criminal court, the question of attributing any mala fide or lack of jurisdiction is not relevant in this case as the petitioner has not challenged the jurisdiction of the competent authority in having placed the petitioner under suspension but has sought relief on the same footing as has been extended to the co-accused/delinquents. I am of the view that it is not proper for the interest of either of the parties to go into the question of mala fide or lack of jurisdiction since the disciplinary proceedings, which were earlier initiated against the petitioner and co-delinquents were stayed pursuant to the orders of the Central Administrative Tribunal, as referred to above, resulting in protracting the completion of the inquiry, which has also resulted in great mental agony besides harassment to the delinquent and their families, which were not proper on the part of the Tribunal. My observations are fortified in this regard from the catena of decisions of the Apex Court. 10. In Secy., Prohibition & Excise Department v. L. Srinivasan, (1996 (3) JT (SC) 202) (supra) cited by Shri Maloo, the impugned order, by which services of the delinquents were placed under suspension, which was challenged before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, Madras, the Tribunal had set aside the departmental enquiry and quashed the charge on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, where the charges were of embezzlement and fabrication of false records. Aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal, the Excise Department of the Tamil Nadu Government challenged the same before the Apex Court. The Apex Court while desisting from expressing any opinion on merit or recording any of the contentions raised by the counsel on either side, lest it may prejudice fair trial of the delinquent, observed that the Tribunal had erred in setting aside the departmental enquiry and in quashing the order of suspension on the ground of delay in initiation of the disciplinary proceedings. Looking to the serious nature of the charge, it was consequently held that the Tribunal was not justified and committed illegality in quashing the order of suspension, and this was one such instance, where a member had exceeded his power of judicial review in quashing the suspension order and charges even at the threshold. The appeals filed by the Department were accordingly allowed and the order of the Tribunal was set aside and the disciplinary authority was directed to proceed with the enquiry and trial also be proceeded in accordance with law. 11. The appeals filed by the Department were accordingly allowed and the order of the Tribunal was set aside and the disciplinary authority was directed to proceed with the enquiry and trial also be proceeded in accordance with law. 11. In my considered view, without going into merits of the present controversy, lest it may prejudice fair trial of the accused before the competent Criminal Court and also the disciplinary proceedings before the competent authority, which have come to stand still as a result of the stay order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal in the year 1993, in all fairness it would be proper to direct the disciplinary authority to proceed with the proceedings against the petitioner and having regard to the fact that had the C.A.T. not stayed the departmental inquiry, the result might have been different. The proper course for the Tribunal was to have directed the authority to complete the disciplinary proceedings expeditiously by fixing particular period rather than staying the same indefinitely, which in my view, has resulted in causing not only prejudice to the case of the petitioner but also mental agony and torture, because it is fundamental principle of criminal/service jurisprudence that the presumption of guilt cannot be drawn at the outset against an accused/delinquent and rather the presumption is that he is innocent till proved guilty and which has to be established beyond any shadow of doubt. Thereafter the State Government should have also taken into consideration that the co-accused Sarva Shri B.K. Meena and B. L. Verma, against whom there were similar charges of alleged misappropriation of funds, were reinstated in service while discriminatory treatment was meted out to the petitioner, which in my view was not proper. Hence as a result of protracted disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner and other co-delinquents, in my considered view it will be proper to revoke the order of suspension and direct reinstatement of the petitioner in service, without prejudice to the merits of the charges framed against the petitioner and co-accused, up to which at this stage it will not be proper to imagine the result thereof. 12. 12. As regards the principles to be adopted by the competent authority in the matter of suspension of an employee and the safeguards to be observed are that after the formation of the charge if prima facie a case is made out to proceed with against delinquent, the memo of charge should be served without any delay and thereafter the delinquent should be given sufficient opportunity of defending himself during the inquiry, and the inquiry officer should be appointed immediately with a direction to proceed with the inquiry as expeditious as possible and if any time is fixed for completing the inquiry, it should be done within stipulated period. 13. The respondents have not placed any material on record, from which either guilt or innocence of the petitioner can be determined nor it is proper for this court to go into the questions at this stage, lest it may prejudice the disciplinary proceedings, which has yet to achieve its logical conclusion and has been delayed mainly on account of the stay order of the CAT resulting in protracting the proceedings. The allegations with regard to the alleged misappropriation of the Government funds has got to be substantiated by admissible evidence before the competent authority after giving full opportunity to the delinquent of defending him against the charges. 