ORDER R.S. Garg, J. 1. The applicant (non-Petitioner in the Lower Court) being aggrieved by the order passed by I Vth Additional District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 58A/97 on 19/1/98 over ruling the objections of the present applicant deciding issues No. 1 and 2 against the present applicant holding that the Court has jurisdiction to decide the matter has filed this revision petition under Section 115 C.P.C. 2. Brief facts necessary for disposal of the present petition are that the non-applicant filed Civil Suit No. 93-A/93 for restitution of conjugal rights and obtained an ex parte decree on 25/10/96 from the Court of I Vth Additional District Judge, Jabalpur. Against the said judgment and decree first appeal No. 608/96 was filed by the present applicant but the same was dismissed on 12/7/97. Being further aggrieved by the said judgment and decree passed in the first appeal, the present applicant has preferred L.P.A. No. 359/97. In the said appeal a Division Bench of this Court has directed issuance of notice to the present non-applicant. It is not in dispute before me that in the said matter question of jurisdiction of the trial Court has been raised. During pendency of these proceedings the non-applicant filed an application under Section 25 of Hindu Marriage Act which has been registered as Civil Suit No. 58-A/97. The non-applicant interalia contended that she was entitled to an order for permanent alimony in her favour, therefore, the amount as has been claimed by her be awarded in her favour. The present applicant after receiving the notice from the Court made his appearance and filed his reply to the application on 8/11/97 interalia pleading that the non-applicant was not entitled to any amount (alimony) under Section 25 of Hindu Marriage Act, further pleading that the Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter in view of Section 19 of Hindu Marriage Act, therefore the application be rejected. 3. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed following preliminary issues: (1) Whether the suit is not maintainable ? (2) Whether the Court has no jurisdiction to try the case ? 4. According to the applicant, in support of his objection, he filed number of documents including application filed on behalf of the non-applicant under Section 125 Cr. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed following preliminary issues: (1) Whether the suit is not maintainable ? (2) Whether the Court has no jurisdiction to try the case ? 4. According to the applicant, in support of his objection, he filed number of documents including application filed on behalf of the non-applicant under Section 125 Cr. P. C. in the Court of J.M.F.C., Jabalpur; copy of the statement of the non-applicant recorded in 125 Cr. P.C. Proceedings and the marriage card of the parties. 5. After hearing the parties, the learned trial Judge by Its order dated 19/1/98 over ruled both the objections and decided the issues in favour of the non-applicant, being aggrieved by the said order, the applicant has preferred this revision petition. 6. Submission of Shri Ravindra Shrivastava learned Counsel for the applicant was that in view of the language of Section 19, the trial Court had no jurisdiction, therefore neither the petition before the trial Court was maintainable nor the trial Court could assume jurisdiction. He further canvassed that the court below was unjustified in observing that as question of jurisdiction has already been found in favour of the non-applicant in the earlier proceedings, therefore the same would operate as res judicata. According to the present applicant, proceedings under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act are separate and distinct from the proceedings of Section 25 of Hindu Marriage Act, therefore the present applicant waw entitled to raise question of jurisdiction and the Court was bound to decide the matter afresh. It was further submitted that the trial Court was wrong in not appreciating that the question of jurisdiction was sub-judice in L. P. A., therefore the same would not be operate as res judicata and the court below was unjustified in deciding the issue against the present applicant. It was also contended that the court below failed to take into consideration the decuments filed by the present applicant and erred in holding that it has jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter. It was also contended that the court below failed to take into consideration the decuments filed by the present applicant and erred in holding that it has jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter. Placing reliance on a judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the matter of Smt. Darshan Kaur v. Malook Singh (AIR 1983 Punjab and Haryana 28), it was contended that even if some court has exerised jurisdiction under Section 9 or 13 on a petition by one of the spouse then the spouse is not forbidden from filing an application under Section 25 of Hindu Marriage Act in another Court which has jurisdiction. It was submitted that the Court below had no jurisdiction. Placing further reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Isabella Johnson v. M. S. Susal reported as a Short Note in 1991 1 M.P. WN 1, it was submitted that to the question of jurisdiction principal of res judicata would not apply because it is a pure question of law. 7. Contending contrary to what is submitted by Shri Shrivastava, Shri Nitin Pendharkar, learned Counsel for the non-applicant-wife submits that the very language of Section 25 of Hindu Marriage Act would show that once a Court has assumed jurisdiction in proceedings under Sections 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 then the same Court would have