14. Before maintaining the order of suspension, it was incumbent upon the respondents to justify showing that there was sufficient material on record to arrive at a prima facie view not to revoke the order of suspension, which instantly has not been done. The respondent has not demonstrated by placing material in the case of co-delinquent, who were placed on similar footing like the petitioner and against whom some charges of grave nature were alleged and who had notwithstanding the same been reinstated in service by revoking the order of suspension, in exercise of administrative powers of review by the appropriate authority. This having not been done, in my view, there is no bar for this Court in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction to review the administrative adverse action by which services of the petitioner were continued to be placed under suspension for last over eight years i.e. w.e.f. 22-5-90, to quash and set aside the order of suspension. This having not been done, in my view, there is no bar for this Court in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction to review the administrative adverse action by which services of the petitioner were continued to be placed under suspension for last over eight years i.e. w.e.f. 22-5-90, to quash and set aside the order of suspension. My observations are fortified from the decisions of the Apex Court in Re T.V. Choudhary, (1987) 3 SCC 258 : ( AIR 1987 SC 1550 ) , O.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 328 and judgment of this Court in Lajpat Rai Gogna v. State of Rajasthan, (1992) 1 Rajasthan LR 619 , cited by Shri M.K. Shah on behalf of the petitioner. 15. In O.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1987 Lab IC 1904) (supra) the Apex court observed that long continuation of suspension of an employee pending departmental inquiry is punitive since it affects means of livelihood of a suspended employee. It was further observed that such an employee is entitled to make representations before the Government for expeditious disposal of the departmental proceedings and if in disregarding such representations, just as it has happened in the instant case, where the present petitioner had made so many representations one after another to the respondent with no active consideration nor any reply to the same was conveyed to him, the only inference which can be drawn is that the competent authority was not interested in dealing with the same with a view to subject the petitioner to continuous harassment and mental agony as a result of unreasonably long period of time, by virtue of which only irresistible inference that could be drawn against the department is that its adverse action in not revoking the order of suspension was arbitrary, unjust and unfair which offends the principles of justice, equity and fair play being also violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 16. In Re T.V. Choudhary, ( AIR 1987 SC 1550 ) (supra), the plea before the Apex Court was that Government singled out an officer for adverse action viz. suspension pending inquiry letting off co-delinquent officers, as has happened in the case of present petitioner. 16. In Re T.V. Choudhary, ( AIR 1987 SC 1550 ) (supra), the plea before the Apex Court was that Government singled out an officer for adverse action viz. suspension pending inquiry letting off co-delinquent officers, as has happened in the case of present petitioner. The Apex Court observed that if the Court is prima facie satisfied that the plea is substantiated by the record produced by the Government, it is competent to advise the Government to take similar adverse action against the other equally culpable officers also,otherwise it would revoke the adverse order made against the aggrieved officer. 17. In Lajpat v. State of Rajasthan, (1992 (1) Rajasthan LR 619) (supra), while dealing with the case of a Government employee, whose services were placed under suspension as per the CCA Rules, 1958 on account of criminal cases pending trial against him in Criminal Court while he continued to suffer mental agony as a result of suspension, which continued for over four years, while disciplinary proceedings were not concluded, this Court observed that discretion to suspend an employee has to be exercised objectively and not arbitrarily and if it is found to be arbitrary and not in accordance with law, it can certainly be subject matter of judicial review. Since the order of suspension passed against the delinquent was without application of mind and the suspension had been prolonged for uncalled for reasons, it was held by this Court that it had no nexus with public interest or interest of service and hence the order of suspension was accordingly revoked. 18. In B.K. Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, ILR (1979) 29 Raj 515 , this Court observed as follows : "It should not be forgotten that suspension has got adverse implication as it has serious demoralising effect on a civil servant, as he is looked with contempt amongst his brother employees and also in the society. It is expected of the State functionaries that they should resort to it only when the case and the subject matter of charge-sheet, which is being enquired into is extremely of serious type where by permitting a civil servant to work during that period would result in serious impediment in the inquiry itself or any other adverse effect in the department. In other words, there must be compelling reason for the disciplinary authority, which of course, cannot be tested on the test of objectivity by the courts, but, it should be such serious magnitude that the disciplinary authority should feel compelled to take extreme step of suspension. Suspension should not be made a rule and should be used sparingly, cautiously and with great restraint." 19. The identical views were expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in Ashok Gaur v. State of Rajasthan, (1987) 2 Rajasthan LR 63 , and Nandlal Verma v. State of Rajasthan, (1989) 1 Rajasthan LR 601 : (1990 Lab IC NOC 101) . 20. Thus viewed in the light of the proposition of law on the subject, as discussed above, and on application of the same to the instant case, I am consequently of the view that the impugned order of suspension (Ann. 5) is not sustainable in the eye of law and, therefore, deserves to be quashed and set aside. 21. In the result, this writ petition is allowed with no order as to costs. The impugned order of suspension (Ann. 5) dated 22-5-1990 is quashed and set aside. The respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits being entitled as a result of revocation of order of his suspension, in accordance with law.Petition allowed. *******