jurisdiction for deciding an application under Section 25 of Hindu Marriage Act. According to him, the phraseology employed in Section 25 would clearly show that the Court which has passed an order in the main proceedings alone would have jurisdiction to hear and decide the application under Section 25 of the act for grant of permanant alimony. According to the Seamed counsel, proceedings under Section 25 are initiated on an application and intact are supplemental to the main proceedings. Placing reliance upon a judgment of Bombay High Court in the matter of Jagdish v. Bhanumati (A.I.R. 1983 Bom, 297), it was submitted that if an application under Section 25 is filed in any Court other than the Court which has passed the original order/decree then such an application is not maintainable, therefore, the trial Court was justified in deciding the issues against the present applicant. 8. 8. Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act reads as under: (1) Any court exercising jurisdiction under this Act may, at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto, on application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, order that the Respondent shall pay to the applicant for her or his maintenance and support such gross sum or such monthly or perodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant as, having regard to the Respondent's own income and other property, if any, the income and other property of the applicant, the conduct of the parties and other circumstances of the case, it may seem to the court to be just, and any such payment may be secured, if necessary, by a charge on the immovable property of the Respondent. (2) If the court is satisfied that there is a change in the circumstances of either party at any time after it has made an order under Sub-section (1), it may, at the instance of either party, vary, modify or rescind any such order in such manner as the Court may deem just. (3) If the Court is satisfied that the party in whose favour an order has been made under this section has re-married or, if such party is the wife, that she has not remarried chaste, or, if such party is the husband that he has had sexual intercourse with any woman outside wedlock, it may at the instance of the other party vary, modify or rescind any such order in such manner as the court may deem just. 9. The opening words of the Section would certainly provide the guideline to the Court for assuming jurisdiction. The words 'any court exercising jurisdiction under this Act may, at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto' would clearly mean that a Court which is exercising jurisdiction under the Act at the time of passing the decree may make an order under Section 25 of the act or a court which has exercised its jurisdiction in passing the decree at any time subsequent to passsing of the decree may make an order under Section 25 of the Act. Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act provides that the spouse deserted by the other spouse can always move an application to a Court of Competent jurisdiction for seeking a relief for restitution of conjugal rights. Section 10 provides that either party to a marriage may present a petition to the District Court praying for a decree for judicial separation on any of the grounds specified in Sub-Section 1 of Section 13 and in the case of wife also on any of the grounds specified in Sub-Section 23 thereof. Section 11 provides that any marriage solemnized after the commencement of the Hindu Marriage Act shall be null and void and may, on a petition presented by either party thereto, against the other party be so declared by a decree of nullity if it contravenes any one of the conditions specified in class (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5. Section 12 provides/gives a right to either of the spouse to move a petition to the court for declaring the marriage to a nullity. Section 12 refers to a relief on the ground that the marriage between the parties was voidable. Section 13 of the Act provides that on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, the marriage can be dissolved by decree of divorce on the grounds provided under Section 13 of the Act. 10. Section 19 of Hindu Marriage Act relates to the jurisdiction of the Court. It reads as under: Every petition under this Act shall be presented to the district court within the local limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction- (i) the marriage was solemnized, or (ii) the Respondent, at the time of the presentation of the petition, resides, or (iii) the parties to the marriage last resided together, or (iv) the petitoner is residing at the time of the presentation of the petition, in a case where the Respondent is, at that time, residing outside the territories to which this Act extends, or has not been heard or as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of him if he were alive. 11. A petition under the Hindu Marriage Act has to be presented to the district court within the local limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction the marriage was solemnized. 11. A petition under the Hindu Marriage Act has to be presented to the district court within the local limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction the marriage was solemnized. A court where the Respondent at the time of presentation of the petition resides would also have jurisdiction. The Court within whose local jurisdiction the parties to the marriage last resided would also have jurisdiction to entertain a petition. A Petitioner can invoke jurisdiction of a Court within whose jurisdiction he resides in a case where the Respondent of the time of filing of the petition is residing outside the territories to which(sic). Hindu Marriage Act extend or in a case where the other party has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more. 12. According to Shri Shrivastava as none of the foundations to claim jurisdiction of the Court were available in favour of the non-applicant-wife an application under Section 25 of the Act was not maintainable as the court has no jurisdiction. The trial Court has observed that as the suit under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act was decided by the said Court a subsequent application under Section 25 could be filed before it. It also held that it was not necessary for the non-applicant to claim permanent alimony in the main petition because the law permits a party to the proceddings to file an application even after disposal of the main petition. 13. So far as the submission of the learned Counsel about the maintainability of the application under Section 25 is concerned it can straight way be rejected in view of the language of Section 25 of the Act. Section 25 clearly provides that any court exercising jurisidiction under the Hindu Marriage Act may at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto, on application made to it order that Respondent shall pay to the applicant for maintenace and support such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant. Section 25 clearly provides that on an application by spouse during the pendency of the main proceedings it can make an order under Section 25 of the Act and the court would have jurisdiction to make an order under Section 25 even after a decree has been passed. Section 25 clearly provides that on an application by spouse during the pendency of the main proceedings it can make an order under Section 25 of the Act and the court would have jurisdiction to make an order under Section 25 even after a decree has been passed. The words 'at the time of passing any decree or any time subsequent thereto' are to be read in their true perspective. If a law provides that an application can be filed during the pendency of the main petition or after the disposal of the main petition then there is no scope to argue that an application under Section 25 seeking permanent alimony has to be filed during the pendency or currency of the main petition. The trial Court was justified in holding that the application filed under Section 25 was maintainable. 14. In the matter of Isabella Johnson (Supra) the question posed for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether the Civil Courts' decision regarding lack of jurisdiction will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit. In the matter of Avtar Singh v. Jagjit Singh and Anr. ( 1979 4 SCC 83 ) a Division Bench of the Supreme Court took the view that Civil Court's decision regarding lack of jurisdiction will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit. In the matter of Avtar Singh (Supra) a suit was filed in the Civil Court but the Civil Court returned the plaint holding that it had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter. The claim was filed before the Revenue Court, the Revenue Court took the view that it had no jurisdiction to try the claim, thereafter a suit was again instituted in the Civil Court for the same relief. The suit failed throughout on the ground of res judicata. The Supreme Court took the view that principles of res judicata were applicable to the issue of jurisdiction. The suit failed throughout on the ground of res judicata. The Supreme Court took the view that principles of res judicata were applicable to the issue of jurisdiction. When this question was raised in the matter of Isabella Johnson (supra) the Supreme court retered to an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy ( 1970 3 SCR 830 ) in which it was held by three Judge Bench that decision on the question of the jurisdiction of the Court or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parites to a previous suit, is not res judicata in the subsequent suit. This view was again reiterated by Bench comprising three learned Judges of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Govind Ram Bohra ( 1990 SCC 193 ). The Supreme Court in the matter of Isabella Johnson (Supra) observed that the learned Judges who decided the matter of 'Avtar Singh' could not take notice of the earlier judgments of the Supreme Court, therefore to the extent the said judgment in Avtar Singh's case taking the view that principle of res judicata would be applicable to an erroneous decision on jurisdiction would not be good law. 15. From the judgment in the matter of Isabella Johnson (Supra), it would only appear that question of jurisdiction or a pure question of law which is non-related to the right of the parties to a previous suit would not be res judicata in the subsequent suit. In the matter of Mahura prasad (Supra), the Supreme Court had clearly stated that a decision on the question of jurisdiction of the Court or a pure question of law unrelated to the rights or the parties to a previous suit would not be res judicata in the subsequent suit. 16. It cannot be disputed that a court which has no jurisdiction in law cannot be conferred with the jurisdiction by applying principles of res judicata. It is well settled that there can be no estoppel on a pure question of law. It also cannot be disputed that question of jurisdiction involved in the present case is a pure question of law. 17. It is well settled that there can be no estoppel on a pure question of law. It also cannot be disputed that question of jurisdiction involved in the present case is a pure question of law. 17. In the matter of Darshan Kaur (Supra), the hasband Malook Singh obtained an ex parte decree of divorce against his wife Darshan Kaur from the Court of Additional District Judge, Allahabad. When the wife came to Know of the decree she filed an appeal in the Allahabad High Court which was dismissed as barred by limitation. Smt. Darshan Kaur thereafter filed an application under Section 25 of the Act for grant of permanent alimony against Malook Singh in the Court of District Judge Jullundur. The petition was contested by Malook Singh who took up a preliminary objection that since the decree of divorce was passed by the Additional District Judge Allahabad, only that Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the petiton. The trial Court heard the parties on the preliminary issue and after placing its strong reliance on the judgment of Rajasthan High Court in the matter of Seeta Ram v. Phooll ( AIR 1972 Raj. 313 ) and A.R. Munuswamy Rajoo v. Hamsa Rani (A.I.R 1975 Mad. 15) held that it is the Court which granted the decree of divorce alone had the jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 25 of the Act. The trial Court held that Jullundur Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. In first appeal, the High Court found that as the marriage of the parities was solemnized within the jurisdiction of District Court, Jullundur, the Jullundur Court would have jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter. The High Court also took the view that the word 'it' used in Section 25 of the Act would not refer to that court alone which has passed the decree. The learned Single Judge further held that if the word 'it' is to be given that strict meaning then it is likely to create a problem in a case where divorce suit is decreed for the first time by the Supreme Court because in such a case an application under Section 25 of the Act will have to be filed before the Supreme court alone. The learned Single Judge further observed that looking to the phraseology of Section 25 proceedings under Section 25 may be taken before 'any' court exercising jurisdiction under the Act the jurisdiction under the Act is exercised in view of Section 19 of the Act on matters arising under the Act. The High Court was of the opinion that reading Section 19 and 25 together it would clearly appear that the Court at Jullundur would have jurisdiction ear and decide an application filed under Section 25 of the Act. 18. In the opinion of this Court, the judgment in the matter of Darshan Kaur is clearly distinguishabl on facts. The said court was not required to consider about the jurisdiction of a Court which has granted the decree in the main proceedings. The High Court was required to consider whether an application under Section 25 of the Act filed before a Court which did not pass the original decree. In the opinion of this Court, the question for consideration in the present matter is different. What is to be seen in the present matter is whether a court which has passed the original decree would have jurisdiction to hear and decide an application filed under Section 25 of the Act subsequent to passing of the decree in the original proceedings. In the matter of Darshan Kaur (Supra) learned judge was of the opinion that as both the parties, on date of filing of the application under Section 25 of the Act were living within the jurisdiction of district Court Jullundur and as the marriage of the parties was solemnized within the jurisdiction of the district Court, Jullundur, the Jullundur Court would have jurisdiction to hear and decide to matter. The present case does not help and assist the case and cause of the applicant. 19. Section 19 in its plain reading would show that it refers to every petition under this Act. The scheme of the Act would show that reference to the word 'Petition' has been made from time to only in respect of petitions filed under Sections 9,10,11,12, 13,13-A and 13-B. It is further to be seen that Section 24, 25 and 26 of the Act do not use the word 'petition'. These sections refer to an application for grant of interim maintenance or permanent alimony and in respect to custody etc. of minor children. These sections refer to an application for grant of interim maintenance or permanent alimony and in respect to custody etc. of minor children. Substantative metrimonial relief under the Act are governed by Section 9 to 13 B of the Act. On the other hand, applications under Section 24,25 and 26 is to be presented during the pendency of the main substantative proceedings. An application for interim maintenance has to be presented during the pendency of the petition for he main relief. Similarly application for custody of the child etc. is to be presented when the main petition is pending. The opening word of Section 24 and 26 clearly show that these applications are to be filed in the proceedings commenced on filing of a petition under the Act. The wording of Section 25 are apparently different. Section 25 provides that any court exercising jurisdiction under the Act at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto, on application made to it may make an order. The words 'any court exercising jurisdiction' would clearly mean that an application under Section 25 can be filed, before the Court which is seized of the matter in relation to the main relief. If an application under Section 25 is filed during the pendency of the main petition then such court would have jurisdiction to hear and decide the application filed under Section 25 of the Act. The language of Section 25 would make it clear that the court, which has passed a decree at any time subsequent to passing of the decree, on application under Section 25 can again execise the jurisdiction. The words 'at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto' would clearly mean that the court which has passed the decree, on an application made to it would certainly have jurisdiction to hear and decide the application filed under Section 25 of the Act. The words 'on an application made to it' would clearly show the intention of the legislature. The woud 'it' refers to the Court which is exercising the jurisdiction or which has exrecised the jurisdiction. The words 'on an application made to it' would clearly show the intention of the legislature. The woud 'it' refers to the Court which is exercising the jurisdiction or which has exrecised the jurisdiction. It would altogether be a different thing if the court dismissed the main petition holding that it has no jurisdiction, in such a case where the main petiton has been dismissed on the ground of jurisdiction then the said Court would have no jurisdiction to hear and decide an application filed under Section 25 of the Act because it did not possess the original jurisdiction to grant or refuse a decree on the merits of the matter. The phraseology would show that it is that court which can pass an order either at the time of passing any decree for substantial relief or at any time subsequent thereto. The words 'subsequent thereto' are again to be read in conjunction with the word 'decree'. A simple reading would make it clear that the Court which has passed a decree, subsequent to passing a decree can entertain an application under Section 25 of the Act and decide the same on merits. 20. In the matter of Jagdish v. Bhanumati ( AIR 1983 Bom. 297 ), the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the matter of Darshan Kaur (supra) was also taken into consideration. The Bombay High Court did not agree with the reasonings given in the matter of Darshan Kaur. In the opinion of this Court, looking to the phraseology adopted in Section 25 of the Act it would be adviseable to follow the decision in the matter of Jagdish (supra). 21. Adverting back to Section 19 it can safely be held that a petition for substantial relief can be filed in any of the court which has jurisdiction. If the marriage was solemnized at place 'A' than a petition for substantial relief can be filed in court at 'A'. If the Respondent to the said marriage, performed at place 'A', at the time of the presentation of the petition was residing at place 'B' then a petition for substantial relief can be filed at place 'B'. If the husband and wife of such marriage last resided together at place 'C' then a petition for substantial relief could be filed at place 'C'. If the husband and wife of such marriage last resided together at place 'C' then a petition for substantial relief could be filed at place 'C'. In such a case a petition certainly can be filed either at place 'A' or at place 'B' or at place 'C', because each of the Court would have jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter placed before it. An application under Section 24 and/or application under Section 26 can be filed during the pendency of the petition for grant of main relief. Once a petition for main relief is filed before a particular court which also had jurisdiction with other Courts then for a relief under Section 25 of the Act an application has to filed during the pendency of the main petition, or subsequent to passing of the decree a petition will have to be filed before that court alone. Once a petition for grant of main relief is disposed of on the merits of the matter then a petition under Section 25 can be filed in that Court alone. It would be incorrect to say that because the other court would have jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Act, therefore after disposal of the petition for substantial relief by one court a petition for consequential relief can be filed in any other court which otherwise has jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Act. I am positive in my view that once a petition for grant of substantial relief is heard and disposed of on merits and a decree is passed in such a matter then a petition for grant of permanent alimony under Section 25 can be filed in that court alone. No, other Court would have jurisdiction to hear and decide an application filed under Section 25, if the same is filed after the disposal of the main petition by one particular court. 22. The submission of the learned Counsel for the applicant cannot be accepted. It deserves to and is accordingly rejected. It is held that the Court below was justified in holding that it has jurisdiction to hear and decide the application filed under Section 25 of the Act. 22. The submission of the learned Counsel for the applicant cannot be accepted. It deserves to and is accordingly rejected. It is held that the Court below was justified in holding that it has jurisdiction to hear and decide the application filed under Section 25 of the Act. To save the interest of the present applicant, as the L.P.A. is pending in this Court, it is directed that this order shall be subject to the final decision to be passed in the L.P.A. If the L.P.A. Court holds that the learned additional district judge had jurisdiction to hear and dicide the matter in relation to the substantial relief then in view of the above findings, the trial Court would have absolute jurisdiction but if the L.P.A. Court holds that the trial Court court could not assume jurisdiction for granting the substantial relief then obviously this judgment would not help and assist the case and cause of the non-applicant because the main petition for grant of relief of restitution of conjugal rights will stand dismissed for want of jurisdiction and an application under Section 25 of the Act would not be maintainable before a Court which has no jurisdiction. 23. With the observation aforesaid, this petition is dismissed. There shall be no orders as to cost.